US Airways Captain Escorted from Aircraft
Join Date: Feb 2008
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So Wells spoke by phone with the airline's chief pilot in Philadelphia. Wells said he kept asking whether she was refusing to fly. "I responded that I want to fly," she said. "I want an airplane that's good. I want this airplane fixed (or another airplane). He asked me five times, with me giving him the same answer."
Seems like a lot of pressure.
That's the nature of mixing labor disputes, flight safety and a long history of poor relations between different labor groups, management and each other. Some of those East pilots have been living with that discord since the '80s. For them, it doesn't appear there will be any letup until mandatory retirement. It's not my fight, so I won't comment on who's right or wrong. I'll just say that some the people I've known or met who are involved tend to feel very strongly about it. That creates allot of pressure. Battle lines are drawn and loyalties compete with objective reasoning. Good luck folks.
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cactusbusdvr - "However, for the rest of the story - she depleted the battery doing multiple APU starts, ignoring the start cycle limitations and displaying a lack of systems knowledge. Then she compounded the situation by making two announcements, one on tHe aircraft and one at the gate after the aircraft was deplaned, telling the passengers that US Airways was unsafe and they wanted her to take an unsafe aircraft. Capt. Wells also told the passengers to refuse to board any other US Airways aircraft and to force the company to reaccomodate them on a different carrier. That was when the company had her leave the terminal."
How many starts? Was the source of your information from one of the other pilots in the cockpit, her official reports, or from someone that wasn't there?
What was said in the two announcement? What is your source for the version you heard?
As a guy said in recurrent training - "they start talking about an event, how screwed up it got, how the pilots screwed up...and then I realized they were talking about an event that happened to me and the version they were telling left out significant, and important, details that altered the whole perception of the event. My actions made sense however as told in training it was an example of bumbling pilots. After hearing the real version the instructor realized there were two, similar but ultimately conflicting, versions of what happened."
How many starts? Was the source of your information from one of the other pilots in the cockpit, her official reports, or from someone that wasn't there?
What was said in the two announcement? What is your source for the version you heard?
As a guy said in recurrent training - "they start talking about an event, how screwed up it got, how the pilots screwed up...and then I realized they were talking about an event that happened to me and the version they were telling left out significant, and important, details that altered the whole perception of the event. My actions made sense however as told in training it was an example of bumbling pilots. After hearing the real version the instructor realized there were two, similar but ultimately conflicting, versions of what happened."
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Just SLF here, but one whose family I'm proud to say quietened a couple of angry pax in the UK after their flight returned to the gate twice one morning. The angry pax were complaining loudly until daughter said that actually she'd rather go up late in a plane that the crew thought was safe rather than on time playing the percentages ... however ... one thing I don't understand is this lady captain is supposed to have made inflammatory announcements to pax to whom one assumes the press would have had immediate access. The press are not noted for their discretion in such matters; so how come its taken nine pages even on pprune to be given some idea of what she (allegedly) might have said .. and even then it isn't specific and in my view isn't really very convincing?
But if there was a BCL fault, it may not have been charging properly. Given the other faults they were experiencing, I suspect that was the real cause.
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Can we at least agree that if this capt lived at the destination and had to attend one of her kids wedding/graduation/first day of school/hockey game, the flight would of left early?
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Busmech. The Capt. and her license had survived thirty years of professional flying. She would not have "risked it" however important her missed date seemed to her. If "risk it" was her mindset she would not have been flying, and, quite probably, not alive.
BTW. I'm not an aviator but I have done lots of inherently dangerous jobs and have reached 72 years and counting by being cautious. My respects to the lady.
BTW. I'm not an aviator but I have done lots of inherently dangerous jobs and have reached 72 years and counting by being cautious. My respects to the lady.
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I just dont know why she cant just say to her chief pilot that "yes she refuses to operate the flight". The CP had to ask her 5 times. She still wouldnt say these words..
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Because refusing the flight is refusing to work.
Rejecting an aircraft for technical reasons is not refusing the flight nor work, it is doing your job as a commander to ensure the safety of the operation.
Big difference, especially in a labour conflict situation.
Rejecting an aircraft for technical reasons is not refusing the flight nor work, it is doing your job as a commander to ensure the safety of the operation.
Big difference, especially in a labour conflict situation.
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IMHO The chief pilot needs retraining in CRM or better still IMHO busting back to flying the line.
Captains get responsibility with no authority....and nobody guards the guards or in this case manages the managers.
Captains get responsibility with no authority....and nobody guards the guards or in this case manages the managers.
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The angry pax were complaining loudly until daughter said that actually she'd rather go up late in a plane that the crew thought was safe rather than on time playing the percentages ...
