Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Cockpit Access
Only way is to prescribe to always have 2 persons on the flightdeck. This is already standard by some airlines. This at least requires conspiracy between 2 persons...
Stercus Accidit
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: Swimming with bowlegged women
Posts: 262
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Apparently a locked door system which does not allow the captain to go back to the cockpit for for whatever reason is wrong. There should be a code that allows only the captain, F/O and head purser to overrule the doorlock from the outside.
Furthermore this crash after all the other crashes lately proves that some kind of constant datastream via satellites should be installed a.s.a.p. With the current state of tech should be not a big problem.
Furthermore this crash after all the other crashes lately proves that some kind of constant datastream via satellites should be installed a.s.a.p. With the current state of tech should be not a big problem.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: In the boot of my car!
Posts: 5,982
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jack
Most of us can probably remember as kids being invited up to the front to see the cockpit and chat to the pilots / 9/11 changed all that and a multi billion airport security industry Grew
Yet I use the tubes and friday night millions stream into those tubes. Dragging cases and from every religion and ethnic background imagine able
Security there would bring the system to a stop
Now there is the possibility of terrorism from within the cockpit and that is what it would be if proved to be true? What security costs in lost time to industry ?
Where do we go from here ?
Most of us can probably remember as kids being invited up to the front to see the cockpit and chat to the pilots / 9/11 changed all that and a multi billion airport security industry Grew
Yet I use the tubes and friday night millions stream into those tubes. Dragging cases and from every religion and ethnic background imagine able
Security there would bring the system to a stop
Now there is the possibility of terrorism from within the cockpit and that is what it would be if proved to be true? What security costs in lost time to industry ?
Where do we go from here ?
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: Agion Oros
Posts: 157
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It seems we need a rethink here in terms of the way we operate as follows:
(a) For short sector flights less than three hours I can see no reason why the crew need to leave the flight deck at all. As a healthy pilot should be able to 'last' until his destination.
(b) Having said that a cabin crew member in the jump seat when I pilot does leave the flight deck seems sensible, but on a short flight, any considerate pilot would not want to take the cabin crew away from their duties, just because they haven't 'planned ahead'.
(c) Then there is the turnaround, the low cost airlines will not like this, but flight crew should be allowed a mandatory, say 15 min break, in other words add fifteen minutes to every turnaround. This allows the use of toilets, freshen up and stretch their legs, not least as this is good for your alertness and health, and reduces the likelihood of a DVT.
(d) Then rethink of flight deck doors is needed, in terms of its operation and structure. The latter becomes apparent through this thread, that in the case of sudden decompression on the flight deck, it seems likely that the armoured door will end up embedded in the flight deck, failing that the adjacent partitions will collapse into the flighdeck.
(e) Finally, on this thread there was a suggestion of greater psychological enquiry regarding pilots, this would be very problematic, not least for those who had ever suffered depression or 'normal life events' at sometime, which probably includes most pilots, again how could you access issues such as breakdown of a marriage, financial problems, cumulative stress or extreme religious views. Of course I can see the psychologists and psychiatrists jumping on the bandwagon and employment laywers would have a field day.
(a) For short sector flights less than three hours I can see no reason why the crew need to leave the flight deck at all. As a healthy pilot should be able to 'last' until his destination.
(b) Having said that a cabin crew member in the jump seat when I pilot does leave the flight deck seems sensible, but on a short flight, any considerate pilot would not want to take the cabin crew away from their duties, just because they haven't 'planned ahead'.
(c) Then there is the turnaround, the low cost airlines will not like this, but flight crew should be allowed a mandatory, say 15 min break, in other words add fifteen minutes to every turnaround. This allows the use of toilets, freshen up and stretch their legs, not least as this is good for your alertness and health, and reduces the likelihood of a DVT.
(d) Then rethink of flight deck doors is needed, in terms of its operation and structure. The latter becomes apparent through this thread, that in the case of sudden decompression on the flight deck, it seems likely that the armoured door will end up embedded in the flight deck, failing that the adjacent partitions will collapse into the flighdeck.
