" FAA concerned about increase in manual handling errors"
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bubbers44:
This old buddy would have dropped the nose about 3 degrees below the horizon and reduced to cruise descent power while sorting things out.
All my old pilot buddies would have held cruise attitude, about 2.5 degrees nose up and gotten out the checklist for unreliable airspeed. It would have then been a non event. They chose because of their automation reliance and being told the Airbus can't stall to pull back on the side stick and do a full stall for over 3 minutes with no clue how to recover. We have a new generation of computer pilots, not real pilots.
The US has made it harder to get into the right seat by requiring 1500 hrs. That is good because they may learn how to hand fly, maybe not, depending how they build that time. I did flight instruction, crop dusting, charter and corporate to get my first airline job with 5500 hrs and felt lucky to do so. 250 hrs into the airlines is nuts.
The US has made it harder to get into the right seat by requiring 1500 hrs. That is good because they may learn how to hand fly, maybe not, depending how they build that time. I did flight instruction, crop dusting, charter and corporate to get my first airline job with 5500 hrs and felt lucky to do so. 250 hrs into the airlines is nuts.
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That would depend how freaked out you became by the sudden rush of adrenalin when things started going wrong at O-dark-hundred in the middle of some significantly unfriendly weather.
Don't get me wrong, it's likely that pilots with more high-altitude manual handling experience on the line probably would have done better (in fact over thirty times when the same tech issue cropped up, the crews managed just fine).
But the truth is that none of us - pilot or no - can really say how we'd have reacted in that position unless we've been put in a position of similar difficulty and come out the other side. Thankfully few of us have.
Don't get me wrong, it's likely that pilots with more high-altitude manual handling experience on the line probably would have done better (in fact over thirty times when the same tech issue cropped up, the crews managed just fine).
But the truth is that none of us - pilot or no - can really say how we'd have reacted in that position unless we've been put in a position of similar difficulty and come out the other side. Thankfully few of us have.
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Amongst other suggestions made I like the idea of mandating that routine sim sessions include at least one scenario in which the correct response is to turn off the automation and hand fly; preferably with a subsequent recovery from unusual attitude, instrument failure, or difficult raw data procedure thrown in just for laughs.
This has the benefit of imprinting this as a possible and acceptable behaviour. It also means candidates will have to maintain their instrument skills at least at the level they achieved when passing their instrument ratings.
In order to facilitate the latter mandate all Airlines to require their pilots log a particular number of manual flying hours per year.
For those who have been there and done that. What would your recommendations for minimum hand flying be ? Obviously balancing the requirement to maintain these skills in the particular aircraft flown with commercial pressures and passenger safety. What areas of flying would you feel were most important to cover (approaches, low level manoeuvring, high altitude manoeuvring)?
This has the benefit of imprinting this as a possible and acceptable behaviour. It also means candidates will have to maintain their instrument skills at least at the level they achieved when passing their instrument ratings.
In order to facilitate the latter mandate all Airlines to require their pilots log a particular number of manual flying hours per year.
For those who have been there and done that. What would your recommendations for minimum hand flying be ? Obviously balancing the requirement to maintain these skills in the particular aircraft flown with commercial pressures and passenger safety. What areas of flying would you feel were most important to cover (approaches, low level manoeuvring, high altitude manoeuvring)?
- mandating more garden-variety handflying might be no panacea, IMVHO it is one of the most effective and at the same time easily implemented, cost-neutral – @ #60.
This is like prescribing treatment without diagnosis, based on the premise that pilots are like "strangers" in an automated flightdeck.
Previous analysis of crew errors identified a combination of contributing factors and cross-cutting factors which contribute to crew errors (refs), it would be interesting to see how many of these were also associated with the FAA’s list of manual handling errors, and if some of the solutions also apply. Particularly time pressure or the crew’s perception of time, together with surprise. - Fast Finger Freddy –
- For those who have been there and done that. -
See the slides on hindsight bias and myths about human error; and for those who wish to perpetuate the debate on AF447, switch to ‘America 903’ instead (in the second reference); why did they survive:– then return to hindsight bias and human error, ad infinitum.
