A Sukhoi superjet 100 is missing
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I understand from some news sources that the authorities in Indonesia have given up searching for the flight data recorder.
This recent news article suggests they have brought army specialists in to help in the search:
Sukhoi Crash Probe Gets Army Support in Hunt for Data Recorder - Businessweek
ST27;
The linked story illustrates that news from Indonesia needs to be confirmed with a number of sources before it can be accepted. The story referencing the "end of the search for the flight recorder" was part of a regular (and reliable) aviation news source which is clearly in conflict with the Business Week story - not the first time that directly-opposite news reports have been issued.
One hopes that the search for the flight data recorder continues. I think they will quickly discover that the CVR alone will not provide the entire picture and that wrong conclusions can be drawn without all available information.
The linked story illustrates that news from Indonesia needs to be confirmed with a number of sources before it can be accepted. The story referencing the "end of the search for the flight recorder" was part of a regular (and reliable) aviation news source which is clearly in conflict with the Business Week story - not the first time that directly-opposite news reports have been issued.
One hopes that the search for the flight data recorder continues. I think they will quickly discover that the CVR alone will not provide the entire picture and that wrong conclusions can be drawn without all available information.
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No evidence of malfunctions on (voice) recorder found, T2CAS was on and alerting the crew about dangerous proximity to ground
Google Translate
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Last edited by vovachan; 21st May 2012 at 17:49.
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This article (in bahasa Indonesia) states that the contents of the CVR will not be made public. The reason being, the investigators do not wish for the public to speculate the cause of the accident. Probably a good idea, so that we all wait for the official accident report to be released.
detikNews : Hindari Spekulasi, KNKT Tak Akan Siarkan Data CVR Sukhoi Superjet 100
detikNews : Hindari Spekulasi, KNKT Tak Akan Siarkan Data CVR Sukhoi Superjet 100
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Again, this article is in Bahasa Indonesia, but gives some info regarding the CVR analysis. I'll do a quick and dirty translation of the article here. The gist of it says, that there are three pilots who are involved in creating the CVR transcript, 2 of whom are from the NTSC (Indonesia) and one from Russia. The transcript will be made in English. They have 2 hours of recording from the CVR which includes data from the first (non-event) flight of the day. The data that is relevant to the crash investigation is in the final 20 minutes of the recording.
detikNews : KNKT Selidiki 20 Menit Percakapan Pilot Sukhoi Sebelum Kecelakaan
detikNews : KNKT Selidiki 20 Menit Percakapan Pilot Sukhoi Sebelum Kecelakaan
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Massive influence?
So long as an ex-KGB man is at the top of a corrupt vertical power structure, which he personally built,-
There is NOT ONE HOPE of a change in "culture".
etc. etc.
So long as an ex-KGB man is at the top of a corrupt vertical power structure, which he personally built,-
There is NOT ONE HOPE of a change in "culture".
etc. etc.
Last edited by ap08; 21st May 2012 at 16:51.
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A couple of things...
Training wheels: Terima kasih untuk terjemahan anda yang cepat dan akurat!
PJ2: I talked to one of the senior people at KNKT (NTSC in English) today and they are NOT abandoning the search for the DFDR.
Retired F4: In two posts within a short time you strongly opine that weather was not a contributing factor. Though I have re-read the posts several times I cannot follow your logic. Please try again to convince me that Wx could not be a factor (whether the aircraft was IFR / IMC; IFR / VMC; or even VFR. I can cite many accidents / incidents worldwide wherein Wx was a contributing factor in all of the above combinations of flight conditions.
General statement: I have spent more hours in the air over Indonesia than I care to remember (including the area of this accident). I was in that area twice in the week before this occurrence; once in the morning and once at about 3pm. The flight conditions (visibility, turbulence, rain, towering CU or CB, etc.) were very similar on those days -- as they often are -- with the afternoon conditions developing as if viewed on a video on "fast forward". The visibility even in the early part of the day in question (May 9) was reduced in haze (combination of smog and smoke from burning) such that the reported prevailing vis was an "optimistic" estimate. Anyone who flies regularly within 60km of Jakarta will tell you that there are few days when the visibility is greater than 5 - 6 km. And the days leading up to this accident were no different. The lovely skies and excellent visibility of some of the stock photos of the area are not representative of what it is usually like -- and was like on May 9.
To suggest that Wx is somehow to be ruled out as a contributing factor at this stage in this instance shows little understanding of local geography and meteorology, human factors, and even accident investigation principles.
Training wheels: Terima kasih untuk terjemahan anda yang cepat dan akurat!
