AF 447 report out
bubbers, do you recall any evidence that the UAS (current in June of 2009) checklist was used by this crew?
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Warning=on, I'm stalled. Warning=silent, I have recovered from stall.
Originally Posted by PJ2
The parameters labeled as such do seem illogical but they are labeled conventionally in flight data work, by their direct result at the point of action, so to speak. So, it isn't Nose-up, it is Tail-down, and the parameter is labeled with a "minus" value; the same is true with the THS, the sidestick parameters and so on.
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You're misinterpreting the significance of stall warning
The stall warning must continue .. until the aircraft is no more stalled or no more near of the stall mode
By Airbus design the AF447 stall warning stopped when the aircraft was in stall ..
BEA notice in conclusions that this is a contributing factor for the accident
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You're misinterpreting the significance of stall warning. It's function is to alert the pilot that he is approaching stall.
Last edited by areobat; 16th May 2013 at 01:41.
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Please close this thread now
I think just about everything that can be known about this tragedy is known. Everything that can be said about it has been said.
It is an important incident in the history of commercial aviation and, of course it will never happen again. There is no point having any more circular discussions about pitots, or center column vs side stick, automation vs hand flying, or B vs A in the context of this incident.
But there will be new incidents like this (hopefully without loss of life) involving the whole system of pilots, CRM, automation and basic equipment faults. There are lessons for everyone. It was especially shocking for me reading the final report on AF447 to see that apart from the pitots, nothing actually failed on the aircraft, until everything did. A simple LOC grew out of all proportions into a major disaster. It happened in a manner that is a foretaste (a bitter one) of the kind of challenges that aviation is going to face. Every extra subsystem adds complexity. Failures, when they occur will be increasingly complex and ever harder to anticipate.
I think future discussions wrt AF447 should focus on this in general, not on the specifics of what happened to the pitots or what was in PF minds during the incident. Let them rest in peace.
It is an important incident in the history of commercial aviation and, of course it will never happen again. There is no point having any more circular discussions about pitots, or center column vs side stick, automation vs hand flying, or B vs A in the context of this incident.
But there will be new incidents like this (hopefully without loss of life) involving the whole system of pilots, CRM, automation and basic equipment faults. There are lessons for everyone. It was especially shocking for me reading the final report on AF447 to see that apart from the pitots, nothing actually failed on the aircraft, until everything did. A simple LOC grew out of all proportions into a major disaster. It happened in a manner that is a foretaste (a bitter one) of the kind of challenges that aviation is going to face. Every extra subsystem adds complexity. Failures, when they occur will be increasingly complex and ever harder to anticipate.
I think future discussions wrt AF447 should focus on this in general, not on the specifics of what happened to the pitots or what was in PF minds during the incident. Let them rest in peace.
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Originally Posted by jcjeant
The stall warning must continue .. until the aircraft is no more stalled
BEA notice in conclusions that this is a contributing factor for the accident
glenbrook
I enjoyed your summary and your points, but let's not forget the trigger event: something did in fact fail (or become impaired): the pitot system. As noted numerous times in this four year long discussion, Air France had changed to the Goodrich pitot tubes on some of their fleet, but that particular hull had not yet gotten the change. Granted, a system malfunction need not become an emergency (nor an upset) as previously noted hundreds of times. That seems to be a key point of great interest to the flying public, to professional pilots, to regulating authorities, and hopefully the management of airline companies.
It was especially shocking for me reading the final report on AF447 to see that apart from the pitots, nothing actually failed on the aircraft, until everything did.
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The pilots failed to maintain control with a simple pitot tube problem. They had a procedure to maintain attitude and power but they didn't use it. They chose to pull full back on the side stick against all procedures. They killed hundreds of people for no reason because they did everything wrong.
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The objective of the SNPL is, and always has been, to support their members and to demonstrate that they were not at fault.
It has the merit of being clear.
.
It has the merit of being clear.
.
Last edited by toffeez; 17th May 2013 at 06:47.
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@desiter And they had a plane that had little control feedback, basic instruments in the zone of view, and a system of Hal 9000 computers that for some reason they were told would protect them or they were made to believe that would allow them to act in a fashion such as pulling the stick back as necessary and that the ship was unstall-able.
Titanic 2.0 sans the Leo and Kate.
Hal 9000 vs Basic Flight Dynamics/Physics - the latter won.
Titanic 2.0 sans the Leo and Kate.
Hal 9000 vs Basic Flight Dynamics/Physics - the latter won.
jcjeant: is there a link to an English rendition of that declaration?
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It's about the EASA director who would not answer questions of the judge (in charge of the AF447 case) .. citing the (his) European immunity
He finally answered after insistence of the judge
In his testimony we learn that the EASA considered only the information provided by the manufacturers without check or question
Thus incidents implicants pitot tube have been underestimated by the manufacturer
They were ignored and that at no time without the agency deems appropriate to investigate further then that is his mission
The Union notes that the testimony of the director of EASA confirms the doubts and suspicions which had already accumulated on the agency
This situation is very worrying for the institutional management of aviation safety in Europe
He finally answered after insistence of the judge
In his testimony we learn that the EASA considered only the information provided by the manufacturers without check or question
Thus incidents implicants pitot tube have been underestimated by the manufacturer
They were ignored and that at no time without the agency deems appropriate to investigate further then that is his mission
The Union notes that the testimony of the director of EASA confirms the doubts and suspicions which had already accumulated on the agency
This situation is very worrying for the institutional management of aviation safety in Europe
Last edited by jcjeant; 16th May 2013 at 18:14.