Ref 1. The Misunderstood Role of Pilot Error in Airline Accidents.
Ref 2. Limitations and Vulnerabilities on the Flight Deck.
This is like prescribing treatment without diagnosis, based on the premise that pilots are like "strangers" in an automated flightdeck.
Previous analysis of crew errors identified a combination of contributing factors and cross-cutting factors which contribute to crew errors (refs), it would be interesting to see how many of these were also associated with the FAA’s list of manual handling errors, and if some of the solutions also apply. Particularly time pressure or the crew’s perception of time, together with surprise. - Fast Finger Freddy –
- For those who have been there and done that. -
See the slides on hindsight bias and myths about human error; and for those who wish to perpetuate the debate on AF447, switch to ‘America 903’ instead (in the second reference); why did they survive:– then return to hindsight bias and human error, ad infinitum.
Ref 1. The Misunderstood Role of Pilot Error in Airline Accidents.
Ref 2. Limitations and Vulnerabilities on the Flight Deck.
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This is like prescribing treatment without diagnosis, ...
... based on the premise that pilots are like "strangers" in an automated flightdeck.
- taking the stairs instead of the elevator, "out of the loop" -
So how does this help understand the underlying issues raised by the FAA recommendation; how is more ‘exercise’ going to prevent some pilots tripping or going up opposed to down (skill and cognitive errors) when taking the stairs (flying manually).
Do those pilots who always fly manually because they have no automation (those without elevators, always having to use stairs) make similar manual handling errors?
So how does this help understand the underlying issues raised by the FAA recommendation; how is more ‘exercise’ going to prevent some pilots tripping or going up opposed to down (skill and cognitive errors) when taking the stairs (flying manually).
Do those pilots who always fly manually because they have no automation (those without elevators, always having to use stairs) make similar manual handling errors?
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How does it help? .... I presume considerably.
The ability to manually fly an aircraft (VFR / IFR) is a skill prone like any other to degradation through disuse.
If you take the view that ONE of the common factors involved in recent accidents has been poor manual flying skills then take action to rectify it.
This doesn't need to wait on the identification of other factors. Or I you suggesting that it does?
The ability to manually fly an aircraft (VFR / IFR) is a skill prone like any other to degradation through disuse.
If you take the view that ONE of the common factors involved in recent accidents has been poor manual flying skills then take action to rectify it.
This doesn't need to wait on the identification of other factors. Or I you suggesting that it does?
Rans, a point of debate is the presumption that the lack of manual flying alone (overuse of automation) is the source of manual flying errors.
This is not to suggest that we dismiss the potential influence of more manual flying, but to be aware that the SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors. With absence of data and interpretation, this assumption is questioned. There may be many contributing factors to ‘manual flying errors’ some with equal or higher relevance than manual flight.
A simple evaluation might conclude that the effectiveness of a safety intervention will be in proportion to its ranking in an occurrence, whereas in modern complex operations it is more likely that a combination of factors and their interaction is more important.
A good example comes from recent analysis of overrun accidents, which previously identified TCH, landing speed, touchdown position, runway condition, and tailwind, as individual factors, where one or another dominated in a specific accident. However, when projecting this data to help avoid further events, it is a combination of several factors which is more important than the particular, thus all of the factors should be considered including a previously unspecified pre-landing distance assessment.
Based on recent highly salient LOC accidents, a combination of factors such as situation assessment/awareness, surprise, automation failure, and knowledge might be a grouping, however without data for lesser incidents and events in normal operations, operators cannot be sure which aspects of ‘more manual flight’ will minimize operating risks. Thus judgment / risk assessment to reduce manual handling error cannot be concluded effectively.
This is not to suggest that we dismiss the potential influence of more manual flying, but to be aware that the SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors. With absence of data and interpretation, this assumption is questioned. There may be many contributing factors to ‘manual flying errors’ some with equal or higher relevance than manual flight.
A simple evaluation might conclude that the effectiveness of a safety intervention will be in proportion to its ranking in an occurrence, whereas in modern complex operations it is more likely that a combination of factors and their interaction is more important.
