AGAIN - My Apologies for the Length of the Following
I find myself in agreement with whomever it was who said, sometime back in this thread, that the subject has now wandered a good bit back and forth across the vastness of the potential subject matter that wraps around such a narrow-pointed topic as “aviation,” where it seems that most who offer opinions and observations are just a guilty as the next person in jumping in with an advocacy of the issue “really centering” on whatever that person’s personal “axe to grind” happens to be. And, YES, I include myself in that mix. I, too, have an opinion – and I, too, have advocated it here, probably more than some but not necessarily as much as others who have advocated their own “axe.” So … let me drag out my recently sharpened “axe,” but, in doing so, I have to remind everyone that I’m in the US – my only exposure is to US operations – moderately exposed to other nation’s efforts – but not to the same extent. So with that understanding …
Oh! First … for those who are unfamiliar with the colloquial reference to “having an axe to grind,” perhaps I’d better explain … at least a bit. The phrase essentially means to have an ulterior motive; or to have private ends to serve, such as desiring to take up and settle a dispute with someone. Commonly attributed to Benjamin Franklin, who allegedly told a story concerning a recounting of an incident from his youth, where a passing stranger takes advantage of him, by flattering and complimenting him on his “clearly obvious” ability to sharpen an axe. By so complimenting the youngster, Ben is duped into turning his grindstone to sharpen the stranger's axe – which was the stranger’s only goal, getting his axe sharpened – giving rise to the meaning of having "an axe to grind" as a metaphor for having an ulterior motive.
This thread has essentially settled into a difference of opinion (and some would, no doubt, disagree with my describing the differences as “opinions,” I’m sure – and would likely prefer me to use the term “facts”) but I digress … and those differences seem to be centered on the type of instrumentation that should be in airline cockpits today – either “round-dial-based” or “linear-tape-based.” My particular “axe,” I believe, addresses both of those positions collectively. My “axe” is ‘training,” and the “dullness” of my axe is what I see as a lack of recognition of the value of training – both initially – and recurrently - regardless of the type of instrumentation involved. While I am quite sure that everyone here would immediately say that “they” understand and acknowledge the value of training – I think they look upon training as a necessary “stepping-stone” (or series of stepping stones) that pilot “candidates” use to get across their “river of desire” … to get into the cockpit and fly.
My advocacy comes from the point of view that training certainly can be grossly considered to be “stepping stones” … but the true function is not of “stepping stones” but is rather one where each "stepping stone" is located, one finds “knowledge and familiarity buckets” where the crossing of that “river of desire” requires one step into each successive bucket, and thereby have some of whatever is “in” that bucket wind up clinging to the person when he/she steps on into the next “bucket.” And that process continues through the entire set of “buckets” that lead to that airplane cockpit. It used to be that we would have that “would-be” pilot flail around in those buckets hoping to completely cover him-/her-self with the contents of that bucket. The hope being that whatever was in those buckets would have the time to penetrate the clothing, penetrate the skin beneath the clothing, and permeate the mind/body of the pilot candidate – essentially providing each candidate the opportunity to fully “absorb” the content (the topic) of each individual bucket such that the candidate’s understanding of that content would be absorbed “down to the bone.” However, the guys who hold the purse strings found it necessary to tighten up on those strings for those efforts that were not generating “income,” and every airline owner/manager recognized that the training of their own crew members did not (and still does not) directly generate income … so … the time spent “in training” was reduced.
The problem is that because of the “time is money” concern, we try to “run” our flight crews across that river at ever increasing speeds – getting them to the cockpit quicker and therefore saving money. The problem created in the “training department” was how to ensure that each candidate was thoroughly immersed in each bucket. So, the instructors were now required to specifically direct each candidate into, and when necessary, back into each section of each bucket, to better ensure the candidate was covered with as much of the bucket’s content as time would allow.
This seemed to work reasonably well – for a while … but … the source that had been providing a robust number of pilot candidates began to dwindle – slightly at first, and then rather substantially. This source (the military - who, very wisely, had previously run those same now-candidate airline pilots through their own version of “knowledge and familiarity buckets” to train them as military pilots) was beginning to realize the value of “hanging on” to those persons into whom they, themselves, had invested so much time and “bucket content” that they wanted to retain those persons for longer periods. At about the same time, the airline industry began to expand – flying into more airports, flying longer distances, and buying increasing numbers of airplanes to expand their money-making potential. This left the airline need for pilots to find another viable source. They turned to the private sector – and supplemented this, at times, with establishing their own “ab initio” pilot training efforts. While this method has generally produced a “shaky” solution to the numbers, there has often been a suspicion that the “down to the bone” understanding of at least some (perhaps a majority?) of the newly sourced pilots was not quite at “bone” level. Airlines revamped their attitudes toward instructor requirements – increasing the numbers, at least in some cases, rather substantially.
Because there was an overriding concern to speed up the pilot training process, but there wasn’t money in the budget to do so … it fell to the instructor staff to solve that problem – to ensure that each trainee, when they were in each “training bucket,” was redirected to other areas of the “bucket” to ensure “maximum dunking.” Unfortunately, when the substantially experienced line-pilot source of instructor candidates dwindled down to those who showed up looking for a job, but whose “bone-level understanding” was becoming more highly suspicioned as being at least somewhat inadequate, it was the regulator who stepped in, attempting to play the role of the “shining Knight on the white horse” and offered several alternatives – only some of which seemed to be logical, and rare was there anything that really stood out as a potential for a substantial savings in direct training costs.
