NTSB update on Asiana 214
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Dozy
You are so data and scientific-proof based, you should also be as pedantic as to what you state, read or interpret.
If i said there was an "unexpected rise" in accidents with one design, that does not preclude that other accidents with older designs did not happen!
The professional thing is to go and discuss why such a rise.
The puerile thing is to brush such questions aside by stating "... bah, the others did the same, so nothing can be wrong here."
You are so data and scientific-proof based, you should also be as pedantic as to what you state, read or interpret.
If i said there was an "unexpected rise" in accidents with one design, that does not preclude that other accidents with older designs did not happen!
The professional thing is to go and discuss why such a rise.
The puerile thing is to brush such questions aside by stating "... bah, the others did the same, so nothing can be wrong here."
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If i said there was an "unexpected rise" in accidents with one design,
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If i said there was an "unexpected rise" in accidents with one design, that does not preclude that other accidents with older designs did not happen!
"a unexpected rise of accidents in airliners lately with loss of speed and subsequently loss of control"
implying the rise to be across all types.
The professional thing is to go and discuss why such a rise.
A cursory glance at the aviation-safety database does not seem to indicate a greater number of LOCi accidents since the '90s, and certainly not that those with speed tape displays and non-moving thrust levers are more prone to them.
The puerile thing is to brush such questions aside by stating "... bah, the others did the same, so nothing can be wrong here."
Off the top of my head I can think of Birgenair 301, West Caribbean 708, Asiana 214 and Air France 447. The first two had round dials, the second pair had tape displays. A quick search also reveals Austral Líneas Aéreas Flight 2553, which also had round dials - so despite being "unscientific" due to the paucity of data, these loss of control crashes due to poor speed management are currently standing at 3 round dials and 2 tape displays. Hardly a ringing endorsement.
Your own assertion that the transition from non-moving thrust levers to the moving type was a causal factor (and thus that the moving type is inherently better) in Asiana 214 ignores that only one of the pilots on that flight deck was converting from a FBW Airbus - there should have been at least two pairs of eyes capable of making the distinction even if your assertion were true. And as I said, there's Turkish 1951 in which none of the pilots were recent converts from Airbus FBW types.
With all due respect, I think it's pretty bizarre that with an accident that happened to a Boeing FBW type and in which Airbus had no part, you're still capable of finding a way of holding Airbus technology (in this case passive thrust levers) partially responsible.
Of course, you're welcome to your opinion and I'd never presume to state otherwise. But I must admit that I find this "traditionalist" view a bit obtuse, and the "you're not a pilot" ad hominem more than a little insulting. Yeah, I'm not a pilot, but if you think that means I'm not well aware of how technological changes and consequent changes in interfaces affect the work I do, then you're very much mistaken.
Using my profession (Software Engineering), my 14 years of professional experience and 10 years of personal experience before that as an analogy, I've gone from pure text-based interfaces, through early graphical interfaces up to modern graphical interfaces (which themselves seem to be rearranged every few years). And yes, each change is initially a real PITA and I spend a fair amount of time cursing the changes and those responsible for them before getting used to them.
Furthermore, if you ask me about it, I'll swear up-and-down that the best interface I know belonged to an OS and a machine that has been obsolete since the mid-90s - and I will be very vociferous about it! But the truth is that I keep one of those machines around for old times' sake and while light-years ahead of its time, the lack of more modern features that I am now used to actually makes the experience more frustrating in terms of actually getting stuff done than the warm fuzzies I get from wearing that familiar old "coat" again.
Anyhoo - enough of the analogy itself. The point is that as humans we're all hard-wired with a tendency to prefer the surroundings we learned on and "grew up with". But, referring back to my analogy, one hard-won lesson I've learned in my professional life is that kvetching about the old ways I miss never got me anywhere. What did get me somewhere was realising that once I understood the core concepts (which have never fundamentally altered much from the very beginning), it was possible to adapt much more easily to any changes that came along, and I believe this is analogous to the example of the airspeed displays.
Whether you're using the angle of an old analogue pointer to closely monitor small changes in acceleration/deceleration, or whether you're using the red bars and bugs on the tape display to do the same, the truth is that adapting between them is not that hard if you're willing to try, because the fundamentals are the same. It may be annoying and you may prefer the older method, but that does not, in and of itself, make it better.