A good example comes from recent analysis of overrun accidents, which previously identified TCH, landing speed, touchdown position, runway condition, and tailwind, as individual factors, where one or another dominated in a specific accident. However, when projecting this data to help avoid further events, it is a combination of several factors which is more important than the particular, thus all of the factors should be considered including a previously unspecified pre-landing distance assessment.
Based on recent highly salient LOC accidents, a combination of factors such as situation assessment/awareness, surprise, automation failure, and knowledge might be a grouping, however without data for lesser incidents and events in normal operations, operators cannot be sure which aspects of ‘more manual flight’ will minimize operating risks. Thus judgment / risk assessment to reduce manual handling error cannot be concluded effectively.
They Were Not Qualified!
Dozy:
Any person who could not have reacted appropriately in that situation is simply not a qualified pilot and should not be allowed in the cockpit let alone on the roster to fly a commercial aircraft. You can blame it on training or any other thing you want, the three pilots of AF447 should not have been there.
But the truth is that none of us - pilot or no - can really say how we'd have reacted in that position unless we've been put in a position of similar difficulty and come out the other side. Thankfully few of us have.A
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Any person who could not have reacted appropriately in that situation is simply not a qualified pilot and should not be allowed in the cockpit let alone on the roster to fly a commercial aircraft. You can blame it on training or any other thing you want, the three pilots of AF447 should not have been there.
Last edited by CEJM; 18th Jan 2013 at 20:10.
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"a point of debate is the presumption that the lack of manual flying alone"
---simple don't presume I don't think many people are arguing that it is the ONLY factor.
"SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors."
---apologies I don't know who SAFO is. I'll let him answer for himself and only reiterate that nobody else thinks the majority of accidents are single factor.
"There may be many contributing factors to ‘manual flying errors’ some with equal or higher relevance than manual flight. "
---Again agree although I am struggling to think of a higher relevance factor than "the inability to manually fly". Equal possible, higher I am struggling.
"when projecting this data to help avoid further events, it is a combination of several factors which is more important than the particular, thus all of the factors should be considered"
---so address all the factors if they have been identified and are amenable.
Based on the evidence of recent air incidents, changes in training and changes in the use of automation ; do you feel that mandated improvements in training / currency for manual flying skills should be brought in now? Or should we await further data or interpretation?
---simple don't presume I don't think many people are arguing that it is the ONLY factor.
"SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors."
---apologies I don't know who SAFO is. I'll let him answer for himself and only reiterate that nobody else thinks the majority of accidents are single factor.
"There may be many contributing factors to ‘manual flying errors’ some with equal or higher relevance than manual flight. "
---Again agree although I am struggling to think of a higher relevance factor than "the inability to manually fly". Equal possible, higher I am struggling.
"when projecting this data to help avoid further events, it is a combination of several factors which is more important than the particular, thus all of the factors should be considered"
---so address all the factors if they have been identified and are amenable.
Based on the evidence of recent air incidents, changes in training and changes in the use of automation ; do you feel that mandated improvements in training / currency for manual flying skills should be brought in now? Or should we await further data or interpretation?
SAFO - Safety Alert for Operators, FAA.
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat.../SAFO13002.pdf Manual Flight Operations
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat.../SAFO13002.pdf Manual Flight Operations
Rans hopefully the debate is a little clearer with SAFO 13002 as background.
Re "the inability to manually fly".
This view blocks any deeper thoughts. If inability is seen the cause of a relatively few accidents – as in posts above – the human is at fault - , it overlooks all the other non-accident flight operations, which are the overwhelming majority, and in which manual flight ability is not a factor. Furthermore the ‘errant’ pilots up to the point of their accident apparently exhibited the requisite ability; so did they just have a bad day or are there other factors to be considered.
Similarly consider American 903, the crew apparently lacked ability at 16000ft, but at 13000ft they regained the necessary ability – the difference could have been in the situation or the way in which they interpreted the situation, or the initial (in)action vs later actions.
A soon as we put ‘the human is at fault’ to one side then there are many other possible contributions to the situation and human behaviour.
