Helicopter Crash Central London
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Pace - I think that you are right in most of what you have said BUT the level of lighting which you suggest I do not think would have helped in those conditions.
That machine is capable of 160kts. My guess is that it was probably nearer 80 - 100kts on that day. The time he would have seen any lights would have been far to late.
That building did not go up overnight. Most of the professional heli guys knows that it is there. They have probably watched the construction progress.
The pilot in this dreadful accident was a very experienced professional, no question about that. My guess from reading everything is that something must have happened before the crane was hit.
The building is here. Click on the movies icon and then down to the construction progress for your info.
The Tower, One St George Wharf
The Tower, One St George Wharf - The Tower - One, St George Wharf
That machine is capable of 160kts. My guess is that it was probably nearer 80 - 100kts on that day. The time he would have seen any lights would have been far to late.
That building did not go up overnight. Most of the professional heli guys knows that it is there. They have probably watched the construction progress.
The pilot in this dreadful accident was a very experienced professional, no question about that. My guess from reading everything is that something must have happened before the crane was hit.
The building is here. Click on the movies icon and then down to the construction progress for your info.
The Tower, One St George Wharf
The Tower, One St George Wharf - The Tower - One, St George Wharf
Last edited by Richard Westnot; 19th Jan 2013 at 19:12.
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For all the seized wing guys asking about ice and helicopters, a personal experience from decades past, a "learned about flying from that":
Was flying a Bell 412 on top to a destination with forecast and actuals of clear (CAVU) but darkness was approaching. Locally we were above an undercast layer of undetermined depth. OAT was approx -25C, we were cruising at 10,000' and felt that we could expect minimal ice accumulation in cloud so elected to start a slow descent down through and avoid a steeper arrival over destination. We also expected to reach clear air shortly.
Less than a minute after starting our descent into cloud(less than 500' from the tops), the icing rapidly increased from nil to light to moderate. We tried to climb back on top but Vbroc and Max Q only gave us a ROD of around 100 fpm.
We declared a MAYDAY, got ATC assistance, and eventually broke out in a very high rate descent. Enough ice was (luckily) shed before hitting the trees that we were able to get to destination.
We had been lulled over previous years of flying the 212 in northern, winter conditions to feeling comfortable with minimal (trace/light) ice exposure and the 212's ability to get back out if we encountered something we didn't like. As we learned, the newer rotor designs are horribly unforgiving.
My point: very few helicopter pilots will risk any icing conditions unless there is absolutely no other choice.
Was flying a Bell 412 on top to a destination with forecast and actuals of clear (CAVU) but darkness was approaching. Locally we were above an undercast layer of undetermined depth. OAT was approx -25C, we were cruising at 10,000' and felt that we could expect minimal ice accumulation in cloud so elected to start a slow descent down through and avoid a steeper arrival over destination. We also expected to reach clear air shortly.
Less than a minute after starting our descent into cloud(less than 500' from the tops), the icing rapidly increased from nil to light to moderate. We tried to climb back on top but Vbroc and Max Q only gave us a ROD of around 100 fpm.
We declared a MAYDAY, got ATC assistance, and eventually broke out in a very high rate descent. Enough ice was (luckily) shed before hitting the trees that we were able to get to destination.
We had been lulled over previous years of flying the 212 in northern, winter conditions to feeling comfortable with minimal (trace/light) ice exposure and the 212's ability to get back out if we encountered something we didn't like. As we learned, the newer rotor designs are horribly unforgiving.
My point: very few helicopter pilots will risk any icing conditions unless there is absolutely no other choice.
Paxing All Over The World
The auto transponsder units, mentioned early on for an installation of wires across a valley (Canada?) and for other obstacles - where are they made? As anyone else experience of hearing their auto TX msg?
Comfort zone
Having followed all of this from the accident day I feel that whatever the reason for this tragedy the pilot felt he was well within his capabilities with regard to the weather conditions prevailing.
As others have said this is the nature of the beast. Helicopters fly into places that the fixed wing can't reach. Very seldom do they slide down an ILS to destination. From my (ground based) observations they're often aloft in marginal VMC weather. He wisely aborted his first destination and was probably still thinking of the closest diversion to Elstree so as to inconvenience his passengers the least. This was after all, a commercial operation.
He wasn't even close to throwing all away in a life/death situation and landing in a park (for chrissakes). That really would be a career terminator. This was a weather diversion well within the remit of a professional. With his experience he would've aborted that diversion/destination too if he thought the weather beyond his capabilities which we must presume he didn't. For reasons yet to be determined his judgement was in error and he flew into a girt big crane perched atop a girt big building bloody close to his track. Cut the guy some slack, we've all nearly been there.
