787 review called for
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This is being reported all over the place. However there nothing on the FAA or NTSB websites yet.
There was a lot of speculation on forums that the FAA and NTSB will need to investigate.
Perhaps the news corps have picked up on this?
There was a lot of speculation on forums that the FAA and NTSB will need to investigate.
Perhaps the news corps have picked up on this?
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Last edited by Shawrey; 11th Jan 2013 at 15:31.
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I wonder if any of these issues could have something to do with the aircraft being in long term storage before delivery? Weren't the first 30 or so frames completed and stored in Seattle pending certification? Could such storage perhaps have had some adverse effects on the failing components?
EDIT:
Just saw this:
Press Release – FAA Will Review Boeing 787 Design and Production
EDIT:
Just saw this:
Press Release – FAA Will Review Boeing 787 Design and Production
Press Release – FAA Will Review Boeing 787 Design and Production
WASHINGTON – In light of a series of recent events, the FAA will conduct a comprehensive review of the Boeing 787 critical systems, including the design, manufacture and assembly. The purpose of the review is to validate the work conducted during the certification process and further ensure that the aircraft meets the FAA’s high level of safety.
“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”
A team of FAA and Boeing engineers and inspectors will conduct this joint review, with an emphasis on the aircraft’s electrical power and distribution system. The review will also examine how the electrical and mechanical systems interact with each other.
“We are confident that the aircraft is safe. But we need to have a complete understanding of what is happening," said FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta. "We are conducting the review to further ensure that the aircraft meets our high safety standards.”
The review will be structured to provide a broader view of design, manufacturing and assembly and will not focus exclusively on individual events. The review is expected to begin in Seattle, but may expand to other locations over the course of several months.
FAA technical experts logged 200,000 hours of work during the 787 type certification and flew on numerous test flights. The FAA reviews 787 in-service events as part of our continued operational safety process.
United Airlines is currently the only U.S. airline operating the 787, with six airplanes in service. The worldwide in-service fleet includes 50 aircraft.
WASHINGTON – In light of a series of recent events, the FAA will conduct a comprehensive review of the Boeing 787 critical systems, including the design, manufacture and assembly. The purpose of the review is to validate the work conducted during the certification process and further ensure that the aircraft meets the FAA’s high level of safety.
“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”
A team of FAA and Boeing engineers and inspectors will conduct this joint review, with an emphasis on the aircraft’s electrical power and distribution system. The review will also examine how the electrical and mechanical systems interact with each other.
“We are confident that the aircraft is safe. But we need to have a complete understanding of what is happening," said FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta. "We are conducting the review to further ensure that the aircraft meets our high safety standards.”
The review will be structured to provide a broader view of design, manufacturing and assembly and will not focus exclusively on individual events. The review is expected to begin in Seattle, but may expand to other locations over the course of several months.
FAA technical experts logged 200,000 hours of work during the 787 type certification and flew on numerous test flights. The FAA reviews 787 in-service events as part of our continued operational safety process.
United Airlines is currently the only U.S. airline operating the 787, with six airplanes in service. The worldwide in-service fleet includes 50 aircraft.
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They were, and still are, racked up on virtually every space they had at the Boeing Everett Plant. Since the shells were not heated, it seemed there was a condensation issue...you could hear the dripping sound..
Looking at the cabling in the NTSB image, something appears odd. Not sure if the cabling in the upper left is data or power, but I believe power is supposed to be contained within 6 inches of a connection (like the cabling shown in the far background)
The exposed cabling that runs through the posts, just seems really odd...
I would think that the fire suppression system would always be armed, and it would be interesting to see if there were any recorded alarms from the incident.
Looking at the cabling in the NTSB image, something appears odd. Not sure if the cabling in the upper left is data or power, but I believe power is supposed to be contained within 6 inches of a connection (like the cabling shown in the far background)
The exposed cabling that runs through the posts, just seems really odd...
I would think that the fire suppression system would always be armed, and it would be interesting to see if there were any recorded alarms from the incident.
Last edited by FlightPathOBN; 11th Jan 2013 at 15:16.
