LOT B787 grounded over missing parts.
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Oakland, CA
Age: 72
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Huh??
They transitioned through radar-controlled class A airspace both in US and Canada and similarly over Iceland.
They transitioned through radar-controlled class A airspace both in US and Canada and similarly over Iceland.
Last edited by olasek; 1st Oct 2013 at 06:19.
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 74
Posts: 3,694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Re LOT Transponder issues.
I have not seen the incident report yet , but if the (newspapers) reported facts are correct the fact that it was at 270 could indicate loss of RVSM status already. The "ID" is probably a loss of transponder(s) , not an issue in oceanic airspace but in class A later on , especially in SSR-coverage only airspace.
But if it was only the Norvegians that refused the a/c ( if this is indeed a fact ) they could have easily reroute via UK controlled airspace. So there must me a bit more to the "refuse entry " story.
Not sure of the fuel comsuption delta between 380 and 270 on a 787. ( maybe someone here in the know can calculate ) and therefore if they could reach VAW without touching their reserves.
So it could be just transponder problems leading to automatic loss of RVSM early in Flight, leading to no reserve to continue flight at 270 all the way to destination. If this was the case, not a real big issue, and correct decision to divert..
I have not seen the incident report yet , but if the (newspapers) reported facts are correct the fact that it was at 270 could indicate loss of RVSM status already. The "ID" is probably a loss of transponder(s) , not an issue in oceanic airspace but in class A later on , especially in SSR-coverage only airspace.
But if it was only the Norvegians that refused the a/c ( if this is indeed a fact ) they could have easily reroute via UK controlled airspace. So there must me a bit more to the "refuse entry " story.
Not sure of the fuel comsuption delta between 380 and 270 on a 787. ( maybe someone here in the know can calculate ) and therefore if they could reach VAW without touching their reserves.
So it could be just transponder problems leading to automatic loss of RVSM early in Flight, leading to no reserve to continue flight at 270 all the way to destination. If this was the case, not a real big issue, and correct decision to divert..
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 74
Posts: 3,694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Your assumption is incorrect
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Oakland, CA
Age: 72
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No, they weren't working. Period. The captain was very clear about their situation when he was speaking with the reporter, I guess the FAA/Canadian controllers were highly accommodating and capable/willing to handle the situation. Please stop contradicting facts that were clearly enumerated by the captain of this particular flight. 
Last edited by olasek; 1st Oct 2013 at 22:46.
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 74
Posts: 3,694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not contradicting, fishing for info 
seems I was lucky,
So if what you say is correct, the a/c took off with its both SSR INOP , so with no TCAS either, was cleared into RVSM airspace and provided with 2000ft sep all the way, the Canadians later accepted this situation but the Icelandic did not and a/c was desecended to 270 below RVSM. Later the Norwegians refused the a/c with no transponder in their airspace. Am I getting warmer ?
The ATC situation aside, if both SSR were INOP on dep the chances that the problem was an electrical one , as opposed to avionics failure, is high.
So back to electrical issues.
seems I was lucky,So if what you say is correct, the a/c took off with its both SSR INOP , so with no TCAS either, was cleared into RVSM airspace and provided with 2000ft sep all the way, the Canadians later accepted this situation but the Icelandic did not and a/c was desecended to 270 below RVSM. Later the Norwegians refused the a/c with no transponder in their airspace. Am I getting warmer ?
The ATC situation aside, if both SSR were INOP on dep the chances that the problem was an electrical one , as opposed to avionics failure, is high.
So back to electrical issues.
PPRuNe Bashaholic
Moderator
Join Date: Jun 1997
Location: The Peoples Alcoholic Republic of Jockistan
Posts: 1,442
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If an aircraft has an INOP transponder, I certainly wouldn't let it head off across the Atlantic without making sure that the ATC authorities on the other side of the pond could accept it.
The UK would refuse the flight also as it would have to pass through an area where there is no primary radar available and no way of seeing the aircraft.