I had a seatmate make similar gripes during a maintenance delay several years ago. After enduring what seemed like hours (which was in reality only about 20 minute's worth) of their venting about the situation, I finally spoke up and asked them: "Would you rather be down here wishing you were up there, or up there wishing you were down here?" I didn't hear another peep out of them for the rest of the flight.
Some people just need to be hit smack dab in the forehead with a clue-by-4 before they "get it.."
Cheers...
from the above mentioned site...
There has been much written and said about this incident by parties outside of the maintenance organization. Many members of the company have requested more facts about this incident particularly regarding maintenance’s role. The purpose of this memo is to explain why the aircraft did what it did, to communicate that the aircraft worked as designed,and to reiterate that our maintenance team handled the situation extremely well and ensured safety of flight.
In this event, an A330 was on APU power getting ready for pushback from the gate. Very soon after push back started, the electrical power from the APU to the aircraft was disconnected reverting the aircraft to battery power only. (Note: published reports have stated the APU auto shutdown and could not be restarted by the crew. An examination of the Electronic Control Box (ECB) fault log file retrieved from the ECB by the repair vendor has confirmed that there was neither an auto shutdown of the APU or any failed attempts to restart the APU.) Within 5 minutes of the APU being hutdown, the aircraft went dark. The jet bridge was re‐attached to the aircraft and ground power was re‐connected to the aircraft.
When our two mechanics got to the flight deck, the flight crew reported to them that the APU had an auto shutdown and that the APU failed to restart. The mechanics performed a series of BITE checks via the MCDU maintenance pages and could not find any faults with the APU. They, then, proceeded to restart the APU and it started on the first attempt without hesitation. After it started, the mechanics told the flight crew that in their assessment the APU was in serviceable condition and they were okay to sign it off however, they needed the crew to complete a log book entry with their discrepancies. That is when the crew pushed back saying that they did not feel comfortable with the status of the APU and that they wanted it “fixed.” The mechanics then gave the crew another option to have the APU deferred on an MEL. After some continued conversation with the flight crew, the flight crew finally elected to have the APU MEL’ed so hey completed a log book write‐up for “APU failed at gate, unable to restart.” The mechanics removed the logbook after the log page was completed by the flight crew so that they could complete the MEL deferral for the APU. More than a couple of hours after the first logbook page was filled out by the flight crew, the mechanics were given a new logbook write‐up for the same APU failure and unable to restart plus it contained a discrepancy for the batteries lasting only 3‐4 minutes and unable to communicate on VHF #1 after the aircraft lost battery power. The mechanics after consulting with MOC regarding the alleged battery failure were requested to perform two A330 AMM Tasks. One was a BITE Test of the BCL and the other was the Operational Test of the DC BAT BUS and DC ESS BUS Isolations. Both of hese tasks checked okay. The VHF #1 was also tested and it, too, checked okay. Maintenance cleared these reported discrepancies and closed out the log page without any deferrals except for the APU MEL from the previous log page. Maintenance later learned that the original flight crew was being replaced as they did not feel comfortable with the aircraft particularly with the APU being on MEL and the aircraft batteries only providing 3‐4 minutes of power to the aircraft on the ground. It should be noted that at no time did maintenance personnel pressure the crew into taking the ircraft. They did explain the limitation of the APU being on MEL which was that the aircraft would be limited to 120minute ETOPS. But, they did not question the Captain’s authority to refuse the MEL. uring the transition from the original flight crew to the replacement flight crew, maintenance personnel did clear the APU MEL after the ECB was replaced. When the replacement flight crew showed up in the flight deck, they started to perform an undocumented “aircraft battery drain test” and got the same results that the previous crew got at pushback – only 3‐5 minutes of battery power before the aircraft went dark. When this replacement flight crew was asked by maintenance personnel where this “test” was coming from, the mechanics were told by the flight crew that it did not come from any manual. However, they did say that they were told in flight training that the aircraft batteries needed to provide at least 30 minutes of power. Maintenance observed this “test” being done again and witnessed the same results. After further consultation with MOC to confirm that there are no battery drain tests in the AMM, the aircraft batteries were changed as a precautionary measure. The “test” was performed again with the fresh batteries and the aircraft remained powered for 30 minutes. It should be noted that the aircraft at this time was not in a flight configuration, as previously “tested”, meaning the electrical draw on the DC ESS and AC ESS buses was less. The replacement crew, then, told maintenance that they were okay taking the aircraft as is; however, since the ETOPS Check had expired, a new ETOPS Check was required to be ompleted. After the ETOPS check was completed and the passengers were re‐boarded, the flight left almost 11 hours late. It should be noted that the ECB that was removed to clear the APU MEL came back from the repair vendor as No Faults ound. Also, both batteries were returned from the battery vendor after inspection with no corrective actions needed on either battery. n summary, our entire team handled this situation extremely well. They thoroughly reviewed each FDML write‐up, took very precaution to ensure they were addressed, and delivered a safe and airworthy aircraft to the flight crew.