PJ2: I talked to one of the senior people at KNKT (NTSC in English) today and they are NOT abandoning the search for the DFDR.
Retired F4: In two posts within a short time you strongly opine that weather was not a contributing factor. Though I have re-read the posts several times I cannot follow your logic. Please try again to convince me that Wx could not be a factor (whether the aircraft was IFR / IMC; IFR / VMC; or even VFR. I can cite many accidents / incidents worldwide wherein Wx was a contributing factor in all of the above combinations of flight conditions.
General statement: I have spent more hours in the air over Indonesia than I care to remember (including the area of this accident). I was in that area twice in the week before this occurrence; once in the morning and once at about 3pm. The flight conditions (visibility, turbulence, rain, towering CU or CB, etc.) were very similar on those days -- as they often are -- with the afternoon conditions developing as if viewed on a video on "fast forward". The visibility even in the early part of the day in question (May 9) was reduced in haze (combination of smog and smoke from burning) such that the reported prevailing vis was an "optimistic" estimate. Anyone who flies regularly within 60km of Jakarta will tell you that there are few days when the visibility is greater than 5 - 6 km. And the days leading up to this accident were no different. The lovely skies and excellent visibility of some of the stock photos of the area are not representative of what it is usually like -- and was like on May 9.
To suggest that Wx is somehow to be ruled out as a contributing factor at this stage in this instance shows little understanding of local geography and meteorology, human factors, and even accident investigation principles.
Last edited by Sam Asama; 22nd May 2012 at 02:22.
SamAsama
Retired F4: In two posts within a short time you strongly opine that weather was not a contributing factor. Though I have re-read the posts several times I cannot follow your logic. Please try again to convince me that Wx could not be a factor (whether the aircraft was IFR / IMC; IFR / VMC; or even VFR. I can cite many accidents / incidents worldwide wherein Wx was a contributing factor in all of the above combinations of flight conditions.
Retired F4: In two posts within a short time you strongly opine that weather was not a contributing factor. Though I have re-read the posts several times I cannot follow your logic. Please try again to convince me that Wx could not be a factor (whether the aircraft was IFR / IMC; IFR / VMC; or even VFR. I can cite many accidents / incidents worldwide wherein Wx was a contributing factor in all of the above combinations of flight conditions.
I´ve never flown in indonesia, but marginal weather for flying can be found anywhere in the world, especially also in central and northern europe.
Aircrews flying modern equipped transport aircraft (and by the way that applies as well for GAT and MIL aviation) are expected to handle the preparation and execution of a flight under all kinds of weather and flight rules to the max extent possible. That means plan according the weather forcast and execute the flight in accordance with the regulations implemented for IFR or VFR flight rules under observation of the actual encountered weather situations.
In short, if you plan to fly VFR, than do it only when the weather will allow it. If you run into unsuitable weather under VFR, then terminate flying VFR and reopen an IFR flight plan. If you are on an IFR flightplan and intend to continue under VFR, it is your responsibility to make sure, that the weather is apropriate to do so. It´s the pilots responibility to orient the planing and execution throughout the flight by respecting the actual weather situation.
We are looking at a flight with a planned flighttime of less than one hour, therefore the forecasted weather should be pretty close to the existing one, including the local weather developements in hilly terrain like you describe it very well. There should be no surprise factor there, if the flight planning and weather briefing was done in accordance with existing rules (which i dont know from indonesia, but they shouldn´t be that different).
Those weather phenomena you describe so well will only influence a flight under visual flight rules. Under IFR it´s no need to see anything except for the final moments of the landing. Only enroute hazard would be thunderstorms , which can be avoided by correct operation of the onboard WX radar.
As far as we know at the moment (that might change, when the CVR or the FDR reveal anything different) the flight was conducted under IFR and the crew requested an descent below MSA / MORA, and ATC granted that descent. Wether that descent was requested and conducted under IFR rules in IMC or VMC or wether it was under VFR / VMC does not change the responsibility of the crew to not descent below the MSA / MORA under IFR/ IMC or to stay well clear of clouds and terrain when operating in VMC.
There might be reason for the crew to descent below MSA /MORA and not be able to maintain VMC close to the ground, but there is none known until now, and i can´t think of one. But i´m open minded, if you see reason in the actions of the crew. The argument, that weather itself was a contributing factor in other accidents is noted and accepted. Icing, turbulence, extreme headwinds, suddenly closed airfields, runway contamination due to precipitation comes to my mind (there sure might be others as well).
But bad planning and bad execution does not make up for your suggestion, that the weather could be a contributing factor for the tragic outcome.