TCAS and ground based conflict detection or trajectory based ATC systems would also be compromised by this flight. Much safer to assess the risk and refuse entry if the airspace is too complicated, too busy, or safety margins are eroded to an unacceptable level.
The pilot in command would also be knowingly breaking the equipment carriage laws in Europe, unless he had obtained dispensation in advance to operate with a reduced MEL. He took the gamble that 'in advance' would be a rolling approval as each agency co-ordinated ahead of the aircraft's passage, whereas if he or his company had checked with each agency before departure, they would have known earlier that a refusal was on the cards somewhere down the line.
The UK would refuse the flight also as it would have to pass through an area where there is no primary radar available and no way of seeing the aircraft.
TCAS and ground based conflict detection or trajectory based ATC systems would also be compromised by this flight. Much safer to assess the risk and refuse entry if the airspace is too complicated, too busy, or safety margins are eroded to an unacceptable level.
The pilot in command would also be knowingly breaking the equipment carriage laws in Europe, unless he had obtained dispensation in advance to operate with a reduced MEL. He took the gamble that 'in advance' would be a rolling approval as each agency co-ordinated ahead of the aircraft's passage, whereas if he or his company had checked with each agency before departure, they would have known earlier that a refusal was on the cards somewhere down the line.
It just makes you wonder about the control in Boeing's QC process
Nothing new there. Followers of the Mil thread will know Boeing QC failures cost MoD 6 lives in a 1987 crash in the Falklands. MoD chose not to pursue the issue to avoid embarrassing a major foreign supplier but that did both MoD and other customers no favours. It merely encouraged the status quo, on both sides.
Anyone know why the 787 parked up at EMA today had someone in a very tall "cherry picker" paying very close attention to the fin/rudder? Was this merely a very conscientious pilot doing his pre-flight inspection? I doubt it.
Join Date: Jun 2013
Location: Or-E-Gun, USA
Posts: 326
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why Were the Filtlers Removed?
Perhaps there is some protocol for R&R'ing the fuel filter shortly after the engine's First Run, or perhaps after taxi tests, but not first flight. I'm only guessing! I guess the engines can operate without them, but my car sure won't! Why on earth would a Boeing maintenance engineer remove a filter with out replacing it? Or logging it with all of the above and grounding the airplane at Paine Field. Did Boeing's warehouse simple run out of filters? I cannot be that simple. For this and several other reasons, LOT is taking Boeing to task and bashing them a bit. As much as I love Boeing and their products, this behavior is beyond my understanding. Formal engine logs begin with the first mounted start and they never end. Was there no detailed inspection before First Start? What the heck am I missing? Boeing is just not that stupid.
Every flight is supposed to be preceded by and external examination and a log check. Was the no-filter detail in the log book? Since this is a new airplane, going back to engine hour zero should not be that difficult. What is in the log books? I want to know!
Every flight is supposed to be preceded by and external examination and a log check. Was the no-filter detail in the log book? Since this is a new airplane, going back to engine hour zero should not be that difficult. What is in the log books? I want to know!
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Another Planet.
Posts: 559
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"What is in the log books? I want to know!"
Alas it may be what is NOT in the log books.
When the paperwork takes longer than the job sometimes, then there's a chance that the penwork will be skipped/forgotten/lost by distraction and workload.
Like the fatigued sleeping pilots, our "spanners" at all levels in most companies are being pressured to do more, with less, in shorter time, to keep the beancounters happy.
We wait with interest the reports on the LHR Airbus cowlings accident and the speculated NLG downlock pin incident.
A fresh reading of the total oil loss incident to G-OBMM and the similar Caribbean Tristar incident could be compulsory reading for todays engineering/airline management.
Same goes for the sub-contractors working for Mr Airbus, Mr Boeing and the car factory down the road.
Once again I ask that we direct our fire away from the line and up the food chain where it should be targeted?