Together with a broad cross-section of the airline representatives who were at a loss as to what programs might be approved by their own management, AND be acceptable to the regulator – there was an eager participation for one such plan. Several rather meaningful steps were taken to “study the problem” and just prior to being able to settle on one that might work, as if by magic, some of the regulators, supported by some of the airline managers, submitted a program, modified from its original intent (originally a test program to examine the proper interval between training exposures – known as the Advanced Qualification Program, or AQP) announced a change in direction and some allowances that could be authorized should airlines be interested. This modified test program appealed to several of the larger operators (as their “training budget” heavily impacted the bottom line cost for the airline) and adopting this newly modified program was seen as an instant savings.
The “axe” I carry is oriented more toward the assurance that the training requirements actually ensure that the student pilot fully understands what equipment is installed on his/her airplane, and that each student is fully, completely, and competently trained on how to operate each piece of that equipment, individually and collectively, in normal, abnormal, and emergency situations, and actually demonstrates his/her ability to do just that - in each case, for each situation. In addition, the tasks that each student must be exposed to and learn to perform correctly and completely should cover, as a minimum, all of the tasks that the pilot may encounter (routinely or in the event of an abnormal or emergency situation), demonstrate a complete and knowledgeable understanding and demonstration for each encounter, both physical ability and coordination, adequately assessing each situation, determining the appropriate response, and then demonstrating proper airplane and flight control use.
Additionally, a comprehensive review of each system, each system interface, each flight task – under normal, abnormal, and/or emergency situation – causing the pilot to understand the operation and function of the complete set of systems and controls, and, if/when asked to do so, could perform the required functions under the direct observation of a professionally qualified and competent instructor. In my view, this is the only method that will allow an unbiased assessment of each individual pilot's current state of knowledge, understanding, and ability with respect to the aircraft he/she is currently operating. That instructor has a front-row-seat, and presuming he/she is observant, should be able to note any misunderstanding and/or misuse of any system or control used in the completion of any assigned flight training task. This should be done regularly, for every one of the pilots flying for every airline – with a particular attention paid to the awareness of pilot understanding of normal, abnormal, and/or emergency operations of systems, procedures, and tasks independently and inter-operably.
Unfortunately, I have known of some authorizations for some, specific training programs, that allow a specific task, for which a specific set of flight controls are used, to substitute for at least some, perhaps ALL, other specific tasks using a similar set and/or sequence of flight control applications such that the other (ALL other?) similar task(s) are not addressed, used, seen, or evaluated during that pilot’s operation history with that airline – UNLESS some “rouge” instructor throws some unexpected requirement at some point. To me, that is an abrogation of responsibility by the instructor, the airline, the pilot union, and the regulatory authority.
It is my opinion that if the above were accomplished regularly and thoroughly – situational awareness and specific system and control operation competence can be best determined, and do so on an on-going basis. Of course, errors are going to be made – and there is a good likelihood of students in a training environment may make errors. And, if or when this occurs, the instructor should ensure that the error is recognized and understood by the “student,” and that he/she is properly corrected to the point that understanding and competence can be assured. Again, I must stress that a pilot in training should not be unduly criticized or ostracized should that pilot make an error. The goal should be to enforce the knowledge, skill, and/or regulatory basis for why an error was committed and ensure to the best possible degree that the pilot understands and is less likely to make the same, or the same kind of, error in the future.
It would be my preference to see this training conducted the same way for the same tasks from airline to airline and pilot to pilot - but I'm not "hard-over" on that aspect. What I DO believe, however, is that the evaluation of each pilot should cover all of what they should have been trained on (and that should only differ when, where, and how that particular operation actually differs), and determine that competency exists to the same level. At my home airport, there is enough diversity of operations that we could easily see 3 different companies have airplanes taxiing out at the same time - but each company could easily use the same aircraft type (say a B-737-800). But because these 3 different operators could rather easily operate under 3 different sections of the rule (airline operations, business/commuter operations, and private operations) the requirements for their training and therefore their testing could easily be markedly different, even though the airplane is exactly the same! To me, this makes no sense. The airplane does not know what section of some rule under which it may or may not be operating.
No … I don’t have a fully structured and fully researched basis on which any such diligent training program should be based – if I did, I would have turned every screw and knocked on every door to attempt its application. However, I DO have some of that knowledge and have done some of that research … but this approach, to be fully successful, will demand the direct participation of professionals from several disciplines (systems, systems integration, aerodynamics, propulsion–to some degree, flight controls, and education ... particularly in flight training and testing) to structure a set of program requirements, and alternatives, if or where appropriate. I know of some such initiatives – and the very best source would be the Training Group or the Flight Simulation Group of the UK's Royal Aeronautical Society. But, from me, that sounds much like a broken record (as I've said such things previously) – we need others shouting the same recommendations – and so many more who are willing if not eager to participate and employ what I believe could/should easily result in meaningful advances in pilot proficiency - directly impacting the safety of airline operations around the world.
OK – axe, partially honed … once again. But, I’m quite sure it will need additional honing many more times before I graduate to a chain saw!
Last edited by AirRabbit; 21st Aug 2014 at 00:26.