" FAA concerned about increase in manual handling errors"
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If poor handling skills are an issue, the regulatory bodies should establish a mandatory handling skill test to augment the IR test.
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FAA encourage operators to promote manual flight operations
Interesting to see that the FAA felt it necessary to issue a SAFO recently encouraging operators to 'promote manual flight operations when appropriate'.
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat.../SAFO13002.pdf
It will be fascinating to see what real world impact this 'encouragement' has.
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat.../SAFO13002.pdf
It will be fascinating to see what real world impact this 'encouragement' has.
Gretchenfrage, your comments @#39 (on #38 & #15 ?), seek to simplify the problem and thereby increase the practicability of a solution.
This appears to be what the FAA have done (a pandemic in modern aviation); but it’s easy to find error as it is a normal aspect of human behaviour. However, without evidence that these ‘errors’ directly contribute to reduced safety (and what are these errors), more of ‘this or that’ simple solution will not guarantee any improvement. You may only improve the skill in ‘flying one-engine ILS approach without FD’.
The FAA’s investigation has used pilot error as a stopping point; the human is at fault, thus train the human – more currency. This simplistic approach may miss underlying problems, and until these and the contributing factors are understood then any meaningful intervention cannot be formulated.
Training standards and currency in manual flying skills may well have deteriorated, but are these changes in proportion to the tasks and situations typical of modern operations, or really at the root of handling related safety concerns. What about the organisation, economic, and social changes; has the baseline human behaviour been affected by these.
Modern views of human factors by-pass human error with the concept of variability; this is a performance characteristic necessary to manage daily activities. No situation is perfect / clear cut, work activity is a compromise. So one aspect to consider is if pilots are sufficiently trained / skilled in the process of compromise – the judgement that originates from situation assessment and choice of action (aspects of airmanship), and which also involves risk management, and the skills of thought when stressed.
I agree that action is required to maintain / improve safety, but this does not imply a simple ‘blame and train’ solution. The industry needs to understand how pilots manage variability, how they compromise activities in the many different situations encountered every day; how do pilots judge situations and choose the correct course of action. Then with evidence of this and any disparity with the task demand, a solution might be proposed.
A solution might not be simple to identify, but it could be shaped to be practical and then at least it would be meaningful.
The third age of human factors.
This appears to be what the FAA have done (a pandemic in modern aviation); but it’s easy to find error as it is a normal aspect of human behaviour. However, without evidence that these ‘errors’ directly contribute to reduced safety (and what are these errors), more of ‘this or that’ simple solution will not guarantee any improvement. You may only improve the skill in ‘flying one-engine ILS approach without FD’.
The FAA’s investigation has used pilot error as a stopping point; the human is at fault, thus train the human – more currency. This simplistic approach may miss underlying problems, and until these and the contributing factors are understood then any meaningful intervention cannot be formulated.
Training standards and currency in manual flying skills may well have deteriorated, but are these changes in proportion to the tasks and situations typical of modern operations, or really at the root of handling related safety concerns. What about the organisation, economic, and social changes; has the baseline human behaviour been affected by these.
Modern views of human factors by-pass human error with the concept of variability; this is a performance characteristic necessary to manage daily activities. No situation is perfect / clear cut, work activity is a compromise. So one aspect to consider is if pilots are sufficiently trained / skilled in the process of compromise – the judgement that originates from situation assessment and choice of action (aspects of airmanship), and which also involves risk management, and the skills of thought when stressed.
I agree that action is required to maintain / improve safety, but this does not imply a simple ‘blame and train’ solution. The industry needs to understand how pilots manage variability, how they compromise activities in the many different situations encountered every day; how do pilots judge situations and choose the correct course of action. Then with evidence of this and any disparity with the task demand, a solution might be proposed.
A solution might not be simple to identify, but it could be shaped to be practical and then at least it would be meaningful.
The third age of human factors.
