Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

[John_K]

As a GA pilot who relies on stick and rudder skills. have been following this thread and feel quite concerned, even though obviously the results of the investigation are to be made.

I am concerned because there are perhaps some RPT Airline crews out there may have forgotten their basic training from the first 20 hours of their original flight training on:

1. Stall recovery - concerned that it appears that alarms about the Air Asia plane stalling were blaring for like 3 minutes - was the basic stall recovery of push the stick or column down/forward to reduce the AoA totally forgotten? including the use of the rudder to unstall a wing?

2. Taking care or avoiding flying through thunderstorms - when we all studied MET what were we taught? Thunderstorms have incredible energy that can tear an aircraft apart - concerned that tight time schedules and familiarity have bred contempt for these powerful weather phenomenon. As others have said, then Airlines crews decide to become Test Pilots it will eventually lead to disaster.

3. Over reliance on automation - too many systems designed to reduce workloads - what about actually knowing how to fly the plane without these? Today's aircraft are inherently more stable, less likely to stall and designed to be smoother in flight but it all can come apart if we let a computer pilot us rather than us piloting the plane.

Hope there are some good learning out of this tragic accident and the loss of life has not been in vein and contributes to improved safety in the RPT Airline industry.

[Volume]

The accepted definition of the "deep stall" or "super stall" is that of Davies', which refers solely to the blanked T-tail designs.

The term "deep stall" (and the phenomena) already existed at least 3 decades before the first T-Tail was invented.
Basically what it means is stable flight in the region between the first Clmax (around 10° AoA, depending on the airfoil and configuration) and the second Clmax, which naturally occurs around 45° AOA for every airfoil. There is always a second "post stall" region of positive Cl over AoA slope, and if the horizontal stabilizer allows to get there, the aircraft can be flown stable in that region with lift and drag of similar magnitude, hence with flight path angles somewhere between 30 and 45 degrees. Depending on the overall design this condition can be so stable, that elevator efficiency is not enough to get out of that. The T-Tail is the most often occurring example for such configurations, but not the only one.
BTW, deep stall with T-Tails is not stable with the Tail in the wake of the wing, but with the Tail on the rear boundary of the wake. It is not so much because the elevator looses efficiency, it is because the flight condition is so extremely stable if any pitch up results in the tail leaving the wake and hence producing lift again and a nose down pitching moment, while pitching down results in the tail fully entering the wake and hence producing less lift and a nose up pitching moment. The Cm curve is so steep in that region, that shifting it up and down due to elevator deflection does not change the pitching moment significantly.
Canard configuration aircraft can even have stable deep stall around 230° AOA (inverted backwards...) as discovered during the SpeedCanard flight test...

[RetiredF4]

Quote:Phoenix
40° AOA is quite extreme and not sustainable, but with THS at 25°-30° AOA, reduced thrust, the elevator at max ND would give a ND movement.

But remember, under FBW C* implementation like AB in normal and alternate law the SS does not control the elevators directly. A SS neutral does not command an elevator at neutral position, it commands a loadfactor of 1g and the elevators and THS will be at whatever it takes to maintain or achieve this 1g. In a stalled condition like you describe with the THS all the way nose up the elevators would be nose up too.
The SS commands a loadfactor change, which the Flight computers will transfer into an elevator command with gains designed for comfort and in order not to exceed the loadfactor limitations. So it will take a long time SS full nose down to get those elevators moving beyond the neutral position into nose down, and only then would the trim start to follow and start to trim nose down. There is no time to wait for that. Use the procedure which is established, and that one includes the use of manual trim.

[wiggy]

Brand B seems to recover from high altitude stall events
Would it, if the stab trim was wound fully back, the speed brought back to less than 100kts, with full power on and descending fast?

Well, FWIW on at least some of Brand B's FBW aircraft stab trimming is inhibited below (approx) min manoeuvre speed.

[bubbers44]

When a tail loses lift the nose pitches down because the horizontal stabilizer pushes the tail down for stability.

[RetiredF4]

bubbers44
When a tail loses lift the nose pitches down because the horizontal stabilizer pushes the tail down for stability.

