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SWA1380 - diversion to KPHL after engine event

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SWA1380 - diversion to KPHL after engine event

Old 18th Apr 2018, 12:22
  #141 (permalink)  
 
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Some notes...

@RAT5
perhaps a pilot did have a look
BBC has what appears piece audio of the/a female pilot talking to ATC where she says someone "went out"... If the pilot had taken a look in the cabin at that time she would have known that the pax was held inside. She may have gone in later though.

About oxygen masks... Reports since the 1960s that the majority of pax dont read the safety cards. And in two well documented cases in each only 2 of 180 pax knew how to operate and put the mask on correctly. That is extremely serious. So hopefully the Darwin remarks wakens some people (dont get mad, please read the card). In documented cases, if they can get it working, people generally put the mask over their mouth only. Apart from pax negligence you have to wonder about the ergonomy of the design. Certainly something that experienced engineers should know about. So I am surprised that the design has not changed. Even a specific minor change could help.

Masks is not the only thing of course...same stories about taking carry on luggage, how to open doors, how to jump n slide, where are the lifevests and how do you put them on. One marine ferry case had multiple people putting on their vest the wrong way which caused the vests to put them head down, which drowned instead of saved a number of ferry passengers in a survivable situation.

NTSB said that part of the cowl was found 60-70 miles away. Wonder what the damage sequence will turn out to be. Fanblade, cowl, window.. Or cowl, fanblade, with window in parallel... The pax could have been hit by fragments or might have been injured by edges of the window construction. There is documentation of hits and fatal hits, but as far as i know not of such cuts/blunt.

On leading edge damage and risks... The Hawker HS door that struck and stuck to the horstab leading edge brought the plane down. During the investigations they found multiple cases where the door had opened, multiple cases in which the door was lost, but only that case led to an accident. I think it was a DC9 where maintenance forgot to refix the leading edge of the lefthand horstab. On the second flight after maintenance the plane lost the edge which caused LOC and crash. Both might be called freak accidents, but certainly inportant to obtain as much detailed data as possible. NTSB Docket system is the best, so we will get some information in the end.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 12:23
  #142 (permalink)  
 
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Fan blade 13 missing at hub with evidence of metal fatigue

msn.com/en-gb/video/news/evidence-of-metal-fatigue-in-deadly-plane-engine-explosion/vi-AAw0iVd?ocid
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 12:30
  #143 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by RAT 5 View Post
I was interested looking at the LED's on left side. They would be out of sight from LHS FD. Equally the engine nacelle was out of sight. Much would depend on CA <10,000, or perhaps a pilot did have a look. That would be interesting to know. The reason I'm curious is that there have been engine blow-ups that damaged LED's and caused an uncontrollable UAP/roll when deployed. I wonder if they conducted a flight control/flap test at 10,000'. This is such a rare event, and certainly not trained for, so anything the rest of us could learn is immensely valuable.
The NTSB briefing makes it clear that the decision to deploy only Flap 5 for the landing was due to consideration of potential controllability issues.

It may or may not be relevant that LEDs are only partially extended at that flap setting on the 737.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 12:36
  #144 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Joe_K View Post
The "expert" in question claims to have been managing director of the NTSB.
He was indeed. But that's the top admin post. It's NOT a technical job. It's admin.

His background is PR and admin. He has no specific technical qualifications I know of.

So, he's no more an aviation expert than I am. At least I used to actually work on planes!
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 12:56
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The pilot, Tammie Jo Shults, is an ex USN fast jet pilot. She flew F18s and left the Navy as a lieutenant commander.
.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 13:00
  #146 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by bsieker View Post
Yes, his current job is administrative, but his brackground is not (at least not exclusively) "PR and admin", although that has been true for some previous chairmen.

He said in the media briefing that he flew Boeing 737 for 10 years, so I think that would qualify him as an aviation expert.

Wikipedia confirms he has been an airline pilot for 24 years (pilot for 32 years).

EDIT: The NTSB is also a board, not a company, so it does not have a "managing director", but a chairman.
You are quoting Bob Sumwalt's CV (NTSB Chair). That's not who we're talking about here.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 13:03
  #147 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
The NTSB briefing makes it clear that the decision to deploy only Flap 5 for the landing was due to consideration of potential controllability issues.