They just had no sound reason to be between those mountains (neither in VMC nor in IMC) below the MSA / MORA, and it was not the weather that led them down there.
That´s no condemnation of the crew, there might be other factors which led to the accident, which we don´t know yet (i.e. technical issues, human factors), i only objected the theories concerning weather and malfunctioning terrain avoidance gadgets being causes or contributing causes to the accident.
Just for the record, that is my personal oppinion, and you and others are entiteled to a different one.
Last edited by RetiredF4; 22nd May 2012 at 07:25.
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Hi RF4.
First, thanks for a quick and well-written response re my comments on your comments.
I agree with everything you say, except for a difference we have in what constitutes "contributing factors". I especially agree with your assertion that poor planning and poor execution are often the underlying causes – even in weather related accidents.
But, in examining the “why and how” of an accident we must (IMO) include contributors to the chain. So, if poor planning and/or poor execution leads a crew into a situation where they hit terrain that that didn’t see in time to avoid (mountain top obscured by fast developed cloud, vis drops significantly in haze or rain shower, etc. then the poor planning / poor execution is a prime factor and the weather would be a contributor.
So, I think we agree in essence. I am simply considering a longer chain of causal events.
First, thanks for a quick and well-written response re my comments on your comments.
I agree with everything you say, except for a difference we have in what constitutes "contributing factors". I especially agree with your assertion that poor planning and poor execution are often the underlying causes – even in weather related accidents.
But, in examining the “why and how” of an accident we must (IMO) include contributors to the chain. So, if poor planning and/or poor execution leads a crew into a situation where they hit terrain that that didn’t see in time to avoid (mountain top obscured by fast developed cloud, vis drops significantly in haze or rain shower, etc. then the poor planning / poor execution is a prime factor and the weather would be a contributor.
So, I think we agree in essence. I am simply considering a longer chain of causal events.
ad hoc profile
Yeah, Sam, I wanna hear the FIRST mission audio. i realize that the weather may not have been much of a factor but did they fly the same profile?
Seems things go south when we change the flight plan and haven't plotted our exact course and turns and such. Even then, we have to have an escape maneuver/turn/climb when things aren't what we planned for, ya think?
Many of us here have flown in mountainous terrain that had rapidly changing weather. But those of us still posting here prolly had our abort plan ready, and it was well-thought out and could be executed in a second or two. in other words, we didn't have to improvise. Luck is when preparation meets opportunity.
Seems things go south when we change the flight plan and haven't plotted our exact course and turns and such. Even then, we have to have an escape maneuver/turn/climb when things aren't what we planned for, ya think?
Many of us here have flown in mountainous terrain that had rapidly changing weather. But those of us still posting here prolly had our abort plan ready, and it was well-thought out and could be executed in a second or two. in other words, we didn't have to improvise. Luck is when preparation meets opportunity.
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According my sources the aircraft was flight planned to do the demos in a training area where MSA is below 6000 , ATC cleared a/c to descend to 6000 in that area. Aircraft made evolutions in the area as planned but then ,apparently without clearance and radio contact ,left the area and flew towards the mountain. If this is confirmed it gets more complicated.
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ATC Watcher
There is another (second) blog of Mr. Soejatman where he has charted a possible flightpath of the second flight. This descripton covers your post contents.
It appears to be possible that the flight received that descend clearance overhead the "Bogor Training Area" (purple line rectangular area on the map of post # 465) and descended under Radar control into that airspace. performed there what ever they had planned.
It will indeed raise new questions about what made them fly without clearance towards the mountains at that too low altitude.
Some posts have mentioned that the search for the FDR was abandoned. It appears that this is only correct for the SAR service. The search goes on, too valuable source of information would be lost otherwise.
It appears to be possible that the flight received that descend clearance overhead the "Bogor Training Area" (purple line rectangular area on the map of post # 465) and descended under Radar control into that airspace. performed there what ever they had planned.
It will indeed raise new questions about what made them fly without clearance towards the mountains at that too low altitude.
Some posts have mentioned that the search for the FDR was abandoned. It appears that this is only correct for the SAR service. The search goes on, too valuable source of information would be lost otherwise.
Last edited by Annex14; 22nd May 2012 at 08:24.
