AA to cut 13,000 jobs
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It was mostly typical MSNBC left-wing bias.
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8486Mechanics/617 AC=13.75 mechanics per a/c.
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Guys, not trying to wind anyone up, but this battles lost. Most of the US major's outsource maintenance. As an example, CO and DL send aircraft to HAECO in Hong Kong. The job is done in half the time, with a higher quality index, and a much lower cost. I know it hurts to hear it, but those are the facts. The only way forward is to strike a grand bargain with modified regs, pay and hopefully you can experience stable growth and increasing pay/benefits going forward. Whatever happens, best of luck. Sincerely.
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Also after the engine separated they were ok but AA policy then was to do initial climb at V2 so to follow company procedure did so not knowing the LED had retracted because of loss of hydraulic fluid. Now we can maintain speed and not reduce.
Airlines tend to make procedures so the dumbest pilot in the group will survive with a mechanical problem so make it generic. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't.
Airlines tend to make procedures so the dumbest pilot in the group will survive with a mechanical problem so make it generic. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't.
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Relative to N110AA,
A concise summary of the blame would fall into 3 components:
Flaws in the Design:
The NTSB believed that the design of the DC-10-10 was flawed and lacked sufficient redundancy in the stall warning system. In addition, the leading edge slats did not include a mechanical locking device to prevent slat movement following a failure of the primary controls; FAA certification was based on acceptable flight characteristics with an asymmetrical leading edge slat condition. The pylon attach points were vulnerable to damage during maintenance. Finally, because the structural separation of the engine was considered extremely improbable by McDonnell Douglas, multiple failures resulting from engine separation were not considered.
Flaws in the Maintenance Procedure:
The modified engine maintenance procedure used by American Airlines to service the engines of its DC-10s was not thoroughly examined before it was implemented. Inspection of all DC-10s after the accident revealed similar cracks in nine airplanes. The ECO developed by American Airlines did not emphasize the degree of accuracy required to properly place the forklift and no evaluation of the ability of the maintenance staff to correctly carry out the procedure was ever made. When the maintenance staff had difficultly carrying out the procedure, no attempt was made to notify engineering of the difficulties.
Flaws in the Accident Reporting and Regulatory Mechanism:
Continental Airlines, using a similar maintenance procedure, had developed and corrected similar pylon cracks. Because the airline classified the damage as a maintenance error, neither the airline nor the the manufacturer reported the damage to the FAA. Furthermore, since the cause was determined to be maintenance error, no further investigation was carried out. American Airlines developed its ECO without the benefit of Continental's experience. The NTSB believed that it was the FAA's responsibility to make sure that such information was made available to all interested parties in a timely manner. However, at the time of the accident, FAA regulations concerning maintenance were generally vague, inadequate, and frequently unenforceable.
You can go to this for the complete report. Particularly, scroll down and read section 1.17.1:
https://hfskyway.faa.gov/(A(Lth2wzpE...20Airlines.pdf
A concise summary of the blame would fall into 3 components:
Flaws in the Design:
The NTSB believed that the design of the DC-10-10 was flawed and lacked sufficient redundancy in the stall warning system. In addition, the leading edge slats did not include a mechanical locking device to prevent slat movement following a failure of the primary controls; FAA certification was based on acceptable flight characteristics with an asymmetrical leading edge slat condition. The pylon attach points were vulnerable to damage during maintenance. Finally, because the structural separation of the engine was considered extremely improbable by McDonnell Douglas, multiple failures resulting from engine separation were not considered.
Flaws in the Maintenance Procedure:
The modified engine maintenance procedure used by American Airlines to service the engines of its DC-10s was not thoroughly examined before it was implemented. Inspection of all DC-10s after the accident revealed similar cracks in nine airplanes. The ECO developed by American Airlines did not emphasize the degree of accuracy required to properly place the forklift and no evaluation of the ability of the maintenance staff to correctly carry out the procedure was ever made. When the maintenance staff had difficultly carrying out the procedure, no attempt was made to notify engineering of the difficulties.