Technical Clarification: One technical issue raised during this event that Maintenance could not quickly explain was why the aircraft batteries only provided power for less than 5 minutes. Detailed below is a technical clarification on that issue:
In this situation, with an A330 on the ground with no AC power available (No Integrated Drive Generator (IDG), Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), or ground power), BAT1 and BAT2 will power the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses when the BAT pushbutton switches are in AUTO. The DC ESSENTIAL SHED bus is disconnected when on battery power only. Once one of the battery voltages drops below 23V for 16 seconds and the LGCIU detects the nose landing gear downlocked and compressed; the Battery Charge Limiters (BCLs) will disconnect both batteries from the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses. This is done to prevent completely discharging the batteries while the aircraft is on the ground (Reference AMM 24‐38‐00). When the BCL disconnects the batteries from the DC ESSENTIAL us, the VHF 1 radio become unavailable. To reconnect the contactors, the flight crew must switch the BAT push button switch to OFF, then AUTO. This would restore the VHF 1 radio. (Reference ‐ USA A330 Controls & Indications Manual) The amount of time the batteries will power these buses will be dependent on the capacity of the batteries and the lectrical load they are holding. The nominal capacity of an A330 battery is either 37 Amp‐Hour or 40 Amp‐Hour,
depending on the battery part number. In the air, the AC and DC buses will be supplied by the IDGs and if running, the APU. If both IDGs and the APU become unavailable, the Constant Speed Motor/Generator (CSM/G) will supply the AC and DC buses. The CSM/G is powered by the green hydraulic system as pressurized by the engine driven hydraulic pumps or the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) should power be lost in both engines. If the CSM/G is unavailable then the aircraft batteries will power the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses. The BCLs will not disconnect the batteries when one is discharged below 23V; hey will continue to power the hot battery buses, DC BAT bus, DC ESSENTIAL bus, and the AC ESSENTIAL bus as long as possible.
There was some discussion during this event that the aircraft batteries must provide at least 30 minutes of power as the aircraft was certified to that. To clarify that point, the A330 is certified to provide battery power to the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses for at least 21 ½ minutes while in flight. There is no certification requirement for how long the batteries need to power the A/C on the Ground before the BCLs disconnect the Batteries.
In this event, an A330 was on APU power getting ready for pushback from the gate. Very soon after push back started, the electrical power from the APU to the aircraft was disconnected reverting the aircraft to battery power only. (Note: published reports have stated the APU auto shutdown and could not be restarted by the crew. An examination of the Electronic Control Box (ECB) fault log file retrieved from the ECB by the repair vendor has confirmed that there was neither an auto shutdown of the APU or any failed attempts to restart the APU.) Within 5 minutes of the APU being hutdown, the aircraft went dark. The jet bridge was re‐attached to the aircraft and ground power was re‐connected to the aircraft.
When our two mechanics got to the flight deck, the flight crew reported to them that the APU had an auto shutdown and that the APU failed to restart. The mechanics performed a series of BITE checks via the MCDU maintenance pages and could not find any faults with the APU. They, then, proceeded to restart the APU and it started on the first attempt without hesitation. After it started, the mechanics told the flight crew that in their assessment the APU was in serviceable condition and they were okay to sign it off however, they needed the crew to complete a log book entry with their discrepancies. That is when the crew pushed back saying that they did not feel comfortable with the status of the APU and that they wanted it “fixed.” The mechanics then gave the crew another option to have the APU deferred on an MEL. After some continued conversation with the flight crew, the flight crew finally elected to have the APU MEL’ed so hey completed a log book write‐up for “APU failed at gate, unable to restart.” The mechanics removed the logbook after the log page was completed by the flight crew so that they could complete the MEL deferral for the APU. More than a couple of hours after the first logbook page was filled out by the flight crew, the mechanics were given a new logbook write‐up for the same APU failure and unable to restart plus it contained a discrepancy for the batteries lasting only 3‐4 minutes and unable to communicate on VHF #1 after the aircraft lost battery power. The mechanics after consulting with MOC regarding the alleged battery failure were requested to perform two A330 AMM Tasks. One was a BITE Test of the BCL and the other was the Operational Test of the DC BAT BUS and DC ESS BUS Isolations. Both of hese tasks checked okay. The VHF #1 was also tested and it, too, checked okay. Maintenance cleared these reported discrepancies and closed out the log page without any deferrals except for the APU MEL from the previous log page. Maintenance later learned that the original flight crew was being replaced as they did not feel comfortable with the aircraft particularly with the APU being on MEL and the aircraft batteries only providing 3‐4 minutes of power to the aircraft on the ground. It should be noted that at no time did maintenance personnel pressure the crew into taking the ircraft. They