NTSB update on Asiana 214

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd

How ? Just a word on a display that one is not looking at at that time ? or maybe a warning light? maybe a horn? whatever, the eyes have to be taken off the job in hand and a computer screen scrutinised, buttons pressed, information read, understood and processed.

I believe EICAS warnings come with both aural and visual cues. Reading and interpreting the EICAS warning onscreen is the job of the PNF, so the PF just continues flying - no need for them to take their eyes off the job in hand.

Wot's esier than noticing a problem out of the corner of the eye and KNOWING INSTANTLY the problem whilst still controlling the task in hand?

With all due respect, the engine instrument cluster on the front panel of the 747 Classic would tell you *where* the problem was, but not *what* it is (or even what it might be) - you'd have to get the FE to look at their panel and try to make a judgement call before knowing what the source of the problem is. If EICAS (or ECAM on the Airbii) is doing its job properly - then the systems themselves will inform the PNF where the problem lies, what it is and in many cases (certainly in the case of ECAM) the correct drill to solve the issue. The PF doesn't need to stop paying full attention to flying the aircraft while that's happening.

40 years later I was teaching co-pilots, brought up on a diet of Space Invaders and Bill Gates' latest toy, who would fly an instrument let-down better that I ever could, or would ... then couldn't put a real aircraft on to the real Earth without assistance.

Again with respect, I think you're over-generalising. Certainly if blind pew's book is anything to go by, the ability gradient of FOs coming out of training has remained fairly consistent, and even back in the Hamble/Trident days (late '60s/early '70s) there were examples of cadets being fast-tracked into jetliners to recoup the company's training money as quickly as possible who maybe should not have been at that stage.

Originally Posted by FGD135

Dozy, that makes no difference. In fact, it makes no difference whether the human subjects are pilots or not - all humans will have the same problems with tapes. This is because of how our brains work.

I suspect you're taking certain conclusions as an absolute when they should not be. If I read those reports right, the (marginal) difference between perception of a raw tape display and the round dial was due to the change in angle being perceived a fraction more quickly - as such the modern PFDs like those in the image I posted have the (angled) VS indicator right next to the altimeter tape to take advantage of this. It is the perception of angle change - not the round dial display itself - which humans perceive slightly faster.

Here is that bit about Boeing again:

Right.
"They lacked relationships that were used extensively by pilots in performing flight tasks."

As I said before, this phrase misses the caveat that those pilots had been used to round dial displays for their entire careers, which would skew the results somewhat.

Then "This perception was strengthened by human factors research, which also concluded that, in general, moving scale displays are not as effective as moving pointer displays"

I'd want to see that research itself before blindly accepting the conclusions as a given.

I linked to that paper because it provided the best summary I could find of the Grether study, but the paper itself I have issues with in terms of several of its conclusions. For one thing it ignores the point that while the Boeing study related to the 744, the 757 and 767 had been using CRT-based PFDs for several years by that point. Boeing's 744 development team would have been very aware that a move to PFDs incurred a greater level (and therefore cost) of conversion training from the 747 Classic, and that in turn would have caused a greater resistance to switching to PFD from some of them.

20 needles that should all be pointing in the same direction, combined with a human eye and experience, is to me the most optimum relationship that we can have between man and machine.

To you, yes. A pilot who has spent all or most of their career with modern PFDs would probably feel differently. What was interesting about the original 1949 Grether study was that the experiments used a control group of non-pilots - so if we look at the summary:



You can see that round dial type "D" and tape display type "G" are roughly comparable in terms of percentage error and interpretation time (in fact the tape display seems superior to the dial in terms of percentage error). The interpretation time is interesting to compare because the non-pilots interpreted both in the same amount of time, but the AAF pilots interpreted the dial marginally faster. From this one could argue that the pilots' prior experience with the dial might have skewed the results.

Look at that picture of the A330 PFD that Dozy posted. I have complained about the size of the tiny patch in the middle of the airspeed tape before, but the VS indication area is even more tiny! (On that PFD design, anyway).

If what I've read is true, size isn't really that important - what makes up for it is that the *proximity* to the ALT tape is much closer. What this means is that - in theory - a scan of the right-hand side of the screen will tell you your current altitude as well as whether you're climbing, descending or neither at a glance. What the photo does not convey is that the VS indicator, as well as changing angle, changes colour from green to amber to red depending on the situation. Similar colour changes affect the digital display of the altitude and the airspeed when outside of the acceptable range. And as I said before, the presence of the various bugs that scroll alongside both tapes allows for "at-a-glance" proximity perception - it's not just reading numeric data as is assumed in some of the studies.

Originally Posted by oblivia

The history of commercial aviation to date is one of increasing automation, reduced cost and reduced real incomes for pilots. I don't think these things are unconnected and see no reason why further levels of automation would produce an opposite trend.

Right, but that situation is not faced by pilots alone - I'd go so far as to argue that it has, over the last 30 years, been the norm for almost all professions with the exception of management and finance. There's a widespread misconception that working in technology is a direct route to wealth and respect, and I can tell you as a software engineer of 14 years' standing that it is completely untrue. I know quite a few junior doctors that would tell you the same.

I can say to oblivia - as a techie with a fairly decent background education in the area - that pilotless airliners are probably not going to be a reality in my lifetime based on the current and projected abilities of technology. The claims regarding China and the developing nations are off-base too. If anything, China's population density would be a brake on that kind of development.

Going back to my previous point though, it's saddening that some pilots see technology as a threat in itself - it's not us tech engineers who benefit from daft corporate policy regarding use of automation and minimal training, in fact we're very much in the same boat as pilots (as are many professions which involve actually doing or making stuff). I'd point out that it suits management and "bean-counters" to have pilots see technology and automation as the enemy, because pilots' enmity gets directed towards us techies and not them.

[AirRabbit]

First safetypee let me say that I very much appreciate the questions/positions you’ve posted. While I’ll certainly attempt to be a bit more explanatory, I think I must explain that this is a subject that is both broad and deep, and therefore, does not lend itself very easily to discussions on an internet forum – in fact, books and books have been written and/or planned on this or similar topics – and one would grow weary in wading through all that “stuff.” I know. I’ve done it. And, I’ve done it on more than one occasion. I don’t believe that the only way we can move forward is by looking backwards.