True for an unstalled aircraft, different for an aircraft in a deep stall situation due to different reasons like shift of center of pressure, .......

[silverstrata]

F4

A neutral stick in the bus commands a loadfactor of 1g, and would therefore force the aircraft in a decreasing speed environment due to power reduction in a higher AOA

You have a stick that commands 'g' instead of attitude??? Who invented that idea? Anyway, surely that is not true in alternate law, it must default to attitude. Yes, no? Surely it must.

But what I said stands true for conventional controls. A good aircraft should always lower its nose in the stall even with the stick neutral. If not, you have the CofG - CofL couple incorrectly positioned. (But see also below.)

Ratherbe:

The pushers were required in these a/c because the stall was unrecoverable. Pushers are not required in a/c that can recover with standard pilot actions.

But this is the question. Is the stall recoverable if the thrust has been left at maximum?

The stall is certainly not recoverable on the 737 (for instance), at low altitude with the engines at max, as was amply demonstrated a few years back on an ILS approach. But what about at high altitude? Ok, thrust may have degraded to about 1/4, at 35,000 ft, but that is still a lot of pitch-couple for the elevators to overcome. So will it recover from the stall at 39,000 ft, with engines at max? My last sim run at this a few years back demonstrated that an underslung twin was reluctant to unstall at full aft CofG at best, and that was not using full chat (we had reduced power, to create the stall).

And if the stall is not easily recoverable with engines at max thrust, then why no stick pusher? (Or why no auto thrust reducer....?)

[Sop_Monkey]

Bubbers 44

"When a tail loses lift the nose pitches down because the horizontal stabilizer pushes the tail down for stability."

If the THS is also stalled and thrust is keeping the nose up (high AoA), will that still be the case?

[NigelOnDraft]

tubby linton

Nigel the latest stall drill in the QRH states--

NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL APPLY
This will reduce angle of attack
Note:
In case of lack of pitch down authority, reducing thrust may be necessary.

Suggest you re-read my post re the drill I referred to, and QRH. Mine says "TOGA and set 15nu"...

[Vilters]

TOGA and nose down stick.

TOGA and pushing nose down on the stick will get you nowhere in some deep stalls.
The 2 moments neutralise ach other.
The engines lifting the nose, and the tail pushing nose down.

The remaining vector is ZERO and the only velocity is going vertical down till impact.

Stalls come in lots of forms and shapes.

Prio ONE is to get the nose down.

Stick, closing of throttles, trim to nose down, all tools are good tools to get the nose down.

But you have to get them all working together.

At FL, this can take several thousands of feet.
But PRIO ONE is to get the nose down again. Even if it means dropping the gear in airplanes that allow it in the higher FL.

Never mind a missing door, if it can get you to regain control of the aircraft.

[tubby linton]

Nigel my post was a straight lift from the FCOM regarding a stall warning(not at take off) .
At Take off it is as you say Toga ~15

[Volume]

When a tail loses lift the nose pitches down because the horizontal stabilizer pushes the tail down for stability.

Actually it is not for stability, but for moment compensation. The moment compensated is the nose-down pitching moment produced naturally by any cambered airfoil with attached flow. So when stalled, this pitching moment may disappear, and no more downforce on the tail is required. But that depends heavily on the specific airfoil characteristics, whether the flow separation starts at the trailing edge and extends forward, or whether it starts at the leading edge and reattaches further aft.
At 30° AoA there is no way to produce a down force, no plain flap (used as elevator) is that powerful and nobody would be insane enough to allow a stabilizer trim to move 30° nose down (relative to the fuselage). And as for a swept wing the outer wing is stalled first, there is so much nose up pitching moment that you need lift on the stabilizer to maintain stable flight.
Which however is not always desirable, as stable may mean unrecoverable, so you may prefer to lose control and start again by recovering from there.
Also the characteristic nose drop at stall is produced by the lift produced at the horizontal stabilizer at high AOA.

[NigelOnDraft]

Nigel my post was a straight lift from the FCOM regarding a stall warning(not at take off) .
At Take off it is as you say Toga ~15

Thanks

It's all a few posts back now, but was in response to a suggestion that a Stall Warning generates an automatic power reduction

[FLEXPWR]

Silverstrata,

To my knowledge, no commercial aircraft is ever directly "commanding" an attitude with either a stick or control column.