did explain the limitation of the APU being on MEL which was that the aircraft would be limited to 120minute ETOPS. But, they did not question the Captain’s authority to refuse the MEL. uring the transition from the original flight crew to the replacement flight crew, maintenance personnel did clear the APU MEL after the ECB was replaced. When the replacement flight crew showed up in the flight deck, they started to perform an undocumented “aircraft battery drain test” and got the same results that the previous crew got at pushback – only 3‐5 minutes of battery power before the aircraft went dark. When this replacement flight crew was asked by maintenance personnel where this “test” was coming from, the mechanics were told by the flight crew that it did not come from any manual. However, they did say that they were told in flight training that the aircraft batteries needed to provide at least 30 minutes of power. Maintenance observed this “test” being done again and witnessed the same results. After further consultation with MOC to confirm that there are no battery drain tests in the AMM, the aircraft batteries were changed as a precautionary measure. The “test” was performed again with the fresh batteries and the aircraft remained powered for 30 minutes. It should be noted that the aircraft at this time was not in a flight configuration, as previously “tested”, meaning the electrical draw on the DC ESS and AC ESS buses was less. The replacement crew, then, told maintenance that they were okay taking the aircraft as is; however, since the ETOPS Check had expired, a new ETOPS Check was required to be ompleted. After the ETOPS check was completed and the passengers were re‐boarded, the flight left almost 11 hours late. It should be noted that the ECB that was removed to clear the APU MEL came back from the repair vendor as No Faults ound. Also, both batteries were returned from the battery vendor after inspection with no corrective actions needed on either battery. n summary, our entire team handled this situation extremely well. They thoroughly reviewed each FDML write‐up, took very precaution to ensure they were addressed, and delivered a safe and airworthy aircraft to the flight crew.
Technical Clarification: One technical issue raised during this event that Maintenance could not quickly explain was why the aircraft batteries only provided power for less than 5 minutes. Detailed below is a technical clarification on that issue:
In this situation, with an A330 on the ground with no AC power available (No Integrated Drive Generator (IDG), Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), or ground power), BAT1 and BAT2 will power the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses when the BAT pushbutton switches are in AUTO. The DC ESSENTIAL SHED bus is disconnected when on battery power only. Once one of the battery voltages drops below 23V for 16 seconds and the LGCIU detects the nose landing gear downlocked and compressed; the Battery Charge Limiters (BCLs) will disconnect both batteries from the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses. This is done to prevent completely discharging the batteries while the aircraft is on the ground (Reference AMM 24‐38‐00). When the BCL disconnects the batteries from the DC ESSENTIAL us, the VHF 1 radio become unavailable. To reconnect the contactors, the flight crew must switch the BAT push button switch to OFF, then AUTO. This would restore the VHF 1 radio. (Reference ‐ USA A330 Controls & Indications Manual) The amount of time the batteries will power these buses will be dependent on the capacity of the batteries and the lectrical load they are holding. The nominal capacity of an A330 battery is either 37 Amp‐Hour or 40 Amp‐Hour,
depending on the battery part number. In the air, the AC and DC buses will be supplied by the IDGs and if running, the APU. If both IDGs and the APU become unavailable, the Constant Speed Motor/Generator (CSM/G) will supply the AC and DC buses. The CSM/G is powered by the green hydraulic system as pressurized by the engine driven hydraulic pumps or the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) should power be lost in both engines. If the CSM/G is unavailable then the aircraft batteries will power the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses. The BCLs will not disconnect the batteries when one is discharged below 23V; hey will continue to power the hot battery buses, DC BAT bus, DC ESSENTIAL bus, and the AC ESSENTIAL bus as long as possible.
There was some discussion during this event that the aircraft batteries must provide at least 30 minutes of power as the aircraft was certified to that. To clarify that point, the A330 is certified to provide battery power to the DC BAT, DC ESSENTIAL, and AC ESSENTIAL buses for at least 21 ½ minutes while in flight. There is no certification requirement for how long the batteries need to power the A/C on the Ground before the BCLs disconnect the Batteries.
Join Date: Dec 2001
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Interesting...
Now provided the above is true I see the balance between safety and union labor issues shifting considerably...
Now for the comments about crew professionalism (and I'm a flight crewmember).
Regards,
Davide
Now provided the above is true I see the balance between safety and union labor issues shifting considerably...
Now for the comments about crew professionalism (and I'm a flight crewmember).
Regards,
Davide
Join Date: Jun 2001
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Whatever happened technically, it's the Capt's call right or wrong, but...if the bit about the PA's to passengers after the fact in the terminal is true and actually happened, that is a bit over the top.....would be interesting to see an actual transcript of that....
