Germanwings aircraft loses part of engine
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It looks like the left hand fan cowl on the left hand engine (so invisible to the pax/crew).
I don't think all undercowl fire extinguishing capabilities would be lost. Looking at the books on the CF6, there doesn't appear to be any fire detectors in that left hand fan cowl area, but there may be extinguishing nozzles (?).
Apart from nacelle anti ice ducting, I recall the engine EEC lives there.
The electrics would be reasonably waterproof. The EEC has ambient pressure (Po) ports, but, if the crew reported no problems, I guess the EEC wasn't bothered by a bit of fresh air
I don't think all undercowl fire extinguishing capabilities would be lost. Looking at the books on the CF6, there doesn't appear to be any fire detectors in that left hand fan cowl area, but there may be extinguishing nozzles (?).
Apart from nacelle anti ice ducting, I recall the engine EEC lives there.
The electrics would be reasonably waterproof. The EEC has ambient pressure (Po) ports, but, if the crew reported no problems, I guess the EEC wasn't bothered by a bit of fresh air
German tabloid Bild posted passenger pictures taken during and after the flight. PAX noticed missing part and informed FA during the flight.
Airbus flog Triebwerks-Abdeckung weg: BILD-Leser-Reporterin berichten aus der Maschine - Leserreporter - Bild.de
Airbus flog Triebwerks-Abdeckung weg: BILD-Leser-Reporterin berichten aus der Maschine - Leserreporter - Bild.de
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hi
The fire protection will be lost as it works only in a confined area, when the cowlings are closed and is anyway only working for fire outside of the engine.
There is a fire detection (loop) on both sides...
The EEC is in a protected blanket, no water ingression possible
EEC is normally cooled by a air scoop in the air intake, so in that case it was very well cooled.
If the pilot does not see (how could he) there is no way to know a cowling is lost except of the nacelle temperature indication if the aircraft is equipped..
And again there is a procedure in the AMM for all work requesting engine cowling opening.
Engine cowling opened for xxxx reason
Engine cowling closed Sign by X
duplicate inspection performed Sign by Y
Now in our engineering world we have the same as crew, we call it procedures.... of course if you do not follow....
Funny I did open a 330 cowling 2 hours ago... and closed it after all that handwriting.
The fire protection will be lost as it works only in a confined area, when the cowlings are closed and is anyway only working for fire outside of the engine.
There is a fire detection (loop) on both sides...
The EEC is in a protected blanket, no water ingression possible
EEC is normally cooled by a air scoop in the air intake, so in that case it was very well cooled.
If the pilot does not see (how could he) there is no way to know a cowling is lost except of the nacelle temperature indication if the aircraft is equipped..
And again there is a procedure in the AMM for all work requesting engine cowling opening.
Engine cowling opened for xxxx reason
Engine cowling closed Sign by X
duplicate inspection performed Sign by Y
Now in our engineering world we have the same as crew, we call it procedures.... of course if you do not follow....
Funny I did open a 330 cowling 2 hours ago... and closed it after all that handwriting.
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Less Hair
You should know to what kind of journalism BILD belongs.
Guess the pictures and the story made for a cheap / zero cost vacation !!
Seen the time of year and obvious time of day the in flight picture was taken this might have happened at about halfway the distance to PMI.
Though assumption, I believe by that time cockpit and cabin had the full information and picture.
Once again, much too much comotion afterwards.
Guess the pictures and the story made for a cheap / zero cost vacation !!
Seen the time of year and obvious time of day the in flight picture was taken this might have happened at about halfway the distance to PMI.
Though assumption, I believe by that time cockpit and cabin had the full information and picture.
Once again, much too much comotion afterwards.
Thanks I know what Bild is, this is why I wrote tabloid. The pictures are still interesting.
But the eyewitness did observe something go missing during takeoff and informed the FA.
No, you can't see any missing part!
Last edited by Less Hair; 22nd Oct 2015 at 15:39.
This happened during the ramp up phase of a new long haul operation for Lufthansa under the Eurowings brand. The aircraft was previously flown by Eva air in Taiwan and the pilots come from Sun Express Germany a joint venture between LH and Turkish airlines.
The aircraft has been shuttling twice a day to Palma getting crews trained and testing the operation. It is probable that maintenance and trainers were being provided by Lufthansa. Exactly how enthusiastic everyone is about this new low cost experiment is unclear. What is obvious is that this is a not very encouraging start to the operation and will raise uncomfortable questions about interactions between various parts of the LH group.
In particular questions are bound to be asked how a large piece of the engine cowl could have come off with potentially serious consequences and the aircraft climb to 41,000 feet and fly nearly two hours to Palma where the weather was not particularly good with a blustery north east wind and thunderstorms in the forecast. It may well all be a chain of unfortunate coincidences and indeed the sort of thing it is better to find out during the shakedown rather than in full out operation. But I am sure the authorities will be looking closely at this.
The aircraft has been shuttling twice a day to Palma getting crews trained and testing the operation. It is probable that maintenance and trainers were being provided by Lufthansa. Exactly how enthusiastic everyone is about this new low cost experiment is unclear. What is obvious is that this is a not very encouraging start to the operation and will raise uncomfortable questions about interactions between various parts of the LH group.
In particular questions are bound to be asked how a large piece of the engine cowl could have come off with potentially serious consequences and the aircraft climb to 41,000 feet and fly nearly two hours to Palma where the weather was not particularly good with a blustery north east wind and thunderstorms in the forecast. It may well all be a chain of unfortunate coincidences and indeed the sort of thing it is better to find out during the shakedown rather than in full out operation. But I am sure the authorities will be looking closely at this.
