Touchdown Short Of Runway
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If you are in companies like BA, easyJet, Virgin etc there is simply no culture of pushing any limit.
Also, when a strike was looming at one stage, during a phone call between the pilot representative and a very senior company Executive, it was mentioned that the pilot representative had a beautiful little daughter who attended such and such a school and would it not be a shame if something terrible happened to her?
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This airline was well known to have had close links with a certain Sicilian syndicate.
Person A
So in Italy you have to distinguish very well between the north and the criminals from the south...
Ciao xxxx. We had a family meeting last night and decided we should meet. Cheers from Catania.
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From a human resources perspective, I don't think the FO was too inexperienced -although not much time either- but very probably the combination of a very high timer on the left seat and baby pilot on the right may not always make sense, the authority gradient could be naturally steep, left aside the possible contributing factors of italian displays of their testosterone level, thus preventing direct bi-directional inputs when deviations occur.
It's called being a first officer in a commercial airliner.
Last edited by Escape Path; 10th Oct 2012 at 03:05.
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Perhaps, but a wrong is a wrong if a 500 hour copilot does it or if it is a 15000 hour captain doing it. There is a steep authority gradient to meet by the copilot, I agree, but if the chap knows his business and what he is supposed to do, he will make sure the captain knows there's a deviation occurring. And even more, if he has any sense of self preservation he will take over command from the captain if he sees no corrective action being taken, no matter how hard the latter screams back at him after doing so.
It's called being a first officer in a commercial airliner.
^^ Here Here to that
It's called being a first officer in a commercial airliner.
^^ Here Here to that
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
I've had the FO correct me several times during my career. Input always gratefully received, and usually right. As I used to point out, the FO is the guy without the pressures that are on the captain, therefore often able to make the more balanced judgement and break up the captain's mindset.
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mm. Maybe the captain came from the same school as the skipper of the Costa Concordia ... I agreeee
Costa Concordia captain wants his job back - Telegraph
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if he has any sense of self preservation he will take over command from the captain if he sees no corrective action being taken
Ut Sementem Feeceris
Well on the 'Bus if the AP is in and the FO pushes the levers forward it's going to go-around which would be difficult to recover from and continue an approach so best to just go with it (the go-around). Again on the 'Bus the FO can hit the takeover PB on his sidestick and lockout the Capts inputs and initiate a go-around.
In both cases, at least the aircraft is now climbing away from potential disaster - then it's down to the Capt and FO to "discuss" the next course of action......
"Captain, you MUST go-around!" - if no reaction INTERVENE.
In both cases, at least the aircraft is now climbing away from potential disaster - then it's down to the Capt and FO to "discuss" the next course of action......
"Captain, you MUST go-around!" - if no reaction INTERVENE.
Last edited by A4; 13th Oct 2012 at 08:01.
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In this day & age there is a great exchange of information and much of it is about the cause of crashes. This could be mechanical or procedural in which case things are redesigned or changed to prevent a reoccurrence. The same is true about human factor errors. Here on prune, and hopefully via the more official channels of flight safety dissemination, we've heard about many such instances, e.g. the B737 in india that continued an approach and ran off the end of a cliff. It was asked by everybody why the F/O was not more forceful in his self-preservation. Still unanswered. Lots of questions about culture differences and experience gradients etc. It was a well reported and discussed event; quite recently. I'm amazed therefore that in the EU, so soon afterwards, there is another similar accident. It is staggering that we as a pilot community seemed to have learnt so little, and that those apprentices in the RHS have not been schooled in these previous events and told with no uncertainty that they are often the last safety net underneath an arrogant/nervous/compulsive/ignorant/non-SOP/ or other kind of captain who is trying to kill you. In most previous cases it was the captain who was PF with get home-itis, but here it was he F/O, and that makes it more curious for the inter-play going on at the time.
Many questions and not perhaps so many answers. I wonder if the captain even knows/remembers/understands what he did and why.
Many questions and not perhaps so many answers. I wonder if the captain even knows/remembers/understands what he did and why.
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All very fine in theory, but it is most unlikely the captain will happily relinqish his command authority to the first officer without a physical altercation in the cockpit. Few operation manuals ever publish exactly how a first officer will physically take control from the captain whose hands are already on the controls.
Well on the 'Bus if the AP is in and the FO pushes the levers forward it's going to go-around which would be difficult to recover from and continue an approach so best to just go with it.
It is a really hard concept and also a really hard thing to do as a young first officer against an experienced captain. But as I said, a wrong is a wrong, no matter who makes it.
Accident: Windjet A319 at Palermo on Sep 24th 2010, touched down short of runway
Risk Management taken too far.
At minimums without rwy in sight but still " Continue, Continue."
Risk Management taken too far.
At minimums without rwy in sight but still " Continue, Continue."
Like everything else in life you get what you pay for which is why there is a significant number of airlines I will never fly with.........
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From the report I think FO was PF until minima and then the Capt. did take over.
So may be the captain did see the runway and said continue.
This section is as far as I see not written.
But another thing I want to emphasize is four reds on the final.
Sometimes I see pilots (both CPTs and FOs) who are trying to be a bit below glide to make a gentle touchdown.
As we all see 3 red must be the limit. You have to immediately correct for 2 red.
4 red you are dead !
So may be the captain did see the runway and said continue.
This section is as far as I see not written.
But another thing I want to emphasize is four reds on the final.
Sometimes I see pilots (both CPTs and FOs) who are trying to be a bit below glide to make a gentle touchdown.
As we all see 3 red must be the limit. You have to immediately correct for 2 red.
4 red you are dead !
Last edited by guclu; 15th Oct 2012 at 12:53.
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So may be the captain did see the runway and said continue.
But still, being a NPA, the FO had a bit of time to make his discomfort known to the captain. If he never saw the runway or thought they were low or even better, to call a missed approach due to an unstabilised approach (+1000ft/min), he never did it, despite having enough time to do so.