Of course, being aware of previously committed errors is only good practice – and will hopefully prevent committing those errors yet again. What I’m advocating is an overhaul of how we approach training – and ensuring – to our best ability – that each pilot we train is provided all the aspects of rule-based behaviors, knowledge-based behaviors, and skill-based behaviors … and in do so, that we provide all of the cueing aspects that are available in an operating airplane – by that I mean the cues provided by motion, visual, sound, and feel systems on today’s flight simulation equipment. AND I have to apologize up front for the length of the following – bear with me – or if there is a lot of grumbling, I promise to take extra precautions to avoid such verbosity in the future. Of course, if you have any questions or comments – let me know.

Let me start with the concept that I’ve attempted to describe on this forum at several times previously … having to do with each of us having our own preferences in what to use, how to use, how to interpret what it is we each use, in order to accomplish any given task in an airplane. In several instances I’ve offered my own personal explanation on “how to land an airplane.” That is a pretty straight forward task – every pilot lands airplanes – every pilot does it quite well at least some of the time, and we’ve all had landings that none of us would want ANYone to remember! So, as an instructor, how does one teach another pilot “how to land the airplane?”

Most instructor pilots (well, maybe not most, but certainly some … I think it’s most, but I don’t know “most” instructors) will tell their student what they believe that student should know and that comes primarily from what that instructor “knows.” The most logical follow-on is to attempt to have that student use the same cues, to the same degree, in the same order, to accomplish the same thing. Sounds simple. If it were possible to have each student do exactly that, each time, all the time, every pilot would be making very satisfactory landings all of the time. However, we all know how accurate that statement is.

Personally, I come from the perspective that each of us is an individual first – and foremost. It just so happens that we’ve all decided to get into the aviation business for one reason or another. But, what I think we sometimes forget is that individuality is always present. And, it is present to the extent that it will raise its attitudes and rely on its understandings to the extent that we will even attempt to take some newly introduced task or procedure or understanding and force it through our prism of “individuality” until we are satisfied that we “have it.” But, what we have is only a “version” of what was originally offered – at least in many, if not most, cases.

Of course there are some aspects of almost any task, procedure, or understanding that are based in hard, cold fact – regardless of how we attempt to modify that/those fact(s), we will inevitably be bound by the hard, cold fact. Let me give you an example.

Airplanes are designed to actually “land” when they are in the level flight attitude for the existing gross weight, configuration, and the associated airspeed. We could disregard the airspeed issue if we were attempting to land on Roger’s Dry Lake Bed in the Mojave Desert of Kern County, California, USA. To give you an idea of the size of this long-time used airplane testing facility … there are seven runways "drawn on" the hard-packed dry lake bed, crisscrossing the surface of Rogers, with the longest extending 7½ miles – which is just a bit less than 40,000 feet. It wouldn’t likely be that we would “overrun” a runway that is 40,000 feet long. But, because we don’t have runways quite that long as a normal situation, we DO have to be aware of and fly the appropriate airspeed.

To go a bit further, and to provide an example of the kind of individuality concerns I believe should be taken into consideration – the following is a post I’ve previously posted in on the forum:

How to Land an Airplane
(This primarily addresses transport category or commuter category airplanes … but the basic premise is applicable to every airplane with wings.)

On short final with wings level and the airplane configured for landing, the airspeed should be at the recommended approach speed – which should be VREF plus any appropriate additive. If VREF speed is not stated, 1.3Vso should be used (where Vso is the calibrated power-off stall speed of the airplane in the landing configuration … usually with a forward CG). However, and importantly, the airspeed flown on the final approach, starting at the Final Approach Fix (FAF), should be above VREF … more specifically, the pilot should add ½ of the headwind component value (… but never less than 5 knots – for safety considerations) … plus all of any wind-gust value reported.

As the runway threshold is approached, the added headwind component should be allowed to bleed off while retaining the wind-gust value, such that when crossing the threshold the airspeed should be VREF plus only that wind-gust value. The height of the airplane when over the threshold should be at or very slightly above the minimum threshold crossing height (TCH). Normally, for transport category airplanes, this height is between 50 and 80 feet. From over the threshold, the position toward which the pilot should fly the airplane is a point on the runway surface about 2/3 of the way between the threshold and the painted “aiming point markings” at the 1000 foot point down the runway – we used to call these painted blocks, the “fixed distance markers.” For reference, the pilot should know that the point to which the airplane is actually being flown is that point that does not move “up” or “down” in the windscreen. During this portion of the final approach, the airplane will continue to descend through those remaining 50 to 80 feet toward that aiming point. However, prior to descending that entire distance, the airplane’s rate of descent should be slowed, and brought to the “level flight attitude.” This task is called the “flare.”

The “flare” should be initiated at a point above the runway that will allow a continuously increasing back pressure on the elevator controls to move the nose up to a level flight attitude … and, in case you didn’t already know, the landing attitude I’m describing is the attitude it would take if you were to continue flight down the runway at THAT height above the runway … without accelerating, without decelerating, without climbing, and without descending. Of course, to do this, it would be necessary to adjust the power to maintain THAT airspeed and a very careful control of both pitch and bank to ensure that the airplane tracks down the centerline of the runway – again without climbing, without descending, without accelerating, and without decelerating – and, in case you forgot, this is the definition of “straight and level flight at a constant airspeed.

This cannot be accomplished if the airplane is NOT in a level flight attitude. It is this “level flight attitude” that I am driven to have you be able to recognize and find again – time after time after time. Also, there are 2 specifics that I would ask you to meet … first, this “level flight attitude” should be achieved with the main landing gear between one (1) and five (5) feet above the runway surface (about 1 foot for the smaller machines and about 5 feet for the bigger machines - yeah, I know, that’s not much height, but, after all, you ARE striving to be a professional … right?), and second, this change in the attitude from when you initiate the flare to reaching the flare attitude should take just about 3 seconds (about 2 seconds for the smaller machines and about 4 seconds for the larger machines).

Under normal circumstances, during the last portion of the final approach, the power will have been held relatively constant, and as the flare is initiated – and no later than upon reaching the level flight attitude – the power will be gradually reduced toward the idle position. The power should be in “idle” at the time of the main landing gear touchdown – and if it is not yet at idle when the gear touches, at that point the throttles will be reduced the remainder of the way to the idle position.

HOWEVER, before we get to that part, and in order to get sufficient practice in determining how you can best determine the rate and magnitude of the control applications and the attitude you want to see at the end of the flare, I would normally have you plan on leveling the airplane at that one (1) to five (5) feet above the runway (yes, you read that correctly!) and from there to maintain the airspeed you’ve reached when airplane reaches that level flight attitude (and you read that correctly, as well) … AND I would ask you to ACTUALLY fly the airplane the full length of the remaining runway – at that altitude and at that airspeed.