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AGAIN - My Apologies for the Length of the Following
I find myself in agreement with whomever it was who said, sometime back in this thread, that the subject has now wandered a good bit back and forth across the vastness of the potential subject matter that wraps around such a narrow-pointed topic as “aviation,” where it seems that most who offer opinions and observations are just a guilty as the next person in jumping in with an advocacy of the issue “really centering” on whatever that person’s personal “axe to grind” happens to be. And, YES, I include myself in that mix. I, too, have an opinion – and I, too, have advocated it here, probably more than some but not necessarily as much as others who have advocated their own “axe.” So … let me drag out my recently sharpened “axe,” but, in doing so, I have to remind everyone that I’m in the US – my only exposure is to US operations – moderately exposed to other nation’s efforts – but not to the same extent. So with that understanding …
Oh! First … for those who are unfamiliar with the colloquial reference to “having an axe to grind,” perhaps I’d better explain … at least a bit. The phrase essentially means to have an ulterior motive; or to have private ends to serve, such as desiring to take up and settle a dispute with someone. Commonly attributed to Benjamin Franklin, who allegedly told a story concerning a recounting of an incident from his youth, where a passing stranger takes advantage of him, by flattering and complimenting him on his “clearly obvious” ability to sharpen an axe. By so complimenting the youngster, Ben is duped into turning his grindstone to sharpen the stranger's axe – which was the stranger’s only goal, getting his axe sharpened – giving rise to the meaning of having "an axe to grind" as a metaphor for having an ulterior motive.
This thread has essentially settled into a difference of opinion (and some would, no doubt, disagree with my describing the differences as “opinions,” I’m sure – and would likely prefer me to use the term “facts”) but I digress … and those differences seem to be centered on the type of instrumentation that should be in airline cockpits today – either “round-dial-based” or “linear-tape-based.” My particular “axe,” I believe, addresses both of those positions collectively. My “axe” is ‘training,” and the “dullness” of my axe is what I see as a lack of recognition of the value of training – both initially – and recurrently - regardless of the type of instrumentation involved. While I am quite sure that everyone here would immediately say that “they” understand and acknowledge the value of training – I think they look upon training as a necessary “stepping-stone” (or series of stepping stones) that pilot “candidates” use to get across their “river of desire” … to get into the cockpit and fly.
My advocacy comes from the point of view that training certainly can be grossly considered to be “stepping stones” … but the true function is not of “stepping stones” but is rather one where each "stepping stone" is located, one finds “knowledge and familiarity buckets” where the crossing of that “river of desire” requires one step into each successive bucket, and thereby have some of whatever is “in” that bucket wind up clinging to the person when he/she steps on into the next “bucket.” And that process continues through the entire set of “buckets” that lead to that airplane cockpit. It used to be that we would have that “would-be” pilot flail around in those buckets hoping to completely cover him-/her-self with the contents of that bucket. The hope being that whatever was in those buckets would have the time to penetrate the clothing, penetrate the skin beneath the clothing, and permeate the mind/body of the pilot candidate – essentially providing each candidate the opportunity to fully “absorb” the content (the topic) of each individual bucket such that the candidate’s understanding of that content would be absorbed “down to the bone.” However, the guys who hold the purse strings found it necessary to tighten up on those strings for those efforts that were not generating “income,” and every airline owner/manager recognized that the training of their own crew members did not (and still does not) directly generate income … so … the time spent “in training” was reduced.
The problem is that because of the “time is money” concern, we try to “run” our flight crews across that river at ever increasing speeds – getting them to the cockpit quicker and therefore saving money. The problem created in the “training department” was how to ensure that each candidate was thoroughly immersed in each bucket. So, the instructors were now required to specifically direct each candidate into, and when necessary, back into each section of each bucket, to better ensure the candidate was covered with as much of the bucket’s content as time would allow.