As others have said this is the nature of the beast. Helicopters fly into places that the fixed wing can't reach. Very seldom do they slide down an ILS to destination. From my (ground based) observations they're often aloft in marginal VMC weather. He wisely aborted his first destination and was probably still thinking of the closest diversion to Elstree so as to inconvenience his passengers the least. This was after all, a commercial operation.
He wasn't even close to throwing all away in a life/death situation and landing in a park (for chrissakes). That really would be a career terminator. This was a weather diversion well within the remit of a professional. With his experience he would've aborted that diversion/destination too if he thought the weather beyond his capabilities which we must presume he didn't. For reasons yet to be determined his judgement was in error and he flew into a girt big crane perched atop a girt big building bloody close to his track. Cut the guy some slack, we've all nearly been there.
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The auto transponsder units, mentioned early on for an installation of wires across a valley (Canada?) and for other obstacles - where are they made? As anyone else experience of hearing their auto TX msg?
If so, Norway (invented here, but bought by some wind turbine company, might have moved it), and yes I have. "Test flight" of well known span (to the pilot)
Info on the system from the AIP: https://www.ippc.no/norway_aip/curre...ENR_4_5_en.pdf
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scud
When the weather turns sour, no matter how well you know the area and how many times you have flown over the area, it all looks different. I think he was just trying to stay out of the clouds, looking at the GPS in relation to his destination and hit a crane that was hidden by mist/fog. Sad situation.
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I can just see how a guys professionalism would make him vulnerable in such a situation.
Saving been forced into a diversion in low cloud and vis you'd be doing all you could to stay as high as poss to avoid both obstructions and excessive noise. It is almost a reflex response to fly as high as you can in such a situation. And pinching it at cloud base is just where you lose forward vis while keeping ground contact, so if there's a crane jib lurking in the cloud that's just where you don't want to be. I wouldn't be surprised that if he'd been a couple of hundred feet lower he'd have had sufficient vis to see and avoid. We just don't think of obstructions growing out of cloud when you can't see an obvious base.
IMHO this talk of enhanced lighting is a red herring and would achieve little or nothing if this event was rerun. Lighting is fine in VMC but pointless if shrouded in cloud.
Sadly it looks like an unfortunate operational accident and rushing into legislatative changes is almost certainly going to be a waste of time.
Questions will doubtless be asked re the wisdom of using battersea as a diversion in such conditions given the atrocious conditions at LCY, and even that of setting off from to elstree in the first place, but that's AAIB territory.
We all know the picture when grubbing along in low cloud/vis, and with obstructions close alongside the route extending up into the clag one is in a vulnerable position.
Very sad.
Saving been forced into a diversion in low cloud and vis you'd be doing all you could to stay as high as poss to avoid both obstructions and excessive noise. It is almost a reflex response to fly as high as you can in such a situation. And pinching it at cloud base is just where you lose forward vis while keeping ground contact, so if there's a crane jib lurking in the cloud that's just where you don't want to be. I wouldn't be surprised that if he'd been a couple of hundred feet lower he'd have had sufficient vis to see and avoid. We just don't think of obstructions growing out of cloud when you can't see an obvious base.
IMHO this talk of enhanced lighting is a red herring and would achieve little or nothing if this event was rerun. Lighting is fine in VMC but pointless if shrouded in cloud.
Sadly it looks like an unfortunate operational accident and rushing into legislatative changes is almost certainly going to be a waste of time.
Questions will doubtless be asked re the wisdom of using battersea as a diversion in such conditions given the atrocious conditions at LCY, and even that of setting off from to elstree in the first place, but that's AAIB territory.
We all know the picture when grubbing along in low cloud/vis, and with obstructions close alongside the route extending up into the clag one is in a vulnerable position.
Very sad.
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Object avoidance
I'm pretty certain that static installation of FLARM style devices on potentially dangerous buildings or antennas would add to general safety in any type of airspace where GA and helicopters ply their trade.
Avoidance avionics
Avoidance avionics
Last edited by Rabina; 20th Jan 2013 at 07:25.
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Except that in routing he would have been overwhelmed by FLARM responses - a distraction, or "turn the darned thing off".
FLARM is not going to be any use v moving traffic if it gives you a response only when you are (say) 750 ft away. The combined speed would mean the time between alarm and impact would be of no use. Reports at (say) 2000 ft would mean one in my cab would be beeping constantly, as I am often 1,000 to 1,500 ft AGL.