For this specific training application, I would have you advance the power to maintain that indicated airspeed (the speed achieved at the end of the flare – which will mean that you’ll have to add a slight bit of power – but I’d even volunteer to help you do that) and then you would fly down the entire length of the remaining runway – understanding that we’d execute a normal missed approach just prior to reaching the runway end. Again, you would maintain the altitude achieved at the end of the flare, and you would maintain the airspeed achieved at the end of the flare; again, without climbing / without descending / without accelerating / without decelerating.

Additionally, there is a very good likelihood that I’d ask you to do this same maneuver several times (4 or 5 times probably) – and depending on your adaptability, we might do it again the next time we fly. The point I’m making here, with this post, is that what I’ve just described is the actualization of my point of ensuring the student uses whatever is easiest for him/her to grasp. Note that I did not say, “flare to X degrees of attitude” … I did not say “flare to put the departure end of the runway 2 inches above the bottom of the forward windscreen” … I did not say “flare to put the bottom of the side window at a 15 degree angle with the side of the runway,” … I did not say “flare to put the vertical speed indicator needle just on the top of the ‘zero’ reference” …and so on. I want the pilot to determine the most definitive way to determine the attitude he/she needs to maintain that level flight attitude, AND what kind of control applications (pressure and or magnitude) will achieve the desired corrections – presuming corrections are necessary – and they usually are. We would do this exercise until the pilot finds the way he/she best achieves the parameters I’ve defined.

When we’ve achieved the goal of determining when, how, how much, of whatever controls are required to move the airplane from the final approach condition to the “landing attitude” (and that’s what we’ve been doing), now we’ll go back to the power reduction – initiated with the initiation of the flare – but not any later than the main landing gear touchdown. The attitude will remain constant, but with the power reduction – and ensuing decrease in airspeed – the nose of the airplane will want to descend. We would discuss NOT letting that happen. The flare puts you into the landing (i.e., touchdown) attitude. With the increase in elevator back pressure – gained by additional elevator surface deflection (but NOT a change in the position of the nose of the airplane!) the airplane will rate of airspeed deceleration will increase, and the rate of descent will also increase. The idea is to have the main landing gear touchdown within the first 3,000 feet OR within the first 1/3 of the runway length, whichever is shorter! If the pilot recognizes that the landing may not occur within these parameters, immediate consideration for executing a “go-around” must be made.

If the above tasks have been mastered and are able to be repeated, there is very little likelihood that the touchdown will be delayed beyond the touchdown zone. Of course, any release of the elevator back pressure currently being held, will almost immediately result in Main Landing Gear contact with the runway. The normal touchdown will be noticed as a bit on the “firm” side (but not “hard”) and is exactly what is desired to ensure positive tire contact with the runway surface in the event of rain or snow accumulation. Of course, any slippery runway conditions will require appropriate aerodynamic and/or ground control to be used as soon as practicable.

Additionally, in the event a crosswind is present, as the flare altitude is approached, the airplane should be in an “angled” position relative to the runway surface, sometimes called a “crab,” such that a point on the belly of the airplane exactly between the main gear (between the body gear the larger machines) is over the runway centerline and the airplane is tracking to maintain this lateral position. In anticipation of landing, power reduction may begin as early as crossing the threshold, and power reduction should begin no later than achieving the “flare” attitude prior to touchdown. Most pilots start the power reduction AS the flare is initiated … and is the same point any crab alignment with the runway centerline is initiated. The rate of power reduction is entirely up to you (and/or your company) … but once started, power reduction should be continued all the way to the flight idle position.

This will reduce the likelihood of having to increase or decrease the rate of back pressure control on the column/stick to continue the flare and subsequently to achieve “level flight” attitude (yes, THAT level flight attitude) as the power reduction is continued. The power should be in the idle position no later than upon main gear touchdown – simply because with some airplanes equipped with auto-spoiler activation/deactivation, having the throttles physically positioned ahead of the spoiler auto-retract position may initiate spoiler extension when the landing gear contacts the runway surface, and then experience immediate spoiler retraction due to that throttle position … which is certainly not something you want at this point.

As you pull the throttle(s) back, you will notice the nose getting heavier – don’t let the nose move down. You will notice the necessity to continually, but slightly, increase the back pressure on the elevator controls … initially to move the nose from the position in which you have been holding it while approaching the flare initiation point, up to that level flight position (more on that in a moment), and once that attitude has been achieved, you will notice the necessity to continue that back pressure increase – no longer to move the nose up – but now, since the level flight attitude has been reached, in order to maintain that level flight attitude as the airspeed decreases – and the more the airspeed decreases, the more back pressure will be required to keep that level flight attitude.

Of course you would recognize that because you have been reducing the throttle(s) position AND you’ve been raising the pitch attitude, the airspeed will be decreasing. Because you will have been reducing the power (maybe to idle) the airspeed will continue to decelerate, and the airplane will continue to descend, going from just above the runway to ON the runway. When performed precisely and accurately, the touchdown will occur exactly AS the airplane reaches that level flight attitude. BUT, and very importantly – humans are rarely perfect – and performing this task to that degree of accuracy is not regularly accomplished – but it IS accomplished – and the more you practice doing this, the more you will be successful in doing it perfectly.

Your touchdown should be firm but not hard. The kinetic energy of the airplane should be moving in the right direction, and the nose should be able to be flown to the runway rather quickly as the attitude will not be unnecessarily high to arrest an unwanted high sink rate. You should be over the center of the runway, with the controls already properly positioned for the landing run. Also, you should be acutely aware of the fact that the longer the power is maintained above the idle position, the farther down the runway it will be that the main gear will actually touch the runway surface.

If you had been carrying a crab angle to counter a crosswind, the crab should be removed in exactly the same time as the flare takes – i.e., approximately 3 seconds – and should be done AS the airplane is being flared. This is done by applying pressure to the rudder pedal to pressure (do not "kick") the nose around to line up the airplane centerline with the centerline of the runway while simultaneously increasing the back pressure on the control column to flare. As you probably know, because of the forward sweep of the upwind wing when removing the “crab” will tend to make that wing rise, it may be necessary to counter with some “into-the-wind” aileron to counter that … but, unless the wind is quite strong, you won’t be in the air long enough to have the wind blow you downwind off the centerline. Of course, if the wind IS quite strong, you may have to add a bit more aileron to slightly (very slightly) dip the up-wind wing into that wind (of course, referencing any flight manual requirement for maximum wing down applications on landings).

