Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

[xcitation]

@glendalegoon

Your logic is solid and convincing however I just don't believe it to be the case.
Maybe they were already in a loss of control situation, a/c in abnormal attitude and unstable. He reasoned that it would be best for him to reach the breaker being trained and experienced in extreme "g" environment and best person to quickly pull breaker in a disorienting situation.

[glendalegoon]

XCitation

I don't like pointing the finger at a dead pilot. I really don't. I mentioned that with only dribs and drabs of data instead of actually having the CVR transcript and FDR data, we are left to our own ideas.

AVIATION World Wide would be better served by the indonesian govt releasing all data right now.

Xcitation...I have seen company men try to fix things instead of just writing them up and having the plane grounded for awhile.

Anyone know if AirAsia is represented by ALPA or another pilot union?

One other thing that is eating at me is the age of the copilot vs hours. Is it possible the captain saw an older copilot and figured he had more flying time than he really did? The copilot was 46 and had left a career as some sort of engineer to be a pilot. Age without experience is not good.

[ekw]

The final report will vindicate him if appropriate. In the meantime, speculating on possible motives for pulling cb's does serve a useful purpose as it is at least a cautionary tale. Maybe the faulty FACs were tripping the AP and the cpt was not comfortable with that. He perhaps knew from experience that a hard reset would fix the problem. Inexperienced PF then gets thrown into alt law for the few seconds it takes to reset and overcompensates when he hits turbulence at the same time. How does the rudder respond in alt law with protections off?

[MountainBear]

IF there was a thunderstorm ahead and there was difficulty controlling the plane , why would a 20, 000 hour ex F16 pilot be out of the seat to play with circuit breakers?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Path_dependence

He'd encountered a similar situation on the same plane before. To understand his frame of mind, walk in his shoes.

[scard08]

I'd suggest pulling the CBs did not cause the problem but was a reaction to it.

I think it is obvious that nobody gets up and pulls the FAC CBs unless they have a problem. And it has been said earlier in the thread that there were log entries indicating issues with the FACs.

But a problem with the FACs does not mean that said problem caused a loss of control. Look at Adam Air 574 -- the pilots became engaged with a problem with the IRS and that distracted them from a much larger issue that caused their crash.

Perhaps focus on the FACs reduced the attention they were paying to other parameters.

[xcitation]

@glendalegoon
I would think it reasonable to expedite things by resolving minor issues however there is a safety line somewhere. If that means having to return and make maintenance replace an error prone flight computer module then so be it. Otherwise the reality is that such fixes are only work around's which can mask symptoms from others e.g. engineers. Capt is the last fail safe device and default responsible for whatever happens - so he/she needs to be the voice of reason.

[_Phoenix]

"my aircraft ?"

ab intro pilots who get most of their training in simulators. They never get the opportunity to build a solid background and learn solid basic stick and rudder skills.

Thousands of stick and rudder hours would have helped them in anyway? or rather ab philosophy requires master knowledge of computer operator?
Because...

This aircraft demands an intensive and thorough knowledge of flight control laws, system architecture, reversion modes, and how to recognize each and every display associated with various component failures.

[Lost in Saigon]

Originally Posted by aterpster

They were concerned about apparently significant TRWs ahead.

It defies common sense at that time either the captain or the engineer on board would have been tinkering with anything.

I disagree. They were not overly concerned with TRW's as they had requested and were given a deviation around them. The weather was not a major obstacle as many other aircraft had passed through the same area.

It is starting to look like they were "troubleshooting" the faulty FAC and got much more than they bargained for. Once more details are released, I would not be surprised to find out that the weather played no part in this accident.

[SAMPUBLIUS]

bug smasher said

But when those go wrong, the system reverts to 'you have control' mode;

I believe a genu wine Airbus pilot and a close read of the manual would explain that absent pulling multiple breakers ( not resets ) full (NO protection) control is NOT available.

HAL wins again !

[Machinbird]

The process of manually flying a jet in cruise is normally a trivial exercise. The hardest part is accurate altitude maintenance. This used to be done with 1/2 dot pitch corrections and a few degrees wing down to get back on the exact heading desired.

With RVSM airspace, when does anyone get a chance to practice even this simple, almost mechanistic skill?

If this was really a case of PF hauling the nose up as is being intimated in some of the news leaks, then AF447 was not an outlier.

Meanwhile, I remain skeptical that a 2000+ hour copilot would have difficulty manually flying in level flight in cruise, even in Alternate law. The explanation that the crew did it is just too pat.

[Jilted]

Reuters report of captain leaving seat is false.

Rough translation of NTSC news conference:

TEMPO.CO, Jakarta -Kabar which mention pilots AirAsia PK-AXC QZ8501, irianto captain had left the cockpit denied Investigation Team Leader of the National Transportation Safety Committee, and against Siswosuwarno. "Invent, there's no story," he said, Saturday, January 31, 2015.

[skytrax]

This accident is going to be a classic example of the Swiss cheese model. I'm sure it's going to be studied carefully.

Lots of factors, a chain of events, bad timing for things to happen, some poor decisions maybe......
It's gonna be a long report!

[Foxxster]

I have a questions for 320 pilots. We have heard that the FAC computer required servicing 9 times in the last 12 months. What events would require a service? Does the requirement to 'reset' the computer automatically require it to be subsequently serviced?