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@safetypee
Do you really see a "blame and train" element here? I rather feel that this FAA approach is quite explicitly directed at the blunt rather than the sharp end (which would IMHO make it all the more important to oblige instead of merely recommend, BTW). And I conjecture that when "looking for what goes right" in everyday flying, some major contributions come from having good situational awareness, being "in the loop", being able to make sound decisions concerning the appropriate level of automation, or not having to fiddle around with the FMC or autopilot to quickly and precisely execute maneuvers not included in the preplanned flight path (which was one central point in the "children of the magenta line" video, IIRC). It may be just me, but I'd see all these skills benefit significantly from increased discretion and encouragement concerning handflying (apart from increased motivation among those bored by button-pushing). All that directly on-the-job, during revenue-generating activities (from a bean-counter perspective).
The tongue-in-cheek solution is simple. Fail your RA. This will lead to autopilot disengagement and loss of flight directors on the failed side upon G/S and LOC capture (the switch to approach mode).
Works very well on the 738 regardless of the wx and the surprise on the PF's face is rather amusing as raw data hand flying is thereby compulsory.
Or we could petition the FAA/CAA to legislate for a minimum AP disengagement height of 1580 instead of 158 feet.
Tongue back in cheek.
Works very well on the 738 regardless of the wx and the surprise on the PF's face is rather amusing as raw data hand flying is thereby compulsory.
Or we could petition the FAA/CAA to legislate for a minimum AP disengagement height of 1580 instead of 158 feet.
Tongue back in cheek.
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@ safetypee
You are damn right! For three reasons: First, in todays scope-bound world you need to simplify in a loud way to raise attention, and that’s what I want. Second, the KISS principle applies here as well, simple solutions are more often the most effective ones because they, third, increase the practicability, as you state yourself.
I refuse to go down the “Dozy way” in asking for evidence or proof for everything that would implement change from the established system. This is an easy way out, because there is almost no real possibility to produce such evidence. It all runs down to statistics, and we know that this is a twisted approach. I.E: In the most recent cases it evolves around Airbus accidents, and the same protagonists that crie for “evidence” before having to engage, deny the blunt fact that such evidence (statistically) prove the competition’s system with 0 victims (as opposed to AB, see the “is AB safe” thread), and then such evidence is immediately rejected.
Therefore asking for “evidence” is almost futile.
Wrong approach. This thread talks about manual handling errors. But it's not about "faults". It’s more about lack of being able to fulfill the role the human still has his place in the cockpit:
To take over when the electrons go the wrong way.
Again, you sound great intellectually and such questions might be worth investigating, but I guess our customers don’t really give a hoot about any changes in proportion to tasks and situations when the s..t hits the fan. They expect us to be able to take over, fly the airplane out of any danger irrespective to any of the above (and even you are a customer every now and then).
Even on newer cars equipped with cruise-controls and distance monitoring/interveneing you still need to be able to brake yourself!
Safetypee, I know what you mean, but still insist that the underlying problem here, is that the basics are not taught well enough and the aquired is not maintained enough. This might be simple, but then it's just as simple to remedy it!!
You can still engage in all other aspects you mention, but do not use any of that to try to delay the earlier.
Gretchenfrage, your comments @#39 (on #38 & #15 ?), seek to simplify the problem and thereby increase the practicability of a solution.
It’s easy to find error as it is a normal aspect of human behaviour. However, without evidence that these ‘errors’ directly contribute to reduced safety (and what are these errors), more of ‘this or that’ simple solution will not guarantee any improvement.
Therefore asking for “evidence” is almost futile.
The FAA’s investigation has used pilot error as a stopping point; the human is at fault, thus train the human – more currency.
To take over when the electrons go the wrong way.
Training standards and currency in manual flying skills may well have deteriorated, but are these changes in proportion to the tasks and situations typical of modern operations, or really at the root of handling related safety concerns.
Even on newer cars equipped with cruise-controls and distance monitoring/interveneing you still need to be able to brake yourself!
Safetypee, I know what you mean, but still insist that the underlying problem here, is that the basics are not taught well enough and the aquired is not maintained enough. This might be simple, but then it's just as simple to remedy it!!
You can still engage in all other aspects you mention, but do not use any of that to try to delay the earlier.
Last edited by Gretchenfrage; 15th Jan 2013 at 05:46.
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"Do you agree, about several examples of incidents/accidents at well known carriers besides THY, like AF/LH/TAM and others, where the crew lost track due to "complexity" of their ship?"