I probably do not need to say that once all the landing gear are on the ground and the airplane is tracking down the runway, immediately ensure the throttle(s) is(are) in idle, extend ground spoilers, apply appropriate wheel brakes, and use reverse thrust as your operations manual dictates.

Let me offer a quick “aside” … for practice … I would probably have you “fly down the runway … at THAT flare altitude … no climb, no descent, no acceleration, no deceleration;” and I’d tell you that “we’ll go around at the end of the runway.” If there had been a crosswind present, I would have you keep the crab angle you established and tell you to fly down the runway with no climb, no descent, no faster, no slower, keeping that point on the belly of the airplane exactly over the runway centerline – and to do that with whatever crab angle you need to do it. Of course, with or without a crosswind present … you’d have to add a bit of power – since you likely would have had the throttles back, but I would allow you to do that since we wouldn’t be landing anyway. I’d have you do this exercise as many times as was necessary to get you comfortable with the timing as to when to initiate the flare, how quickly to flare, and to what attitude you need to stop the flare with the main gear just off the runway surface – and the key point would be to have you use whatever cues made sense to YOU to accomplish all these things.

This would enable you to recognize and become familiar with your position … know how to recognize when to start the flare … and get comfortable with how quickly you need to adjust the elevator controls to achieve the flare you desire … and, perhaps most importantly, have you recognize what attitude you should have at the end of the flare … using whatever cues are important and understandable … to YOU – and again, the attitude we are discussing is called the LEVEL FLIGHT ATTITUDE – which is THE attitude from which all airplanes should be landed – and I mean ALL airplanes! One more thing ... this exercise can be successfully accomplished in most higher level simulators ... and because of the inevitable deficiencies (regardless of how minor) that exist in the simulated environment, there may be some slight modification required to the cues you will use when landing the airplane as opposed to the simulator - and if it is necessary, go ahead and make that/those adjustment(s) ... with the practice you've had in the simulator, it should be a reasonably easy adjustment to your recognition processes.

Clearly, while I stand by what I’ve said here, and I’ve practiced it throughout my career, as you probably have heard me say, over and over, all of the above is my opinion, and does not reflect the position of any other individual, any company, any enterprise, or any agency … despite whatever desire I may have to the contrary.

[ExSp33db1rd]

DozyWannabe ...

Again, with respect I think you're over generalizing ....

I wouldn't disagree, but there was a trend and I wasn't the only Old Fart to remark upon it.

(Also ... Sorry about my Maths. it was more like 30 years, not 40 !! )

[andrasz]

I think the airplane load of passengers at the mercy of an autonomous computer is still some distance in the future.

A very long way...

And not because of the lack of technical capabilities (let's face it, already most large commercial aircraft out there, if properly set up, could be landed by anybody with the simple instruction 'don't touch it'...), but because the balance of risks and associated expenses.

I'm not a pilot but one of those usually referred to as engaged in doing arithmetic involving the seeds of a certain legume species. In the past I have been involved in designing and operating a very complex automated data extraction systems. One of the key realisations during the project was that you can design a good robust software that handles 99% of the envisioned scenarios (lets not speak of the un-envisioned ones), but to automate the remaining 1% will take 9x the effort so far (directly translating into cost), and the result will still have an unacceptable error rate (which was defined as less than one error for every 1,000 processing events). The solution was to design a system with a human operator to handle and decide upon exceptions, with automation aiding to spot errors and correct manually. This achieved an error rate better than 1 in 10k events.

The scenario in aviation is similar. We have reliable automation to handle 99% of scenarios, and the pilots are there to cope with the remaining 1% and monitor what the automation is doing and take control if needed. That is not going to change, simply because the potential error rate (and the associated costs) with a remote pilot or full automation is too high to be acceptable. Military drones is another story - there the increased payload and reduced complexity for 99% of missions provides more savings than the cost of losing 1% (or less) of expendable airframes.

[oblivia]

@Air Rabbit

Everything you say makes sense and is totally reasonable, and I of course am a total layman with unsophisticated thoughts on the subject — motivated largely by a boyish desire to have a go on a robot plane (and to spitefully deny pilots the opportunity to fly for a living).

But to bring it back to the discussion at hand... even with today's technology this 777 could in fact have landed itself just fine, right? Is there a safety argument for not doing that more often?

My suspicion is that pilots, perfectly understandably, prefer to fly landings themselves. But is pilot preference really the best way to make such decisions? And is safety the guiding factor?

Humans will always have the same flaws, but computers just keep getting better. I'm not convinced that the human added value will stay above zero forever.

As for us passengers, we can't see you guys anyway. Our experience would be near identical, so hardly the same leap of faith as letting a robot cut you open with no doctors present! Most of us tend to assume that you're just sitting up there playing on your iPads anyway.

[roulishollandais]

Reliability of 99% is OK for an ordinary toy.

[blind pew]

Dozy and air rabbit enjoyed your posts...would have liked to have been taught to land an aircraft like that but.....more like pitch up to X degrees, close throttles and wait for the thump....lower the nose ...but not too fast and keep straight.

Oblivia...there are times when I have been so nackered that I've preferred that the automatics or the other guy did the landing.
Fatigue has a huge amount to play in accidents but the remedy is expensive so it is often sidelined.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by oblivia

@Air Rabbit

Everything you say makes sense and is totally reasonable, and I of course am a total layman with unsophisticated thoughts on the subject — motivated largely by a boyish desire to have a go on a robot plane (and to spitefully deny pilots the opportunity to fly for a living).

Believe it or not I understand your comment about wanting to “spitefully deny” pilots the opportunity to earn a living by flying airplanes, and I might have had the same feelings had I not had the opportunity to do just that … however (and it is a significant however), having such a feeling today is not necessary (at least for a good portion of today’s pilots) because the pittance often tendered would not likely be misinterpreted as a “living wage” in many cases.

Originally Posted by oblivia

But to bring it back to the discussion at hand... even with today's technology this 777 could in fact have landed itself just fine, right? Is there a safety argument for not doing that more often?

The simple response to this interrogatory, obviously, is YES. However, there are a couple of prerequisites that would have to have been in place for that to have happened. The flight crew would have had to allow adequate time, and flight distance, to descend, to configure and slow the airplane accordingly; tune and identify the appropriate navigation receivers; set the appropriate airspeed and heading references; set, ensure that the appropriate systems (i.e., autopilot, auto-throttle, and any other required/suggested systems) are correct, and properly engaged; compute appropriate go-around settings (speed, altitude, heading) with a full understanding of where any missed approach would take them; and then, at the appropriate times and locations, make appropriate adjustments to any of these systems/settings that may be appropriate or required depending on the heading, altitude, airspeed directions received and subsequent approach/landing clearances and requirements are issued. Typically in such circumstances, the flight crew would be well advised to “pre-think” the next logical set of instructions or clearances that are likely to be issued – maintaining both positional and situational awareness, typically through recognizing and understanding the clearances/updates issued to any preceding airplanes, as well as the responses from those other airplanes in the traffic area.

