Distracted crew let Q400 descend towards terrain
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When we all learned instruments, our instructors (or at least my instructor) always told us to keep the "next two things" in mind. I remember practicing nonprecision approaches and always being asked "what now, and what next?" over and over again. He'd pull the chart out off my yoke clip and expect a response like "7 miles to go to the VOR, out of 3100 descending to 2200, level then configure at 2 DME, then next altitude 1400 next course 274, right crosswind". Always know the next two things that are going to happen. This is your PRIMARY situational awareness tool; extraneous avionics are SECONDARY to it, ALWAYS.
As we get into larger, better equipped aircraft with glass, FMS, GPS, moving maps, VNAV, etc and fly longer routes with less-frequent landings, we naturally start to lean on the automation to tell us these "next two things". Initial and recurrent training in the airline world assumes tacitly that professional pilots do not need to be taught these basic airmanship skills; you are EXPECTED to bring that to the plate with you from jumpstreet, day 1. This is as it should be. However, over the years the natural encroachment of automation dependency (or shall I say unconscious automation laziness..?) that most of us at least occasionally experience will erode those sharp thinking processes. THAT is the thing that in my humble opinion is NOT adequately addressed in most training. Maintenance of those truly fundamental skills of airmanship which can all too easily be overlooked by the fact that the purple line very rarely fails during a simulator check.
A flight director, autopilot, etc is a CONVENIENCE item, fundamentally. It increases safety when it 1. reduces fatigue and 2. is FULLY under the pilot's control, allowing an increased sense of situational awareness by attending to the basic task of flying while allowing the pilot to monitor a more relaxed "big picture". If it fails to do either one of those things, it becomes a liability and should be instinctually and instantly disregarded. By always maintaining that same thought pattern of the "next two things", monitoring the raw data underneath the automation, this instinctive "step down" to basics is a complete nonissue. We must simply ALWAYS, proactively keep our mind engaged with the airplane, whether flying with hands on the yoke or with the autoflight system.
It's been a long time since I've been anywhere near a Dash, but as a former TRI and captain on 3 out of 4 models of the Crash-8 for a few thousand hours on type I can tell you that these basics hold as true for that aircraft as a 172, as well as for the jet types I've had the pleasure of enjoying subsequently. The hypnotic effect of automation complacency is equally destructive to basic airmanship and situational awareness in all of the above, as well.
"But for the grace of God, there go I". This kind of incident could happen to ANY of us in a moment of unaware fixation. Anyone who disagrees with that statement is either wrong, or truly much smarter than myself and 90% of the people I have flown with in any capacity in my entire career. Fly safe and remember the "next two things".
As we get into larger, better equipped aircraft with glass, FMS, GPS, moving maps, VNAV, etc and fly longer routes with less-frequent landings, we naturally start to lean on the automation to tell us these "next two things". Initial and recurrent training in the airline world assumes tacitly that professional pilots do not need to be taught these basic airmanship skills; you are EXPECTED to bring that to the plate with you from jumpstreet, day 1. This is as it should be. However, over the years the natural encroachment of automation dependency (or shall I say unconscious automation laziness..?) that most of us at least occasionally experience will erode those sharp thinking processes. THAT is the thing that in my humble opinion is NOT adequately addressed in most training. Maintenance of those truly fundamental skills of airmanship which can all too easily be overlooked by the fact that the purple line very rarely fails during a simulator check.
A flight director, autopilot, etc is a CONVENIENCE item, fundamentally. It increases safety when it 1. reduces fatigue and 2. is FULLY under the pilot's control, allowing an increased sense of situational awareness by attending to the basic task of flying while allowing the pilot to monitor a more relaxed "big picture". If it fails to do either one of those things, it becomes a liability and should be instinctually and instantly disregarded. By always maintaining that same thought pattern of the "next two things", monitoring the raw data underneath the automation, this instinctive "step down" to basics is a complete nonissue. We must simply ALWAYS, proactively keep our mind engaged with the airplane, whether flying with hands on the yoke or with the autoflight system.