I disagree, slightly. I am giving a Type qualification course at the moment. As with many airlines it is self-funded by the student and thus is kept to a minimum number of sessions. As with other airlines the type rating is combined with an OPC. A few decades ago, in my early life entering the airlines, we were taught to fly the a/c in the TQ course, with SOP's attached. The line operation and SOP's were refined during line training. The initial emphasis was knowing how the a/c worked, how the systems worked and how to fly it. The line training refined these skills and expanded how to operate it within the airways system and a multitude of busy airports and small visual airfields. Understanding the complexities of the systems came with our 'apprenticeship', which had started in the sim.
Nowadays the TQ course seems to shift the emphasis more towards SOP's during the manoeuvres, some of which are with normal & non-normal scenarios. Some of the non-normals scenarios are box-ticking on the LST form, very few are in depth training of the gotchas and pitfalls. The handling emphasis is aimed at the LST items.
Thus IMHO it was not the 'complexity of their ship' which sucked them into trouble, it was the lack of training = understanding of those systems. This ignorance created a complex system when in fact with proper training it would have been quite simple.
One wonders if the policy of many airlines to use relatively (2 years experience) inexperienced F/O's as SFI's is correct. They have followed the self same course of knowing what to do, but not the how & the why. They then pass on this diluted knowledge to the next generation of cadets who will become the next generation of SFI's and so the downward spiral of knowledge continues. SOP's are so intense that the first thought of a pilot in a less than ideal situation is to ask, "what does the book say?" Second, if at all, comes "what is the most sensible airmanship thing to do?" By the time you arrive at the 2nd option it might be too ate as the a/c was still travelling very fast during the first phase of questioning confusion. It is noticeable that I've been told by newish F/O's that flying with the old farts is usually more relaxing than with the newbie captains. The oldies do what is best instinctively, and within the book boundaries, but are not afraid to bend the SOP's; the newbies are terrified to even blow at the boundaries and thus delay making some decisions and then have to race to catch up. All old farts were newbies once, but mostly with a longer and deeper apprenticeship than today.
IMHO, if the industry is gong to continue making captains with relatively low hours then the training of manual skills, and especially systems knowledge and understanding of all their possibilities, needs to be more in depth to compensate for the shorter apprenticeship. Too many commands can be given to those whose prof checks are above average and SOP knowledge is perfect. SOP's can not cover all eventualities. Most incidents and accidents started quite subtly and the human intervention, or lack of it, caused a can of worms to develop, when it was preventable. And that's a whole other discussion about a good crew being preventative rather than reactive. Slavishly following SOP's is not always preventative, but that was touched upon in an earlier thread.
Knowledge is power: ignorance can be painful in the extreme.
I disagree, slightly. I am giving a Type qualification course at the moment. As with many airlines it is self-funded by the student and thus is kept to a minimum number of sessions. As with other airlines the type rating is combined with an OPC. A few decades ago, in my early life entering the airlines, we were taught to fly the a/c in the TQ course, with SOP's attached. The line operation and SOP's were refined during line training. The initial emphasis was knowing how the a/c worked, how the systems worked and how to fly it. The line training refined these skills and expanded how to operate it within the airways system and a multitude of busy airports and small visual airfields. Understanding the complexities of the systems came with our 'apprenticeship', which had started in the sim.
Nowadays the TQ course seems to shift the emphasis more towards SOP's during the manoeuvres, some of which are with normal & non-normal scenarios. Some of the non-normals scenarios are box-ticking on the LST form, very few are in depth training of the gotchas and pitfalls. The handling emphasis is aimed at the LST items.
Thus IMHO it was not the 'complexity of their ship' which sucked them into trouble, it was the lack of training = understanding of those systems. This ignorance created a complex system when in fact with proper training it would have been quite simple.