(e) Finally, on this thread there was a suggestion of greater psychological enquiry regarding pilots, this would be very problematic, not least for those who had ever suffered depression or 'normal life events' at sometime, which probably includes most pilots, again how could you access issues such as breakdown of a marriage, financial problems, cumulative stress or extreme religious views. Of course I can see the psychologists and psychiatrists jumping on the bandwagon and employment laywers would have a field day.
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: A hemisphere
Posts: 184
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Whilst it makes sense to always have 2 people in the cockpit, the idea that a FA "behind" the other pilot does not inspire confidence. Should the one person with ill intent be the FA and NOT the pilot, it would be pretty easy to disable the pilot from behind very quickly.
This scenario is greatly reduced with a longer training/experience period. ie another pilot/engineer. Not foolproof, but certainly better than an FA who can be there in a few weeks.
This scenario is greatly reduced with a longer training/experience period. ie another pilot/engineer. Not foolproof, but certainly better than an FA who can be there in a few weeks.
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: On the Rump of Pendle Hill Lancashi
Posts: 614
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The entire reason and activation of locked doors was done with the best of safety intentions going back to the days of the VC10 being blown up in the Jordanian deserts, but is it beyond the wit and sensibility of all the brains who build these A/c, as well as you who fly them to come up with a safer system.
After all there does seem to have been quite a few situations from the Egyptian Pilot suicide to this latest incident that could be put down to a simple LOCKED door, with no other means of entry..WHY!!
After all there does seem to have been quite a few situations from the Egyptian Pilot suicide to this latest incident that could be put down to a simple LOCKED door, with no other means of entry..WHY!!
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: France
Posts: 168
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The problem is the BEA attitude that refuses to speak at all. This behaviour is starting to bother a lot of people here. The almost military attitude of this body reminds me what happened in the AF447 disaster. Because the BEA refused to unveil the CVR transcript, someone decided that enough was enough and released it to the exterior. The transcript was released in a book "Erreurs de pilotage Nr5" by Jean-Pierre OTELLI in Sep 2011.
I think that a reform of this institution should be done. The BEA will explain that it is not its role to speak because of the judicial inquiry but in our world today this kind of attitude is totally unacceptable. The press conference yesterday was a masquerade if not a farce as I have heard. The Chairman when he was speaking knew that he was not saying the truth or hiding it, totally or partially. The BEA reputation in the crash investigations is widely admitted and not discussed but, if what have been published by the NYT is true ( how can you invent such things?!) this reputation is sullied if not ruined. The BEA is not entirely responsible of that. The BEA is an official body depending of the DGAC and the Minister of Transport and everything is subject to the administrative supervision. It says what one tell him to say.
The BEA site was named as "dot org" and now is "dot aero". It seem that the only desire of the BEA is to proclaim that it is independent but from who? This is intolerable. The BEA is an official body depending of the French State and do not have to be ashamed of that.
For the time being the BEA remains silent.
Now about the door. A 320 driver explained some minutes ago the way of working of the cockpit door on this aircraft.
There are two codes. The second is a high security one and is known by the crew only. The door is then opened with a switch. There is also an electrical lock mounted on the door in the cockpit side. This lock is activated by the crew and there is a timer. When activated the door will remain closed. The pilot said that it may be activated without having to stand up, according to your size.
I think that a reform of this institution should be done. The BEA will explain that it is not its role to speak because of the judicial inquiry but in our world today this kind of attitude is totally unacceptable. The press conference yesterday was a masquerade if not a farce as I have heard. The Chairman when he was speaking knew that he was not saying the truth or hiding it, totally or partially. The BEA reputation in the crash investigations is widely admitted and not discussed but, if what have been published by the NYT is true ( how can you invent such things?!) this reputation is sullied if not ruined. The BEA is not entirely responsible of that. The BEA is an official body depending of the DGAC and the Minister of Transport and everything is subject to the administrative supervision. It says what one tell him to say.
The BEA site was named as "dot org" and now is "dot aero". It seem that the only desire of the BEA is to proclaim that it is independent but from who? This is intolerable. The BEA is an official body depending of the French State and do not have to be ashamed of that.
For the time being the BEA remains silent.
Now about the door. A 320 driver explained some minutes ago the way of working of the cockpit door on this aircraft.
