TU154 out of Sochi is missing.
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we will see and come back to this gents, but i do not think so - it was not nose down but up till the stall angle , i think he had some massive drag either by speed brakes / spoilers extended , a reverser unlocked or he had lack of power by the engines. the flaps were put up intentionally as soon as possible to reduce drag and he aimed for minimum clean speed , the words "damn flaps" was either false translation and he meant spoilers or a last desperate word when he realized he is down to a speed he will stall for sure without flaps.
raising flaps immediately after takeoff will result in an crash very close to the airfield or a none event , depending on the mass, crew action , power of the engines and the design how critical the wing is.
i would not blame the fo he grabbed the false lever because i,m sure its not the cause.
raising flaps immediately after takeoff will result in an crash very close to the airfield or a none event , depending on the mass, crew action , power of the engines and the design how critical the wing is.
i would not blame the fo he grabbed the false lever because i,m sure its not the cause.
Quote from aerobat77:
"raising flaps immediately after takeoff will result in an crash very close to the airfield or a none event "
Sadly, the aircraft did indeed come down close to the airfield. Flaps and slats do not retract instantly.
Fortunately for the investigators, loss of thrust or any other fault leading to loss of performance (other than structural failure) should be recorded. A severe nocturnal tailwind-sheer seems improbable, but if applicable could also be inferred from the flight data.
"raising flaps immediately after takeoff will result in an crash very close to the airfield or a none event "
Sadly, the aircraft did indeed come down close to the airfield. Flaps and slats do not retract instantly.
Fortunately for the investigators, loss of thrust or any other fault leading to loss of performance (other than structural failure) should be recorded. A severe nocturnal tailwind-sheer seems improbable, but if applicable could also be inferred from the flight data.
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Crew experience? Composition
Were they both captains on such an VIP flight.?
Experienced, but not lately? and NOT from right hand seat?
Anyway, never seen anyone ever do the flaps before gear, but this fits the profile perfect as we know it.
How:, Cpt in f/o seat , not instructor or used to fly from that side.
Nearest Flaps
Far lever, Gear,
ooops.
Gear and Flaps retracted in wrong sequence, not flyable, end story.
Unlikely, but simple,
And with a normal gear flaps sequence they would hit 2 miles and not 1 mile after liftoff if somthing else happened just at flaps up.
Hit me ,
May their music live on.
Cpt B
Experienced, but not lately? and NOT from right hand seat?
Anyway, never seen anyone ever do the flaps before gear, but this fits the profile perfect as we know it.
How:, Cpt in f/o seat , not instructor or used to fly from that side.
Nearest Flaps
Far lever, Gear,
ooops.
Gear and Flaps retracted in wrong sequence, not flyable, end story.
Unlikely, but simple,
And with a normal gear flaps sequence they would hit 2 miles and not 1 mile after liftoff if somthing else happened just at flaps up.
Hit me ,
May their music live on.
Cpt B
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We have next to no info, but flap asymmetry is a non event as far as control is concerned . On Boeing it locks with a diff of .4deg. no roll even. No cure.
Yes all aircraft can have it, and all are protected.
Complete flap assym not likely.
Yes all aircraft can have it, and all are protected.
Complete flap assym not likely.
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TO/ICL probs: Mainly overload, shifting cargo, engine fails?
Originally Posted by guadaMB http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9627745
guadaMB, thanks much for your list in your 2 Jan post. I wondered too how rare flaps/slats/gear errors on TO. Seems very rare indeed.
I also worked up that list. I spreadsheeted Tu-154 incidences from ASN:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...v-154/database
It gives 118 incidences total out of 1026 Tu-154 produced, 69 hull losses. Hull losses come to under 7%, comparable to the 727. Only 20 of these losses occurred during TO (14) and Init Climbout (6). Most of the TO probs due to overloaded planes with shifting cargo, and engine fails. Not clear if ANY due to flaps/slats/gear errors. Could be, some of these notes clearly not complete. Only one clearly tied to control surfaces, deployed spoilers on CCCP-85030 in 1973.
not very understandable that a professional and experienced military pilot and his FO (supposedly also experienced and skilled enough to co-fly this bird) make a BAD CONFIGURATION FOR TAKE OFF in a Tu-154.
Asked if was a possibility the mentioned confusion of levers (flaps/gear), he doubted energically.