Keep that picture of relevant CEO(s) being led off to a gaol sentence, handcuffed and manhandled, in your minds, it's hopefully going to happen soon?!
When the paperwork takes longer than the job sometimes, then there's a chance that the penwork will be skipped/forgotten/lost by distraction and workload.
Like the fatigued sleeping pilots, our "spanners" at all levels in most companies are being pressured to do more, with less, in shorter time, to keep the beancounters happy.
We wait with interest the reports on the LHR Airbus cowlings accident and the speculated NLG downlock pin incident.
A fresh reading of the total oil loss incident to G-OBMM and the similar Caribbean Tristar incident could be compulsory reading for todays engineering/airline management.
Same goes for the sub-contractors working for Mr Airbus, Mr Boeing and the car factory down the road.
Once again I ask that we direct our fire away from the line and up the food chain where it should be targeted?
Keep that picture of relevant CEO(s) being led off to a gaol sentence, handcuffed and manhandled, in your minds, it's hopefully going to happen soon?!
Not quite as simple as being posted [and i have no inside knowledge on this case] , everything is not in the log book !!!! a lot of this will be in a 'workpackage' , which will consist of cards with all the jobs and certification on. when its all finished the paperwork is signed up and the logbook signed. to my knowledge of new deliveries the logbook is different for every operator and regulatory jurisdiction, so the manufactiurer uses their own paperwork system until acceptance by the operator who then initiates the logbook when the initial C of A etc is issued .So it appears to be a paperwork system error , much of which these days is computer generated. Not really very different to most airline systems in reality , generally its only going to be line work thats in the tech log, i.e defects or a filter change that doesnt come due during a scheduled check.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: EGGW
Posts: 2,112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No Fly Zone
Read my post #23.
The engines were flown with the LP fuel filters installed, throughout the test flying prior to delivery.
Due to an Airworthiness Limitation, which requires the FOHE to have a borescope inspection carried out on the left engine after 20 flight hours and on the right engine at 40 flight hours. This borescope inspection is to check for debris from the fuel tanks covering the inlet screen of the FOHE, due to an oversight during the certification process.
When these inspections were carried out debris was found on two aircraft, so both the FOHE were replaced.
The FOHE assembly contains the LP fuel filter assembly, which does not contain a filter when the assembly is despatched from the OEM.
You have to fit a filter after you install the FOHE, which Boeing did not do so on 3 of the 4 FOHE, no idea why one was fitted, maybe that FOHE was removed from a serviceable engine and did not come from the store.
Yes the engine behaves perfectly without the filters fitted, provided the fuel is clean, no more debris from the fuel tanks.
However once they were found to missing, RR demand various components to be changed and inspections which include borescope of the fuel delivery nozzles.
Boeing is not going to be able to portion blame to sub contractors in this case, it will have to take it on the chin.
The engines were flown with the LP fuel filters installed, throughout the test flying prior to delivery.
Due to an Airworthiness Limitation, which requires the FOHE to have a borescope inspection carried out on the left engine after 20 flight hours and on the right engine at 40 flight hours. This borescope inspection is to check for debris from the fuel tanks covering the inlet screen of the FOHE, due to an oversight during the certification process.
When these inspections were carried out debris was found on two aircraft, so both the FOHE were replaced.
The FOHE assembly contains the LP fuel filter assembly, which does not contain a filter when the assembly is despatched from the OEM.
You have to fit a filter after you install the FOHE, which Boeing did not do so on 3 of the 4 FOHE, no idea why one was fitted, maybe that FOHE was removed from a serviceable engine and did not come from the store.
Yes the engine behaves perfectly without the filters fitted, provided the fuel is clean, no more debris from the fuel tanks.
However once they were found to missing, RR demand various components to be changed and inspections which include borescope of the fuel delivery nozzles.
Boeing is not going to be able to portion blame to sub contractors in this case, it will have to take it on the chin.