This seemed to work reasonably well – for a while … but … the source that had been providing a robust number of pilot candidates began to dwindle – slightly at first, and then rather substantially. This source (the military - who, very wisely, had previously run those same now-candidate airline pilots through their own version of “knowledge and familiarity buckets” to train them as military pilots) was beginning to realize the value of “hanging on” to those persons into whom they, themselves, had invested so much time and “bucket content” that they wanted to retain those persons for longer periods. At about the same time, the airline industry began to expand – flying into more airports, flying longer distances, and buying increasing numbers of airplanes to expand their money-making potential. This left the airline need for pilots to find another viable source. They turned to the private sector – and supplemented this, at times, with establishing their own “ab initio” pilot training efforts. While this method has generally produced a “shaky” solution to the numbers, there has often been a suspicion that the “down to the bone” understanding of at least some (perhaps a majority?) of the newly sourced pilots was not quite at “bone” level. Airlines revamped their attitudes toward instructor requirements – increasing the numbers, at least in some cases, rather substantially.
Because there was an overriding concern to speed up the pilot training process, but there wasn’t money in the budget to do so … it fell to the instructor staff to solve that problem – to ensure that each trainee, when they were in each “training bucket,” was redirected to other areas of the “bucket” to ensure “maximum dunking.” Unfortunately, when the substantially experienced line-pilot source of instructor candidates dwindled down to those who showed up looking for a job, but whose “bone-level understanding” was becoming more highly suspicioned as being at least somewhat inadequate, it was the regulator who stepped in, attempting to play the role of the “shining Knight on the white horse” and offered several alternatives – only some of which seemed to be logical, and rare was there anything that really stood out as a potential for a substantial savings in direct training costs.
Together with a broad cross-section of the airline representatives who were at a loss as to what programs might be approved by their own management, AND be acceptable to the regulator – there was an eager participation for one such plan. Several rather meaningful steps were taken to “study the problem” and just prior to being able to settle on one that might work, as if by magic, some of the regulators, supported by some of the airline managers, submitted a program, modified from its original intent (originally a test program to examine the proper interval between training exposures – known as the Advanced Qualification Program, or AQP) announced a change in direction and some allowances that could be authorized should airlines be interested. This modified test program appealed to several of the larger operators (as their “training budget” heavily impacted the bottom line cost for the airline) and adopting this newly modified program was seen as an instant savings.
The “axe” I carry is oriented more toward the assurance that the training requirements actually ensure that the student pilot fully understands what equipment is installed on his/her airplane, and that each student is fully, completely, and competently trained on how to operate each piece of that equipment, individually and collectively, in normal, abnormal, and emergency situations, and actually demonstrates his/her ability to do just that - in each case, for each situation. In addition, the tasks that each student must be exposed to and learn to perform correctly and completely should cover, as a minimum, all of the tasks that the pilot may encounter (routinely or in the event of an abnormal or emergency situation), demonstrate a complete and knowledgeable understanding and demonstration for each encounter, both physical ability and coordination, adequately assessing each situation, determining the appropriate response, and then demonstrating proper airplane and flight control use.
Additionally, a comprehensive review of each system, each system interface, each flight task – under normal, abnormal, and/or emergency situation – causing the pilot to understand the operation and function of the complete set of systems and controls, and, if/when asked to do so, could perform the required functions under the direct observation of a professionally qualified and competent instructor. In my view, this is the only method that will allow an unbiased assessment of each individual pilot's current state of knowledge, understanding, and ability with respect to the aircraft he/she is currently operating. That instructor has a front-row-seat, and presuming he/she is observant, should be able to note any misunderstanding and/or misuse of any system or control used in the completion of any assigned flight training task. This should be done regularly, for every one of the pilots flying for every airline – with a particular attention paid to the awareness of pilot understanding of normal, abnormal, and/or emergency operations of systems, procedures, and tasks independently and inter-operably.
Unfortunately, I have known of some authorizations for some, specific training programs, that allow a specific task, for which a specific set of flight controls are used, to substitute for at least some, perhaps ALL, other specific tasks using a similar set and/or sequence of flight control applications such that the other (ALL other?) similar task(s) are not addressed, used, seen, or evaluated during that pilot’s operation history with that airline – UNLESS some “rouge” instructor throws some unexpected requirement at some point. To me, that is an abrogation of responsibility by the instructor, the airline, the pilot union, and the regulatory authority.
