EZY 2.99G landing at Luton
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EZY 2.99G landing at Luton
AAIB report out and in this week's Flight:
Air Accidents Investigation: Airbus A319-111, G-EZFV
Thankfully no serious injuries but U/C replaced.
"Below 30 ft, over the runway, both pilots sensed that
the aircraft was sinking rapidly and both initiated a
TOGA 102 go-around. The PF momentarily retarded
the thrust levers to idle before advancing them to the
TOGA (Takeoff and Go-around) position. At the same
time, he made a full forward sidestick input, within
one second, which was then rapidly reversed to full
aft sidestick. As the PF made the forward sidestick
input, the commander initiated an aft sidestick input
which reached the full aft position within one second.
He followed through the PF, pushing the thrust levers
fully forward and announced “I HAVE CONTROL”. The
aircraft made firm contact with the runway, on all three
landing gear legs simultaneously, before lifting off and
starting to climb. During this phase the PF relinquished
control and reverted to the PNF role."
Air Accidents Investigation: Airbus A319-111, G-EZFV
Thankfully no serious injuries but U/C replaced.
"Below 30 ft, over the runway, both pilots sensed that
the aircraft was sinking rapidly and both initiated a
TOGA 102 go-around. The PF momentarily retarded
the thrust levers to idle before advancing them to the
TOGA (Takeoff and Go-around) position. At the same
time, he made a full forward sidestick input, within
one second, which was then rapidly reversed to full
aft sidestick. As the PF made the forward sidestick
input, the commander initiated an aft sidestick input
which reached the full aft position within one second.
He followed through the PF, pushing the thrust levers
fully forward and announced “I HAVE CONTROL”. The
aircraft made firm contact with the runway, on all three
landing gear legs simultaneously, before lifting off and
starting to climb. During this phase the PF relinquished
control and reverted to the PNF role."
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Hard to understand why such an uninteresting report makes R & N almost a year after the (non) event. Its not even a rumour and and it is ancient history in last years news.
zzzz
zzzz
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I disagree.
There are two very important lessons to be taken on board by A320 Training Captains.....
There are two very important lessons to be taken on board by A320 Training Captains.....
Last edited by TyroPicard; 23rd Jan 2013 at 19:03.
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From one of their previous reports, Air Accidents Investigation: Airbus A320, G-DHJZ well-beloved of all those unfortunate enough to find themselves training on this aircraft:
During the landing phase of flight, an instructor pilot monitors the approach by assessing the aircraft’s performance, ie, by visually scanning both the flight instruments and the ‘picture’ through the flight deck windows. In addition, in a ‘traditional’ aircraft, where the flight controls are fully interlinked, the instructor might also be able to monitor the direction and magnitude of any, albeit relatively small, control inputs made by the student by sensing their movements in a tactile manner. By doing so, they may be able to prime themselves for the flare motion on the control column and, if the motion is late or absent, make an appropriate input in sufficient time to attempt to avert a heavy landing.
In a fly-by-wire aircraft fitted with sidesticks, the instructor also monitors the approach by assessing the aircraft’s performance, but does not have an option of sensing control inputs made by the trainee. By the time it is apparent that no flare, or an incorrect flare, has been made, it may be too late for the instructor to intervene and the aircraft to respond before a possible heavy touchdown occurs
In a fly-by-wire aircraft fitted with sidesticks, the instructor also monitors the approach by assessing the aircraft’s performance, but does not have an option of sensing control inputs made by the trainee. By the time it is apparent that no flare, or an incorrect flare, has been made, it may be too late for the instructor to intervene and the aircraft to respond before a possible heavy touchdown occurs
Last edited by frontlefthamster; 23rd Jan 2013 at 20:12.
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How many posts before dozywannabe comes storming in telling that the AAIB and all pilots who posted so far on this thread are wrong?
That we are not supposed to be able to sense the other pilots inputs?