We might assume that the FAA has the data; then why not publish it. If their single view of cause persists, representing an old view of human factors, then what might this say about the FAA’s views on HF or even their safety culture?
A favourite ref. http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/pa...ithlynne-p.pdf
Re "the inability to manually fly".
This view blocks any deeper thoughts. If inability is seen the cause of a relatively few accidents – as in posts above – the human is at fault - , it overlooks all the other non-accident flight operations, which are the overwhelming majority, and in which manual flight ability is not a factor. Furthermore the ‘errant’ pilots up to the point of their accident apparently exhibited the requisite ability; so did they just have a bad day or are there other factors to be considered.
Similarly consider American 903, the crew apparently lacked ability at 16000ft, but at 13000ft they regained the necessary ability – the difference could have been in the situation or the way in which they interpreted the situation, or the initial (in)action vs later actions.
A soon as we put ‘the human is at fault’ to one side then there are many other possible contributions to the situation and human behaviour.
We might assume that the FAA has the data; then why not publish it. If their single view of cause persists, representing an old view of human factors, then what might this say about the FAA’s views on HF or even their safety culture?
A favourite ref. http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/pa...ithlynne-p.pdf
If we go back to our basic flying training and look at the development of our flying skills, than it comes down to gaining expierience by training. First just to fly the aircraft straight and level or do gentle turns ocupied our whole thinking process despite hours of theoretical training. Would we have been able to manually fly a raw data ILS without FD in the first hours? No, we would have been all over the place. But after we honed the manual flying skills within a few hours, we had room for further tasks like flying on instruments under the hood including doing approaches and go arounds. Later on we (from the military) could do it in close formation and while performing other military tasks like implementing sensors and weaponary, even in single pilot operated aircraft. With continuing hours we got better from year to year, although not perfect and not without some shortcomings, as nobody gets ever perfect.
But nowadays I have the impression that the peak of manual flying performance is reached prior the work on the line starts, and then decays from this minimal level to a background noise. When the situation arises that manual flying is mandatory due to some sudden technical deficiency, the brain is overloaded with the simple task to maintain aircraft control by handling the controls without the daily helpers, which then leaves less room for dealing with the cause of the situation on hand and the necessary steps to perform. It´s like in a bad dream when you want to run away, but you are not able to move your limbs.
I´m probably exagerating and i hope that most pilots are still able to use the knowledge once learned in basic training otherwise i wouldn´t fly anymore, but i think it´s high noon to do something against a further decrease of those once learnt skills.
But nowadays I have the impression that the peak of manual flying performance is reached prior the work on the line starts, and then decays from this minimal level to a background noise. When the situation arises that manual flying is mandatory due to some sudden technical deficiency, the brain is overloaded with the simple task to maintain aircraft control by handling the controls without the daily helpers, which then leaves less room for dealing with the cause of the situation on hand and the necessary steps to perform. It´s like in a bad dream when you want to run away, but you are not able to move your limbs.
I´m probably exagerating and i hope that most pilots are still able to use the knowledge once learned in basic training otherwise i wouldn´t fly anymore, but i think it´s high noon to do something against a further decrease of those once learnt skills.
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This is not to suggest that we dismiss the potential influence of more manual flying, but to be aware that the SAFO assumes that a single (predominant?) factor is the reason for the errors. With absence of data and interpretation, this assumption is questioned.
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One problem is commercial. I know of one airline who used to allow visual approaches in the hope of saving time & fuel. They did this in their 'old' a/c. Now with shiny new wizz-bang a/c and all that great SA information you'd expect it to be even easier. Rapid expansion has led to a vast spectrum of abilities and experience. Philosophy now dissuades from short cut visuals. One of the reasons was the large increase in G.A's as soon as CAVOK hit the airfields. Guys thinking they could thread the needle again after months of IFR stuff. The 'lack of fuel & time saving' by such antics caused a shift in attitude and rather than address the root cause = lack of training & practice, the solution was to restrict it. To counter this attitude by the CAA's there will be a great bun-fight and my guess is the airlines would win it.