It is my opinion that if the above were accomplished regularly and thoroughly – situational awareness and specific system and control operation competence can be best determined, and do so on an on-going basis. Of course, errors are going to be made – and there is a good likelihood of students in a training environment may make errors. And, if or when this occurs, the instructor should ensure that the error is recognized and understood by the “student,” and that he/she is properly corrected to the point that understanding and competence can be assured. Again, I must stress that a pilot in training should not be unduly criticized or ostracized should that pilot make an error. The goal should be to enforce the knowledge, skill, and/or regulatory basis for why an error was committed and ensure to the best possible degree that the pilot understands and is less likely to make the same, or the same kind of, error in the future.
It would be my preference to see this training conducted the same way for the same tasks from airline to airline and pilot to pilot - but I'm not "hard-over" on that aspect. What I DO believe, however, is that the evaluation of each pilot should cover all of what they should have been trained on (and that should only differ when, where, and how that particular operation actually differs), and determine that competency exists to the same level. At my home airport, there is enough diversity of operations that we could easily see 3 different companies have airplanes taxiing out at the same time - but each company could easily use the same aircraft type (say a B-737-800). But because these 3 different operators could rather easily operate under 3 different sections of the rule (airline operations, business/commuter operations, and private operations) the requirements for their training and therefore their testing could easily be markedly different, even though the airplane is exactly the same! To me, this makes no sense. The airplane does not know what section of some rule under which it may or may not be operating.
No … I don’t have a fully structured and fully researched basis on which any such diligent training program should be based – if I did, I would have turned every screw and knocked on every door to attempt its application. However, I DO have some of that knowledge and have done some of that research … but this approach, to be fully successful, will demand the direct participation of professionals from several disciplines (systems, systems integration, aerodynamics, propulsion–to some degree, flight controls, and education ... particularly in flight training and testing) to structure a set of program requirements, and alternatives, if or where appropriate. I know of some such initiatives – and the very best source would be the Training Group or the Flight Simulation Group of the UK's Royal Aeronautical Society. But, from me, that sounds much like a broken record (as I've said such things previously) – we need others shouting the same recommendations – and so many more who are willing if not eager to participate and employ what I believe could/should easily result in meaningful advances in pilot proficiency - directly impacting the safety of airline operations around the world.
OK – axe, partially honed … once again. But, I’m quite sure it will need additional honing many more times before I graduate to a chain saw!
Oh! First … for those who are unfamiliar with the colloquial reference to “having an axe to grind,” perhaps I’d better explain … at least a bit. The phrase essentially means to have an ulterior motive; or to have private ends to serve, such as desiring to take up and settle a dispute with someone. Commonly attributed to Benjamin Franklin, who allegedly told a story concerning a recounting of an incident from his youth, where a passing stranger takes advantage of him, by flattering and complimenting him on his “clearly obvious” ability to sharpen an axe. By so complimenting the youngster, Ben is duped into turning his grindstone to sharpen the stranger's axe – which was the stranger’s only goal, getting his axe sharpened – giving rise to the meaning of having "an axe to grind" as a metaphor for having an ulterior motive.
This thread has essentially settled into a difference of opinion (and some would, no doubt, disagree with my describing the differences as “opinions,” I’m sure – and would likely prefer me to use the term “facts”) but I digress … and those differences seem to be centered on the type of instrumentation that should be in airline cockpits today – either “round-dial-based” or “linear-tape-based.” My particular “axe,” I believe, addresses both of those positions collectively. My “axe” is ‘training,” and the “dullness” of my axe is what I see as a lack of recognition of the value of training – both initially – and recurrently - regardless of the type of instrumentation involved. While I am quite sure that everyone here would immediately say that “they” understand and acknowledge the value of training – I think they look upon training as a necessary “stepping-stone” (or series of stepping stones) that pilot “candidates” use to get across their “river of desire” … to get into the cockpit and fly.
My advocacy comes from the point of view that training certainly can be grossly considered to be “stepping stones” … but the true function is not of “stepping stones” but is rather one where each "stepping stone" is located, one finds “knowledge and familiarity buckets” where the crossing of that “river of desire” requires one step into each successive bucket, and thereby have some of whatever is “in” that bucket wind up clinging to the person when he/she steps on into the next “bucket.” And that process continues through the entire set of “buckets” that lead to that airplane cockpit. It used to be that we would have that “would-be” pilot flail around in those buckets hoping to completely cover him-/her-self with the contents of that bucket. The hope being that whatever was in those buckets would have the time to penetrate the clothing, penetrate the skin beneath the clothing, and permeate the mind/body of the pilot candidate – essentially providing each candidate the opportunity to fully “absorb” the content (the topic) of each individual bucket such that the candidate’s understanding of that content would be absorbed “down to the bone.” However, the guys who hold the purse strings found it necessary to tighten up on those strings for those efforts that were not generating “income,” and every airline owner/manager recognized that the training of their own crew members did not (and still does not) directly generate income … so … the time spent “in training” was reduced.