One wonders if the policy of many airlines to use relatively (2 years experience) inexperienced F/O's as SFI's is correct. They have followed the self same course of knowing what to do, but not the how & the why. They then pass on this diluted knowledge to the next generation of cadets who will become the next generation of SFI's and so the downward spiral of knowledge continues. SOP's are so intense that the first thought of a pilot in a less than ideal situation is to ask, "what does the book say?" Second, if at all, comes "what is the most sensible airmanship thing to do?" By the time you arrive at the 2nd option it might be too ate as the a/c was still travelling very fast during the first phase of questioning confusion. It is noticeable that I've been told by newish F/O's that flying with the old farts is usually more relaxing than with the newbie captains. The oldies do what is best instinctively, and within the book boundaries, but are not afraid to bend the SOP's; the newbies are terrified to even blow at the boundaries and thus delay making some decisions and then have to race to catch up. All old farts were newbies once, but mostly with a longer and deeper apprenticeship than today.
IMHO, if the industry is gong to continue making captains with relatively low hours then the training of manual skills, and especially systems knowledge and understanding of all their possibilities, needs to be more in depth to compensate for the shorter apprenticeship. Too many commands can be given to those whose prof checks are above average and SOP knowledge is perfect. SOP's can not cover all eventualities. Most incidents and accidents started quite subtly and the human intervention, or lack of it, caused a can of worms to develop, when it was preventable. And that's a whole other discussion about a good crew being preventative rather than reactive. Slavishly following SOP's is not always preventative, but that was touched upon in an earlier thread.
Knowledge is power: ignorance can be painful in the extreme.
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I guess lack of training never applied to us old guys. We kind of trained ourselves. We couldn't afford a lot of formal training. Our first few thousand hours had no automation so we just took our hands and did what was needed to fly.
When automation became readily available we used it to reduce workload when we felt like it. We didn't really trust it but we used it knowing we could easily disconnect it when it didn't do what we wanted.
Now some airliners want everything done on autopilot because it can fly better than any pilot. Airlines hire young pilots with little experience and they are shown how you don't need to hand fly any more because of automation. Labor is cheap.
Then AF447 shows the world how wrong that was. All that flight needed was one pilot in the cockpit who knew how to handfly but they didn't so everybody died for no reason. And the beat goes on.
When automation became readily available we used it to reduce workload when we felt like it. We didn't really trust it but we used it knowing we could easily disconnect it when it didn't do what we wanted.
Now some airliners want everything done on autopilot because it can fly better than any pilot. Airlines hire young pilots with little experience and they are shown how you don't need to hand fly any more because of automation. Labor is cheap.
Then AF447 shows the world how wrong that was. All that flight needed was one pilot in the cockpit who knew how to handfly but they didn't so everybody died for no reason. And the beat goes on.
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You know, for those USA based pilots on here (like myself), if you ever really want to hear your recurrent ground instructor / fleet manager / head check airman / chief pilot / training scheduler / POI / etc laugh you out of the room, just wait until the next time you are in recurrent ground school / a check airman meeting / etc and the subject of logging a minimum number of autolands for CAT 2/3 currency (or the equivalent) comes up in conversation. Then, raise your hand and suggest to them that "we also mandate a certain number of manually flown, raw-data approaches and landings be logged to maintain hand flying currency, similarly to how we log autoland currency" as a response to this SAFO.
I'm going to try it at my next recurrent. I expect the response will be entertaining!
I'm going to try it at my next recurrent. I expect the response will be entertaining!
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hikoushi:
Make sure you print a few copies of the FAA bulletin to hand out at that training/meeting session:
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2013/SAFO13002.pdf
You know, for those USA based pilots on here (like myself), if you ever really want to hear your recurrent ground instructor / fleet manager / head check airman / chief pilot / training scheduler / POI / etc laugh you out of the room, just wait until the next time you are in recurrent ground school / a check airman meeting / etc and the subject of logging a minimum number of autolands for CAT 2/3 currency (or the equivalent) comes up in conversation. Then, raise your hand and suggest to them that "we also mandate a certain number of manually flown, raw-data approaches and landings be logged to maintain hand flying currency, similarly to how we log autoland currency" as a response to this SAFO.
I'm going to try it at my next recurrent. I expect the response will be entertaining!
I'm going to try it at my next recurrent. I expect the response will be entertaining!
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2013/SAFO13002.pdf
Armchairflyer (#46), Gretchenfrage (#49);
‘Blame and Train’ might be a bit strong, but the theme underlies the SAFO.
