SQ006 final report out 26/4/02
Guest
Posts: n/a
Thegypsy - you have chosen to be highly selective in your memory I think, if you were to read back over posts made by me since I first came to PPRuNe in April 1997 you would find on many occasions I have been highly critical of SIA and its practises, however, when I think SIA are being unfairly slated then yes, I will post my opinions.
I cannot reprint it here but the editorial in this weeks Flight does not entirely agree with Insider107's view that the report from ASC and the way it has classsified its findings is correct and fair nor does it think that the exclusion of the SIA representative in the analysis phase of the investigation was in accordance with ICAO recommendations either. Trying to downplay the extent that the badly marked and lit RW05R was a contributing factor to the cause of this accident does ASC no credit at all.
This aspect, however, is really just nit-picking at the periphery, it is much more important to ensure that this sort of accident does not happen again and that both SIA and Taipei Airport get their respective acts together.
As far as Gladiator is concerned, had he not fallen foul of the system, (many do not), he would probably be a B744 captain now and you would not have heard a peep out of him. One might be forgiven for mistakenly thinking that Gladiator walked away from SIA solely on the grounds of his concern for flight safety.
I cannot reprint it here but the editorial in this weeks Flight does not entirely agree with Insider107's view that the report from ASC and the way it has classsified its findings is correct and fair nor does it think that the exclusion of the SIA representative in the analysis phase of the investigation was in accordance with ICAO recommendations either. Trying to downplay the extent that the badly marked and lit RW05R was a contributing factor to the cause of this accident does ASC no credit at all.
This aspect, however, is really just nit-picking at the periphery, it is much more important to ensure that this sort of accident does not happen again and that both SIA and Taipei Airport get their respective acts together.
As far as Gladiator is concerned, had he not fallen foul of the system, (many do not), he would probably be a B744 captain now and you would not have heard a peep out of him. One might be forgiven for mistakenly thinking that Gladiator walked away from SIA solely on the grounds of his concern for flight safety.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Dec 1999
Location: Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Posts: 330
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's nice to see the second coming of Insider 107 (I'd been wondering where he was) but for the life of me, even if all he and Gladiator say is true and accurate, I cannot see serious evidence of a connection between it and the SQ006 accident, which, it seems to me, was one waiting to happen and could so easily have happened to a crew from any nation or nationality.
Rockhound
Rockhound
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: U.S.A
Posts: 61
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I would not trade my right seat B737, 18 days off per month, 105,000 USD per year, fantastic quality of life (cost of living 1/5th of Singapore) for left seat B747-400 at SIA, not in a million years.
It is not your equipment or seat SIA, it is your attitude.
It is not your equipment or seat SIA, it is your attitude.
Join Date: Feb 2001
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
G.Khan
You say:
"The locals have a very healthy respect for typhoons and since some other operators had already cancelled, this captain....etc."
Perhaps if this particular captain had had such a healthy respect for typhoons, he too would have cancelled?
Could he have felt himself to be under pressure, subtle or otherwise, not to delay, or was his being at "his zenith as a B744 commander" sufficient reason for him not to ponder the no-go decisions, made by, perhaps, wiser heads at the time?
I understand that the captain of an SIA B744 freighter, due to leave CKS at about the same time as SQ6, was one of many who declined to depart until the weather improved. Can you or anyone else cast further light on this and would it be true to say that SIA felt no obligation to hotac the freight pallets on the night in question?
Regards.
You say:
"The locals have a very healthy respect for typhoons and since some other operators had already cancelled, this captain....etc."
Perhaps if this particular captain had had such a healthy respect for typhoons, he too would have cancelled?
Could he have felt himself to be under pressure, subtle or otherwise, not to delay, or was his being at "his zenith as a B744 commander" sufficient reason for him not to ponder the no-go decisions, made by, perhaps, wiser heads at the time?
I understand that the captain of an SIA B744 freighter, due to leave CKS at about the same time as SQ6, was one of many who declined to depart until the weather improved. Can you or anyone else cast further light on this and would it be true to say that SIA felt no obligation to hotac the freight pallets on the night in question?
Regards.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Tosh26 - I take your point, mine was a personal opinion, based on what I know(knew) and my own personal experiences.
Given the system at CKS, (briefed at the gate by EVA), it is quite possible the crew of SQ6 didn't know others had cancelled - not that this should make any difference.
Given the system at CKS, (briefed at the gate by EVA), it is quite possible the crew of SQ6 didn't know others had cancelled - not that this should make any difference.
Join Date: Feb 2001
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
G.Khan
Yes, a “hermetically sealed” gate briefing by ground staff, eager to see an on-time dispatch of the flight could have reinforced a “go-mode” frame of mind in the crew, on the night in question.
Regards
Yes, a “hermetically sealed” gate briefing by ground staff, eager to see an on-time dispatch of the flight could have reinforced a “go-mode” frame of mind in the crew, on the night in question.