And most importantly how many times would be a normal amount for the FAC to be serviced in a 12 month period and if it is less than 9 which as a non pilot seems a hell of a lot, at what number do you as pilots turn around and say you are not flying until the underlying cause is identified and fixed?

[Sop_Monkey]

Let's not be too tough on the crew. They are in no position to defend themselves, not did they set out on this final journey to kill themselves and everyone else on board. Obviously.

I put the blame totally on the authorities, East and West, for allowing a system to be in place, that has lead to these types of accidents. The fact that a report will be years in the making, thus stifling valuable information for crews to learn from now, is of great concern for me.

Of course the crew will be blamed. They will take the hit for the incompetence of the authorities and the possible interference of the manufacturers.

[training wheels]

Originally Posted by Foxxster

I have a questions for 320 pilots. We have heard that the FAC computer required servicing 9 times in the last 12 months. What events would require a service? Does the requirement to 'reset' the computer automatically require it to be subsequently serviced?

And most importantly how many times would be a normal amount for the FAC to be serviced in a 12 month period and if it is less than 9 which as a non pilot seems a hell of a lot, at what number do you as pilots turn around and say you are not flying until the underlying cause is identified and fixed?

I don't fly the A320 (yet), but the report you heard was 9 write-ups of the FAC 2 in the tech log during 2014. That is, the pilots who flew this aircraft previously have found faults with FAC 2 on 9 occasions in 2014 and have written this in the tech log for the engineers to fix.

According to this blog, a news reporter who has leaked information about the technical status of the aircraft, FAC 2 of the accident aircraft (PK-AXC) was swapped with one from PK-AXV two days before the accident. What bearing this has on the accident, I don't know and will be the subject of further investigation by the NTSC no doubt.

Every aircraft has a MEL (minimum equipment list) which states what systems/instruments etc and how many of those items need to be working before you can legally depart. Depending on the equipment and its redundancy, for some items, you may depart with that item not in working order, but it needs to be fixed in a certain time frame or else the aircraft is grounded. There are of course "no go" items which means certain systems need to be fully working, or you can't depart.

[unworry]

Originally Posted by Training_Wheels

According to this blog, a news reporter who has leaked information about the technical status of the aircraft, FAC 2 of the accident aircraft (PK-AXC) was swapped with one from PK-AXV two days before the accident.

also has some interesting articles which explain the A320 system architecture, including details on

• A320 FBW system, laws and the FAC
• FAC and maintenance
• Pilot procedures on rudder problems

[silverstrata]

Katslf:

I'd suggest pulling the CBs did not cause the problem but was a reaction to it. I bet it was after the zoom climb.

I would very much doubt it. If an aircraft is pitching 25º up at 30,000ft, and probably pulling some 'g', your first thought is not: "oh, I will get out of my seat and pull some CBs over there....." And there was not really enough time for such actions, once the loss of control started.

And the report as leaked thus far appears to indicate the the upset was the result of pulling CBs and the f/o losing control, and not vice versa.

A more reasonable scenario is they were dealing with another issue entirely that was giving some warnings and decided - for whatever reason - to pull the CBs. And this action resulted in a loss of control. The question is, why? Especially if this reset was a 'ground-only' function.


Edit:
If the FAC had been flagged nine times previously, this may give us a possible rationale for resetting it. However, a ground reset is normally a ground reset for a jolly good reason. But in this case, the justification for repeatedly returning the same box to service after it had been snagged nine times, needs looking into as much as any subsequent actions during the flight. The pressure by management on engineers NOT to replace items needs looking at in much greater detail. The casual notation: "tested found serviceable" is all-too common in all airlines, and is becoming engineer-speak for "they are complaining about nothing, again". (hint: a bench-test is not the same as a flight test).

[StinkyMonkey]

There is not enough information out yet to speculate,
but IF the captain was out of his seat, that indicates they were not following any approved FAC reset procedure.

Also, for the people who have not flown both, the A320 and A330 are very different when it comes to the flight control computers and the location of circuit breakers. All circuit breakers (reset buttons) are within reach from the seat on the A330. Not so on the A320.

Any airline that takes safety seriously would have replaced such an important computer if it indeed had failed that many times in the past.

[silverstrata]

Slinkey

Any airline that takes safety seriously would have replaced such an important computer if it indeed had failed that many times in the past.

Ha, ha, ha, you do have a funny sense of humour there, Slinky. Do you know how much those things cost? Do you know how much the passengers were paying for their seats?

Come on, the real world is down here...

[SLFandProud]

@silverstrata

A more reasonable scenario is they were dealing with another issue entirely that was giving some warnings and decided - for whatever reason - to pull the CBs. And this action resulted in a loss of control.

The question is, why? Especially if this reset was a 'ground-only' function.

Here's a thought - maybe they read PPRuNe?

After any accident involving an Airbus, there are always lengthy threads populated by old timers writing with the Star Spangled Banner proudly playing in the background that everything was safer in their day (despite all the evidence to the contrary), that the cause of all Airbus crashes is 'HAL', and that none of this would have happened if the computers were just turned off and pilots allowed to fly the plane.

Maybe there are impressionable types who don't appreciate this for what it is (Luddism mixed with a healthy dose of jingoism), and maybe there is a responsibility for some PPRuNe posters to cut some of the crap... Worth thinking about.