AF 447 report out
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Perhaps Sky are idiots? Most that knew him called him Sully. His name is Chesley B. Sullenberger. How does a reporter come up with Jay?
He was probably too much of a gentleman to correct them.
Nonetheless....Your point is well taken. I am sure his and many others will continue to find the the report disturbing, because it is just that.
He was probably too much of a gentleman to correct them.
Nonetheless....Your point is well taken. I am sure his and many others will continue to find the the report disturbing, because it is just that.
Last edited by CityofFlight; 6th Jul 2012 at 01:36.
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Human Factors
I'm a cognitive psychologist, not a pilot. I've just read (well, skimmed parts of) the BEA report, and I think it's interesting that it emphasizes a few issues:
The report suggests
So, from a cognitive perspective, the accident makes sense. A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
Could they have done better? Of course. Are they entirely, or even primarily to blame? Far from it.
- Diagnosis : did the pilots diagnose "unreliable air speed"?
- Stall warning: did they comprehend it?
The report suggests
- Diagnosis : the pilots never diagnosed "unreliable air speed". Analysis of the dozen or so similar incidents where pitot tubes froze suggest that most of those crews did not diagnose it either.
- Stall warning: did they comprehend it? The report provides references suggesting that in a confusing environment, humans can be cognitively deaf to aural stimuli, and tend to prefer and respond to visual stimuli much better.
So, from a cognitive perspective, the accident makes sense. A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
Could they have done better? Of course. Are they entirely, or even primarily to blame? Far from it.
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How many recent accidents have been caused by problems with the AFCS, whether it be failure, reversion or simply the pilot being unable to engage it in the first place?
I can immediately think of four - Kenyan, Ethiopian, Turkish & Air France. There may be more.
There seems to be a growing number of pilots these days who can't actually fly & when the autopilot decides to have a rest they are left in control of a large aluminium tube full of unsuspecting & trusting people, with no idea of what to do next. Is the licencing scandal in India not exclusive to that country & more widespread than people think?
Airline flying is supposed to be the pinnacle of aviation, only reached after many years of study, training, experience & perseverance. This does not seem to be the case anymore. People obviously believe that as little as 250 hours is enough.
Some of the comments here indicate that they believe that all airline pilots are created more or less equal. I have sat beside & behind enough of them to know that that is not the case. Some airline flight decks are populated by people who have no business being there. But they are cheap - just ask the accountants who put them there!
Some comments also indicate that people believe that the answer is more automation or a refinement in the current automation. I'm sorry, but I don't agree. If you can't tell when the automation is behaving incorrectly, or you have to rely totally on the aircraft to tell you what to do next with some verbal warning or instruction, then you have no place in an airline flight deck. Does anybody remember having to look 'through' the flight director on occasions & simply fly the aircraft?
The cost cutting mantra of modern business that has flowed into the airline industry is taking it's toll. I have seen a drop in both quantity & quality of training in recent years. Reducing T & C's is possibly reducing the quality of peolpe coming into the industry as well. Arguably we are no longer getting the brightest & best any more. The question is - is cost cutting winding back all the gains that have been made in aviation safety over the last 2 or 3 decades? Are we seeing the beginning of another era of increasing accident rates?
IMHO, the reaction by the PF on this flight to a loss of airspeed indication, followed by the A/P dropping out, is inexcusable. The decision by the more experienced PM to continue to let him fly after his initial reaction of excessively pitching up at that altitude in also inexcusable.
If we have a generation of pilots in flight decks who can't actually fly, then it is going to get a whole lot worse before it gets better.
I can immediately think of four - Kenyan, Ethiopian, Turkish & Air France. There may be more.
There seems to be a growing number of pilots these days who can't actually fly & when the autopilot decides to have a rest they are left in control of a large aluminium tube full of unsuspecting & trusting people, with no idea of what to do next. Is the licencing scandal in India not exclusive to that country & more widespread than people think?
Airline flying is supposed to be the pinnacle of aviation, only reached after many years of study, training, experience & perseverance. This does not seem to be the case anymore. People obviously believe that as little as 250 hours is enough.