The focus is on the operators, management and crew; the sharp end from the FAA’s perspective. Furthermore, this view may avoid the need to explain whether regulatory and checking processes should have detected the issue earlier.
‘Evidence’ perhaps is not the right word; the safety initiative requires justification and supporting information to help operators better direct their interventions.
The reasoning in the SAFO is illogical and weak; how does “continuous use of autoflight systems … lead to degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state.”
What are the errors which presumably lead to “an undesired state”?
The crux of the recommendation is that operators “should ensure that all pilots have the appropriate opportunities to exercise the aforementioned knowledge and skills [for manual flight] in flight operations”; but what is this ‘knowledge’ and what specific skills shortfall are there?
Error (fault) can be interpreted in several ways; using ‘variable human performance’ could minimise any confusion.
The FAA has identified that manual handling performance deviated from that required (error); but what was the context, in what situations.
Was the deviation because human performance was less than that expected, or did the situation demand greater performance than was available. A mismatch could also originate from assumptions about training standards, knowledge and skill retention (in an automated world), or the nature of the situations to be encountered (in an automated world).
Also consider that the handling problems do not necessarily relate to individual pilots; aircraft are operated by a crew. Was the handling performance deviation detected and countered, if not, then why not? Were there weaknesses in monitoring - detection or intervention, or with some other aspect of operational situations which contributed to inadequate performance.
The SAFO provides no background on these aspects whatsoever, and indeed most of the assumptions would be under FAA control.
“The underlying problem here is that the basics are not taught well enough and the acquired is not maintained enough.” (#49) This is supposition.
Alternatively, consider the reasons for the success of everyday operations.
The current high safety standard suggests that the vast majority of pilots are sufficiently well trained and that they retain the requisite knowledge and skills, apparently without overly practicing manual flight.
Without ‘evidence’ (further explanation and information), operators may choose to fly manually ‘as and when’ it suits them, and just ‘tick the SAFO safety box’ without further thought.
Delay safety; no.
Just pause for thought about effective safety.
Whatever Happened To “Human Error”?
Perspectives on Human Error: Hindsight Biases and Local Rationality.
‘Blame and Train’ might be a bit strong, but the theme underlies the SAFO.
The focus is on the operators, management and crew; the sharp end from the FAA’s perspective. Furthermore, this view may avoid the need to explain whether regulatory and checking processes should have detected the issue earlier.
‘Evidence’ perhaps is not the right word; the safety initiative requires justification and supporting information to help operators better direct their interventions.
The reasoning in the SAFO is illogical and weak; how does “continuous use of autoflight systems … lead to degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state.”
What are the errors which presumably lead to “an undesired state”?
The crux of the recommendation is that operators “should ensure that all pilots have the appropriate opportunities to exercise the aforementioned knowledge and skills [for manual flight] in flight operations”; but what is this ‘knowledge’ and what specific skills shortfall are there?
Error (fault) can be interpreted in several ways; using ‘variable human performance’ could minimise any confusion.
The FAA has identified that manual handling performance deviated from that required (error); but what was the context, in what situations.
Was the deviation because human performance was less than that expected, or did the situation demand greater performance than was available. A mismatch could also originate from assumptions about training standards, knowledge and skill retention (in an automated world), or the nature of the situations to be encountered (in an automated world).
Also consider that the handling problems do not necessarily relate to individual pilots; aircraft are operated by a crew. Was the handling performance deviation detected and countered, if not, then why not? Were there weaknesses in monitoring - detection or intervention, or with some other aspect of operational situations which contributed to inadequate performance.
The SAFO provides no background on these aspects whatsoever, and indeed most of the assumptions would be under FAA control.
“The underlying problem here is that the basics are not taught well enough and the acquired is not maintained enough.” (#49) This is supposition.
Alternatively, consider the reasons for the success of everyday operations.
The current high safety standard suggests that the vast majority of pilots are sufficiently well trained and that they retain the requisite knowledge and skills, apparently without overly practicing manual flight.
Without ‘evidence’ (further explanation and information), operators may choose to fly manually ‘as and when’ it suits them, and just ‘tick the SAFO safety box’ without further thought.
Delay safety; no.