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For anyone who would like a translation from doublespeak:
“We are confident that the aircraft is safe. But we need to have a complete understanding of what is happening," said FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta. "We are conducting the review to further ensure that the aircraft meets our high safety standards.”
"We are convinced the aircraft is safe, we'd like to know why"
“We are confident that the aircraft is safe. But we need to have a complete understanding of what is happening," said FAA Administrator Michael P. Huerta. "We are conducting the review to further ensure that the aircraft meets our high safety standards.”
"We are convinced the aircraft is safe, we'd like to know why"
Last edited by Lyman; 11th Jan 2013 at 15:27.
Weasel words?
Quote from the FAA:
"The purpose of the review is to validate the work conducted during the certification process and further ensure that the aircraft meets the FAA’s high level of safety."
Extraordinary. A statement more worthy of a political spin doctor than an aviation safety regulator, responsible for certification.
"FAA technical experts logged 200,000 hours of work during the 787 type certification and flew on numerous test flights."
So, will heads roll? Or have they already...
(Perhaps I should add that I know little more of the 787 than that it has two wings and a tail, but have always believed that the Americans make airplanes second to none.)
"The purpose of the review is to validate the work conducted during the certification process and further ensure that the aircraft meets the FAA’s high level of safety."
Extraordinary. A statement more worthy of a political spin doctor than an aviation safety regulator, responsible for certification.
"FAA technical experts logged 200,000 hours of work during the 787 type certification and flew on numerous test flights."
So, will heads roll? Or have they already...
(Perhaps I should add that I know little more of the 787 than that it has two wings and a tail, but have always believed that the Americans make airplanes second to none.)
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Perhaps the single most troubling artifact of politics' invasion of engineering.
Without evidence, (of a mitigating fix), keep your traps shut.....I don't know whether to be relieved or further troubled that both Boeing and the FAA are working together...
Who wrote the public interface book these spokespeople are referring to?
Nixon? Clinton?
Without evidence, (of a mitigating fix), keep your traps shut.....I don't know whether to be relieved or further troubled that both Boeing and the FAA are working together...
Who wrote the public interface book these spokespeople are referring to?
Nixon? Clinton?
Last edited by Lyman; 11th Jan 2013 at 15:57.
RE: Weasel words?
Its interesting that the authorities are going back to the certification process to look for faults. Some of these problems sound like QA issues (fuel lines not properly installed, etc.). On the other hand, if these are issues with design, the "787 type certification", that could be serious.
There are design issues that do crop up in the manufacturing process. The design looks good in analysis and in testing, but it just can't be replicated in manufacturing reliably. That would call into question the whole "design team" philosophy Boeing advertised, where members of manufacturing sat in on preliminary design meetings to identify those that were unproducable. It may turn out that these were exercises in getting manufacturing to keep quiet about bad engineering once it hit the shop floor. And they (mfg) didn't buy in. I saw quite a few instances of that when I did my time at Boeing.
The other "type certification" issue is that Boeing doesn't own much of the design process anymore. Some of these problems might be chased back to Boeing's partners. And if the system requirements and contract language were not written without loopholes, the required changes will cost Boeing a bundle of money. That will get some push back from Boeing as not "encouraging aerospace trave", one of the FAA's roles.
There are design issues that do crop up in the manufacturing process. The design looks good in analysis and in testing, but it just can't be replicated in manufacturing reliably. That would call into question the whole "design team" philosophy Boeing advertised, where members of manufacturing sat in on preliminary design meetings to identify those that were unproducable. It may turn out that these were exercises in getting manufacturing to keep quiet about bad engineering once it hit the shop floor. And they (mfg) didn't buy in. I saw quite a few instances of that when I did my time at Boeing.
The other "type certification" issue is that Boeing doesn't own much of the design process anymore. Some of these problems might be chased back to Boeing's partners. And if the system requirements and contract language were not written without loopholes, the required changes will cost Boeing a bundle of money. That will get some push back from Boeing as not "encouraging aerospace trave", one of the FAA's roles.
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Design problem? Or Mission problem?
If the FAA is to "encourage aerospace travel" and provide for the highest level of safety, we have the problem to hand, and it is not pretty....
The salesman also oversees safety? Hello?