There are two codes. The second is a high security one and is known by the crew only. The door is then opened with a switch. There is also an electrical lock mounted on the door in the cockpit side. This lock is activated by the crew and there is a timer. When activated the door will remain closed. The pilot said that it may be activated without having to stand up, according to your size.
In my opinion, a flight deck should always have a minimum of 2 people present, each of whom is capable of detecting and preventing an unauthorised act or incorrect procedure on behalf of the other. That is the 'two man rule' as applied to safety critical situations to prevent potentially hazardous activity and should become SOP for two person flight decks during flight.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: UK
Age: 73
Posts: 6
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There is a 'rule' about theories called 'Ockham's Razor'. The fewer assumptions upon which the theory is based, the more likely the theory is to be true. For sure, in all disasters a number of phenomena have to line up as has been shown from all investigations from the Titanic onwards. Normally one event is the trigger, whatever the failings which proceeded. An iceberg with Titanic, failed O ring with Challenger, damaged tyre with Concorde.
It is more likely a single event has caused this incident, locked doors or no locked doors, suicidal pilots or not, slowly failing cabin pressurisation or not.
It is more likely a single event has caused this incident, locked doors or no locked doors, suicidal pilots or not, slowly failing cabin pressurisation or not.
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: earth
Posts: 1,098
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Isn't it ironic all these knee jerk reactions to previous incidents?
Let's add zillions of more automation gimmicks and gazillions of doors to be triple-locked and bigger hordes of friendly numpties who check us out on every flight.
We will however continue to be shook up by accidents induced by programs that were intended to "protect" us, or others induced by doors now locking out pilots in absence of the bad terrorist.
The cry is now out to do more extended background checks on us stupid and malicious pilots .....
.... but we will continue to forget to do this to the airline managers who drive us nuts and fatigued to the point of braking.
Automation, locks, eternal checks, checks, checks, but no more common sense!
Brave new world!
Let's add zillions of more automation gimmicks and gazillions of doors to be triple-locked and bigger hordes of friendly numpties who check us out on every flight.
We will however continue to be shook up by accidents induced by programs that were intended to "protect" us, or others induced by doors now locking out pilots in absence of the bad terrorist.
The cry is now out to do more extended background checks on us stupid and malicious pilots .....
.... but we will continue to forget to do this to the airline managers who drive us nuts and fatigued to the point of braking.
Automation, locks, eternal checks, checks, checks, but no more common sense!
Brave new world!
Not subscribing to the rogue pilot theory, just answering Beags point of:
Good luck - for that to be a meaningful precaution you need a minimum of three type rated pilots on each and every commercial flight......anything else (e.g using cabin crew to "sit in") would just be window dressing.
weebobby
I you think you're "finding things out" from any news source at the moment then have I got news for you.....I'll grant you the Americans seem to good at quoting un-named sources, unattributed sources .....perhaps it's simply a case of the American speculation being better/louder than the European version.
In my opinion, a flight deck should always have a minimum of 2 people present, each of whom is capable of detecting and preventing an unauthorised act or incorrect procedure on behalf of the other. That is the 'two man rule' as applied to safety critical situations to prevent potentially hazardous activity and should become SOP for two person flight decks during flight.
weebobby
Strange also that we are having to find things out from the Americans and not the Europeans......
Join Date: Apr 2012
Location: planet earth
Age: 59
Posts: 48
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Only way is to prescribe to always have 2 persons on the flightdeck. This is already standard by some airlines. This at least requires conspiracy between 2 persons...
Anyway, any pilot, who would be determined to crash the plane has a very good chance of being able to do so, regardless of how many people are in the cockpit! A nice firm push on the yoke or stick at 500 ft AGL, would do the job. That will work even in an Airbus!
Absolute security is unachievable.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: FUBAR
Posts: 3,348
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There was also a persistent "rumour" that one Air Asia pilot (the Capt ) was not in his seat, which the investigators finally discounted.
As was posted on here yesterday, it may have been better if the BEA either said nothing (if there is nothing to say that is best ) or told us a little more about the contents of the CVR, less speculation run rife. . . . which is exactly what appears to have happened.