This kind of cockpit/pilot activity is quite typical of experienced flight crews, when not flying a specifically cleared “instrument approach” (which is sometimes asked for – even in CAVU weather conditions – primarily to ensure a minimum of “thinking errors” after a long flight at the end of a longer work day. Should the pilot flying elect to manually fly the descent, traffic pattern, approach, and landing, it is fully logical to presume that all of the above kinds of issues would have to be addressed and then followed, pretty closely to the manner in which the automatic systems would be expected to do, except that the pilot flying would have manual control of the flight controls and throttles. The typical advantage to manually conducted approaches (in addition to the obvious point that manually flying an airplane in a safe and efficient manner is also quite a bit of fun) is that when it may become available to do so, some of the “rigid corners” that are typically flown under “radar control” can be foreshortened to the extent that the airplane can often be landed some 12 to 20 minutes earlier than the more formalized and “squared” radar contact methodology – without compromising one bit of safety and perhaps saving a bit of flight time on the airframe, running time on the engines, and a commensurate reduction in the fuel quantity used – all of which translates to corporate cost savings.

Originally Posted by oblivia

My suspicion is that pilots, perfectly understandably, prefer to fly landings themselves. But is pilot preference really the best way to make such decisions? And is safety the guiding factor?

Of course, it is no secret that pilots – at least most of them that I know, personally – like the idea of flying. And, in that regard, taking off and landing are easily the 2 most “pilot-like” activities they get to accomplish. I know I would plead guilty to that concept. I am not at all sure that the decision to program the automatic systems and then allow those systems to “land the airplane” is measurably “more safe” than having a competent and qualified pilot perform those same tasks. If there were such a “safety-measurement” ever to be objectively developed, there might be an effort mounted to adjust the regulatory requirements accordingly. However, the more the “automatics” are inserted and the more the “manual” aspects are eliminated – the greater the amount of confidence in the error-free operation of those automatic systems has to be able to be depended upon.

As we’ve said previously in other threads in this and in other categories, while computerized systems are becoming better and better at what they are designed to do ... however, and with no “tongue-in-cheek” attitude on my part, computers DO NOT think … they merely compare sensed values to the degree of accuracy provided by whatever sensors are used and the transmission capabilities of the connections, where those sensed values are compared to what has been previously set - either by the system’s programmers during development and assembly or by one or more of the crew members aboard that flight.

However, even with all of the attempts to incorporate “redundantly comparative” loops in such programming, the bottom line remains essentially unchanged - computers do not think. Computers do not look out front and make decisions as to what is likely to happen or what course of action would be the least interruptive to the flight path of the airplane. Computers ONLY compare what is sensed to what has been programmed – and, then, first - within the parameters previously programmed into that computer and then, second - within the availability and extent of the authority granted to that computer response, will insert some amount of control (and/or power) adjustment, until what is then sensed and compared to what has been programmed, and then the computer follows another set of pre-programmed responses – retain the control application, reduce that application to ½ the value (or some other factor), return the control application to the initial position, etc. Of course, those sampling and comparison rates are substantially faster than what can be accomplished by humans. However, the computer’s primary DISADVANTAGE is its inability to think, plan, and establish alternatives that might be equally or more advantageous when their activation is required or implemented.

Originally Posted by oblivia

Humans will always have the same flaws, but computers just keep getting better. I'm not convinced that the human added value will stay above zero forever.

Of course, I understand the premise you describe. However, I think you’d have to agree that the “thinking ability” of humans, in that this is what is responsible for whatever has been developed and/or improved in the computer world as we know it today. Equally true, as long as this remains a fact, I cannot see how computers will ever be "better" than the human who developed it. Faster? Sure! ... but Better? No way! Now, if you’re advocating either the possibility or the inevitability of computers designing, constructing, and developing even better computers than humans have or will have in the future, it might be more advantageous for you to spend your time in discussions with the likes of Lionel Fanthorpe, Mercedes Lackey, Piers Anthony, or Isaac Asimov.

Originally Posted by oblivia

As for us passengers, we can't see you guys anyway. Our experience would be near identical, so hardly the same leap of faith as letting a robot cut you open with no doctors present! Most of us tend to assume that you're just sitting up there playing on your iPads anyway.

Well, I don’t think that is necessarily so … at least the few times I have been subjected to “a doctor’s knife” … and in those cases, the last person I saw beforehand was either the paramedic or the floor nurse, and I didn’t meet the doctor until well after the surgery was complete – nor do I have any memory of being IN an operating room … and THAT’s the way I prefer it (thank you very much!). But, I went into the process with a full awareness that someone who had passed all sorts of training and tests, and that someone else who had a similar background and capability, actually certified this person to exercise the authority and competency to wield that knife over (and into) the only body I’ll ever have! No … I think that we’re a least a modicum of time away from turning over surgery to Doctor Automoton and “IT’S” staff of equally robotic nurses and aides. When I stop to think that the first humans who had to have limbs removed or wounds to stitch-up or similar human tragic negatives some 7,000 to 10,000 years ago – and recognizing that while the equipment those kinds of folks use has gotten bigger (or smaller – when necessary), sharper, and better – and the knowledge of the person wielding those instruments is obviously and vastly more educated, trained, and tested … it surely seems to me that we’re some additional 7 to 10 thousand, hundred thousand, million (where to stop?) years before computers are likely to be on a “par” with humans … despite the Television and Movie Theater repeated attempts to convince us otherwise.

Originally Posted by blind pew

there are times when I have been so nackered that I've preferred that the automatics or the other guy did the landing.
Fatigue has a huge amount to play in accidents but the remedy is expensive so it is often sidelined.