Some of the comments here indicate that they believe that all airline pilots are created more or less equal. I have sat beside & behind enough of them to know that that is not the case. Some airline flight decks are populated by people who have no business being there. But they are cheap - just ask the accountants who put them there!
Some comments also indicate that people believe that the answer is more automation or a refinement in the current automation. I'm sorry, but I don't agree. If you can't tell when the automation is behaving incorrectly, or you have to rely totally on the aircraft to tell you what to do next with some verbal warning or instruction, then you have no place in an airline flight deck. Does anybody remember having to look 'through' the flight director on occasions & simply fly the aircraft?
The cost cutting mantra of modern business that has flowed into the airline industry is taking it's toll. I have seen a drop in both quantity & quality of training in recent years. Reducing T & C's is possibly reducing the quality of peolpe coming into the industry as well. Arguably we are no longer getting the brightest & best any more. The question is - is cost cutting winding back all the gains that have been made in aviation safety over the last 2 or 3 decades? Are we seeing the beginning of another era of increasing accident rates?
IMHO, the reaction by the PF on this flight to a loss of airspeed indication, followed by the A/P dropping out, is inexcusable. The decision by the more experienced PM to continue to let him fly after his initial reaction of excessively pitching up at that altitude in also inexcusable.
If we have a generation of pilots in flight decks who can't actually fly, then it is going to get a whole lot worse before it gets better.
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Suffice it to say that there is plenty of blame to go around and the crew cannot be exempt.
If I had to put words to it, pilot inadequacy is closer to the mark than pilot error. They were never trained how to really fly the aircraft, they were trained to fly the automation, which is fine while all the systems work as designed, but if they don't, this is the inevitable result. The reasons for that are much wider than just the pilots, they go right to the top, and fixing it will have to go to the top as well.
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If I had to put words to it, pilot inadequacy is closer to the mark than pilot error.
The argument that some system or combination of systems failed the pilots ignores the reality that the pilots are part of the system. After all, if the only cause of the crash is that the system(s) failed the pilots then the best answer is to get rid of the pilots entirely. The argument for improved training and systems is premised on the notion that pilots have some purpose on the flight deck. It's irrational to claim that pilots have a purpose and then when then plane crashes shift the blame somewhere else.
Voltaire said that with great power comes great responsibility. This can be condensed to the idea that with power comes responsibility. Since the pilots clearly had some power to prevent this crash they clearly must bear some responsibility for not doing so. It's axiomatic.
What would have happened if the automation had NOT dropped out...?
What would have happened if the automation had said to itself, "hummm, the airspeed sensors seem to be taking a break, let's ignore them for a while and see what happens if we just keep doing what we have been doing for the last 3 minutes...."? May be flash an ECAM warning stating they were in "speed extrapolation mode" or something?
What would have happened if the automation had said to itself, "hummm, the airspeed sensors seem to be taking a break, let's ignore them for a while and see what happens if we just keep doing what we have been doing for the last 3 minutes...."? May be flash an ECAM warning stating they were in "speed extrapolation mode" or something?
These planes are designed with fuel economy in mind and in cruise get trimmed for rearward CG for better economy and at cruise they are also flying close to coffin corner. The automation can fly the plane to the accuracy needed in cruise but can a low hour pilot flying manually?
In smooth air the PF would probably not need to touch the side stick for a minute or so until the UAS corrected itself, but in turbulent air, at night, and possibly in cloud that is a difficult scenario. I think the autopilot dropping out and control laws degrading so protections such as stall protection are lost, should not have to be the case for a UAS. Design a system for the worst scenarios and build in redundancies to better give the pilots a chance to manage that system when there are failures.
In smooth air the PF would probably not need to touch the side stick for a minute or so until the UAS corrected itself, but in turbulent air, at night, and possibly in cloud that is a difficult scenario. I think the autopilot dropping out and control laws degrading so protections such as stall protection are lost, should not have to be the case for a UAS. Design a system for the worst scenarios and build in redundancies to better give the pilots a chance to manage that system when there are failures.