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one point worth thinking about is that there aren't many places in Russia with abrupt changes in elevation & weather as we see around Bogor
yes, I know that as professionals they should fly by the book and stay on a flight plan but I'm sure the dangers of cumulo-granite weren't as near the front of their minds as it would be to someone who flies out (say) Seattle or Vancouver
yes, I know that as professionals they should fly by the book and stay on a flight plan but I'm sure the dangers of cumulo-granite weren't as near the front of their minds as it would be to someone who flies out (say) Seattle or Vancouver
one point worth thinking about is that there aren't many places in Russia with abrupt changes in elevation & weather as we see around Bogor
yes, I know that as professionals they should fly by the book and stay on a flight plan but I'm sure the dangers of cumulo-granite weren't as near the front of their minds as it would be to someone who flies out (say) Seattle or Vancouver
yes, I know that as professionals they should fly by the book and stay on a flight plan but I'm sure the dangers of cumulo-granite weren't as near the front of their minds as it would be to someone who flies out (say) Seattle or Vancouver
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despegue
You answered like a typical churlish and rude Russian.
And hey... what danger did you find in that very phrase "turn left heading 010"? I have heard such a command many times in different parts of the planet... Quite standard one, betcha!
Respect others, and look around and at the mirror more frequently.
By the way, copy-past the post you have cursed into Google Translator and try to understand that he did NOT say the test-pilots of SSJ are (were) idiots. Contrary to what you have perceived.
Cheers.
You answered like a typical churlish and rude Russian.
And hey... what danger did you find in that very phrase "turn left heading 010"? I have heard such a command many times in different parts of the planet... Quite standard one, betcha!
Respect others, and look around and at the mirror more frequently.
By the way, copy-past the post you have cursed into Google Translator and try to understand that he did NOT say the test-pilots of SSJ are (were) idiots. Contrary to what you have perceived.
Cheers.
Last edited by 06105; 22nd May 2012 at 15:49.
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Gentlemen,
Greetings from Russia. Having had a privilege to know very well the captain of the SSJ who was really an outstanding pilot and personally a great man, I am very interested in every detail about this tragedy happened to my friend. And I am glad to read reasonable, professional and valuable comments here, with this forum.
I am not a pilot, but has been involved in various R&D projects in space and defence for more than 3 decades already, and would like to share some thoughts on an issue that likely was not yet raised here (sorry if I overlooked).
Putting aside the questing why they found themselves in the mountains, I assume that, while there, they relied to a certain (if not large) extent on the T2CAS (and here its TAWS part matters). As far as I can see in the publicly available publications, this system uses the digital terrain data, more precisely DTED (Digital Terrain Elevation Data) and some look-ahead algorithms.
So, I tried to figure out what digital maps are used in the civil aviation: Terrain Awareness Warning System Databases for the Civil Aviation Industry
Here is the link to DTED for those not familiar:
DTED - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
And the question immediately arose about the DTED Level of the map available for this particular Salak region. It is well-known that interpolation errors on steep slopes can be huge. This article provides a good reference with quatitative estimates:
http://www.eurocontrol.int/sass/gall...%20DATA-11.pdf
E.g. in page 5 it is written that on a rough terrain in Alps, the elevation error for DTED Level 0 can be up to 307 meters (!!). For level 2 it was about 25 meters, and I assume that for Level 1 the error would be somewhat in between (and still high enough).
I would be happy to be mistaken, but it seems to me that Level 2 and higher (30 m post spacing and less) is not available for the Salak area. It would require too much effort to implement, while this area seems to be not much in use.
Thus, I would have a concern on performance of the TAWS on such a rough data, if it is of DTED Level 0 or 1. It's not a matter of avionics or onboard math, but if your input is that much «over-noised», your output would be hard to predict (e.g. the system may «shout» in a safe situation and keep silence or make a mild warning in danger).
What do you think?
Greetings from Russia. Having had a privilege to know very well the captain of the SSJ who was really an outstanding pilot and personally a great man, I am very interested in every detail about this tragedy happened to my friend. And I am glad to read reasonable, professional and valuable comments here, with this forum.
I am not a pilot, but has been involved in various R&D projects in space and defence for more than 3 decades already, and would like to share some thoughts on an issue that likely was not yet raised here (sorry if I overlooked).
Putting aside the questing why they found themselves in the mountains, I assume that, while there, they relied to a certain (if not large) extent on the T2CAS (and here its TAWS part matters). As far as I can see in the publicly available publications, this system uses the digital terrain data, more precisely DTED (Digital Terrain Elevation Data) and some look-ahead algorithms.