Part of the globalisation of aero construction (design?), other than fracturing single site assembly, is to dilute and diminish ultimate responsibility, and not just the financials.
The definition of good design is to simplify to the point nothing is left that is not crucial. Scattering critical task at the altar of "sharing" is risky, if not downright dangerous......the incest of discrete disciplines is the problem.
This applies to the blending of newish technology with "marketing"....to include manufacture, oversight, and reliability (safety).
The salesman also oversees safety? Hello?
Part of the globalisation of aero construction (design?), other than fracturing single site assembly, is to dilute and diminish ultimate responsibility, and not just the financials.
The definition of good design is to simplify to the point nothing is left that is not crucial. Scattering critical task at the altar of "sharing" is risky, if not downright dangerous......the incest of discrete disciplines is the problem.
This applies to the blending of newish technology with "marketing"....to include manufacture, oversight, and reliability (safety).
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well....
THAT safety review will be all politics...
however the new FAA top indian, the DOT boss and last but not least the Boeing CEO are taking some risk...
if only one 787 should experience some "china syndrome" event in flight with one of those Li Ion batts, they will all be toast...
dont know whether that causes them to lose any sleep...
it better should...
dont get me wrong, I like the concept of the 787...it will ultimately become a great airplane...however, to "spice" that baby up with Li Ions as main batts was a big mistake from Boeing's side..
and OK, the CJ 4 ( C525C) is "only" a part 23 airplane, but also had "special conditions" by the FAA for that Li Ion Main Batt...but when Cessna's own demo bird went up in flames in their hangar in ICT the bird was effectively grounded by Cessna and the FAA until having been retrofitted with conventional batts..
sure that may not be so easy on the 787 as the performance of those Li Ion batts seems to have been incorporated into the design already at a very early stage..
but at the end of the day, makes no difference...Li Ions are neither ready nor mature yet for air transport from a safety point of view...it's as simple as that at the end of the day
however the new FAA top indian, the DOT boss and last but not least the Boeing CEO are taking some risk...
if only one 787 should experience some "china syndrome" event in flight with one of those Li Ion batts, they will all be toast...
dont know whether that causes them to lose any sleep...
it better should...
dont get me wrong, I like the concept of the 787...it will ultimately become a great airplane...however, to "spice" that baby up with Li Ions as main batts was a big mistake from Boeing's side..
and OK, the CJ 4 ( C525C) is "only" a part 23 airplane, but also had "special conditions" by the FAA for that Li Ion Main Batt...but when Cessna's own demo bird went up in flames in their hangar in ICT the bird was effectively grounded by Cessna and the FAA until having been retrofitted with conventional batts..
sure that may not be so easy on the 787 as the performance of those Li Ion batts seems to have been incorporated into the design already at a very early stage..
but at the end of the day, makes no difference...Li Ions are neither ready nor mature yet for air transport from a safety point of view...it's as simple as that at the end of the day
Last edited by falconer1; 11th Jan 2013 at 18:17.
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[Not a pilot--ignore or delete as necessary] My question is what did Boeing have to do to get this approved for production? It's not as if they built the plane and smuggled an illicit battery aboard. If the battery was not defective or installed incorrectly, is it likely that a major failure scenario would have been missed by the engineers/designers under intense scrutiny by aviation authorities? [Later: Sincere thanks to aterpster and EEng. Sounds like, "We'll back you all the way--until you screw up!"]
Last edited by fotoguzzi; 12th Jan 2013 at 10:22.
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Can someone help me here please! I seem to recall that L-ION batteries were limited to ??400gm?? for carriage by air under IATA DG regs. What has changed to make these safe?
fotoguzzi; Often, a company such as Boeing will have some key engineering personnel known as DERs (Designated Engineering Representatives) who approve or recommend for approval designs to the FAA. (see: Designees & Delegations - Designated Engineering Representative (DER)).
There is some controversy regarding the over reliance that the FAA has on the work product of these DERs. Boeing clearly didn't 'sneak' a LiON battery onto the 787. They requested an exemption to current rules restricting the use of this battery technology onboard aircraft. So now the questions are: Did Boeing (or more accurately Boeing's subcontractor) consider all of the environmental factors and conditions of use placed on the battery when doing its testing and analysis? And did the FAA miss anythging when reviewing the DER's work product?