The problem is that because of the “time is money” concern, we try to “run” our flight crews across that river at ever increasing speeds – getting them to the cockpit quicker and therefore saving money. The problem created in the “training department” was how to ensure that each candidate was thoroughly immersed in each bucket. So, the instructors were now required to specifically direct each candidate into, and when necessary, back into each section of each bucket, to better ensure the candidate was covered with as much of the bucket’s content as time would allow.
This seemed to work reasonably well – for a while … but … the source that had been providing a robust number of pilot candidates began to dwindle – slightly at first, and then rather substantially. This source (the military - who, very wisely, had previously run those same now-candidate airline pilots through their own version of “knowledge and familiarity buckets” to train them as military pilots) was beginning to realize the value of “hanging on” to those persons into whom they, themselves, had invested so much time and “bucket content” that they wanted to retain those persons for longer periods. At about the same time, the airline industry began to expand – flying into more airports, flying longer distances, and buying increasing numbers of airplanes to expand their money-making potential. This left the airline need for pilots to find another viable source. They turned to the private sector – and supplemented this, at times, with establishing their own “ab initio” pilot training efforts. While this method has generally produced a “shaky” solution to the numbers, there has often been a suspicion that the “down to the bone” understanding of at least some (perhaps a majority?) of the newly sourced pilots was not quite at “bone” level. Airlines revamped their attitudes toward instructor requirements – increasing the numbers, at least in some cases, rather substantially.
Because there was an overriding concern to speed up the pilot training process, but there wasn’t money in the budget to do so … it fell to the instructor staff to solve that problem – to ensure that each trainee, when they were in each “training bucket,” was redirected to other areas of the “bucket” to ensure “maximum dunking.” Unfortunately, when the substantially experienced line-pilot source of instructor candidates dwindled down to those who showed up looking for a job, but whose “bone-level understanding” was becoming more highly suspicioned as being at least somewhat inadequate, it was the regulator who stepped in, attempting to play the role of the “shining Knight on the white horse” and offered several alternatives – only some of which seemed to be logical, and rare was there anything that really stood out as a potential for a substantial savings in direct training costs.
Together with a broad cross-section of the airline representatives who were at a loss as to what programs might be approved by their own management, AND be acceptable to the regulator – there was an eager participation for one such plan. Several rather meaningful steps were taken to “study the problem” and just prior to being able to settle on one that might work, as if by magic, some of the regulators, supported by some of the airline managers, submitted a program, modified from its original intent (originally a test program to examine the proper interval between training exposures – known as the Advanced Qualification Program, or AQP) announced a change in direction and some allowances that could be authorized should airlines be interested. This modified test program appealed to several of the larger operators (as their “training budget” heavily impacted the bottom line cost for the airline) and adopting this newly modified program was seen as an instant savings.
The “axe” I carry is oriented more toward the assurance that the training requirements actually ensure that the student pilot fully understands what equipment is installed on his/her airplane, and that each student is fully, completely, and competently trained on how to operate each piece of that equipment, individually and collectively, in normal, abnormal, and emergency situations, and actually demonstrates his/her ability to do just that - in each case, for each situation. In addition, the tasks that each student must be exposed to and learn to perform correctly and completely should cover, as a minimum, all of the tasks that the pilot may encounter (routinely or in the event of an abnormal or emergency situation), demonstrate a complete and knowledgeable understanding and demonstration for each encounter, both physical ability and coordination, adequately assessing each situation, determining the appropriate response, and then demonstrating proper airplane and flight control use.