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and at cruise they are also flying close to coffin corner
typically 40-50kts spread between VLS and MMO, not exactly in any "corner", Airbus says to "respect the stall warning, as it is generated by AOA, not air data, they were in a confusing situation for sure, and at night, in weather, not an enviable position to be in for sure, unless they had struck hail, and unless the radome failed/partially separated, the AOA would have been accurate...
typically 40-50kts spread between VLS and MMO, not exactly in any "corner", Airbus says to "respect the stall warning, as it is generated by AOA, not air data, they were in a confusing situation for sure, and at night, in weather, not an enviable position to be in for sure, unless they had struck hail, and unless the radome failed/partially separated, the AOA would have been accurate...
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I'm not a professional pilot but I have a lot of intuition, if you want to call it that, for what being a professional pilot would entail. I get along very well with pilots. "There but for the grace of God.." Why?
I'm actually more interested in airplanes than in flying. I'm not even that comfortable in the air these days. But I never tire of seeing aircraft, particularly large ones like the A330, defeating gravity.
And I just can't imagine a pilot who has no interest in airplanes. Well, your ass is constantly on the line, because you ere 5 to 8 miles up and your motors must keep running and your control surfaces in place and symmetrically distributed. Your ass and the rudder are one.
Now, anyone with any interest in airplanes will make some effort to understand how they work. And that means understanding how the air works, because there is no airplane without air.
But in this crash, there seems to be no interest at all in either air or airplanes - because otherwise, how would it be possible to fail to understand the simplest facts about either the atmosphere or flight dynamics? Particularly when your own personal death is the cost of ignorance?
Why would anyone get inside a machine that's going to be 8 miles above the middle of the ocean without understanding every rivet in the galley if necessary? Much less how it stalls?
I just can't understand this. And I can't understand why anyone would design an airplane with disconnected controls unless they expected the pilot to one day be redundant.
I'm actually more interested in airplanes than in flying. I'm not even that comfortable in the air these days. But I never tire of seeing aircraft, particularly large ones like the A330, defeating gravity.
And I just can't imagine a pilot who has no interest in airplanes. Well, your ass is constantly on the line, because you ere 5 to 8 miles up and your motors must keep running and your control surfaces in place and symmetrically distributed. Your ass and the rudder are one.
Now, anyone with any interest in airplanes will make some effort to understand how they work. And that means understanding how the air works, because there is no airplane without air.
But in this crash, there seems to be no interest at all in either air or airplanes - because otherwise, how would it be possible to fail to understand the simplest facts about either the atmosphere or flight dynamics? Particularly when your own personal death is the cost of ignorance?
Why would anyone get inside a machine that's going to be 8 miles above the middle of the ocean without understanding every rivet in the galley if necessary? Much less how it stalls?
I just can't understand this. And I can't understand why anyone would design an airplane with disconnected controls unless they expected the pilot to one day be redundant.
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What the local papers say...
Here in Germany the local papers are repeating the two main points, in layman's language, from the report: the crew did not cope adequately with the problem, and part of the problem was the design of the aircraft.
It will be interesting to see if there's any significant drop in traffic for Air France after this. I don't think there will be, while the A330 is a very popular type of airliner and likely to remain so.
It seems pretty obvious that climbing at a fixed power setting from cruise is going to cause a reduction in speed. That's something we learn very early in our training. Never mind what, if anything, the ASI is showing, it should be obvious that a gain in altitude implies a reduction in speed if nothing else has changed, so? Of course that basic point is very obvious in a simple aircraft, but it was clearly overlooked in this complicated A330. I guess that means it will be 'Back to the drawing board,' in some measure.
It will be interesting to see if there's any significant drop in traffic for Air France after this. I don't think there will be, while the A330 is a very popular type of airliner and likely to remain so.