Plastic PPRuNer
OCR and Google Translate
SNPL Roissy, May 15, 2013
France ALPA
Press release
Survey AF447: the European Agency
seriously defective air safety
The testimony of the Director of EASA shows the total absence
independence of the regulatory agency vis-à-vis manufacturers.
The SNPL France ALPA questioned since the beginning of the judicial inquiry into the role played by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in this painful case. During many months of August 2010 to April 2013, the Executive Director of the agency clung to its European immunity to avoid testifying. At the request of its board of directors and by the obstinacy of the instruction judge Zimmermann, he finally explained to justice. The SNPL France ALPA civil party had access to the evidence.
We discover that EASA has seriously failed in its duty of continuing airworthiness of aircraft considering only the information provided by the manufacturers, but never verify or challenge.
It is in this way that the incidents prior to the crash of the AF447 and precursors thereof, caused by icing of pitot probes, were underestimated by the manufacturer. They have been ignored, but that at no time the Agency considers it appropriate to investigate further, as this is where the heart of its mission.
This seems incomprehensible inversion prerogatives reduce EASA a simple transmission belt very bad quality.
The SNPL France ALPA said that in addition to finding a damning report of the Court of Auditors of the European Union in late 2012 involving the deplorable management of conflicts of interest within the EASA.
It is clear that the testimony of the director of EASA reinforces the doubts and suspicions which had already accumulated on the European Agency.
Put into perspective with the development of new FTL, in which the upper hand of airlines is well established, this situation is very worrying about the institutional management of aviation safety in Europe.
The Executive Office of SNPL France ALPA
For 1: SUV enformations. you izomys
Yves DESHAYES, President of ALPA SNPL France: 06 31 06 06 98
Carole Arnaud-BATTANDIER, Media Relations Manager SNPL France ALPA: 0686 709 702
NATIONAL UNION OF DRIVERS LINE FRANCE ALPA
AFFILIATE ACE IFALPA - SFtET N 785 743 246 0003 1 COOE APE 4420Z
Roissypéle The Dome - 5 denies the Hague-BP 19955-95733 Roissy CDG CEDEX
Tel (33) 01 49 89 24 00 - Fax (33) 01 49 89 24 10 - e-mail @ SNPL SNPL oom
France ALPA
Press release
Survey AF447: the European Agency
seriously defective air safety
The testimony of the Director of EASA shows the total absence
independence of the regulatory agency vis-à-vis manufacturers.
The SNPL France ALPA questioned since the beginning of the judicial inquiry into the role played by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in this painful case. During many months of August 2010 to April 2013, the Executive Director of the agency clung to its European immunity to avoid testifying. At the request of its board of directors and by the obstinacy of the instruction judge Zimmermann, he finally explained to justice. The SNPL France ALPA civil party had access to the evidence.
We discover that EASA has seriously failed in its duty of continuing airworthiness of aircraft considering only the information provided by the manufacturers, but never verify or challenge.
It is in this way that the incidents prior to the crash of the AF447 and precursors thereof, caused by icing of pitot probes, were underestimated by the manufacturer. They have been ignored, but that at no time the Agency considers it appropriate to investigate further, as this is where the heart of its mission.
This seems incomprehensible inversion prerogatives reduce EASA a simple transmission belt very bad quality.
The SNPL France ALPA said that in addition to finding a damning report of the Court of Auditors of the European Union in late 2012 involving the deplorable management of conflicts of interest within the EASA.
It is clear that the testimony of the director of EASA reinforces the doubts and suspicions which had already accumulated on the European Agency.
Put into perspective with the development of new FTL, in which the upper hand of airlines is well established, this situation is very worrying about the institutional management of aviation safety in Europe.
The Executive Office of SNPL France ALPA
For 1: SUV enformations. you izomys
Yves DESHAYES, President of ALPA SNPL France: 06 31 06 06 98
Carole Arnaud-BATTANDIER, Media Relations Manager SNPL France ALPA: 0686 709 702
NATIONAL UNION OF DRIVERS LINE FRANCE ALPA
AFFILIATE ACE IFALPA - SFtET N 785 743 246 0003 1 COOE APE 4420Z
Roissypéle The Dome - 5 denies the Hague-BP 19955-95733 Roissy CDG CEDEX
Tel (33) 01 49 89 24 00 - Fax (33) 01 49 89 24 10 - e-mail @ SNPL SNPL oom
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What the SNPL doesn't say (important in my opinion) ..
If they had followed Air France procedures they wouldn't have crashed.
Through incompetence they flew a plane into a stall then into the Atlantic.
.
Through incompetence they flew a plane into a stall then into the Atlantic.
.
Last edited by toffeez; 17th May 2013 at 06:49.
Thank you, jc, and thank you Mac.