Flaws in the Accident Reporting and Regulatory Mechanism:
Continental Airlines, using a similar maintenance procedure, had developed and corrected similar pylon cracks. Because the airline classified the damage as a maintenance error, neither the airline nor the the manufacturer reported the damage to the FAA. Furthermore, since the cause was determined to be maintenance error, no further investigation was carried out. American Airlines developed its ECO without the benefit of Continental's experience. The NTSB believed that it was the FAA's responsibility to make sure that such information was made available to all interested parties in a timely manner. However, at the time of the accident, FAA regulations concerning maintenance were generally vague, inadequate, and frequently unenforceable.
You can go to this for the complete report. Particularly, scroll down and read section 1.17.1:
https://hfskyway.faa.gov/(A(Lth2wzpE...20Airlines.pdf
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1011AA. From what I understand there was no special hydraulic lift, simply a forklift under the engine change/transport stand with the intent of engine and pylon removal.
The simple flaw was un expectected stress to the tombstone or FWD pylon to wing connection. To my knowledge they did this w/o any measure of weight. The common practice now is to use chain hoists or a special hyd lift with dyno's to measure the stress applied to the pylon (measure engine weight before disconnect from the pylon as null weight).
The simple flaw was un expectected stress to the tombstone or FWD pylon to wing connection. To my knowledge they did this w/o any measure of weight. The common practice now is to use chain hoists or a special hyd lift with dyno's to measure the stress applied to the pylon (measure engine weight before disconnect from the pylon as null weight).
I really didn't want to re-open the N110AA tragedy except to point out to the Count that his comment was nonsense.
However, now that we are talking about this tragedy, I would like to make one comment.
I keep hearing that if the crew had stuck at V2+10 and had not reduced to V2 like they were taught then they would not have crashed. It is quite true that largely as a result of this tragic accident, we went on to a system that if you were at V2 when the failure happened, then maintain V2. If you were at a speed above V2 then maintain that speed. That is entirely logical but it was not the thinking at the time. In other words, if your aeroplane is still flying at that speed, then stick to that as a minimum. Not all of us are test pilots.
In any event, claiming that they crashed because they reduced to V2 does not really bear inspection. The fact is that the damage caused by the pylon and the engine going up and over the wing caused massive hydraulic leaks apart from the retraction of the slats on the left wing. (There was no manual reversion on the DC-10). Even if they had survived the reduction of speed to V2, they would have died anyway about 5 minutes later due to loss of control due to loss of hydraulics.
We re-ran this scenario in the AA simulators at DFW and it was not survivable.
Now, before the promising hysterics on this forum get started, this disaster bore no resemblance to the Sioux City tragedy. In that case they had lost the centre engine (No.2) and still had the wing engines which could be used for pitch and yaw. Had they lost one of the wing engines (like N110AA) they were equally doomed.
I think it might also be worth considering that the difference between Flaps Zero/Retract and Flaps Zero/Extend depending on weight was between 60 and 70 knots.
In other words, the difference in stall speed between Slats Extended and Slats Retracted was between 60 and 70 knots.
So, to have no slats on one wing after take-off was going to be pretty disastrous and 10 knots would not have made much difference.
However, now that we are talking about this tragedy, I would like to make one comment.
I keep hearing that if the crew had stuck at V2+10 and had not reduced to V2 like they were taught then they would not have crashed. It is quite true that largely as a result of this tragic accident, we went on to a system that if you were at V2 when the failure happened, then maintain V2. If you were at a speed above V2 then maintain that speed. That is entirely logical but it was not the thinking at the time. In other words, if your aeroplane is still flying at that speed, then stick to that as a minimum. Not all of us are test pilots.
In any event, claiming that they crashed because they reduced to V2 does not really bear inspection. The fact is that the damage caused by the pylon and the engine going up and over the wing caused massive hydraulic leaks apart from the retraction of the slats on the left wing. (There was no manual reversion on the DC-10). Even if they had survived the reduction of speed to V2, they would have died anyway about 5 minutes later due to loss of control due to loss of hydraulics.
We re-ran this scenario in the AA simulators at DFW and it was not survivable.
Now, before the promising hysterics on this forum get started, this disaster bore no resemblance to the Sioux City tragedy. In that case they had lost the centre engine (No.2) and still had the wing engines which could be used for pitch and yaw. Had they lost one of the wing engines (like N110AA) they were equally doomed.
I think it might also be worth considering that the difference between Flaps Zero/Retract and Flaps Zero/Extend depending on weight was between 60 and 70 knots.