It may or may not be relevant that LEDs are only partially extended at that flap setting on the 737.
The photos on Avherald certainly look like more than 5 degrees. Avherald also said egress was via stairs, so there does not seem to have been a reason to lower the flaps (which serve as emergency "slides" for the overwing exits on the 737). Or is it standard procedure to lower the flaps after an emergency landing in anticipation of an emergency evacuation even if flaps were only partially deployed during the landing?

Bernd
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 13:03
  #148 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
You are quoting Bob Sumwalt's CV (NTSB Chair). That's not who we're talking about here.
Yes, I noticed my mistake and deleted my post. Sorry for the confusion.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 13:23
  #149 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Car RAMROD View Post
In one of the recordings I listened to I think I heard the pilots saying to the fire crew that they were putting the flaps down (my guess is in case a fire starts/evac). If they were lowered at this point, I'm wondering did they pull them up initially after landing, or land with zero or reduced flap, or land with a normal (but not full) flap setting then extend them fully?
In most transport category aircraft you land with reduced flap if single engine to preserve go around margins.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 13:32
  #150 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by kwh View Post
The sense I got from the various reports is that whatever broke the window also hit & seriously injured the passenger, probably knocking her unconscious, and so her upper body ending up jammed in the window with her having been partially sucked out of it would fit with the reports...
I doubt it. If the pax was in line with the axis of the fan there would have been a high energy penetration. Being that the failed window was behind the wing, its likely that it was an unlucky strike of some debris falling rearwards.
The report is she was out of the window up to her waist, and the injury likely occurred flailing in the slipstream against the fuselage.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 13:54
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Identical Southwest jet in another emergency this morning. Flight 577 taking off from Nashville for Phoenix had to turn back 20 minutes later after a bird strike. Plane landed safely.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:16
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Originally Posted by Ozgrade3 View Post
During a rapid depressurisation (greater than 3 seconds) does the outflow valve move to full close, thereby increasing the total volume of air exiting the window hole?
The outflow valve is controlled using pressure differential as the major input variable. If the cabin pressure drops, then the outflow valve will close. The volume of air through the window will not change a whole lot, this is limited by the size of the hole and the max speed it will accellerate to through this hole.
Originally Posted by Ozgrade3 View Post
Was it a rapid or an explosive decompression.
That depends on the definitions for 'rapid' and 'explosive'. In my view, this was not an explosive decompression as there was no further structural damage as a result of the first breach of the fuselage. But that's just my definition.
Originally Posted by Ozgrade3 View Post
Once level at 10,000 are the a/c packs turned off on the operating engine(s) to minimise the airflow through the cabin and out the new hole.
The checklist will most likely not suggest this. Also, common sense dictates that without full knowledge of what the problem is, the crew will leave everything 'as is' to avoid additional problems. Also, they'll be concentrating on getting the aircraft down to 10,000', sorting out the engine issue and getting back on the ground at the diversion airfield. Theoretically (only that!) you could influence the airflow through the hole by manually selecting the outflow valve to full open, but why fiddle with something when you don't know what other problems you might invite.

Personal views only...
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:18
  #153 (permalink)  
 
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Aside from the noise and vibrations, it is quite possible the other engine indications were pretty normal. I don’t see much damage to the engine itself, apart from the missing fan blade.
The evaquation checklist on the 737 calls for (time permitting) FL40.
You would be able to see some of the damage to the leading edge from the cockpit in a -700 model.

As for the pilots actions, the aircraft and passengers/crew are safely on the ground. Not much to debate.

Job very well done!
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:18
  #154 (permalink)  
 
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Unintended consequence of derated takeoffs?

A user on AVHerald posted a question which merits an answer from the pilots here:

Downstream consequence of derated takeoffs?
By Lee on Tuesday, Apr 17th 2018 21:32Z

Due to the way they operate, it seems the highest N1 fan speed will be encountered during climb at high altitude rather than during takeoff (since derated power takeoffs are the norm). This accident appeared to happen at almost the exact same altitude as the previous [SWA] incident (around FL300), which would be when N1 is approaching the maximum seen during the flight. Perhaps they should do a periodic max power takeoff or ground tests to 104% N1 to flush out any bad fan blades. In the past these types of failures would occur on takeoff, everything would be contained, and the cowl would stay on. Either Boeing needs to figure out how to keep the engine cowl intact if the fan throws a blade at altitude, or SW needs to do more rigorous blade inspections.
It must be true that if this accident had begun on the ground, there could not have been injuries from cabin decompression.