And that the FBW system was developed by genious pilots, so that it can't possibly be flawed?
On topic:
These guys recently would have come from the 737, which requires nose-down input during a go-around. So that could be a factor as well. Muscle memory in high stress situation.
That we are not supposed to be able to sense the other pilots inputs?
And that the FBW system was developed by genious pilots, so that it can't possibly be flawed?
On topic:
These guys recently would have come from the 737, which requires nose-down input during a go-around. So that could be a factor as well. Muscle memory in high stress situation.
Last edited by 737Jock; 23rd Jan 2013 at 20:25.
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Perhaps the trainee was reverting to the instinctive reaction when in the RHS where the right hand pulls back and the left pushes forward instead of the new LHS where the right hand now pushes forward and the left hand pulls back. Just a guess though.
WanganuiLad
That is not quite correct, if both pilots provide input; which should not be done but often happens a "Dual Input!" will be annunciated through the loudspeakers (even if they're switched off)
If the correct technique is applied and the new PFselects the AP OFF/Takeover PB (while the AP is off) then a "Priority right/left" will be annunciated and a visual indication will appear on the glare-shield accordingly.
If what you were referring to was a proprioceptive feedback then that is correct and many would argue that would be more useful in any aircraft, however as always it comes down to understanding the system and not letting yourself get caught out by a last minute need to "follow through" otherwise as you say the inputs will be summed and disaster could ensue
That is not quite correct, if both pilots provide input; which should not be done but often happens a "Dual Input!" will be annunciated through the loudspeakers (even if they're switched off)
If the correct technique is applied and the new PFselects the AP OFF/Takeover PB (while the AP is off) then a "Priority right/left" will be annunciated and a visual indication will appear on the glare-shield accordingly.
If what you were referring to was a proprioceptive feedback then that is correct and many would argue that would be more useful in any aircraft, however as always it comes down to understanding the system and not letting yourself get caught out by a last minute need to "follow through" otherwise as you say the inputs will be summed and disaster could ensue
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The previous report makes mention, at least twice, of the highly instinctive nature of the sidestick, and the highly cognitive nature of the priority push-button. Add that the aural sense is often degraded in stress, and you can also understand that the warning is not a reliable safeguard.
Yes, pilots can be trained to exhibit 'correct technique' up to a point, but they cannot reliably be untrained from the deepest-founded results of their early training: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds. Airbus seem to think that human behaviour may be modified reliably to support: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds, unless I am under stress and my colleague may be making an input, in which case I have to press a button (which I hardly ever touch) as well, and then take account of whatever response the aircraft was exhibiting to my colleague's input, whatever that may have been, until I over-rode it. None of us need a PhD to see the holes in that proposition, and these regular accidents bear our thoughts out.
Yes, pilots can be trained to exhibit 'correct technique' up to a point, but they cannot reliably be untrained from the deepest-founded results of their early training: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds. Airbus seem to think that human behaviour may be modified reliably to support: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds, unless I am under stress and my colleague may be making an input, in which case I have to press a button (which I hardly ever touch) as well, and then take account of whatever response the aircraft was exhibiting to my colleague's input, whatever that may have been, until I over-rode it. None of us need a PhD to see the holes in that proposition, and these regular accidents bear our thoughts out.
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The problem with that little red button is that in normal ops you only ever press it momentarily to disconnect the autopilot. In the take over case you have to press and hold it (for 30 secs to lock the other s/s out) to ensure you really do have control. If you forget then you are back in dual input territory.
Originally Posted by Agaricus Bisporus
Hard to understand why such an uninteresting report makes R & N almost a year after the (non) event. Its not even a rumour and and it is ancient history in last years news.
Originally Posted by WanganuiLad
How is this not a design error ?
Originally Posted by 737Jockl
How many posts before dozywannabe comes storming in telling that the AAIB and all pilots who posted so far on this thread are wrong?
