“They’d all be walking, talking and alive if they went around”...
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AF 447 had two crew members that couldn't hand fly so crashed into the Atlantic from RIO to Paris. They had everything but couldn't fly so everybody died. Unfortunately this is the new generation of pilots. Loss of AS in my career wasn't that big a deal. We had charts and attitudes depending on altitude and weight to keep flying.
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alexander de meerket
maybe somethings are better...but we have a new breed of crashes...inattention to basic flying skills. an unintended consequence of computer gadgets.
spending hours figuring out gadgets and not making airspeed part of your scan is the wrong way of flying.
gadgets can help...love TCAS for example and I'm sure moving maps/GPS can help...but if you don't watch airspeed and know what altitude to keep all the gadgets will end up mocking you.
maybe somethings are better...but we have a new breed of crashes...inattention to basic flying skills. an unintended consequence of computer gadgets.
spending hours figuring out gadgets and not making airspeed part of your scan is the wrong way of flying.
gadgets can help...love TCAS for example and I'm sure moving maps/GPS can help...but if you don't watch airspeed and know what altitude to keep all the gadgets will end up mocking you.
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The last post was sent to me by the way. I hope eventually we will have the quality of pilots we had in the last decades. Not being able to land on 28L at SFO with out a GS means we have pilots who can not fly.
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DER MANAGEMENT IN THE SPOTLIGHT AGAIN?
Interesting to note posting #s 4, 11, 12, 33 and 44 are bringing into the equation the very people who are also responsible for the unfortunate crews being FATIGUED or COMMERCIALLY PRESSURED as they make the continue or G/A decision?
In theory the accident investigations should highlight ALL factors affecting the "smoking hole/bent metal" scenario, but very few if any have hung out the "suits" in the company to dry in public.
Perhaps the media might like to do some informed research into what really goes on in the industry and start moving the emphasis away from the faceworkers and to shine the spotlight where it should be, viz illuminating the real villains?
In theory the accident investigations should highlight ALL factors affecting the "smoking hole/bent metal" scenario, but very few if any have hung out the "suits" in the company to dry in public.
Perhaps the media might like to do some informed research into what really goes on in the industry and start moving the emphasis away from the faceworkers and to shine the spotlight where it should be, viz illuminating the real villains?
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Just a thought...
I know airbus have produced a runway over-run protection system (ROPS) that compares the aircraft speed and trajectory with that needed to gaurantee a safe stop on the runway.
What about something similar that checks whether your approach is stabilised or not, and warns you to "go around" if not? On modern aircraft with ILS, GPS, ADIRS (or similar), FMS and a runway database it would be possible to generate an algorithm that would do this. After all, many aircraft already have TCAS, GPWS and ROPS, all algorithm based warning systems that are in use and saving lives.
What about something similar that checks whether your approach is stabilised or not, and warns you to "go around" if not? On modern aircraft with ILS, GPS, ADIRS (or similar), FMS and a runway database it would be possible to generate an algorithm that would do this. After all, many aircraft already have TCAS, GPWS and ROPS, all algorithm based warning systems that are in use and saving lives.
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I would think that is all possible - indeed it could all be automated why put the error prone human in the loop. Isn't this close to what the prof at Embry-Riddle was saying?
In Human Factors terms its called human on the loop, being a monitor but not actually getting involved in the minutiae of controlling the aircraft.
In Human Factors terms its called human on the loop, being a monitor but not actually getting involved in the minutiae of controlling the aircraft.
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Part of the problem with adding a further level of automation is where that system fails down the line somewhere, as it will, you will have even more out-of-the-loop pilots IN the loop, as it were. Also it won't work when you are diverting to Hicksville and already under pressure from time/fuel/weather/tech issues. Also it fails to address the problem of over-reliance on safety measures.
Note that here we are not being critical of safety measures per se.
See Homeostasis theory.
Note that here we are not being critical of safety measures per se.
See Homeostasis theory.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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To go with weekend flyer's idea of an 'approach monitor' let's have a full-blown auto g/a if conditions are not right.
The 'modern' generation seem to be quite adept at button-pushing etc and not at 'real' flying, so maybe it is also time to have new categories for pilots, which can be annotated on flight plans? 'I' for Instrument approaches only and 'A' for 'all' ie instrument and/or visuals, and a rigid SOP in airlines that all 'I' pilots are to remain in auto with autoland only approaches? That'll sort it, and the occasional 'failure' which requires an 'I' pilot to fly a visual or manually would just result in an acceptable crash statistic. It will also reduce training and checking costs significantly. Yes! I've cracked it! OK, a bit of a task for rostering and ops in alternate planning, but...........think of the safety
Lord help us.