Just pause for thought about effective safety.
Whatever Happened To “Human Error”?
Perspectives on Human Error: Hindsight Biases and Local Rationality.
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@safetypee
This drifts into semantics, we can continue all night long.
The only real meat in your statement is:
My answer is yes and yes. Therefore remedial action is required.
Take AF447.
1. Human perform was less than expected, because they could not fly an Airbus straight and level and save it from deep stall crash.
2. The situation, provoked by malfunctions first then inadequate design later, demanded greater performance that was either never taught or not trained well enough.
If such (may I call that) evidence is not enough for rapid remedy, then I am slightly lost about the genuine intent of the responsible participants.
We need aircraft with less of all the little nintendo-snags and crews that can adequately fly an aircraft stripped from such gags. Basta, khalas, point à la ligne, schlusspunkt, indeed or whatever!
It is so simple and almost jumping us in the face. That's why I criticise approaches like yours, albeit very intelligent and certainly honest. But they give the responsible parties all the time and excuses to act in an investigative way. Look at all the courtrooms who do just that to make sure there is no loophole a slimy lawyer can exploit, and the result are processes that take several years only to be diluted beyond reconnaissance. That will happen to our topic if we continue to "pause for thought".
This drifts into semantics, we can continue all night long.
The only real meat in your statement is:
Was the deviation because human performance was less than that expected, or did the situation demand greater performance than was available?
Take AF447.
1. Human perform was less than expected, because they could not fly an Airbus straight and level and save it from deep stall crash.
2. The situation, provoked by malfunctions first then inadequate design later, demanded greater performance that was either never taught or not trained well enough.
If such (may I call that) evidence is not enough for rapid remedy, then I am slightly lost about the genuine intent of the responsible participants.
We need aircraft with less of all the little nintendo-snags and crews that can adequately fly an aircraft stripped from such gags. Basta, khalas, point à la ligne, schlusspunkt, indeed or whatever!
It is so simple and almost jumping us in the face. That's why I criticise approaches like yours, albeit very intelligent and certainly honest. But they give the responsible parties all the time and excuses to act in an investigative way. Look at all the courtrooms who do just that to make sure there is no loophole a slimy lawyer can exploit, and the result are processes that take several years only to be diluted beyond reconnaissance. That will happen to our topic if we continue to "pause for thought".
Last edited by Gretchenfrage; 17th Jan 2013 at 02:10.
The tongue-in-cheek solution is simple. Fail your RA. This will lead to autopilot disengagement and loss of flight directors on the failed side upon G/S and LOC capture (the switch to approach mode).
Works very well on the 738 regardless of the wx and the surprise on the PF's face is rather amusing as raw data hand flying is thereby compulsory.
Or we could petition the FAA/CAA to legislate for a minimum AP disengagement height of 1580 instead of 158 feet.
Works very well on the 738 regardless of the wx and the surprise on the PF's face is rather amusing as raw data hand flying is thereby compulsory.
Or we could petition the FAA/CAA to legislate for a minimum AP disengagement height of 1580 instead of 158 feet.
Interesting concept, to practice (not simulate...) the underlying failure event that resulted in parking the THY B738 in the tulip field... tongue in cheek notwithstanding.
As commented on by safTP in part, there is variability in human performance...
beyond that, there is constant variability in the operation performance from almost all factors exhibiting random and coupled variations, which can result in a total performance deviation outside of acceptable conditions. The linear system behaviour that Reason elaborated on, and which current CRM principles as well as SMS analysis is predicated on is a simplification of system dynamics.
For a bad outcome to occur doesn't take a bad pilot, bad training, bad plane design or bad weather, normal performance variation can result in exceeding normal performance due to the resonance of the system components; the normal accident. The problem can be one of loss of awareness of the system performance, effectively a failure of SA1, 2 or 3 by those entrusted with achieving the operating outcomes. In the current discussion, that would also include the FAA, as a stakeholder in the health of the state aviation program. It is a good outcome that they have recognised an issue, and are proposing a simply implemented fix, that has some change of achieving an improvement in outcomes. If getting pilots to fly manually in some conditions does result in reducing the inertia against intervention, and improve monitoring skills and recognition of anomalous operation, then that would be a great outcome. On my own observations while evaluating crew performance, there is room to get the crew back into the command loop in order to ensure that they are more comfortable with a reversion when they recognise that there is an issue. The history of catastrophic losses is replete with serviceable aircraft or those with minor failures being lost, more prevalent than heroic multiple system failures occurring. Reinforcement of recognition and lowering the barriers to intervention are potentially good things to be developing. Increasing the manual flying in appropriate circumstances has a potential to achieve these aims. All changes have potential for additional risk to be assumed, and increasing manual flying can be a change to the crew coordination routines that have resulted from the emphasis on automation use.
