Air France does a 'Memmingen'.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: East Sussex
Age: 85
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I think we are beginning to see a trend that has long been predicted by us greybeards and ignored by bean counters in all walks of aviation. A GAPAN working group of the Education and Training cttee warned of it in a long and comprehensive report. One of the issues discussed was that, with the increasing use and dependence on automatics, when they fail or ( more likely) are misused, the ensuing pilot intervention requires a more highly skilled hand than would have been the case in the past simply because that skill will have been degraded by long term lack of practice. Current policies ensure that that skill will be unavailable.
Bloggs … “pity the Asiana PNF didn't do what Bubbers did.”
Yes of course with hindsight, but can you explain why Bubs (or you) did, and 'they' didn’t? And then with that understanding, explain how other pilots might avoid such behavior in future situations.
If you stop investigating when you identify what did/did not occur, (is failure to GA a root cause, blaming the human?), it can block opportunity for learning from an event.
Alternatively if you seek the underlying contributions to human behavior, those aspects which might influence situation assessment and decision making, then even though it might be impossible to determine the precise details of this accident, it should enable thoughts about training, operations, and ways of thinking which might just help avoid our own close call.
How do you turn hindsight into foresight?
Yes of course with hindsight, but can you explain why Bubs (or you) did, and 'they' didn’t? And then with that understanding, explain how other pilots might avoid such behavior in future situations.
If you stop investigating when you identify what did/did not occur, (is failure to GA a root cause, blaming the human?), it can block opportunity for learning from an event.
Alternatively if you seek the underlying contributions to human behavior, those aspects which might influence situation assessment and decision making, then even though it might be impossible to determine the precise details of this accident, it should enable thoughts about training, operations, and ways of thinking which might just help avoid our own close call.
How do you turn hindsight into foresight?
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fl
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I can see how some pilots here believe being agressive to avert an unnecessary incident or accident is a sign of being over controlling in a two pilot cockpit. I think both pilots should make sure the flight is safe, not just one and the other just agree.
Our recent SFO example states my case. I don't care what OO thinks of my standards of taking care of business but flying hundreds of people in an airplane is serious business and must be dealt with accordingly. Blaming the glide slope being out or the autothrottle didn't work as you thought it should or being 30 knots slow is not an excuse.
Our recent SFO example states my case. I don't care what OO thinks of my standards of taking care of business but flying hundreds of people in an airplane is serious business and must be dealt with accordingly. Blaming the glide slope being out or the autothrottle didn't work as you thought it should or being 30 knots slow is not an excuse.
bubbers, there are many shades of command and practice, hopefully all with the same objective of safety. However, neither by seeking blame nor making excuse will help improve safety, which from this incident and similar appears to be necessary.
One small move in that direction is for those who hold strong opinions on what they did or will do, could provide details of why and ‘how to’; to describe those aspects which trigger a realisation that an approach needs rescuing and how these aspects are defined and assessed.
An alternative is to consider ‘what if’, to identify the factors which might influence the human for both good and not so good decisions, then defend as best able against the not so good.
In this incident the thread has cited the crew for not making a go-around decision; whereas the alternative view that consciously or unconsciously they decided to continue, may provide greater understanding of the problems.
One small move in that direction is for those who hold strong opinions on what they did or will do, could provide details of why and ‘how to’; to describe those aspects which trigger a realisation that an approach needs rescuing and how these aspects are defined and assessed.
An alternative is to consider ‘what if’, to identify the factors which might influence the human for both good and not so good decisions, then defend as best able against the not so good.
In this incident the thread has cited the crew for not making a go-around decision; whereas the alternative view that consciously or unconsciously they decided to continue, may provide greater understanding of the problems.
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Also, I don't know it all, but 23,000 hrs of flying helps understand how things work and some of the new guys could listen to what their captains tell them that Embry Riddle didn't teach. I went there too but didn't learn how to really fly until I left. Amazing how books and airplanes actually flying are different.