Just a quick comment (and, for me, THAT is saying something!) I think that recognizing when and under what circumstances turning to the automatic systems for descent, approach, and landing is an exceptionally confident thing to do. In my book, that level of confidence is more than just “likely” to be justified, as I believe it indicates that this person is quite comfortable with his/her professional abilities and is not dependent on others to recognize and comment on it, including the status of their mental acuity and physical ability. Just like executing a missed approach … some pilots would “never” consider missing the approach for fear that it might tarnish his/her reputation. I believe that a pilot who has such recognition of his/her own skills and abilities, can, and more importantly, WILL, objectively decide to reject the continuation of an approach that may have begun to deteriorate, is a pilot I would have on my payroll at any time! The same thing holds true for those who recognize their own mental acuity and physical ability as likely being a slight bit slower than normal (due to a myriad of reasons, but fatigue is certainly one of them) – is the mark of a true professional who has to make NO apologies for exercising what he/she KNOWS to be the right decision.

By the way - I've spent quite a bit of time in the UK - and I thought I had the "vernacular" pretty well understood ... but, I admit that I had to turn to a truly "English" dictionary to learn about the term "nackered!" At least I can point to the fact that even at my advanced state of ... well ... never mind about that ... at least I'm still able to Learn something new .... thanks.

[RayCee]

AirRabbit 1066

I loved that read!
That is exactly the procedure my instructor used when I was training for CPL, he hated sloppy flares with a passion.
Every dual outing, over and over. Then he started narrowing the alt and AS limits and then having to do the same procedure at night, and in a full crosswind. (Without landing)
I never had much trouble with landing attitude since, whatever I flew.

[Tee Emm]

The power should be in “idle” at the time of the main landing gear touchdown – and if it is not yet at idle when the gear touches, at that point the throttles will be reduced the remainder of the way to the idle position.

The throttles might be against the idle stop when the gear touches but the engine power will certainly not be at idle power because it takes a finite time for the RPM to reduce to idle N1. In fact to get the best out of immediate reverse thrust on touch down one method is to touch down with approach thrust still applied then at the moment of touch down close the throttles against the idle stop and select full reverse as quickly as possible. This takes into account that by the time the reverser sleeves are full open the N1 is still well above idle N1 and spool up time is significantly less. In turn this means reaching full reverse power more quickly (highly desirable) than happens if idle N1 is first reached before the spool up process starts to happen

[safetypee]

AirRabbit, thank you for the detailed comments (#1066). Many of my questions were rhetorical, inviting thought (which you provided), and consideration of the human task in these scenarios.

The detailed description of how to land is just that – a description; this is valuable theory, but not knowledge in application (in context). Knowledge should be based on theory but also requires the action skills of when (or not) to apply the theory.
Landing is one of many aspects of flying which involves tacit knowledge – those skills which cannot be taught from a book, only by demonstration, by doing, and then improving, gaining experience.
There may be weaknesses in these areas, but choosing one aspect or the other for accident resolution might not have considered where or how the significant aspects in accidents arise.

The vast majority of operations are extremely safe. Many of the contributing factors in accidents are within the regulatory assumptions, and also noting that crews had met the training requirements. Thus why require more of what already exists. We should be asking what contributes to the rare circumstances which lead to accidents – human variability? We could consider eliminating variability, but equally must not to forget how often we rely on variability to maintain safety and an economic operation. Instead of seeking to zero variability, we might better bound it – understand the performance spread in operations, rethink regulations and requirements for human tasks, and then look at systems and environment interactions.

Flying would be very boring if all approaches and landings were consistent – lacking the challenge of variability

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by Tee Emm

The power should be in “idle” at the time of the main landing gear touchdown – and if it is not yet at idle when the gear touches, at that point the throttles will be reduced the remainder of the way to the idle position.

The throttles might be against the idle stop when the gear touches but the engine power will certainly not be at idle power because it takes a finite time for the RPM to reduce to idle N1. In fact to get the best out of immediate reverse thrust on touch down one method is to touch down with approach thrust still applied then at the moment of touch down close the throttles against the idle stop and select full reverse as quickly as possible. This takes into account that by the time the reverser sleeves are full open the N1 is still well above idle N1 and spool up time is significantly less. In turn this means reaching full reverse power more quickly (highly desirable) than happens if idle N1 is first reached before the spool up process starts to happen

I am more than a little disappointed in this attitude. While the physics of what is described here may be generally correct, at least to some, it leaves far too many “negatives” open for possible (and likely?) occurrence.

1. Because the distance from the threshold to the touchdown point is simply matter of speed and time, retaining the thrust used during the final approach all the way to touchdown will lengthen the touchdown point substantially. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

2. Touching down with same thrust maintained during the final approach would require the touchdown attitude to be one where the nose is well below that normally achieved for landing – which increases the potential of the nose gear touching down prior to the main gear. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

3. Touching down with substantially higher airspeed significantly increases the potential of a “touchdown skip,” or becoming airborne immediately thereafter. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

4. Should the airplane actually skip back into the air simultaneously with the pilot selecting full reverse thrust, there is an increased possibility of not having the main gear triggering of the thrust reverser lock-outs to be completely released. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

5. If the one or more of the thrust reverser lock-outs are not released, one (or more) of the engines may not have the reversers deployed while at least some (perhaps all?) of the engines are being fed an increased fuel flow. Depending on the rigging and the touchdown firmness, there is a substantially increase potential for experiencing an increasing asymmetrical thrust potential, complicating both directional control and the aerodynamically controlled pitch attitude. Should that pitch control be negatively affected, either the tail may strike the runway surface, or the airplane may reach the critical AoA and could aerodynamically stall. Real potential for unacceptable outcome.

6. If the skip is immediate (which is more likely with any increase in airspeed) and if all the reverser lock-outs are retained as the pilot, now futilely, attempts to increase reverse thrust, the airplane momentum (which in addition to continuing to move forward) will be increasing in pitch attitude but without any increase in engine thrust. This must necessarily result in at least one of three outcomes; 1) an increasing pitch attitude, a decreasing airspeed, but no increase in height above the runway, resulting in a tail strike; 2) an increasing height above the runway, no increase in pitch, resulting in an aerodynamic stall; or 3) in response to either the increasing pitch or the increasing height, the pilot releases all, or most, of the currently held elevator-up control, allowing the nose to drop, precipitously, resulting in a nose-gear-first re-contact with the runway, resulting in an increase downward pivot, driving the main gear down and also onto the runway. It would be complete conjecture to attempt to predict whether or not the pilot could immediately attempt to stow the thrust reversers, unlocking the throttle advance interlock, advance the power, and adjust the flight controls to maintain a flyable attitude at whatever airspeed is current, and safely recover the airplane. Real potential for unbelievably unacceptable outcome.