Helicopters are designed to operate in that kind of environment. It would take the design of a purpose-built system.
Then, in this case, he knew he was low because he was intending to land, so he would expect the FLARM warning. So what use?
Ag Bi post is on the nail here.
FLARM is not going to be any use v moving traffic if it gives you a response only when you are (say) 750 ft away. The combined speed would mean the time between alarm and impact would be of no use. Reports at (say) 2000 ft would mean one in my cab would be beeping constantly, as I am often 1,000 to 1,500 ft AGL.
Helicopters are designed to operate in that kind of environment. It would take the design of a purpose-built system.
Then, in this case, he knew he was low because he was intending to land, so he would expect the FLARM warning. So what use?
Ag Bi post is on the nail here.
Flarm uses closing speed, distance and relative altitude to decide on issuing alerts and alarms.
It also includes a display that shows relative altitude, distance and azimuth of other Flarms. It also shows whether other traffic is climbing, level or descending.
It also includes a display that shows relative altitude, distance and azimuth of other Flarms. It also shows whether other traffic is climbing, level or descending.
Paxing All Over The World
Speaking as an onlooker: I understand that an OCAS/FLARM system may not have been suitable in this particularly difficult situation but should we be telling the CAA to get their act together and compel their usage by the folks making millions out of such buildings?
I do not want to be part of the politicians 'do something/do anything but make it look like you're concerned' brigade. Yet the systems are already proven/available and may help some other flyers in other circumstances?
I do not want to be part of the politicians 'do something/do anything but make it look like you're concerned' brigade. Yet the systems are already proven/available and may help some other flyers in other circumstances?
Avoid imitations
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To those saying he should not have been there, bear in mind that Vauxhall Bridge is a VRP and is on the long-established heli-route H4 which lies inside controlled airspace. He would have been under ATC control at the time. Why he went there remains to be seen.
crossing into the surreal...
Safety devices such as FLARM need to be justified on a cost/benefit analysis. While it may be a wonderful thing for glider competitions, I cannot see how or why every object above the size of a garden gnome would ever end up with a transponder to assist flight crew avoid what should normally be avoided by the general flight rules. The rules occasionally don't catch all situations, however what do the proponents of a vast active transponder system fitted to inanimate objects propose to do in the case of a single transponde failure occurring in the morass of object d'art covered in electronics, presumably paid for by, well no one I can think of. I would probably object to having to install additional electronics on the outside of Big Ben, to accomodate an aerial service which has issues on occasions. My GPS's on the Navajo, mixmaster and my helicopter have obstacle data bases, rather more simple system than installing active electronics on every building above the London underground. Heck, go buy a Garmin Aera, and add your obstacles into the DB at your leisure.... it would be as reliable at managing 10,000 or more obstacles in the greater London area as that many fixed transponders. Out of interest, what is the max target density for FLARM before it collapses? I recall looking at that for the TCAS implementation in the 80's, don't suspect the situation is much different, unless the frequency is in radar ranges. If you are only proposing transponders on a small number of specific obstacles, then the granularity is probably not different to the GPS obstacle data base.
It's hard enough getting TCAS and EGPWS or GPWS to be followed due to the persistence of crew inertia to warnings with any level of false events; I barely get above 300AGL in much operation around some cities (legal for the state...) and the map is normally all red anyway with terrain & obstacles... Operating around the city in normal conditions would result in continuous alerts (as of course does the TDB on the GPS systems). The operator becomes inured to continuous alerts and warnings, and additional procedural training has to be conducted to ensure that an alert that is ignored in some cases is reacted to in others. Oddly enough the same outcome can be obtained in general by knowing what your LSALT is and popping up above LSALT when inadvertent IMC, presuming that the aircraft and the piot is IFR qualified. On helicopters, that is not all that common of course. Transitioning to IMC in a helicopter is far more fun than in a fixed wing, and icing is a factor to be considered before hard IMC in cool climates.
Safety devices such as FLARM need to be justified on a cost/benefit analysis. While it may be a wonderful thing for glider competitions, I cannot see how or why every object above the size of a garden gnome would ever end up with a transponder to assist flight crew avoid what should normally be avoided by the general flight rules. The rules occasionally don't catch all situations, however what do the proponents of a vast active transponder system fitted to inanimate objects propose to do in the case of a single transponde failure occurring in the morass of object d'art covered in electronics, presumably paid for by, well no one I can think of. I would probably object to having to install additional electronics on the outside of Big Ben, to accomodate an aerial service which has issues on occasions. My GPS's on the Navajo, mixmaster and my helicopter have obstacle data bases, rather more simple system than installing active electronics on every building above the London underground. Heck, go buy a Garmin Aera, and add your obstacles into the DB at your leisure.... it would be as reliable at managing 10,000 or more obstacles in the greater London area as that many fixed transponders. Out of interest, what is the max target density for FLARM before it collapses? I recall looking at that for the TCAS implementation in the 80's, don't suspect the situation is much different, unless the frequency is in radar ranges. If you are only proposing transponders on a small number of specific obstacles, then the granularity is probably not different to the GPS obstacle data base.