It's been a long time since I've been anywhere near a Dash, but as a former TRI and captain on 3 out of 4 models of the Crash-8 for a few thousand hours on type I can tell you that these basics hold as true for that aircraft as a 172, as well as for the jet types I've had the pleasure of enjoying subsequently. The hypnotic effect of automation complacency is equally destructive to basic airmanship and situational awareness in all of the above, as well.
"But for the grace of God, there go I". This kind of incident could happen to ANY of us in a moment of unaware fixation. Anyone who disagrees with that statement is either wrong, or truly much smarter than myself and 90% of the people I have flown with in any capacity in my entire career. Fly safe and remember the "next two things".
Last edited by hikoushi; 23rd Jun 2012 at 10:02.
Paxing All Over The World
SLF here.
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That is a real snap judgement on someone that you do not know. PERHAPS the numbers tell of a person who realised that the 'glamorous' long haul was costing family life? Perhaps someone decided to work short haul local to be more human?
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The Captain had 3000hrs total, 1500 on type and was 44 years old. I don't consider that alot of experience to be honest, and the age against hours indicates a 'career changer'.
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PAXboy:
They no longer log long-haul hours?
That is a real snap judgement on someone that you do not know. PERHAPS the numbers tell of a person who realised that the 'glamorous' long haul was costing family life? Perhaps someone decided to work short haul local to be more human?
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We really need to drop this topic of 'experience'. 3000hrs is ample for the job and sufficient for a 737/AB command. Add in 1500 on type and I would suggest this Cpt was just fine on experience.
Read hikoushi's post - it could happen to a 30,000 hr pilot. No, it shouldn't, but it can.
Read hikoushi's post - it could happen to a 30,000 hr pilot. No, it shouldn't, but it can.
The classic example was Eastern 401. A crew fixated upon a warning light whilst the autopilot flew the aircraft into the ground. The captain had just under 30,000hr .
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Did you see the First Choice 767 damage photos contained in the AAIB bulletin of the previous month? 14,000 hr skippers can make mistakes too. I take issue with the crass "flybe monthly" comment; 2 out of 4 events reported in the last few months were due to technical faults rather than crew error/low experience.
Tyreplug - Are you insane ? the Captain had 3000hrs total, 1500 on type and was 44 years old. I don't consider that alot of experience to be honest, and the age against hours indicates a 'career changer'.
Eastern wiseguy is correct in that the Autopilot on EA 401 had disconnected . Due to a difference in the breakout forces between the Captain's Yoke and the F/O's yoke, on the F/O's side the light which indicated autopilot engagement and altitude hold remained lit even though the autopilot had been inadvertently disconnected by a nudge from the Captain.
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Nowhere in my instrument training because we had no autopilot did it say to monitor the descent. It said do it to the next altitude. I know the new guys use automation because of their expeience level so tend to rely on it more than us old guys. Hope they figure it out before the next event. The next one might be like Buffalo if they don't get their act together. Just learn to hand fly like us old pilots and you will be fine. Relying on automation works sometimes.
"I am sure the MPL will improve things"
In this case not having an MPL didn't help, so maybe it will....
The most sensible post so far on this thread was the one about ther but for the grace of God etc...
What you can say is that the individual crew, all of flybe's other Q400 crews along with their training department and any other company's Q400 crews who read the aaib report will have learned from it. Anyone who hasn't flown a Q400 is just guessing.
In this case not having an MPL didn't help, so maybe it will....
The most sensible post so far on this thread was the one about ther but for the grace of God etc...
What you can say is that the individual crew, all of flybe's other Q400 crews along with their training department and any other company's Q400 crews who read the aaib report will have learned from it. Anyone who hasn't flown a Q400 is just guessing.
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The most sensible post so far on this thread was the one about ther but for the grace of God etc...
If in doubt hit the power and go round, even if you only have an unexplained feeling that something is not right, you probably dont have time to figure out what is wrong, just get out of there.
I have never understood why so many pilots feel that a go-around is somehow shamefull or a sign of weakness.