Regards
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: us
Posts: 20
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gladiator,
You have elaborated on SIA's apparent "deficiencies" concerning licensing and crew complement.Perhaps you could comment on the already-implied notion that there is some pressure on crew to meet on-time departures regardless of safety considerations.This would be far more relevant to the causes of the crash.Did you ever experience such pressure yourself or did you know of any crews that were?
You have elaborated on SIA's apparent "deficiencies" concerning licensing and crew complement.Perhaps you could comment on the already-implied notion that there is some pressure on crew to meet on-time departures regardless of safety considerations.This would be far more relevant to the causes of the crash.Did you ever experience such pressure yourself or did you know of any crews that were?
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: U.S.A
Posts: 61
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
holden,
I was never put into that situation. However bad weather and the word 'no go' are part of flying 101, that applies to a Cessna 150 as well as a B747-400.
As far as pressure on other crew, Yes, most were fuel related. Dispatch with minimum fuel to Europe in winter where common place. Asking for more fuel could get you in trouble, you would need a better reason than just the word 'good judgement'.
Equipment safety, in my days, SIA used to have several questionable B747-200F aircraft that were dumped by FEDEX. They had so many MEL stickers one could qualify them as Christmas decoration.
I was never put into that situation. However bad weather and the word 'no go' are part of flying 101, that applies to a Cessna 150 as well as a B747-400.
As far as pressure on other crew, Yes, most were fuel related. Dispatch with minimum fuel to Europe in winter where common place. Asking for more fuel could get you in trouble, you would need a better reason than just the word 'good judgement'.
Equipment safety, in my days, SIA used to have several questionable B747-200F aircraft that were dumped by FEDEX. They had so many MEL stickers one could qualify them as Christmas decoration.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Flew the B744 for ten+ years with SQ, never had extra fuel loaded queried once! Knew of a few on the B747-300 that did get into hot water but adding 5 to 10 tonnes on Japan and Australian flights and citing, "That's how I like to operate" isn't going to endear you to the management of any airline I would suggest!
Did get sent to Europe on re-dispatch with only 1000kgs contingency sometimes and was not too happy about that - but it wasn't an unsafe practice, if, at the re-dispatch point you had less than legal fuel required to reach final destination then you were obliged to tech stop and possibly require a crew change.
Provided you had your calculations correct there is no come back.
Did get sent to Europe on re-dispatch with only 1000kgs contingency sometimes and was not too happy about that - but it wasn't an unsafe practice, if, at the re-dispatch point you had less than legal fuel required to reach final destination then you were obliged to tech stop and possibly require a crew change.
Provided you had your calculations correct there is no come back.
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Singapore
Posts: 32
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fuel Uplift
I have to agree here with Kahn. Although Gladiator very often is spot on in his observations I must say that in my 12 years with SQ I have never ever been asked to explain why I took extra fuel, or why I took a delay . As long as you VR your reasons there is no problem. I think that "feeling" pressure from management on fuel and on time departures is often something very personal and as long as there is a solid reason you shouldn't be worried . But again that is how I think about it.
Join Date: Feb 2001
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gladiator
Re: Your posting of 18 May 2002
Most interesting that you mention “bad weather and the word 'no go' are part of flying 101, that applies to a Cessna 150 as well as a B747-400.”
I am aware of two SIA captains (ex-pats) who, on separate dates, declined to depart CKS on time, in weather conditions similar to those prevailing on 31 October 2000 and sensibly awaited improvements.
They both mentioned (the two conversations late at night and outside Singapore) feeling under inordinate pressure from dispatch staff, to depart on time, despite the dramatic met conditions and both subsequently fielded the inevitable, less than friendly ‘phone call, the following day, back at base, demanding details of events that had already been VR’d.
It was further interesting to hear that both captains were kindly tipped off by their respective FO’s (locals), to expect these calls, as they themselves had previously been quizzed for details before the captains were telephoned!
Regards
Re: Your posting of 18 May 2002
Most interesting that you mention “bad weather and the word 'no go' are part of flying 101, that applies to a Cessna 150 as well as a B747-400.”
I am aware of two SIA captains (ex-pats) who, on separate dates, declined to depart CKS on time, in weather conditions similar to those prevailing on 31 October 2000 and sensibly awaited improvements.
They both mentioned (the two conversations late at night and outside Singapore) feeling under inordinate pressure from dispatch staff, to depart on time, despite the dramatic met conditions and both subsequently fielded the inevitable, less than friendly ‘phone call, the following day, back at base, demanding details of events that had already been VR’d.
It was further interesting to hear that both captains were kindly tipped off by their respective FO’s (locals), to expect these calls, as they themselves had previously been quizzed for details before the captains were telephoned!