Often times, Boeing, or some systems subcontractor will define the conditions under which a component will operate and request that the component be designed and tested to those conditions. But due to a lack of understanding of systems integration considerations, those conditions may be poorly defined. The component will pass tests under the specified conditions. But some aspects of its use may push it beyond its design limitations.
Given that there are several layers between the component suppliers, systems contractors and Boeing, the finger pointing may soon commence.
There is some controversy regarding the over reliance that the FAA has on the work product of these DERs. Boeing clearly didn't 'sneak' a LiON battery onto the 787. They requested an exemption to current rules restricting the use of this battery technology onboard aircraft. So now the questions are: Did Boeing (or more accurately Boeing's subcontractor) consider all of the environmental factors and conditions of use placed on the battery when doing its testing and analysis? And did the FAA miss anythging when reviewing the DER's work product?
Often times, Boeing, or some systems subcontractor will define the conditions under which a component will operate and request that the component be designed and tested to those conditions. But due to a lack of understanding of systems integration considerations, those conditions may be poorly defined. The component will pass tests under the specified conditions. But some aspects of its use may push it beyond its design limitations.
Given that there are several layers between the component suppliers, systems contractors and Boeing, the finger pointing may soon commence.
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Here in Boeing land, its getting kindof ugly...
The FAA is said to review the design, manufacture, and certification of the 787 Firebird.
That is not a vote of confidence for either group, Boeing nor the FAA.
My opinion, just as the aircraft cert parameters have little correlation to real ops...perhaps the battery specs are as well...
remember, meeting certification is the bare minimum between legal and illegal.
Look at the size of that battery compartment and the battery itself...very high load demand for that size..with little apparent cooling.
Li batteries rely on shielding of each cell, and a perfect balance between each cell..to avoid runaway...
note that cars with Li cells are immersed in a cooling agent that is circulated
Put some temperature monitors on the other 787's in operation...
The FAA is said to review the design, manufacture, and certification of the 787 Firebird.
That is not a vote of confidence for either group, Boeing nor the FAA.
My opinion, just as the aircraft cert parameters have little correlation to real ops...perhaps the battery specs are as well...
remember, meeting certification is the bare minimum between legal and illegal.
Look at the size of that battery compartment and the battery itself...very high load demand for that size..with little apparent cooling.
Li batteries rely on shielding of each cell, and a perfect balance between each cell..to avoid runaway...
note that cars with Li cells are immersed in a cooling agent that is circulated
Put some temperature monitors on the other 787's in operation...
Last edited by FlightPathOBN; 11th Jan 2013 at 22:18.
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[Not a pilot--ignore or delete as necessary] My question is what did Boeing have to do to get this approved for production? It's not as if they built the plane and smuggled an illicit battery aboard. If the battery was not defective or installed incorrectly, is it likely that a major failure scenario would have been missed by the engineers/designers under intense scrutiny by aviation authorities?
Same thing happens in France. (and elsewhere.)
Last edited by aterpster; 12th Jan 2013 at 01:09.
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terpster...
Concur with your assessment...
The FAA has gone down the path of facilitating self certification..
In reality...the regulators are 'validating' the validity of the submission to them..
It is NOT the mission of any regulatory agency to approve, therefore assume liability for the aircraft....
It is only the regulators duty to approve what was submitted to meet the minimum requirements, and it is NOT the regulators scope to design by regulations, how the system meets the criteria...
A significant disconnect in my view..
Concur with your assessment...
The FAA has gone down the path of facilitating self certification..
In reality...the regulators are 'validating' the validity of the submission to them..
It is NOT the mission of any regulatory agency to approve, therefore assume liability for the aircraft....
It is only the regulators duty to approve what was submitted to meet the minimum requirements, and it is NOT the regulators scope to design by regulations, how the system meets the criteria...
A significant disconnect in my view..
Put some temperature monitors on the other 787's in operation...
That's the way we used to do this kind of stuff when I got to burn parts up in the lab.