Asked if was a possibility the mentioned confusion of levers (flaps/gear), he doubted energically.
I also worked up that list. I spreadsheeted Tu-154 incidences from ASN:
https://aviation-safety.net/database...v-154/database
It gives 118 incidences total out of 1026 Tu-154 produced, 69 hull losses. Hull losses come to under 7%, comparable to the 727. Only 20 of these losses occurred during TO (14) and Init Climbout (6). Most of the TO probs due to overloaded planes with shifting cargo, and engine fails. Not clear if ANY due to flaps/slats/gear errors. Could be, some of these notes clearly not complete. Only one clearly tied to control surfaces, deployed spoilers on CCCP-85030 in 1973.
Last edited by WBryanH; 4th Jan 2017 at 22:26.
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And this is fatal within seconds under these (supposed) conditions.
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Last words from CVR (We are falling, sir) in explicit way suggest loss of control. However, it still could be from many reasons like stall, upset, structural failure, etc. We know nothing at the moment about critical event.
And, IMO, its very unlikely that they retracted flaps instead of landing gear just after airborne.
Should be an audible alarm noticed then. But it wasn't.
And finally, Head of the russian FAA said clearly that except last 10 seconds everything was pretty normal in that flight.
And, IMO, its very unlikely that they retracted flaps instead of landing gear just after airborne.
Should be an audible alarm noticed then. But it wasn't.
And finally, Head of the russian FAA said clearly that except last 10 seconds everything was pretty normal in that flight.
For those describing the Tu154's considerable power/weight ratio, bear in mind this was a Tu154B with the original Kuznetsov engines, rather than the later Tu154M variant, the only one in airline use for the last 15 years or so, with substantially improved Soloviev engines, which much recent documentation refers to.
If we take the inadvertent flap retraction line, there is of course a timelag between selection of retract and the achievement of that, which does vary from airframe to airframe dependent on the state of the hydraulics. When first selected the aircraft would still be accelerating, until the progressive loss of lift overcame the speed.
I can believe the FO still thought they had retracted the gear, and the commander was too absorbed with maintaining flying into unexpected conditions to scan all the controls. I wonder what the FE was doing during this time; are gear and flap indicators repeated on their panel ?
If we take the inadvertent flap retraction line, there is of course a timelag between selection of retract and the achievement of that, which does vary from airframe to airframe dependent on the state of the hydraulics. When first selected the aircraft would still be accelerating, until the progressive loss of lift overcame the speed.
I can believe the FO still thought they had retracted the gear, and the commander was too absorbed with maintaining flying into unexpected conditions to scan all the controls. I wonder what the FE was doing during this time; are gear and flap indicators repeated on their panel ?
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ICAO Annex 13 defines what is and isn't classified as an accident.
There is very little scope for "interpretation".
There is very little scope for "interpretation".
Most notably, in the airline industry much of our safety statistics are based on IATA definitions, which are more restrictive than the ICAO definitions. I.e., many events categorized as accidents by ICAO are excluded from IATA's definition.
Hence ICAO accident statistics can't be compared directly with IATA statistics. The Global Safety Information Exchange (GSIE) was created in part to facilitate exchange of data between the two organizations.
Similarly many researchers (e.g., from Flight Safety Foundation) may use their own modifications of the basic ICAO definitions depending on the study -- usually because the ICAO statistics tend to be over-broad.
It's perfectly fine for guadaMB to include / exclude data for specific purposes as long as it's clear to everyone what were the intentions behind them.
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Originally Posted by WHBM
bear in mind this was a Tu154B with the original Kuznetsov engines, rather than the later Tu154M variant
I also don't put a lot of faith in the accuracy of the snippet of cockpit dialogue put out by RT news, if they're going to release anything, why not release the whole transcript? What's the point of releasing the incoherent snippet that RT gave the world?
If no more hard information is released, this one will have to go into the history books as "the unexplained TU 154 crash." Or perhaps as the TU 154 that crashed in the fog on a perfectly clear morning.
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To those considering selecting flaps instead of gear as the possible cause for this accident, consider instead this scenario:
1. Gear raised as per normal procedures.
2. In the process of selecting flaps from 28 to 15, the control was mis-handled or defective (depending on the original design concept) and was inadvertently selected to full up.) PF would not initially note much of a problem until the LE flaps began to retract and then all h*ll would break loose.