How many posts about Airbus being faulty by design before someone puts such an argument into coherent, articulate, reasoned and fact-supported essay and sends it to aeronautical powers that be?
Originally Posted by ReallyAnnoyed
Perhaps the trainee was reverting to the instinctive reaction when in the RHS where the right hand pulls back and the left pushes forward instead of the new LHS where the right hand now pushes forward and the left hand pulls back. Just a guess though.
Originally Posted by frontlefthamster
the deepest-founded results of their early training: if I move the stick, the aircraft responds.
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It has been proven so many times now:
Airbus design is for the every day, sop bound, non event, no disturbance flight for the barely trained and rated modern pilot.
It is not for any deviation from the above, not for training and certainly not for unforeseen and unexpected emergencies.
For all those astronauts who still insist that proper knowledge of the complicated system allows these super pilots to recognise any sub-sub mode and its deviations from the normal mode, instantly enables them to counteract the accompanying reversion of the protection which is due to the fact that the feeding probes and their computers were tricked by another submode that could not analyse properly what these pilots could see instantly by checking the PNFs PFC, knowing that if it deviated more than 5deg from the standby indicator, they had to disconnect one PRIM and the opposite SEC which would finally enable the PF to trust his sidestick again, provided the PNF did not intervene with a opposite input.
You guys should all have applied at Houston.
for me there is only one thing to say: Qoud erat demonstrandum
Airbus design is for the every day, sop bound, non event, no disturbance flight for the barely trained and rated modern pilot.
It is not for any deviation from the above, not for training and certainly not for unforeseen and unexpected emergencies.
For all those astronauts who still insist that proper knowledge of the complicated system allows these super pilots to recognise any sub-sub mode and its deviations from the normal mode, instantly enables them to counteract the accompanying reversion of the protection which is due to the fact that the feeding probes and their computers were tricked by another submode that could not analyse properly what these pilots could see instantly by checking the PNFs PFC, knowing that if it deviated more than 5deg from the standby indicator, they had to disconnect one PRIM and the opposite SEC which would finally enable the PF to trust his sidestick again, provided the PNF did not intervene with a opposite input.
You guys should all have applied at Houston.
for me there is only one thing to say: Qoud erat demonstrandum
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The brief nose-down inputs made by the Capt U/T occurred at a time when a nose-up control input would normally be expected and probably took the commander by surprise. The sidesticks move independently. So he would have had no knowledge of the inputs being made by the Capt U/T until the flightpath of the aircraft changed.
But nothing new here as similar events seem to accumulate.
Could be of interest to compare RYR and EZY statistics on that matter ... Which philosophy provides more pertinent information to a training Captain, 737 or 320 ?
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In absence of a reaction by Dozy,
May I refresh your memory with some pictures of hard landing damage NON Airbus.
B737-300 ??G
B767-300 1.8G
DC-9
767-300 1.8G
B737-300 Excessive impact load ??G
May I refresh your memory with some pictures of hard landing damage NON Airbus.
B737-300 ??G
B767-300 1.8G
DC-9
767-300 1.8G
B737-300 Excessive impact load ??G
Last edited by A33Zab; 24th Jan 2013 at 19:24.
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Originally Posted by A33Zab
May I refresh your memory with some pictures of hard landing damage NON Airbus.
You could also have linked a few video to emphasize your point like these ones :
ANA 767 Hard Landing Creases Fuselage - YouTube
DC 9 80 Hard Landing - YouTube
Now, do you think you can try answering the Q.
Which philosophy provides more pertinent information to a training Captain, 737 or 320 ?
Or is it you're simply missing the background to formulate an opinion ?
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@CONF:
Which philosophy provides more pertinent information to a training Captain, 737 or 320 ?
Definitely I am missing the background, but still know the correct answer: to a training Captain a 737 gives more informtion.
And knowing that now, this justifies 'interconnecting' sidesticks?
interconnected columns didn't prevent hard landings