Additionally, a comprehensive review of each system, each system interface, each flight task – under normal, abnormal, and/or emergency situation – causing the pilot to understand the operation and function of the complete set of systems and controls, and, if/when asked to do so, could perform the required functions under the direct observation of a professionally qualified and competent instructor. In my view, this is the only method that will allow an unbiased assessment of each individual pilot's current state of knowledge, understanding, and ability with respect to the aircraft he/she is currently operating. That instructor has a front-row-seat, and presuming he/she is observant, should be able to note any misunderstanding and/or misuse of any system or control used in the completion of any assigned flight training task. This should be done regularly, for every one of the pilots flying for every airline – with a particular attention paid to the awareness of pilot understanding of normal, abnormal, and/or emergency operations of systems, procedures, and tasks independently and inter-operably.
Unfortunately, I have known of some authorizations for some, specific training programs, that allow a specific task, for which a specific set of flight controls are used, to substitute for at least some, perhaps ALL, other specific tasks using a similar set and/or sequence of flight control applications such that the other (ALL other?) similar task(s) are not addressed, used, seen, or evaluated during that pilot’s operation history with that airline – UNLESS some “rouge” instructor throws some unexpected requirement at some point. To me, that is an abrogation of responsibility by the instructor, the airline, the pilot union, and the regulatory authority.
It is my opinion that if the above were accomplished regularly and thoroughly – situational awareness and specific system and control operation competence can be best determined, and do so on an on-going basis. Of course, errors are going to be made – and there is a good likelihood of students in a training environment may make errors. And, if or when this occurs, the instructor should ensure that the error is recognized and understood by the “student,” and that he/she is properly corrected to the point that understanding and competence can be assured. Again, I must stress that a pilot in training should not be unduly criticized or ostracized should that pilot make an error. The goal should be to enforce the knowledge, skill, and/or regulatory basis for why an error was committed and ensure to the best possible degree that the pilot understands and is less likely to make the same, or the same kind of, error in the future.
It would be my preference to see this training conducted the same way for the same tasks from airline to airline and pilot to pilot - but I'm not "hard-over" on that aspect. What I DO believe, however, is that the evaluation of each pilot should cover all of what they should have been trained on (and that should only differ when, where, and how that particular operation actually differs), and determine that competency exists to the same level. At my home airport, there is enough diversity of operations that we could easily see 3 different companies have airplanes taxiing out at the same time - but each company could easily use the same aircraft type (say a B-737-800). But because these 3 different operators could rather easily operate under 3 different sections of the rule (airline operations, business/commuter operations, and private operations) the requirements for their training and therefore their testing could easily be markedly different, even though the airplane is exactly the same! To me, this makes no sense. The airplane does not know what section of some rule under which it may or may not be operating.
No … I don’t have a fully structured and fully researched basis on which any such diligent training program should be based – if I did, I would have turned every screw and knocked on every door to attempt its application. However, I DO have some of that knowledge and have done some of that research … but this approach, to be fully successful, will demand the direct participation of professionals from several disciplines (systems, systems integration, aerodynamics, propulsion–to some degree, flight controls, and education ... particularly in flight training and testing) to structure a set of program requirements, and alternatives, if or where appropriate. I know of some such initiatives – and the very best source would be the Training Group or the Flight Simulation Group of the UK's Royal Aeronautical Society. But, from me, that sounds much like a broken record (as I've said such things previously) – we need others shouting the same recommendations – and so many more who are willing if not eager to participate and employ what I believe could/should easily result in meaningful advances in pilot proficiency - directly impacting the safety of airline operations around the world.
OK – axe, partially honed … once again. But, I’m quite sure it will need additional honing many more times before I graduate to a chain saw!
Last edited by AirRabbit; 21st Aug 2014 at 00:26.
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FGD's summaries are of papers ... *not* scientific studies.
That paper, sometimes called a "white paper", will frequently make references to other, earlier research that has been done on a similar topic. Those references will consist of a one or two line summary of the research, together with citations of the name of the study and the authors (and the year).
Because that summary is only one or two lines, it may sound like mere opinion, but in reality, that summary will almost always be representative and accurate. It is in the author's interests to be accurate as he has made his name public, and his reputation is at stake!
... these loss of control crashes due to poor speed management are currently standing at 3 round dials and 2 tape displays. Hardly a ringing endorsement.
At issue is the fact that we have had a spate of accidents over the last five years where the aircraft has crashed due to stalling, and the airspeed decay prior to the stall went unnoticed by the pilots. It is only accidents with these circumstances that are relevant.