Would any of the above potentials actually occur? I sincerely doubt that anyone knows the answer. However, it is certainly true that the potential for any one, or any combination, of the above outcomes is certainly increased should a pilot elect to follow the procedures described here. That is not the way pilots are trained and it is not the way most pilots operate their airplane. Certainly, the only way to totally prevent airplane accidents is to put all airplanes in a hangar and lock the door. HOWEVER, the risks that are inherent with aviation have long-been examined, and reasonable procedures, practices, and policies have been examined, altered, refined, and implemented. We’ve come too far to cavalierly toss together some knowledge pieces and convince ourselves that we’ve discovered a new and better “wheel.”

To me it’s way too much like some of the “Do You Believe It” television programs that capitalize on the almost hilariously comedic, and at least bordering on tragic, “stunts-gone-wrong” that a whole series of "someones" have caught on film or video. I think that most of us would (certainly I do) wind up wincing in our seats, audibly uttering “OH!” or “OUCH!” when we observe the results of the “devil-may-care-attitudes” that must have been present in the minds of the persons (who at least appear to be young and likely woefully inexperienced persons) who deliberately attempt such stunts while very likely being fully aware of the potential outcomes.

I would hope that as professional aviators none of us would disregard the safety factors that have been (or should have been) driven into our thought process and throw caution into the wind in favor of gambling that the “physics” of a potential “stunt” could work if precisely conducted, while not knowing for sure that all of the associated parts and pieces will work precisely as designed and are not troubled with any wear or tear or fatigue that might exist. Has anyone ever heard the oft repeated and sarcastic lament "shoulda, coulda, woulda" ?? I won’t do it – and no one on any airplane over which I have any influence will do it – THAT is for sure!

[Chronus]

APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES IN
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE FLIGHT
Warren R. Duji-ene, Jr., Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern

Universig, Ft. Lauderdale, FL.

The full text of the above paper may be found at

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...0040082071.pdf

Here are a couple of extracts from the paper.

Current research efforts are looking at
advancing the UAV to full autonomous operation
and flight. While there seem to be many definitions
of what the autonomy encompasses, each discipline

has highlighted its meaning and benefits.

These systems attempted to formulate
the art of flying an aircraft into logical series of
events to maintain control of specific functions of
the aircraft. This concept will still be a key

component with systems designed for future use.

Porterhouse may be aware of the work currently being undertaken in AI and UAV`s.

There seems to be no mention in any of the current research studies involving Air Rabbit`s balsa wood craft as replacement for the space shuttle.

The researcher`s description of piloting as an "art"as being the key concept , is perhaps note worthy.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by safetypee

Many of my questions were rhetorical, inviting thought (which you provided), and consideration of the human task in these scenarios.

The detailed description of how to land is just that – a description; this is valuable theory, but not knowledge in application (in context). Knowledge should be based on theory but also requires the action skills of when (or not) to apply the theory.
Landing is one of many aspects of flying which involves tacit knowledge – those skills which cannot be taught from a book, only by demonstration, by doing, and then improving, gaining experience.
There may be weaknesses in these areas, but choosing one aspect or the other for accident resolution might not have considered where or how the significant aspects in accidents arise.

The vast majority of operations are extremely safe. Many of the contributing factors in accidents are within the regulatory assumptions, and also noting that crews had met the training requirements. Thus why require more of what already exists. We should be asking what contributes to the rare circumstances which lead to accidents – human variability? We could consider eliminating variability, but equally must not to forget how often we rely on variability to maintain safety and an economic operation. Instead of seeking to zero variability, we might better bound it – understand the performance spread in operations, rethink regulations and requirements for human tasks, and then look at systems and environment interactions.

Flying would be very boring if all approaches and landings were consistent – lacking the challenge of variability

Hi safetypee:

Of course my post consists entirely of my thoughts … but those are the processes I’ve personally used to train more than a few pilots on how to land an airplane (from small SE recips; to swept wing, single/tandem seat “fast-jets,” to some of the largest jet transports in the air) – not simple theoretical thoughts or expressions of thought. These procedures work and for the most part, work quite well. Of course, after a student goes on about his/her professional career, how much of the techniques and habit patterns they each learned during that relatively short stint as a student is almost anyone’s guess. Additionally, not everyone adapts to the training provided equally – and, for sure, I’ve had some students who vehemently refused to do anything unless I told them precisely what to do. In at least some of those cases, it wasn’t simply up to me – although I did attempt to move some such “caged-thought” persons to other instructors and was reasonably successful, certainly there were some with whom I had to get specifically adamant about what they were to do.

The persons with whom and for whom I worked in those situations, thankfully, were almost always agreeable to allow me to place in such a student’s training profile, my notes on why I did what I did, and I managed to insert additional comments that I thought to be relevant. Of course, as anyone would recognize, there is no way for me to go back over those years (dare I say decades) and recall the names and locations of each “student-of-concern.” Although, it is certainly possible that some became good pilots, never to have experienced any problems – and it is also possible that some of the students about whom I was genuinely proud have ultimately committed errors of commission or omission, about which I would certainly be professionally surprised to learn.

However, and notwithstanding all of the above, I feel quite confident that a vast majority of those pilots who had the duty (good or bad) to have endured my instruction have turned out to be competent and capable aviators. However, THAT is not entirely due to my level of professionalism or competence – merely an acknowledgement that those pilots recognized what it was that THEY used to understand and ultimately to actually accomplish something they were attempting or were required to do … and THAT is all that I was attempting to convey to them.

I am NOT, at all, against thorough examination of airplane accidents – in fact, I am a committed advocate of “the more thorough, the better!” As I’ve said multiple times, pilots are humans; humans make mistakes; and therefore, to presume that for whatever reason any pilot would be incapable of making a mistake would be the height of arrogance and/or stupidity. I hope I’m not seen by anyone as flaunting such personal characteristics … as, for no other reason, my own list of committed errors would very likely be impressively long … and I hope that I’ve learned from each one.

The point that I continually stress and advocate is a desire to see the regular and complete review of training goals, tasks, methods, and equipment. Not everything that goes wrong can or will be traceable to a training issue. However, certainly some problems, correctable by training, might be essentially eliminated or at least mitigated to the extent that a safe outcome could be achieved. But without such a regular review, conducted by competent professionals who are capable of recognizing not only the problem but also the logical correction for that problem – those problems are likely to continue and just as likely to become more complex – making further corrections even more difficult to define and difficult to correct.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by Chronus

There seems to be no mention in any of the current research studies involving Air Rabbit`s balsa wood craft as replacement for the space shuttle.