It seems pretty obvious that climbing at a fixed power setting from cruise is going to cause a reduction in speed. That's something we learn very early in our training. Never mind what, if anything, the ASI is showing, it should be obvious that a gain in altitude implies a reduction in speed if nothing else has changed, so? Of course that basic point is very obvious in a simple aircraft, but it was clearly overlooked in this complicated A330. I guess that means it will be 'Back to the drawing board,' in some measure.
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it should be obvious that a gain in altitude implies a reduction in speed if nothing else has changed,
In still air, yes, but in an area of convective weather, that's not the case....remember it wasn't exactly clear blue skies they were operating in at the time this event occurred now were they?
Not defending the apparent errors made by the crew, but rather encouraging the "after the fact experts" here on this forum to look at WHY the crew might have reacted in the manner they did...
Maybe airspeed unreliable training scenarios should include distractions such as convective weather and turbulence before the event occurs....
In still air, yes, but in an area of convective weather, that's not the case....remember it wasn't exactly clear blue skies they were operating in at the time this event occurred now were they?
Not defending the apparent errors made by the crew, but rather encouraging the "after the fact experts" here on this forum to look at WHY the crew might have reacted in the manner they did...
Maybe airspeed unreliable training scenarios should include distractions such as convective weather and turbulence before the event occurs....
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Amundsen the celeb explorer wrote :
Victory awaits him,who as everythings in order.
Luck we call it.
Defeats is definitely due for him,who has neglected to take the necessary precautions.
Bad luck we call it.
Methink this apply perfectly for this accident
Victory awaits him,who as everythings in order.
Luck we call it.
Defeats is definitely due for him,who has neglected to take the necessary precautions.
Bad luck we call it.
Methink this apply perfectly for this accident
Last edited by jcjeant; 6th Jul 2012 at 07:10.
With ever increasing use of automation during basic training these days & the subsequent reduction of simple hands on manual flying of the aircraft. More & more Pilots coming through the system, could very well find, that the first time they ever have to actually think & manually fly the aircrat, is unfortunately when something has gone wrong big time. No winners here Folks, but let's get back to some simple basic flying training skills of old & only once these are understood, move on with the automatics. A quite terrifying & ghastly time for the Crew & pax as well on the A330, they had it all, at night, poor wx, automatics dropping out etc, but a better grasp of the basic skills may just have saved them all. God Bless.
Last edited by kaikohe76; 6th Jul 2012 at 08:07.
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Total layman here so please excuse me. I'm just a tad confused about something:
Ironbutt said
But I seem to remember reading on one of the other numerous threads that below a certain airspeed, the stall warning stops. If this is the case, then if they pulled up, with very low airspeed and a nasty AoA, then wouldn't the stall warning stop giving the impression that there was no stall? Then when pushing nose down, the stall warning would start again when airspeed increased above the limits 'causing' them to pull up again to wrongly get out of the stall?
Even if that was the case, shouldn't they have known about this behaviour?
Obviously if I'm totally wrong, I'll butt out again... Sorry.
Thanks for all your input, this is a very interesting read.
Ironbutt said
Airbus says to "respect the stall warning, as it is generated by AOA, not air data,
Even if that was the case, shouldn't they have known about this behaviour?
Obviously if I'm totally wrong, I'll butt out again... Sorry.
Thanks for all your input, this is a very interesting read.
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But I seem to remember reading on one of the other numerous threads that below a certain airspeed, the stall warning stops. If this is the case, then if they pulled up, with very low airspeed and a nasty AoA, then wouldn't the stall warning stop giving the impression that there was no stall? Then when pushing nose down, the stall warning would start again when airspeed increased above the limits 'causing' them to pull up again to wrongly get out of the stall?
Anyway .. when you read 60 knots (all parameters indicated that this speed was valid) on the speed indicator of an A330 .. you can deduce two things:
Or you are rolling on ground
Or if you are in the air ... your plane is no more flying .. he is falling like a stone ... (check altimeter)
Last edited by jcjeant; 6th Jul 2012 at 08:47.
I'm a cognitive psychologist, not a pilot. I've just read (well, skimmed parts of) the BEA report, and I think it's interesting that it emphasizes a few issues:
Diagnosis : did the pilots diagnose "unreliable air speed"?