Regards
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Mexico
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
to blame or not to blame...that is the question
It seems that much of this thread has revolved around blame. Are the pilots to blame for the SQ6 crash or did the environment and CKS conspire to force their mistake? Let me try and clarify the issue:
To err is to be human. Everyone makes mistakes. BUT when your mistake costs the lives of 83 men, women and children, not to mention horrific burns to 40 survivors, THEN something is going to hit the fan. People WILL blame you for making that mistake because you were in full controll and made all the decisions.
The fact is that blame for this accident lies squarely at the feet of Capt. Foong, and his crew, because they failed the basic test of navigation -- to use a map and compass to ensure that the a/c ended up on the correct r/w. The fact that 05R looked 'normal' or that the t/w and r/w markings were bad are IRRELEVANT because IF the Capt. had employed good navigation skills and not dead reckoning the crash would not have happened.
The fundamental objective of any investigation is to identify WHO made the mistake and then ask WHY it was made, and HOW to prevent it being made again. The ASC identified the WHO, were blurry on the WHY, and completely missed the HOW to prevent another. The WHY in this case was because the Capt.s navigation skills were poor or sloppy on the ground, and the HOW therefore should have been to make it mandatory to test Pilots' low-viz taxi skills on a regular basis to prevent the development of bad habits.
One final thing. A word of warning to all you pilots who use dead-reckoning in poor viz conditions -- there is a reason why they call it DEAD reckoning.
A summary of our argument and the ASC and MOT reports can be found on the SQ6 Survivor's web site:
www.anycities.com/sq006/crash.html
(P.S. this site is the source of Murrelet's earlier posting)
To err is to be human. Everyone makes mistakes. BUT when your mistake costs the lives of 83 men, women and children, not to mention horrific burns to 40 survivors, THEN something is going to hit the fan. People WILL blame you for making that mistake because you were in full controll and made all the decisions.
The fact is that blame for this accident lies squarely at the feet of Capt. Foong, and his crew, because they failed the basic test of navigation -- to use a map and compass to ensure that the a/c ended up on the correct r/w. The fact that 05R looked 'normal' or that the t/w and r/w markings were bad are IRRELEVANT because IF the Capt. had employed good navigation skills and not dead reckoning the crash would not have happened.
The fundamental objective of any investigation is to identify WHO made the mistake and then ask WHY it was made, and HOW to prevent it being made again. The ASC identified the WHO, were blurry on the WHY, and completely missed the HOW to prevent another. The WHY in this case was because the Capt.s navigation skills were poor or sloppy on the ground, and the HOW therefore should have been to make it mandatory to test Pilots' low-viz taxi skills on a regular basis to prevent the development of bad habits.
One final thing. A word of warning to all you pilots who use dead-reckoning in poor viz conditions -- there is a reason why they call it DEAD reckoning.
A summary of our argument and the ASC and MOT reports can be found on the SQ6 Survivor's web site:
www.anycities.com/sq006/crash.html
(P.S. this site is the source of Murrelet's earlier posting)
Join Date: May 2001
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Murrelet
In your post of 3 May 2002 you said:
"I have read the reports, and think it might be useful to summarize at least the ASC report for all those too lazy to read it for themselves! You will see that Taiwan does not entirely escape blame in the ASC report."
You then went on to post a cogent and persuasive summary that the words above seemed to imply you were author of and, indeed, following which posting, you silently accepted the plaudits of Alpha Leader, Slasher, Insider107 and similar luminaries.
It would now appear that you are guilty of the very laziness you ascribe to others, in that you in turn, could not be bothered to originate your own stuff but were happy to plagiarise the material of others, as pointed out by SQ6 Survivor.
Would it perhaps not have been better to acknowledge your source right from the start?
In your post of 3 May 2002 you said:
"I have read the reports, and think it might be useful to summarize at least the ASC report for all those too lazy to read it for themselves! You will see that Taiwan does not entirely escape blame in the ASC report."
You then went on to post a cogent and persuasive summary that the words above seemed to imply you were author of and, indeed, following which posting, you silently accepted the plaudits of Alpha Leader, Slasher, Insider107 and similar luminaries.
It would now appear that you are guilty of the very laziness you ascribe to others, in that you in turn, could not be bothered to originate your own stuff but were happy to plagiarise the material of others, as pointed out by SQ6 Survivor.
Would it perhaps not have been better to acknowledge your source right from the start?
Join Date: Feb 2001
Posts: 141
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SQ6 Survivor
I’ve flown a few times with captains who’ve lost the plot in LVP conditions and to a man they've instantly stopped and called for a follow-me truck to take them to the ramp. I’ve had to do the same a couple of times. The one thing we’ve all had in common though is that we’ve not been trying to race a typhoon to the take off position.
I’ve flown a few times with captains who’ve lost the plot in LVP conditions and to a man they've instantly stopped and called for a follow-me truck to take them to the ramp. I’ve had to do the same a couple of times. The one thing we’ve all had in common though is that we’ve not been trying to race a typhoon to the take off position.