In other words, the difference in stall speed between Slats Extended and Slats Retracted was between 60 and 70 knots.
So, to have no slats on one wing after take-off was going to be pretty disastrous and 10 knots would not have made much difference.
Last edited by JW411; 9th Feb 2012 at 14:15.
AA DC10 ORD
JW411
Your statement above is not meaningful unless you define "massive hydraulic leaks" in light of the design concepts of "shielding", separation" and/or "redundancy"
Are you saying that multiple hydraulic systems were compromised or just that one single hydraulic system failed that "was" or "could" not be accomodated through other systems
The fact is that the damage caused by the pylon and the engine going up and over the wing caused massive hydraulic leaks apart from the retraction of the slats on the left wing.
Are you saying that multiple hydraulic systems were compromised or just that one single hydraulic system failed that "was" or "could" not be accomodated through other systems
Lomapaseo:
I know you are a bit of a flight safety boffin from previous encounters on Pprune.
You are now asking me detailed questions about an accident that took place about 33 years ago but I will do my best to answer.
The DC-10 had 3 hydraulic systems - all of which fed the flight controls in one way or another. As already stated, there was no manual reversion (like they had on the B707). Therefore, no hydraulics, no control (except that it was just possible to fly using differential engine thrust).
I have in front of me two hydraulic diagrams from my original AA DC-10 manual.
The leading edge devices (slats) were controlled by No.1 and No.3 hydraulic system.
So, the loss of No.1 engine (and its pylon) when it went over the top of the left wing not only retracted the slats on the left wing but wrecked the No.1 and No.3 hydraulic systems.
That leaves us with the No.2 hydraulic system (and I make a huge assumption that it was entirely intact).
The No.2 system (and I am only talking about flight controls here) controlled:
1. Half of the outboard ailerons.
2. No.5 spoiler on each wing.
3. Inboard half of each inboard and outboard flap section.
4. Spoiler No.1 on each inboard section.
5. Half of each inboard aileron and flap section.
6. Roughly speaking, one third of the elevator (the horizontal stabiliser - which had the same wing span as a DC-3 was controlled by No.1 and No.3 systems. So even if they had survived all the other bits, landing would have been a little bit "tricky" - as we Brits tend to say).
7. The lower rudder.
If you are still with me, the rudder was in four pieces. It was protected by non-reversible motor pumps which ensured that a reservoir of hydraulic fluid would always be available for the rudder.
The rest of the flying controls had motor pumps fitted. In other words, as long as you had hydraulic pressure in one system, then the motor pumps would power the other system as long as there was no leak in either system.
I cannot promise that I can answer your next question but I will certainly try.
I know you are a bit of a flight safety boffin from previous encounters on Pprune.
You are now asking me detailed questions about an accident that took place about 33 years ago but I will do my best to answer.
The DC-10 had 3 hydraulic systems - all of which fed the flight controls in one way or another. As already stated, there was no manual reversion (like they had on the B707). Therefore, no hydraulics, no control (except that it was just possible to fly using differential engine thrust).
I have in front of me two hydraulic diagrams from my original AA DC-10 manual.
The leading edge devices (slats) were controlled by No.1 and No.3 hydraulic system.
So, the loss of No.1 engine (and its pylon) when it went over the top of the left wing not only retracted the slats on the left wing but wrecked the No.1 and No.3 hydraulic systems.
That leaves us with the No.2 hydraulic system (and I make a huge assumption that it was entirely intact).
The No.2 system (and I am only talking about flight controls here) controlled:
1. Half of the outboard ailerons.
2. No.5 spoiler on each wing.
3. Inboard half of each inboard and outboard flap section.
4. Spoiler No.1 on each inboard section.
5. Half of each inboard aileron and flap section.
6. Roughly speaking, one third of the elevator (the horizontal stabiliser - which had the same wing span as a DC-3 was controlled by No.1 and No.3 systems. So even if they had survived all the other bits, landing would have been a little bit "tricky" - as we Brits tend to say).
7. The lower rudder.
If you are still with me, the rudder was in four pieces. It was protected by non-reversible motor pumps which ensured that a reservoir of hydraulic fluid would always be available for the rudder.
The rest of the flying controls had motor pumps fitted. In other words, as long as you had hydraulic pressure in one system, then the motor pumps would power the other system as long as there was no leak in either system.