Is there any merit in the argument that stressing engines to the max on the ground from time to time would be a good idea?
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:22
  #155 (permalink)  
 
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N1 is highest during the final part of the climb, typically around 100%.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:24
  #156 (permalink)  
 
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EMT interviewed said it was apparent from looking at the patient's upper body what the end result would be but as per training, she + another EMT continued CPR until the passenger could be offloaded. One would conclude injuries were from upper body in slipstream with consequent injuries.

Report on AvHerald is flaps 5 used due to control ability concerns so higher than normal landing speed. Interesting to hear some passengers say rougher than normal landing while others say very smooth. All in one's perception. It was good to hear that many passengers had a frantic response while probably more experienced passengers kept telling them to calm down, we are going to get through this okay. Importance of experienced travelers assisting cabin crew (only 3 of them) to calm those having a panic attack.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:25
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Originally Posted by framer View Post
It’s not amazing when you consider that there are only eight of us pilots left on the forum
I’ve been considering the way I would prioritise my actions in this circumstance. There would be a lot to do with the depressurisation and engine fail/fire indications occurring simultaneously. The first 120 seconds would be very intense.
Spot on Framer - very intense indeed - for my sins I got this T-shirt in a full A330 in 1996 - engine failure climbing through 37,000 immediately followed by a depress. Thankfully, the engine didn't destroy itself in the way this one did - it just stopped with a bang. The biggest bug bear is the noise of the multiple warnings and cautions - noise can really interfere with a clear thought process and I don't think this is considered enough in accident investigation.

I've got to say that having our Air Traffic brothers and sisters helping in situations like these is a great workload relief in terms of navigation, aircraft separation etc, unfortunately, my day was departing from a small far eastern airport where ATC doubled the workload with their comms and actions. The controllers on this one were just fantastic - hats off to them too.

Sounds as though the flight crew did a really great professional job.

Best
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:36
  #158 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Rob Bamber View Post
I've just rewatched it (season 1, episode 10). In their tests they couldn't get a crash test dummy to be sucked out of the plane, in any scenario.

However, they did blow out the window in a manner very similar to this one, and in the footage you can see how traumatic it would be for the passenger sitting next to it. Sucked out: no chance.
Crash test dummies are very stiff compared to humans, you can see the dummy keeping its body inside the plane using its HEAD only. Would you have the power in your neck muscles for that? I doubt it.
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 14:49
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It can be seen that a minor amendment to the certification requirement may relieve the interference of multiple aural alerts expressed by "Good Business Sense"


"b. Multiple Aural Alerts
(1) Aural alerts should be prioritised so that only one aural alert is presented at a time. If more than one
aural alert needs to be presented at a time, each alert must be clearly distinguishable and intelligible by the flight
crew (CS 25.1322(a)(2)).
(2) When aural alerts are provided, an active aural alert should finish before another aural alert begins.
However, active aural alerts must be interrupted by alerts from higher urgency levels if the delay to annunciate the
higher-priority alert impacts the timely response of the flight crew (CS 25.1301(a)). If the condition that triggered the
interrupted alert is still active, that alert may be repeated once the higher-urgency alert is completed. If more than
one aural alert requires immediate awareness and the interrupted alert(s) affects the safe operation of the
aeroplane, an effective alternative means of presenting the alert to the flight crew must be provided to meet the
requirements of CS 25.1322(a)(1) and (a)(2)."
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Old 18th Apr 2018, 15:01
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Originally Posted by J-Class View Post
A user on AVHerald posted a question which merits an answer from the pilots here
Leaving aside the oxymoron inherent in that statement, the suggestion that

Perhaps they should do a periodic max power takeoff or ground tests to 104% N1 to flush out any bad fan blades.
is simplistic in the extreme, being based on the assumption that if a blade is going to let go it will do so the first time N1 reaches a certain value and not on some subsequent occasion.

It's particularly irrelevant in this case, given that the NTSB is already reporting indications of metal fatigue at the blade root.
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