Hi Mr. Chronus

First – My intent is NOT to insult you or your beliefs. Second, I do know a little (in comparison to some of my colleagues, a VERY little) about UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) or RPV (Remotely Piloted Vehicles), and am fully aware of the research project you referenced. In fact one of the comments in that report says, “Some of the problems that still exist today include the fact that an expert pilot’s decision-making process is difficult to imitate with computers” … which goes directly toward only some of the basic concerns I mentioned to you earlier. I stand by my earlier comment where I said, “…one of the serious issues … is the connectivity between the “pilot” on the ground and the airborne UAS – which presents its own interesting set of problems and solutions.” What I didn't say, but is even more true (presuming relative "levels of truth" even exist), are the problems of developing the necessary algorithms, with the appropriate separate interfaces, with the required accuracy and the capability of handling the sheer amount of primary and necessary redundant data, to satisfactorily and safely operate a "pilotless" airplane, at passenger carrying gross weights, over passenger carrying distances, at passenger carrying altitudes and airspeeds, into, over, and through, the various kinds of weather systems and temperatures encountered around the globe, at the levels of repetition that todays data would suggest would be required.

As I said, I know some of the folks who are looking at, dealing with, administering, and/or overseeing, the development of UAVs in all of their present, and what are hoped to be future, applications. What they are doing is not a big secret. Yes, there ARE some aspects of UAV operations, conducted by or for Military interests, that remain under the “classified” banner, but it doesn’t take a “rocket scientist” to logically guess at what those problem areas might be. As long as the pilot on the ground has the ability to have the control inputs transmitted to the UAV quickly and without error, the conduct of UAV missions are notably successful.

I fully recognize that this RPV/UAV industry is expanding … and good for them. Even more so … hopefully, anyway … good for the rest of us, as well! We even have organizations such as Federal Express (the US based package delivery company) who, by the way, essentially pioneered the small airplane, hub-to-hub, overnight delivery process, have announced an intent to develop either an RPV or a UAV that would be capable of delivering packages directly to a client’s home or office. They weren’t terribly specific in their proposals but it wouldn’t surprise me to see something along those lines in the not terribly distant future.

In fact, today RPVs and some UAVs are used extensively in power line inspection and highway surveillance (for maintenance purposes), and a myriad of other similar emerging technical applications. But, as prolific as some these applications are, none of them, in my not-so-humble opinion, even remotely approach the capability or the sophistication that would be minimally required to begin thinking of carrying passengers around the globe without pilots involved – either with pilots on the ground remotely located or with completely autonomous on-board computers flying the machine. While it is true that flight is flight … even more true, or important, at least, is that one kind of flight isn’t necessarily comparable to all other forms of flight. Hence, 4-piece balsa wood gliders that 6-year-olds play with are not remotely similar to something like the space shuttle. That doesn’t mean that the 6-year-olds should stop enjoying what they are doing – merely that an interested onlooker, shouldn’t immediately conclude that what they are observing those 6-year-olds doing must be similar to all other flying vehicles (including the Space Shuttle Replacement) and can be achieved with a similar amount of "simple."

[roulishollandais]

UAV and pilotless A/C are two very different things.

Statistics of drones accidents and losses, with pilots on ground, are still very bad !

@Chronus
Thanks for the link. Which is the date of that study? Is it just theoric from students working for some compilation thesis, or is the aim of that study to be a part of an actually project with real $$$ ?

[safetypee]

AR, at this point our views diverge. You favour continuance of a training approach, although I applaud the need to ‘review’ and ‘not everything is training’ caveats.

Yes, accidents usually involve complex interaction, which calls for a different way of thinking about them; but can we change our thinking.
Humans dislike complexity and have difficulty in representing the many interconnections, thus tend to deal with contributing factors separately – training, systems, environment; and having separated them, tend to prioritise them according to time association with the accident. Thus the NTSB, identifies the human with the probable cause (cause is a poor term), then examines the contributory factors with respect to the human, thus training appears in the first recommendations, and the recommendations aim to ‘fix’ the human with more of the same variable human attributes.

An alternative might be to use a TEM approach; the dominant threat was the system complexity, not the human who suffered difficulty in managing the system.
Classic TEM should first avoid the threat; in systems terms eliminate it, or at least ensure that the risk of error is minimal. However, the NTSB approach starts with error management and mitigation - human activities which were shown to be weak. The recommendations then add to the training, documentation, and checking burden, but without assurance that the threat will be countered at some future date.

There are similarities here with AF447; the threat was (is) ice crystals, but the ‘management’ management of this threat concentrated on the resultant of an adverse encounter with the threat, not as might be first considered its avoidance. We cannot remove Cbs, but we can avoid them by a greater margin, and if we don’t, then we might have to use error management and procedural mitigation.

The significant safety issue in this accident is not the crew’s mismanagement of the approach, but the higher level mismanagement of design, systems approval, approach procedure, and operational regulatory oversight (experience), and the industry's continued belief that these can be mitigated by the human with more 'training'.

Comments relate to NTSB summary - Board Meeting: Crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214

[aterpster]

safetypee:

The significant safety issue in this accident is not the crew’s mismanagement of the approach, but the higher level mismanagement of design, systems approval, approach procedure, and operational regulatory oversight (experience), and the industry's continued belief that these can be mitigated by the human with more 'training'.

What was wrong with design?

What was wrong with system approval?

What was wrong with the "approach procedure?"

When my college professors threw out glittering generalities we threw out the gantlet.

[olasek]

aterpster - I am with you, there was absolutely NOTHING wrong with all those things.

By the way, what's TEM - Tunneling Electron Microscope.

[FGD135]

What was wrong with ...

I'm with safetypee. I'm not sure what was wrong with the approach procedure, but wrong with "design" and "system approval" were:

1. The presentation of airspeed in the tape format, making it much more difficult for pilots to monitor airspeed (and become aware of incorrect airspeed);

2. The abysmal man/machine interface. There is nothing wrong with airliners being highly automated, the issue is how well the automation can be operated/managed. In this case, and with all other modern airliners, the pilots are just not trained anywhere near well enough - because it is just not possible to train a human to that degree. A robot, yes, but a human - no.

The sheer number of modes makes the modern cockpit too complex for the average human. The aircraft can remain just as automated, or even more so, but how the aircraft is operated must be changed.

How about just 5 or so modes, with one manual mode, where everything is manual? The aircraft would then either be fully automatic, or fully manual - no mixtures of modes with varying levels of automation. The auto modes would be "takeoff", "climb", "cruise", "hold", "land", etc.

... and the industry's continued belief that these can be mitigated by the human with more 'training'.

Indeed. There are limits to what can be achieved via training. At some point, other factors need to be addressed.