Birgenair 301 does not count. It stalled, yes, but the airspeed indicators were misreading. WCA 708 also does not count, as the co-pilot was aware of the airspeed and had correctly diagnosed the stall. Austral Líneas Aéreas Flight 2553 also does not count, as it did not even stall.
NWA 6231 also does not count, as it too had misreading airspeed indicators.
In the last five years, we have had the following 4 high profile accidents. All have shared the relevant circumstances:
Colgan Air 3407,
Turkish 1951,
Air France 447,
Asiana 214
All of these aircraft had the airspeed tape. When we look at the accident record for the 30 years of commercial aviation with the big round dial for airspeed, we cannot find anything remotely resembling this current trend.
To my knowledge, there is only 1 accident to a round dial aircraft that possibly fits the circumstances. That was United Airlines 553, the B737-200 that stalled on final approach to Chicago Midway in 1972, but given that it was the inadvertent flap retraction that brought on the stall, there is the possibility that this accident too, may not count.
FGD, just a thought: Sully did OK with the tapes in a stressful situation. 
While I prefer round dials for the usual brain / peception channel reasons, acclimating to the tapes and using them may not be quite the tall order being advertised.
While I prefer round dials for the usual brain / peception channel reasons, acclimating to the tapes and using them may not be quite the tall order being advertised.
Dozy, in your analysis (#1107) you might have overlooked what question ‘interpretation’ was asking.
‘What is the accuracy of reading the speed value’ vs time is not the same as understanding the speed value in context, task, limit margin, rate of change, manoeuvre capability, altitude effects. As per FDG135 #1112.
Also, for context we should consider the background assumptions in design and operation; With/without auto flight, accuracy demands, workload, automation policies.
Airbus favours the use of automation as an entity; the accidents relating to this are dominated by system failure cases.
Boeing opt for flexibility, the pilot can choose, but not always with appropriate training or guidance to limit the situations which might be generated; thus accidents more likely involve operational implementation.
Also both manufactures have encountered the parallel problems of automation dependence; this involves much more than design or policies, individuals, etc, but also the changing operating environment and assumptions made by the planners.
With the Next Gen of GA aircraft, with tape EFIS, but perhaps without the same extent of automation, particularly autothrust, or even more so the lack of guidance and training, then whatch this space … Clandestino (#1121).
‘What is the accuracy of reading the speed value’ vs time is not the same as understanding the speed value in context, task, limit margin, rate of change, manoeuvre capability, altitude effects. As per FDG135 #1112.
Also, for context we should consider the background assumptions in design and operation; With/without auto flight, accuracy demands, workload, automation policies.
Airbus favours the use of automation as an entity; the accidents relating to this are dominated by system failure cases.
Boeing opt for flexibility, the pilot can choose, but not always with appropriate training or guidance to limit the situations which might be generated; thus accidents more likely involve operational implementation.
Also both manufactures have encountered the parallel problems of automation dependence; this involves much more than design or policies, individuals, etc, but also the changing operating environment and assumptions made by the planners.
With the Next Gen of GA aircraft, with tape EFIS, but perhaps without the same extent of automation, particularly autothrust, or even more so the lack of guidance and training, then whatch this space … Clandestino (#1121).
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Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
FGD, just a thought: Sully did OK with the tapes in a stressful situation.
While I prefer round dials for the usual brain / peception channel reasons, acclimating to the tapes and using them may not be quite the tall order being advertised.
While I prefer round dials for the usual brain / peception channel reasons, acclimating to the tapes and using them may not be quite the tall order being advertised.
Originally Posted by glendalegoon
Lonewolf_50
Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.
Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.
14. Despite being unable to complete the Engine Dual Failure checklist, the captain started the auxiliary power unit, which improved the outcome of the ditching by ensuring that a primary source of electrical power was available to the airplane and that the airplane remained in normal law and maintained the flight envelope protections, one of which protects against a stall.
15. The captain’s decision to ditch on the Hudson River rather than attempting to land at an airport provided the highest probability that the accident would be survivable.
16. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high angles-of-attack, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage.
17. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation.
15. The captain’s decision to ditch on the Hudson River rather than attempting to land at an airport provided the highest probability that the accident would be survivable.
16. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high angles-of-attack, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage.
17. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation.
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Actually, the NTSB report shows difficulty in maintaining a proper airspeed in the sully case.
Following incidents like these in the tape aircraft - where the flying pilot has survived - he should be asked how easy he found it to keep to a particular airspeed.
I bet I know what Sully's answer would have been. I think he wrote a book on it. Does he mention anything in his book?
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17. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation.
Probably much harder keeping a powerless C* aircraft on correct glide speed than one you can trim. For the C* aircraft (like the Airbus), about all you can do is set a nose low attitude and note the speed trend, then adjust from there and keep repeating the process.
For a a powerless jet that can be trimmed, trim to the desired speed, then avoid applying heavy forces on the yoke as you handle the rest of your problems.
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I think some here may be forgetting at least 2 things about the Miracle on the Hudson: first - that Sully was an accomplished glider pilot – and second - the “difficulties” in maintaining a constant, let alone the desirable, airspeed, were even more complicated by the fact that both engines were essentially at zero thrust, and the only way to control airspeed was to control the rate of descent – go down faster to increase airspeed – go down more slowly to reduce airspeed. That’s probably OK if you don’t care where you eventually get to the earth’s surface. However, in that Sully knew, within a reasonably short distance where he “had” to put the airplane down – “over this bridge but prior to the next bridge.” If you come down too fast, you will either splash-down too hard OR if you let a higher airspeed bleed off to reach a more logical (i.e., survivable) water touchdown, you’ll touchdown too close to that next bridge. I can’t tell you for sure as I haven’t talked with Sully, but I would imagine that he kept adjusting the pitch attitude to get down and to do so a rate of descent that would get him where on the river he wanted to be, AND at an airspeed that wouldn’t result in a stall or in such a horrific splashdown that passenger evacuation would be improbable. The result was quite likely seen as a rather “jittery” airspeed trace on the FDR – but that wasn’t the indication of a problem in being able to read the airspeed indication, that was the result of what Sully was deliberately and professionally trying to do - and he had to rely on being able to see, recognize, and understand what the airspeed was - throughout the entire ordeal - and he was using the only control he had to manage that airspeed - while, at the same time, properly managing the rate of descent to get where he wanted to be when he "had" to put it down.
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Asiana 214 crash
Original Asiana 214 threads are locked. This is a recently released tower video of crash and aftermath: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CHYg3gleQzA. Quite an interesting perspective and I'm sure it will be helpful for many groups.
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You can tell that from the video can you? That's some perception you have. There were significant forces involved in the incident. Of the twelve cabin crew, eight suffered serious injuries and 2 suffered minor injuries. Four cabin crew were ejected from the aircraft when the tail separated and two were temporarily trapped by evacuation slides that inflated inside the aircraft. I think the relative speed of evacuation in this particular case is one of the impressive aspects of the video.
The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.
The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.
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Theres a longer version of that video, actually showing the final approach and crash.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jvb_Tq0vZ10
You can tell that from the video can you? That's some perception you have. There were significant forces involved in the incident. Of the twelve cabin crew, eight suffered serious injuries and 2 suffered minor injuries. Four cabin crew were ejected from the aircraft when the tail separated and two were temporarily trapped by evacuation slides that inflated inside the aircraft. I think the relative speed of evacuation in this particular case is one of the impressive aspects of the video.
The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.
The video supports the investigation report finding that the person in command of firefighting had no aircraft rescue and firefighting training.
But according to video timecode, 4 minutes after the aircraft came to rest numerous passengers/crew were still exiting the forward slides.
Presumably delayed due to obstructions? Passenger injuries?
I would tend to agree that, even with the benefit of hindsight, there is much to be said about the firefighting aspect of this accident and that NTSB report is relatively tame on the subject. Bit surprising, would have expected a top notch response.
One of my coworkers was on that flight with his wife and teenage son. There were seated in roughly row 20, and were not hurt. We kidded him about being filmed carrying off luggage, and he pointed out that it wasn't their luggage; in fact they lost their laptops. Instead, he was carrying luggage which was blocking the aisle. He said that to the extent he could see toward the rear of the plane, the overheads had all opened and the aisles were severely blocked. In his view, the evacuation was quite expeditious considering the mess.