It's hard enough getting TCAS and EGPWS or GPWS to be followed due to the persistence of crew inertia to warnings with any level of false events; I barely get above 300AGL in much operation around some cities (legal for the state...) and the map is normally all red anyway with terrain & obstacles... Operating around the city in normal conditions would result in continuous alerts (as of course does the TDB on the GPS systems). The operator becomes inured to continuous alerts and warnings, and additional procedural training has to be conducted to ensure that an alert that is ignored in some cases is reacted to in others. Oddly enough the same outcome can be obtained in general by knowing what your LSALT is and popping up above LSALT when inadvertent IMC, presuming that the aircraft and the piot is IFR qualified. On helicopters, that is not all that common of course. Transitioning to IMC in a helicopter is far more fun than in a fixed wing, and icing is a factor to be considered before hard IMC in cool climates.
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Shy Torque
I don't think anyone is suggesting that he shouldn't have been there, just that he shouldn't have been there in those conditions.
I don't think anyone is suggesting that he shouldn't have been there, just that he shouldn't have been there in those conditions.
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So those suggesting OCAS / FLARM are you suggesting installing the devices on every mountain as well? Many more CFITs due to mountains than due to buildings!
I have not seen anyone advocating use of such systems for avoidance of terrain/obstacles for IFR/IMC. For that there are better things available, such as EGPWS and TAWS.
When I fly in my plank (sorry
) VFR along a valley at say 800ft AGL, I might be several thounsand feet below safe IFR altitudes, but it might be great to get a last chance warning about the new spindly tv mast of the digital ground net some fool has placed half way up the valley side. (Terrain backdrop, and a b*tch to spot even in good light conditions)I find the terrain features in my 695 a bit lacking with those kind of obstacles.
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This may be a dumb question/observation, but assuming the probability that he was "scud running" towards a diversion, would he not have followed the Thames (that is one/the heli route, I believe)?
Forgive my ignorance of heli ops, but as far as I am aware there are no protruding obstacles emanating from directly above the Thames, other than bridges, had he remained above the centre of the river.
Or maybe the approach into the landing spot caused him to leave the security of such a routing?
Forgive my ignorance of heli ops, but as far as I am aware there are no protruding obstacles emanating from directly above the Thames, other than bridges, had he remained above the centre of the river.
Or maybe the approach into the landing spot caused him to leave the security of such a routing?
More bang for your buck
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I suspect he probably was following the river as it would have led him to Battersea heli-port, but that building is right on the edge of the river right on the apex of a bend, so it is quite possible that just before the bend he suddenly found himself IMC and missed the bend.
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I'll highlight this again...
A commonly given clearance when routing to Battersea Heliport from the north (e.g. from Elstree!) is to fly in a straight line from Alexandra Palace to Vauxhall Bridge, not above 1,000 feet London QNH, VFR.
When following this route, aircraft arrive at 90 degrees to the river Thames at Vauxhall Bridge, which is a compulsory VRP. The river is less than 300 metres or so in width at that point so a very sharp turn to starboard is needed to join heli-route H4 there, unless you fly a little bit further east and put a radius on the turn.
On reaching the river and reporting at Vauxhall, pilots are told to call Battersea Tower for onward clearance because it's the boundary of their ATZ.
The AAIB will of course already know which route the aircraft was flying on the day and what clearance was given.
A commonly given clearance when routing to Battersea Heliport from the north (e.g. from Elstree!) is to fly in a straight line from Alexandra Palace to Vauxhall Bridge, not above 1,000 feet London QNH, VFR.
When following this route, aircraft arrive at 90 degrees to the river Thames at Vauxhall Bridge, which is a compulsory VRP. The river is less than 300 metres or so in width at that point so a very sharp turn to starboard is needed to join heli-route H4 there, unless you fly a little bit further east and put a radius on the turn.
On reaching the river and reporting at Vauxhall, pilots are told to call Battersea Tower for onward clearance because it's the boundary of their ATZ.
The AAIB will of course already know which route the aircraft was flying on the day and what clearance was given.