There isn't much handle travel between flaps 15 and UP. In the dark cockpit, it would be difficult to see the the mis-selection of flaps up until it began to cause problems.
If the flap handle design was intended to prevent direct selection to up from flaps 28, then wear or failure of some part of a mechanical interlock could be considered a system problem followed by the aircrew not realizing in time what they had (inadvertently) done wrong. This is essentially what is being reported, isn't it?
This image was originally posted to this thread by Kulverstukas.
The origin of this image appears to be a Russian language blog by 'Denokan' on safety matters.
A google translate link to the blog is here:
https://translate.google.com/transla...html&sandbox=1
As an aid to interpretation read harvest=retract and chassis=landing gear
The thrust of this article is to move cockpit controls slowly and deliberately and to avoid rushing procedures.
1. Gear raised as per normal procedures.
2. In the process of selecting flaps from 28 to 15, the control was mis-handled or defective (depending on the original design concept) and was inadvertently selected to full up.) PF would not initially note much of a problem until the LE flaps began to retract and then all h*ll would break loose.
There isn't much handle travel between flaps 15 and UP. In the dark cockpit, it would be difficult to see the the mis-selection of flaps up until it began to cause problems.
If the flap handle design was intended to prevent direct selection to up from flaps 28, then wear or failure of some part of a mechanical interlock could be considered a system problem followed by the aircrew not realizing in time what they had (inadvertently) done wrong. This is essentially what is being reported, isn't it?
This image was originally posted to this thread by Kulverstukas.
The origin of this image appears to be a Russian language blog by 'Denokan' on safety matters.
A google translate link to the blog is here:
https://translate.google.com/transla...html&sandbox=1
As an aid to interpretation read harvest=retract and chassis=landing gear
The thrust of this article is to move cockpit controls slowly and deliberately and to avoid rushing procedures.
Last edited by Machinbird; 8th Jan 2017 at 18:53. Reason: Add credits
If the flap handle design was intended to prevent direct selection to up from flaps 28, then wear or failure of some part of a mechanical interlock could be considered a system problem followed by the aircrew not realizing in time what they had (inadvertently) done wrong.
This is essentially what is being reported, isn't it?
This is essentially what is being reported, isn't it?
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About the CVR text bits leaked to life.ru, “the flaps, b*tch!” ("Закрылки, с*ка!") and “Commander, we’re going down!” ("Командир, падаем!"), the flaps leak is wide open to interpretation. Did "one of the pilots" try to say what to do or not do with the flaps, e.g. 15-->28, 28 -->15, 15-->0? Or that he perceived a fail with them? Or maybe he said another word entirely? E.g. instead of "flaps" ("zakrylki") he said some similar-sounding word like "closed" ("zakrito")? Point is, this provocative life.ru leak gives min info and max plausible deniability.
This isn't like the Yak-42 crash in Yaroslavl, in which the private charter could take the blame for the loss of the beloved Lokomotiv team. This is the Russian AF, so maybe more potential direct govt accountability and embarrassment. With that in mind, we should question such a quick CVR leak, two days after the crash, via life.ru, an outlet well connected with Moscow authorities. This leak could be in part distraction, in part trolling for info/ideas. To tease Anons out of the woodwork who might know something.
That said, very many folks helped to recover crash remnants, and a few of you are posting some great high-res shots of some of it here. So making stuff up will have limits. But I'd be asking as much what we *don't* see as what we do see.
This isn't like the Yak-42 crash in Yaroslavl, in which the private charter could take the blame for the loss of the beloved Lokomotiv team. This is the Russian AF, so maybe more potential direct govt accountability and embarrassment. With that in mind, we should question such a quick CVR leak, two days after the crash, via life.ru, an outlet well connected with Moscow authorities. This leak could be in part distraction, in part trolling for info/ideas. To tease Anons out of the woodwork who might know something.
That said, very many folks helped to recover crash remnants, and a few of you are posting some great high-res shots of some of it here. So making stuff up will have limits. But I'd be asking as much what we *don't* see as what we do see.