So, I tried to figure out what digital maps are used in the civil aviation: Terrain Awareness Warning System Databases for the Civil Aviation Industry
Here is the link to DTED for those not familiar:
DTED - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
And the question immediately arose about the DTED Level of the map available for this particular Salak region. It is well-known that interpolation errors on steep slopes can be huge. This article provides a good reference with quatitative estimates:
http://www.eurocontrol.int/sass/gall...%20DATA-11.pdf
E.g. in page 5 it is written that on a rough terrain in Alps, the elevation error for DTED Level 0 can be up to 307 meters (!!). For level 2 it was about 25 meters, and I assume that for Level 1 the error would be somewhat in between (and still high enough).
I would be happy to be mistaken, but it seems to me that Level 2 and higher (30 m post spacing and less) is not available for the Salak area. It would require too much effort to implement, while this area seems to be not much in use.
Thus, I would have a concern on performance of the TAWS on such a rough data, if it is of DTED Level 0 or 1. It's not a matter of avionics or onboard math, but if your input is that much «over-noised», your output would be hard to predict (e.g. the system may «shout» in a safe situation and keep silence or make a mild warning in danger).
What do you think?
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Terrain avoidance question
Background ...
ATC Watcher
According my sources the aircraft was flight planned to do the demos in a training area where MSA is below 6000 , ATC cleared a/c to descend to 6000 in that area.
Aircraft made evolutions in the area as planned but then ,apparently without clearance and radio contact ,left the area and flew towards the mountain.
Annex14
There is another (second) blog of Mr. Soejatman where he has charted a possible flightpath of the second flight. It appears to be possible that the flight received that
descend clearance overhead the "Bogor Training Area" (purple line rectangular area on the map of post # 465) and descended under Radar control into that airspace
[then] performed there what ever they had planned.
Soeman then speculates that their final turn towards the airport may have been delayed because of difficulties contacting ATC at their busiest time of day.
[The implication being that their flight plan did not appreciate the imminent dangers of continuing on their current flight-path. Perhaps because of the use of
inadequate maps/charts.]
Comment ...
This starts to look like it could have been a gentle "taxi ride" that went wrong.
From posts earlier in the thread, visibility restrictions may well have prevented them seeing the developing danger.
Question ... if the above scenario is approximately true, and considering the nasty nature of the terrain they were to meet:
How well would you expect the terrain warning system to perform?
Would you expect it to have warned them in good time to take effective avoidance action.
How much would be down to luck. For example first contact being a ridge or a valley.
ATC Watcher
According my sources the aircraft was flight planned to do the demos in a training area where MSA is below 6000 , ATC cleared a/c to descend to 6000 in that area.
Aircraft made evolutions in the area as planned but then ,apparently without clearance and radio contact ,left the area and flew towards the mountain.
Annex14
There is another (second) blog of Mr. Soejatman where he has charted a possible flightpath of the second flight. It appears to be possible that the flight received that
descend clearance overhead the "Bogor Training Area" (purple line rectangular area on the map of post # 465) and descended under Radar control into that airspace
[then] performed there what ever they had planned.
Soeman then speculates that their final turn towards the airport may have been delayed because of difficulties contacting ATC at their busiest time of day.
[The implication being that their flight plan did not appreciate the imminent dangers of continuing on their current flight-path. Perhaps because of the use of
inadequate maps/charts.]
Comment ...
This starts to look like it could have been a gentle "taxi ride" that went wrong.
From posts earlier in the thread, visibility restrictions may well have prevented them seeing the developing danger.
Question ... if the above scenario is approximately true, and considering the nasty nature of the terrain they were to meet:
How well would you expect the terrain warning system to perform?
Would you expect it to have warned them in good time to take effective avoidance action.
How much would be down to luck. For example first contact being a ridge or a valley.
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last two posts ...
good points raised.
possible database "latitude for error" especially so (A van).
The implication is that whilst we put trust in the system performance day in day out, if there are accuracy disclaimers in mountainous regions (and lets not beat about the bush .. this is the last hole in the cheese model) it's a point worth examining and bringing our collective experience of TAWS to the table.
My own is that pre-TAWS (basic GPWS) I had one hard warning due to an ATC slip-up .. post enhanced GPWS/TAWS .. no incident or observed false warning ... but others have a contribution to make in the light of experience, and more system related in depth knowledge perhaps ?
possible database "latitude for error" especially so (A van).
The implication is that whilst we put trust in the system performance day in day out, if there are accuracy disclaimers in mountainous regions (and lets not beat about the bush .. this is the last hole in the cheese model) it's a point worth examining and bringing our collective experience of TAWS to the table.
My own is that pre-TAWS (basic GPWS) I had one hard warning due to an ATC slip-up .. post enhanced GPWS/TAWS .. no incident or observed false warning ... but others have a contribution to make in the light of experience, and more system related in depth knowledge perhaps ?