IFLOC is inexcusable from an industry perspective; if the pilots cannot fly planes we have a big problem. The industry changes that have lead towards the atrophy of flying skills is a result of commercial pressures and the pragmatism of the CAA's in accepting the standards of the airlines. Apparently this is the free market at play, with consequences.
[Why inexcusable? a student pilot losing control of a C150 is unacceptable, having flight crew that are unable to either recognise a loss of control state or handle the aircraft thereafter to a safe flight condition is not what the passenger is expecting when they pay for their ticket (albeit the cheapest fare that is offered under the open sky/deregulation enabled arbitrage that exists in the global market)].
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IFLOC is inexcusable from an industry perspective; if the pilots cannot fly planes we have a big problem. The industry changes that have lead towards the atrophy of flying skills is a result of commercial pressures and the pragmatism of the CAA's in accepting the standards of the airlines. Apparently this is the free market at play, with consequences.
Free market is a good thing, but it needs oversight with some ruling guidelines. Otherwise we end up with "consequences" like the banking system. That's basically why modern societies implemented regulators. Such regulators must however have the power and the balls to impose and not only recommend. Or we end up with something like the banking system again, where the overseeing bodies trusted too much in "self regulating forces" and only intervened with "recommendations".
If something is "inexcusable", as you rightfully say, then there must be rapid and stringend intervention.
Gretchenfrage, +/- semantics, we have similar ideals.
Putting AF447 aside (it’s too muddled by hindsight and emotive bias), consider a hypothetical LOC accident following instrument failure, where there had been several previous incidents in which crews maintained control or recovered from abnormal manoeuvres.
Superficial comparison of events might identify differences in piloting performance, yet even some of the successes showed apparent weaknesses in flight technique or, as with the accident, the initial input could have been intentional. The difference in avoiding LOC was the appreciation of the revised situation. Thus deeper analysis would add initial and subsequent situation awareness to the list of possible contributors to the accident.
Further investigation might look at the standard of training, not only the basic skills, but the specifics of flight control after instrument failure. In this there are at least two scenarios; the critical dynamic situation after takeoff, and the more benign level flight. If, in supposition, the specific training had overly focused on the dynamic situation (which required memory action) then when encountering the more benign, the human may be predisposed towards the memory drills and (for the benign situation) incorrect flight manoeuvres.
The difference was again in recognition that the initial behaviour did not match the situation, but also the influence of the training method (situational / contextual emphasis) on the pilot’s choice of action.
The point of this example is to highlight that the apparent superficial conclusion in the SAFO - that lack of manual flight currency was the only contributor to the operational incidents, may not contribute very much to safety, and also adversely bias operational wiliness to invest time and money in this or subsequent initiatives.
By all means fly manually more often, but don’t expect the ‘promised’ improvements*. Yes the industry requires rapid and stringent intervention, but it has to be an appropriate intervention.
* ‘promised’ improvements - semantics - expected or as assumed from simple ‘effect = cause’ reasoning.
What you find is not always what you fix.
Putting AF447 aside (it’s too muddled by hindsight and emotive bias), consider a hypothetical LOC accident following instrument failure, where there had been several previous incidents in which crews maintained control or recovered from abnormal manoeuvres.
Superficial comparison of events might identify differences in piloting performance, yet even some of the successes showed apparent weaknesses in flight technique or, as with the accident, the initial input could have been intentional. The difference in avoiding LOC was the appreciation of the revised situation. Thus deeper analysis would add initial and subsequent situation awareness to the list of possible contributors to the accident.