The 'modern' generation seem to be quite adept at button-pushing etc and not at 'real' flying, so maybe it is also time to have new categories for pilots, which can be annotated on flight plans? 'I' for Instrument approaches only and 'A' for 'all' ie instrument and/or visuals, and a rigid SOP in airlines that all 'I' pilots are to remain in auto with autoland only approaches? That'll sort it, and the occasional 'failure' which requires an 'I' pilot to fly a visual or manually would just result in an acceptable crash statistic. It will also reduce training and checking costs significantly. Yes! I've cracked it! OK, a bit of a task for rostering and ops in alternate planning, but...........think of the safety
Lord help us.
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All this reliance on automatics not being a good trend reminds of what might seem a minor issue, but shows a start point in this current philosophy. In late 80's my airline had just transferred from needles & dials to EFIS & EICAS a/c. The instructors were beating the pilots to 'follow the FD': no need to scan the panels overhead; let EICAS tell you there is a problem: no need to know power & attitude, the FD takes care of attitude and auto-throttle takes care of speed. My idea is that on a visual approach you need to know the latter to control the a/c; the former idea of EICAS being you eyes is that it only pops up when the limit is reached; your eyes notice a trend before it goes bang. This was a frightening attitude and it was the precursor to the laisse faire attitude more prevalent today and that which has led to incidents/accidents. It's been a subtle trend in training and operating over 25 years and now it is biting us.
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I sometimes just get fixated on the perceived touchdown point, its a bad thing, but I don't really know how to not do it, it feels like I am concentrating on arriving at that point so much, that I might miss important cues that its not quite right.
I think as pilots, we are more aware than some that things don't always go to plan and try to have contingencies thought out, but we are are human.
I think as pilots, we are more aware than some that things don't always go to plan and try to have contingencies thought out, but we are are human.
Originally Posted by Lone Ranger
I sometimes just get fixated on the perceived touchdown point, its a bad thing, but I don't really know how to not do it, it feels like I am concentrating on arriving at that point so much, that I might miss important cues that its not quite right.
This notion of "they should have gone round"... is stating the bleedin' obvious. The question is why they couldn't see it. Rarely these days would the crew just say "to hell with it, we're gonna land regardless". Asiana, Turkish, possibly UPS all are shaping up to be crews trying to do the right thing but messing up, having lost the birdy tapping you on your shoulder saying "get out of here you idiot". How do you not mess up/keep that birdy on your shoulder when the pressure comes on? Be more familiar with the scenario that puts you under that pressure. You'll have more spare brain-power to evaluate what's happening and make the right decision when things start getting out of hand.
Less use of automatics when you don't need them!
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I`d like to see automatics handle s situation like the A380 Uncontained engine failure
Sounds very much like some of todays automatics and their followers.
I guess the still common sensed pilos would have put such a deadly injured bird back on safe ground asap. If it can take-off from a strip, it can land there.
Too many automatics failed there, why wish for some more of the same??
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Gretchenfrage, as a follower of your continuing ignorance of the nuances of that event, would you kindly expound your limited understanding of Brake Energy Limits and how the reduced brake availability along with the much higher approach speed courtesy of the absence of the leading edge slats would effect the landing distance required.
Please take your time because nitpicker330 is giving me a great big laugh with his meanderings on another thread.
I'm not sure the mods will allow me 2 wind-ups in one day.
Please take your time because nitpicker330 is giving me a great big laugh with his meanderings on another thread.
I'm not sure the mods will allow me 2 wind-ups in one day.
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Interesting to note posting #s 4, 11, 12, 33 and 44 are bringing into the equation the very people who are also responsible for the unfortunate crews being FATIGUED or COMMERCIALLY PRESSURED as they make the continue or G/A decision?
In theory the accident investigations should highlight ALL factors affecting the "smoking hole/bent metal" scenario, but very few if any have hung out the "suits" in the company to dry in public.
Perhaps the media might like to do some informed research into what really goes on in the industry and start moving the emphasis away from the faceworkers and to shine the spotlight where it should be, viz illuminating the real villains?
In theory the accident investigations should highlight ALL factors affecting the "smoking hole/bent metal" scenario, but very few if any have hung out the "suits" in the company to dry in public.
Perhaps the media might like to do some informed research into what really goes on in the industry and start moving the emphasis away from the faceworkers and to shine the spotlight where it should be, viz illuminating the real villains?