Conventional aircraft command a pitch change (or attitude) by deflection of the elevator.
Airbus FBW aircraft side stick orders command a g load which, through various flight computers, move the elevator accordingly to give the demanded g load, until the stick is released back to its neutral position, then 1g (corrected for pitch) will be maintained again, until a new input is made on the side stick.

This is valid in pitch both in normal law and alternate law. Roll is another story.
Only direct law will provide a direct relationship between elevator and sidestick longitudinal movements, though not in a strickly linear fashion.

For the rest of these wonders of aviation technologies and why it was designed this way, I recommend that you spend some time in the Tech Log and get a good grip with the concept of Airbus FBW before suggesting this is nonsense, or why would anyone design such a thing.

[HarryMann]

Well I hope Volume will agree that a lot of swept wings are doctored
to force a root stall first so the mainplane itself contributes to
nose down (-) in and of itself.

[sky9]

I have always been fascinated by the position of the wing on the A320 compared to the 737. It appears to be further forward which would suggest to me that the downforce on the stabilizer of the A320 is less than the 737. If that is the case the aircraft would have less of a natural recovery from the stall than the Boeing. Any thoughts?

[Msunduzi]

I have always been fascinated by the position of the wing on the A320 compared to the 737. It appears to be further forward which would suggest to me that the downforce on the stabilizer of the A320 is less than the 737. If that is the case the aircraft would have less of a natural recovery from the stall than the Boeing. Any thoughts?.............................................


Maybe they have fatter pilots.

Doesn't matter where the wing is in comparison, where the CoG is that matters, and to the CoP

[Lazerdog]

Anyone know what the transit time for the the elevator auto-trim is from the full 13 degrees up back to neutral on the -320 when pushing full forward? That delay is problematic when the brain is racing to solve a problem and acting faster than the systems on the A/C.

[RetiredF4]

I think problematic is not the time of travel of the THS trim, it would move quite fast (when it is commanded by the computers to move) however that depends on the present loadfactor and speed and the gains, and I think there are more factors going into the flight computers which finally position the elevators and move the trim.

More problematic seems to be that pilots over all brands avoid considerable loadfactor reductions to below 1 g by all means, which is good for load comfort during normal ops. Minimal loadfactor reduction below 1 g is only present during day to day ops when initiating a descent or doing a level off after a climb. I trained military pilots in air combat maneuvering, and even this breed is very reluctant to use agressive nose down stick inputs and the more when this input should be maintained for more than a second in the range of 0 to -1g. It has to be trained into them that they gain confidence in the outcome of such inputs. Sure it comes handy to be strapped into the seat and having no meals fly around.

Therefore in a stalled situation it is a total untrained and uncomforting maneuver to put the SS or the control column full forward until the aircraft reacts to the input in the desired way. Looking at the FDR' s from some stall accidents will show my point. It is the thinking " a neutral or slightly nose down input will do the trick" and "negative g's will kill" which is the elephant in the room in failed stall recoveries.

I think especially Airbus crews could do that maneuver without much thinking, as the loadfactor protection is operational in normal and alternate law and should protect the aircraft from too much negative g's. Let the system work for the benefit of a fast and quick recovery instead of taking the chance that it works against this intent. And if the full forward stick does not lead to the desired reaction, feed in manual trim.

[Jack of All]

UPRT

I have recently undergone the Upset Recovery Training developed specifically to train airline crew to recognize and recover from extreme upsets and Loss of Control Inflight ( LOC-I).

I am an Airbus TC on the 320, and I must say, after that program, we are staring at the biggest threat to airline ops completely wide-eyed and unprepared.

This totally redefines the concept of unusual attitude recovery. Hugely.

Thank heavens this has actually been developed, refined and is now actually being implemented. Google UPRT and have a look at the excellent documents available.

Let your management know in no uncertain terms that this must form part of your recurrent program THIS YEAR.

Push. Roll. Power. Stabilize!