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The overhead panel photo in Machinbird`s post shows that there are no detents for intermediate flap selections. Accordingly selection appears to be reliant on visual confirmation of setting. So in terms of speculation, Machinbird`s would seem credible. Kulverstukas had earlier told us that the gear lights were located on the instrument panel. So in the visual, head down scan these will be easy to confirm. Is there anything similar for the flaps. Could someone with knowledge of the aircraft please offer some comment about the white band and the rider above it on the left side of the flap selector shown in the photo.
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http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post9627959
To the left of gear light you can see flaps indicator (round one with two dials) and further left HS position indicator. Slats control light is under gear lights.
To the left of gear light you can see flaps indicator (round one with two dials) and further left HS position indicator. Slats control light is under gear lights.
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Mr. Machinbird
You state as certain a flaps config for TO:
In the process of selecting flaps from 28 to 15, the control was mis-handled or defective (depending on the original design concept) and was inadvertently selected to full up.)
In Tu-154 -AFAIK- TO procedures are very variable, depending on several factors. It's a fully "analogic" design of the 60's.
Previously (post # 276) is shown a TO -from zero- with a 15º flaps config.
There are two certain data to the moment:
a.- flaps were at 0º at the moment of impact
b.- we ignore the preferred configuration selected by crew.
You state as certain a flaps config for TO:
In the process of selecting flaps from 28 to 15, the control was mis-handled or defective (depending on the original design concept) and was inadvertently selected to full up.)
In Tu-154 -AFAIK- TO procedures are very variable, depending on several factors. It's a fully "analogic" design of the 60's.
Previously (post # 276) is shown a TO -from zero- with a 15º flaps config.
There are two certain data to the moment:
a.- flaps were at 0º at the moment of impact
b.- we ignore the preferred configuration selected by crew.
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My attempt of translation radio comm with TWR:
TWR: 85572 write down: meteo at 2:00, RWY 24, wind... 5 m/s, RVR more than 10, QFE762/1016, friction 0.7
Tu-154: I wrote ....(repeating)
TWR: 85572 write down departure procedure: according flight plan, the path BINOL2A, FL 100, at 300 m work with Sochi APP 135.8, squawk 2444
Tu-154: ...(repeating)... Sochi APP 125.8...
TWR: 85572 Sochi APP 135.8
Tu-154: Sochi APP 135.8, 85572
TWR: 85572 tell me from where you plan T/O?
Tu-154: 85572 from the beginning of RWY, heavy
TWR: from the beginning...
Tu-154: ...
TWR: go on behind Follow-me car at RWY06 until crossing then at RWY02
Tu-154: ...RWY 02 ...
TWR: 85572, plane approaches RWY06, speed up taxi
Tu-154: 85572
TWR: 85572 behind Follow-me by TWY P, clear for ...., RWY24
Tu-154: (repeating)
TWR: 85572, report when ready for T/O
Tu-154: 85572 ready for T/O
TWR: T/O 85572, RWY24, wind 20 degrees 5m/s, clearence for T/O
Tu-154: 85572
TWR: 85572 Aproach 135.8
Maybe somebody Russian native can correct, add or improve :-)
TWR: 85572 write down: meteo at 2:00, RWY 24, wind... 5 m/s, RVR more than 10, QFE762/1016, friction 0.7
Tu-154: I wrote ....(repeating)
TWR: 85572 write down departure procedure: according flight plan, the path BINOL2A, FL 100, at 300 m work with Sochi APP 135.8, squawk 2444
Tu-154: ...(repeating)... Sochi APP 125.8...
TWR: 85572 Sochi APP 135.8
Tu-154: Sochi APP 135.8, 85572
TWR: 85572 tell me from where you plan T/O?
Tu-154: 85572 from the beginning of RWY, heavy
TWR: from the beginning...
Tu-154: ...
TWR: go on behind Follow-me car at RWY06 until crossing then at RWY02
Tu-154: ...RWY 02 ...
TWR: 85572, plane approaches RWY06, speed up taxi
Tu-154: 85572
TWR: 85572 behind Follow-me by TWY P, clear for ...., RWY24
Tu-154: (repeating)
TWR: 85572, report when ready for T/O
Tu-154: 85572 ready for T/O
TWR: T/O 85572, RWY24, wind 20 degrees 5m/s, clearence for T/O
Tu-154: 85572
TWR: 85572 Aproach 135.8
Maybe somebody Russian native can correct, add or improve :-)
Last edited by Karel_x; 4th Jan 2017 at 20:33.