Stall warning: did they comprehend it?
The report suggests
Diagnosis : the pilots never diagnosed "unreliable air speed". Analysis of the dozen or so similar incidents where pitot tubes froze suggest that most of those crews did not diagnose it either.
Stall warning: did they comprehend it? The report provides references suggesting that in a confusing environment, humans can be cognitively deaf to aural stimuli, and tend to prefer and respond to visual stimuli much better.
So, from a cognitive perspective, the accident makes sense. A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
Could they have done better? Of course. Are they entirely, or even primarily to blame? Far from it.
Diagnosis : did the pilots diagnose "unreliable air speed"?
Stall warning: did they comprehend it?
The report suggests
Diagnosis : the pilots never diagnosed "unreliable air speed". Analysis of the dozen or so similar incidents where pitot tubes froze suggest that most of those crews did not diagnose it either.
Stall warning: did they comprehend it? The report provides references suggesting that in a confusing environment, humans can be cognitively deaf to aural stimuli, and tend to prefer and respond to visual stimuli much better.
So, from a cognitive perspective, the accident makes sense. A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
Could they have done better? Of course. Are they entirely, or even primarily to blame? Far from it.
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@GarageYears
What would have happened if the automation had said to itself, "hummm, the airspeed sensors seem to be taking a break, let's ignore them for a while and see what happens if we just keep doing what we have been doing for the last 3 minutes...."? May be flash an ECAM warning stating they were in "speed extrapolation mode" or something?
There are a variety of new, very cheap sensors that could be added to every plane to make something like that possible. In this case, equipping the plane with multi-axis acceleration sensors would allow very good approximation of air-speed for hours even with all pitot tubes out of commission. These solid-state sensors have been around for almost 20 years and today everyone has one of them inside their smart phone. They are very inexpensive and extremely accurate.
There is a certain amount of idiocy associated with the way automation is pursued in all "regulated" technology areas. Nobody dares to say that the only way to safely do something like that is either:
1. Full sensors and systems redundancy where each reading needed for proper functioning of controls is replicated 4 or more times, leading to the situation where complete loss of necessary control input would require several unrelated but simultaneous failures.
2. In absence of full sensor redundancy where dropping of automation due to unreliable or missing inputs is allowed as even fairly unlikely event, the crews should be able and required to regularly practice flying without the automation.
Sensor redundancy is possible but is not done due to regulatory costs. To begin with, Pitot Tube is an archaic piece of sensor that should not be used anymore. It is being used because introducing new technology requires decades of bureaucratic and legal hassle. Not only it has to be approved by variety of bureaucrats but anything new introduced to the market (no matter how good) is instantly a target for lawyers. If the AF447 had brand new kind of any type of sensors the lawyers would instantly claim that this was the reason for the crash.
To see how logic and sense have nothing to do with today's law, examine all the lawsuits against Toyota, for example - where people claimed that their car accelerated on their own. The only way to end this nonsense would be to allow libel suits and damages against parties that make such idiotic claims.
In airplane market - look how many years it took them to start using solid state voice and data recorders in place of the mechanical ones with magnetic tape. Here, the decision to use them should be crystal-clear.
1. Even most retarded lawyer cannot claim that using solid state recorder instead of magnetic tape can cause a crash
2. Solid state recorders are much smaller, able to withstand moisture and heat that no magnetic tape can.
3. Solid state recorders are much cheaper. For the price of one mechanical recorder you can have ten solid state recorders, one in every part of the plane, each recording a full copy of the data.
The problem is that while there is a big demand for automation (mostly because of fuel efficiency concerns), the regulatory framework is absolutely not able to allow to do it right (the full redundancy path), and so it is done same way if someone was trying to put a fuel efficiency automation on a stage coach.
With such approach - it makes perfect sense to drop automation due to unreliable sensor reading because in absence of sensor redundancy the pilot still has more sensors than the plane and in theory should be able to handle the situation - IF he is trained to do so, that is and can use his eyes and ears as a substitute for a faulty sensor.