As previous poster has said, there is a code for the door lock . . . . . . . . so, "normally" 8-10 min is plenty time to get back in. . . . assuming he had found a portable 02 bottle if depressurisation was involved.
As was posted on here yesterday, it may have been better if the BEA either said nothing (if there is nothing to say that is best ) or told us a little more about the contents of the CVR, less speculation run rife. . . . which is exactly what appears to have happened.
As previous poster has said, there is a code for the door lock . . . . . . . . so, "normally" 8-10 min is plenty time to get back in. . . . assuming he had found a portable 02 bottle if depressurisation was involved.
Join Date: Apr 2012
Location: planet earth
Age: 59
Posts: 48
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why are you people openly discussing the finer details pertaining to system (door) operation and more frighteningly, door procedures!
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 2,044
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There should be a code that allows only the captain, F/O and head purser to overrule the doorlock from the outside
but I suspect you are wanting that code to be genuinely secret?Trouble is when it comes to apply to a fleet of 150 aircraft, 3000 pilots and 10000 Cabin Crew. How do you inform people of the codes, rely on the crew remembering, change it regularly (?).
Prior to this accident, most debate over the door concerned the funny occasions the crew locked themselves out...
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: France
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Unintended consequences
Unintended consequences can be roughly grouped into three types:
Unexpected benefit: A positive, unexpected benefit (usually referred to as luck, serendipity or a windfall).
Unexpected drawback: A negative, unexpected detriment occurring in addition to the desired effect of the policy (e.g., while irrigation schemes provide people with water for agriculture, they can increase waterborne diseases that have devastating health effects, such as schistosomiasis).
Perverse result: A backfire or perverse effect contrary to what was originally intended (when an intended solution makes a problem worse). This has been dubbed the 'cobra effect', after an anecdote about how a bounty for killing cobras in British India created a perverse incentive for people to breed cobras.
There will never be absolute security or safety, and often something implemented to solve one issue, will then open the door to an unintended issue.
Unexpected benefit: A positive, unexpected benefit (usually referred to as luck, serendipity or a windfall).
Unexpected drawback: A negative, unexpected detriment occurring in addition to the desired effect of the policy (e.g., while irrigation schemes provide people with water for agriculture, they can increase waterborne diseases that have devastating health effects, such as schistosomiasis).
Perverse result: A backfire or perverse effect contrary to what was originally intended (when an intended solution makes a problem worse). This has been dubbed the 'cobra effect', after an anecdote about how a bounty for killing cobras in British India created a perverse incentive for people to breed cobras.
There will never be absolute security or safety, and often something implemented to solve one issue, will then open the door to an unintended issue.
Or perhaps the co pilot had such limited hours it was just easier to program the plane to head down ??
If pilot suicide is now being seen as a problem, irrespective of this accident, then I'm rather surprised that a pilot orientated forum hasn't spotted the obvious solution, ie a third pilot!
Such a requirement would remove the possibility of the flight deck ever being occupied by one person alone, would remove the need to remove cabin crew from the cabin, and of course offer further pilot employment opportunities. As it would be a regulatory requirement, then no carrier would have a financial advantage over others. Any regulator that did not conform would soon find its airlines barred from all airspace other than its own. Costs of course would rise, fares would no doubt follow, but death by pilot would hopefully cease to be a statistical concern...
Such a requirement would remove the possibility of the flight deck ever being occupied by one person alone, would remove the need to remove cabin crew from the cabin, and of course offer further pilot employment opportunities. As it would be a regulatory requirement, then no carrier would have a financial advantage over others. Any regulator that did not conform would soon find its airlines barred from all airspace other than its own. Costs of course would rise, fares would no doubt follow, but death by pilot would hopefully cease to be a statistical concern...
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: I wouldn't know.
Posts: 4,499
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No you would have a cabin crew member there capable of opening the door from the inside quickly if any problem arose. Would make it much harder for a pilot to commit suicide.
No, it wouldn't make it harder to commit suicide, FAs usually do not have any idea what i'm doing anyway and can't do anything against it. But it would make it much harder for a minimally screened person after just a six week training course to crash a plane with only one pilot in the flightdeck to prevent it. And then there's the big elephant, or rather crash axe, in the flightdeck that either could use to get rid of the other.