Further investigation might look at the standard of training, not only the basic skills, but the specifics of flight control after instrument failure. In this there are at least two scenarios; the critical dynamic situation after takeoff, and the more benign level flight. If, in supposition, the specific training had overly focused on the dynamic situation (which required memory action) then when encountering the more benign, the human may be predisposed towards the memory drills and (for the benign situation) incorrect flight manoeuvres.
The difference was again in recognition that the initial behaviour did not match the situation, but also the influence of the training method (situational / contextual emphasis) on the pilot’s choice of action.
The point of this example is to highlight that the apparent superficial conclusion in the SAFO - that lack of manual flight currency was the only contributor to the operational incidents, may not contribute very much to safety, and also adversely bias operational wiliness to invest time and money in this or subsequent initiatives.
By all means fly manually more often, but don’t expect the ‘promised’ improvements*. Yes the industry requires rapid and stringent intervention, but it has to be an appropriate intervention.
* ‘promised’ improvements - semantics - expected or as assumed from simple ‘effect = cause’ reasoning.
What you find is not always what you fix.
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I'm just going to handfly...like I've been doing all these years...while some of you "safety guys" analize the "problems" and get it all sorted out. It's going be a long day. Coffee, black, please. 
FE, looks like we'll need LRC or we might have a fuel issue at destination.
Tongue in cheek...sort of.
FE, looks like we'll need LRC or we might have a fuel issue at destination.
Tongue in cheek...sort of.
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Despite being an academic myself, I feel that the objections to "paralysis by analysis" are rather justified in this case, and while mandating more garden-variety handflying might be no panacea, IMVHO it is one of the most effective and at the same time easily implemented, cost-neutral, and time-saving (hence hopefully realistic) measures to ensure that pilots don't feel like "strangers" in their daily work environment when for whatever reason George is not the option of choice or not available.
On a side note concerning the "emotions" surrounding AF 447: I am somewhat puzzled that a very similar accident some four years earlier (West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia) is hardly ever used to illustrate the woes of automation and de-skilled "children of the magenta line" (maybe because the aircraft involved has a distinct "pilot's plane" reputation, and the person to assess the situation correctly was a very young F/O with probably little handflying experience on type?).
(BTW, I also see AF 447 much more as a call against Fast Finger Freddy and for procedural discipline than for better handling skills. AFAIK, if the pilots had simply followed the pertinent checklist and left the plane alone beyond that, the ASI loss would probably have had no far-reaching consequences. Purely personal opinion, all hindsight and armchair pilot disclaimers apply.)
On a side note concerning the "emotions" surrounding AF 447: I am somewhat puzzled that a very similar accident some four years earlier (West Caribbean Airways Flight 708 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia) is hardly ever used to illustrate the woes of automation and de-skilled "children of the magenta line" (maybe because the aircraft involved has a distinct "pilot's plane" reputation, and the person to assess the situation correctly was a very young F/O with probably little handflying experience on type?).
(BTW, I also see AF 447 much more as a call against Fast Finger Freddy and for procedural discipline than for better handling skills. AFAIK, if the pilots had simply followed the pertinent checklist and left the plane alone beyond that, the ASI loss would probably have had no far-reaching consequences. Purely personal opinion, all hindsight and armchair pilot disclaimers apply.)
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All my old pilot buddies would have held cruise attitude, about 2.5 degrees nose up and gotten out the checklist for unreliable airspeed. It would have then been a non event. They chose because of their automation reliance and being told the Airbus can't stall to pull back on the side stick and do a full stall for over 3 minutes with no clue how to recover. We have a new generation of computer pilots, not real pilots.
The US has made it harder to get into the right seat by requiring 1500 hrs. That is good because they may learn how to hand fly, maybe not, depending how they build that time. I did flight instruction, crop dusting, charter and corporate to get my first airline job with 5500 hrs and felt lucky to do so. 250 hrs into the airlines is nuts.
The US has made it harder to get into the right seat by requiring 1500 hrs. That is good because they may learn how to hand fly, maybe not, depending how they build that time. I did flight instruction, crop dusting, charter and corporate to get my first airline job with 5500 hrs and felt lucky to do so. 250 hrs into the airlines is nuts.