Pitot tube - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Modern ways to very accurately measure air-flow:
Mass flow sensor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Airplane application of such a sensor would basically require a little metal peg or even simply piece of metal foil stuck on a wing. The principle of operation is such that you heat a piece of metal to a specific temperature and measure the amount of energy required to keep it at that temperature. The bigger air flow cools it faster so more energy is required to keep it at constant temperature. Damaging/disrupting/contaminating such a sensor is orders of magnitude less likely than Pitot tube.
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p.s.
In case someone wants to argue that regulatory bureaucracy is not the problem:
Title 14: Aeronautics and Space
CHAPTER I: FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)
SUBCHAPTER G: AIR CARRIERS AND OPERATORS FOR COMPENSATION OR HIRE: CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS
PART 125: CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A SEATING CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 6,000 POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT
Subpart F: Instrument and Equipment Requirements
125.205 - Equipment requirements: Airplanes under IFR.
No person may operate an airplane under IFR unless it has:
(a) A vertical speed indicator;
(b) A free-air temperature indicator;
(c) A heated pitot tube for each airspeed indicator;
(d) A power failure warning device or vacuum indicator to show the power available for gyroscopic instruments from each power source;
Meaning - nobody is allowed to use anything other than the archaic pitot tubes for airspeed reading and gyroscopic instruments while we for years have solid-state sensors that are more than 10 times more accurate than gyroscopic instruments or pitot tubes.
Title 14: Aeronautics and Space
CHAPTER I: FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)
SUBCHAPTER G: AIR CARRIERS AND OPERATORS FOR COMPENSATION OR HIRE: CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS
PART 125: CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A SEATING CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 6,000 POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT
Subpart F: Instrument and Equipment Requirements
125.205 - Equipment requirements: Airplanes under IFR.
No person may operate an airplane under IFR unless it has:
(a) A vertical speed indicator;
(b) A free-air temperature indicator;
(c) A heated pitot tube for each airspeed indicator;
(d) A power failure warning device or vacuum indicator to show the power available for gyroscopic instruments from each power source;
Meaning - nobody is allowed to use anything other than the archaic pitot tubes for airspeed reading and gyroscopic instruments while we for years have solid-state sensors that are more than 10 times more accurate than gyroscopic instruments or pitot tubes.
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Originally Posted by soylentgreen
The report provides references suggesting that in a confusing environment, humans can be cognitively deaf to aural stimuli, and tend to prefer and respond to visual stimuli much better.
So, from a cognitive perspective, the accident makes sense. A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
So, from a cognitive perspective, the accident makes sense. A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
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Q from a non-pilot: Could any of you professionals here explain what knowledge of flight physics is taught to pilots in their training, and how much most of them will remember after ten or so years on the job?
Also, having read soylent green's post which seems very convincing, forgive my continuous ignorance but I would have thought that any pilot, in instrument conditions, would monitor basic things like their artificial horizon and variometer, displayed on the primary flight displays. Do we have to conclude that these don't give enough of a clue to diagnose a high-altitude stall? And what could you imagine, supposing this was the thread to discuss that, how an optimal feedback should be displayed?
The reason why I'm asking this is, I'd like to understand how improvements to the cockpit design and interfaces might be made to help particularly pilots who, for whatever reason, are temporarily not at the very top of their skill (nothing implied here!!!), cope with unsusual situations.
Also, having read soylent green's post which seems very convincing, forgive my continuous ignorance but I would have thought that any pilot, in instrument conditions, would monitor basic things like their artificial horizon and variometer, displayed on the primary flight displays. Do we have to conclude that these don't give enough of a clue to diagnose a high-altitude stall? And what could you imagine, supposing this was the thread to discuss that, how an optimal feedback should be displayed?
The reason why I'm asking this is, I'd like to understand how improvements to the cockpit design and interfaces might be made to help particularly pilots who, for whatever reason, are temporarily not at the very top of their skill (nothing implied here!!!), cope with unsusual situations.