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the fire protection will be lost as it works only in a confined area, when the cowlings are closed and is anyway only working for fire outside of the engine.
There is a fire detection (loop) on both sides...
There is a fire detection (loop) on both sides...
It's been a while since I worked on the CF6 and my CF6 notes appear to be simplified
The engine is divided into sections. I assumed the ribs would prevent all extinguishant being lost due to one area being open.
The EEC is in a protected blanket, no water ingression possible
Rgds
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The protective blanket around the fan is not for thermal protection, but for protection against liquids impregnating the Kevlar armour.
Get yourself a Kevlar armour jacket and soak some liquid into it and see how well it stops a bullet or not.
Must be an Airbus thing to wrap them up, although I've never heard of thermal blankets stopping water ingress.
Get yourself a Kevlar armour jacket and soak some liquid into it and see how well it stops a bullet or not.
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The protective blanket around the fan is not for thermal protection, but for protection against liquids impregnating the Kevlar armour.
Cheers
I have heard it took quite some time to contact them. Incident was observed and reported right away by AB crew taking off right behind them. EDDK Tower tried to follow the always changing ATC contacts enroute the A330. Finally they went via Sun Express HQ. Might be a good lesson to learn from.
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Less Hair
There are some open questions to what you report to have heard!
First - if that AB crew was next for departure at holding point 14L at CGN they definately would have been alighned at about 50 - 30 deg to the centre line of 14L.
I twas dark at the time of departure, therefore no chance to even have a glance on what was going on 800 - 1000 m down the runway - assume that is about the distance to achieve the necessary speed to rip of a major cowling part.
What they might have seen, if the mentioned sequence is correct, are some parts on the runway that showed up in their landing lights during t/o run.
Next was to first check if there was indeed something wrong, then collect the pieces and identify and than inform the flight.
Of course TWR could have relayed the sighting message directly to Langen center(Frankfurt ACC), running App and Dep Control for CGN, and that by simply pushing a button, activating a secured, standing line.
The same is true for the connection between Langen center(Frankfurt ACC) and Maastricht/Eurocontrol(UAC) or Eurocontrol/France (UAC)
The delay in information of the flight seems to be more related to the time needed to get factual information at hand.
Even in my "Dinosaur" times we were able to catch any "part looser" within our FIR.
First - if that AB crew was next for departure at holding point 14L at CGN they definately would have been alighned at about 50 - 30 deg to the centre line of 14L.
I twas dark at the time of departure, therefore no chance to even have a glance on what was going on 800 - 1000 m down the runway - assume that is about the distance to achieve the necessary speed to rip of a major cowling part.
What they might have seen, if the mentioned sequence is correct, are some parts on the runway that showed up in their landing lights during t/o run.
Next was to first check if there was indeed something wrong, then collect the pieces and identify and than inform the flight.
Of course TWR could have relayed the sighting message directly to Langen center(Frankfurt ACC), running App and Dep Control for CGN, and that by simply pushing a button, activating a secured, standing line.
The same is true for the connection between Langen center(Frankfurt ACC) and Maastricht/Eurocontrol(UAC) or Eurocontrol/France (UAC)
The delay in information of the flight seems to be more related to the time needed to get factual information at hand.
Even in my "Dinosaur" times we were able to catch any "part looser" within our FIR.
The AB-crew reported to have seen part(s) next to the runway when they took off. This incident was noticed right away. This is why the runway got checked immediately. However it took some time to relay that message to the a/c concerned.
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The problem is, what would you do as a two men crew on a 2 hrs flight if you are notified by ATC that you "probably have lost some parts" (not yet identified at that time) with no indication of a problem in the cockpit.
How likely would it be to be able to identify the damage from the cockpit or cabin (if you leave the cockpit)? How important would it be to have the full flight crew in the cockpit if indeed an issue develops? What would you expect your cabin crew to be able to detect if you ask them to check the aircrafts integrity?
Our actions must start from evidence to be effective. There must be ground staff which asap can identify debris. There must be a way to immediately assess those items (wrt. consequences to the aircraft and looming risk), there must be a way to immediately inform (and not just confuse...) the crew.
Otherwise there (generally) is not much you can do, except for continuing the flight and hoping for the best (or hoping for the designers to have done a good job to make the aircraft damage/falult tolerant).
So what we need, are experienced people on duty, just in case you may need them. At the airport, at the Operators, at the manufacturer, in the cabin. People you can call 24/7 and get an immediate educated answer. Something the beancounters do not like at all.
How likely would it be to be able to identify the damage from the cockpit or cabin (if you leave the cockpit)? How important would it be to have the full flight crew in the cockpit if indeed an issue develops? What would you expect your cabin crew to be able to detect if you ask them to check the aircrafts integrity?
Our actions must start from evidence to be effective. There must be ground staff which asap can identify debris. There must be a way to immediately assess those items (wrt. consequences to the aircraft and looming risk), there must be a way to immediately inform (and not just confuse...) the crew.
Otherwise there (generally) is not much you can do, except for continuing the flight and hoping for the best (or hoping for the designers to have done a good job to make the aircraft damage/falult tolerant).
So what we need, are experienced people on duty, just in case you may need them. At the airport, at the Operators, at the manufacturer, in the cabin. People you can call 24/7 and get an immediate educated answer. Something the beancounters do not like at all.