I cannot promise that I can answer your next question but I will certainly try.
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Looks like pensions will be frozen, not terminated. PBGC not letting AMR management "walk" on DB plans. Pilot's Union asking for "binding arbitration" on the remaining contract items.
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Keep hearing about v2-vs v2+10, but wondering how this is known, as the "black boxes" both stopped shortly after the engine separation, according to the NTSB report, unless this is just an assumption after the fact during a simulator rehash of the accident...
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Looks like pensions will be frozen, not terminated. PBGC not letting AMR management "walk" on DB plans. Pilot's Union asking for "binding arbitration" on the remaining contract items.
The APA is going to poll the Supplement B pilots for authorization to end the lump sum provision of the CBA. As APA Prez Dave Bates explains it, if they drop the lump sum, the A Plan gets 'hard frozen' and survives. If they don't, the A Plan gets terminated and the lump sum goes away with it anyhow.
Of course, a lot can go wrong on the way to the courthouse in these deals.
More than at any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly. - Woody Allen
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Looks like the bankruptcy is taking its toll on at least one of the AA FA's:
2 Flight Attendants Reportedly Injured In Incident On Board American Airlines Flight | Fox News
Authorities said American Airlines flight 2332 had to be diverted back to the gate moments before take-off over reports a flight attendant ranted to passengers over the public address system, saying the plane was going to crash. The crew member also complained about the airline's bankruptcy reorganization, according to reports.
Two people on board the flight told the Dallas Observer that the flight attendant had to be restrained by other crew members and passengers.
"We are not taking off," the female flight attendant said as the plane was taxiing on the runway, according to the passengers. "We're having technical difficulties. We are heading back to the gate."
Although another crew member told passengers to disregard her warning, the flight attendant kept ranting about technical problems.
According to The Dallas Morning News, she also referred to the airline's bankruptcy reorganization during her outburst.
"Captain," she said. "I am not responsible for crashing this plane."
Two people on board the flight told the Dallas Observer that the flight attendant had to be restrained by other crew members and passengers.
"We are not taking off," the female flight attendant said as the plane was taxiing on the runway, according to the passengers. "We're having technical difficulties. We are heading back to the gate."
Although another crew member told passengers to disregard her warning, the flight attendant kept ranting about technical problems.
According to The Dallas Morning News, she also referred to the airline's bankruptcy reorganization during her outburst.
"Captain," she said. "I am not responsible for crashing this plane."
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It has been reported that the flight attendant causing the disruption had a bi-polar health condition. According to the news report tonight, she expressed this to one of the passangers that was restraining her who was interviewed by ABC. This, according to ABC News this evening.
Perhaps, if true, maybe she had gone off her meds.
Perhaps, if true, maybe she had gone off her meds.
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It has been reported that the flight attendant causing the disruption had a bi-polar health condition.
I have colleagues who have taken medications for diagnosed depression. They are sick for exactly two years then suddenly become well since that is when the sick pay coverage runs out. They get their medical certificate back with no problem since their illness was post partum depression after childbirth.
Similarly, if a coworker exhibits unusual behavior in the cockpit you are encouraged to report it to the union or the company so they can get help. However, if your colleague sometimes dresses as a man, sometimes as a woman you are advised that any comments you make may subject you to discipline up to termination if the cross dressing colleague deems them hostile or insensitive. They have the right to 'explore their sexuality' in the workplace and you are the pervert if you disagree or in any way imply that their behavior is aberrant according to the modern airline view.
And, in an airline bankruptcy, you'd be crazy if you didn't have mental health issues with all the uncertainty and conflict. Like a lot of us here, I've been through the corporate BK more than once.
AA pilots recently viewed themselves as God's Gift, now they are beggars in the long line of unsecured creditors. Some have even stooped so low as pursuing expat jobs
:Facing a bankrupt American, some pilots look to China for jobs - Business - MiamiHerald.com
China Lures U.S. Pilots Tired of 14-Year Wait for Airline Captain
I guess that leaves 12,999 to be furloughed?
The FAA seems to look the other way with FA's taking antidepressants and other psych meds. According to an FA friend, a lot of them take Xanax and there are doctors near the airport that will write a script after a very brief evaluation chat.