Inexperienced Pilots of LX 3597
dragonslayer extraordinaire
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just wanted to stand in line to thank Capt. Peacock and pprune Towers for their contribution.
As for the "inexperience" of the F/O, let us not forget that the F/O with 300 hours, trying to learn his trade, is there were we were a couple of years ago. We all started at 0 hours, except for the small minority of natural-born ace pilots who seem to soar above us mere mortals...
By the way I happened to come accross some low -hour F/O's who did a better job than some of our old captains...
What is important is not only the hours in the log, but mainly training and attitude ( not only as a pilot but as a human being)
I recommend that anyone having doubts about this read Ernest Gann's " Fate is the hunter".
...Live and Learn...
As for the "inexperience" of the F/O, let us not forget that the F/O with 300 hours, trying to learn his trade, is there were we were a couple of years ago. We all started at 0 hours, except for the small minority of natural-born ace pilots who seem to soar above us mere mortals...
By the way I happened to come accross some low -hour F/O's who did a better job than some of our old captains...
What is important is not only the hours in the log, but mainly training and attitude ( not only as a pilot but as a human being)
I recommend that anyone having doubts about this read Ernest Gann's " Fate is the hunter".
...Live and Learn...
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The truth rarely lies at the extremes of the argument, and we are in danger of taking up entrenched positions. I am now an Airbus FO but was previously a turboprop Training Captain. Like others here have experienced, I found that some 509ers with 250-300 hours were simply outstanding and others with several thousand hours (particularly ex-instructors I have to say and I am one!) were frankly very poor.
I have given a lot of thought to this issue and the conclusion I have come to is that it actually a 'statistical' judgement. It is clearly not true to say that every experienced pilot is better than every inexperienced pilot as we can all verify. This accounts for all the many cases we can site where a 250 hour bloke is way better than a 4000 hour bloke. My own belief however is that, in general terms, a more experienced pilot will do better than a less experienced one in a given situation. There are many exceptions, but statistically you are significantly increasing the likeliehood of a successful outcome to a difficult situation by having experienced crews - particularly those with experience on type. There are clearly other factors that are harder to define - crew personalities and how they 'gelled' on the day being very high up the list along with the technical proficiency of the individual pilots.
I am interested to know other people's view on this as there are clearly many factors involved.
[ 30 November 2001: Message edited by: Norman Stanley Fletcher ]
I have given a lot of thought to this issue and the conclusion I have come to is that it actually a 'statistical' judgement. It is clearly not true to say that every experienced pilot is better than every inexperienced pilot as we can all verify. This accounts for all the many cases we can site where a 250 hour bloke is way better than a 4000 hour bloke. My own belief however is that, in general terms, a more experienced pilot will do better than a less experienced one in a given situation. There are many exceptions, but statistically you are significantly increasing the likeliehood of a successful outcome to a difficult situation by having experienced crews - particularly those with experience on type. There are clearly other factors that are harder to define - crew personalities and how they 'gelled' on the day being very high up the list along with the technical proficiency of the individual pilots.
I am interested to know other people's view on this as there are clearly many factors involved.
[ 30 November 2001: Message edited by: Norman Stanley Fletcher ]
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Norman S.F. I personally agree with your comments.
We are dealing with Human Perfomances and is very difficult to find exact patterns applicable to every pilot, company,......
We are dealing with humans within an unpredictible scenario.
It is impossible to define a rule or a standard profile for the best F/O (or the CPT) suiting all the cases.
We need to develop (or at least try to ...) a "positive attitude" human profile.
Then you define the way you look at a "positive attitude" by the known criterias of professionalism, CRM, pilot technique, systems/automation knowledge, flight experience, hours, type ratings ......
In that way you give a chance to everybody for developing the necessary skills for sitting in the LH/RH seat.
Nevertheless we need to consider the fact that we are not 100% sure the human response will be the same for all the life: different private/external factors may influence the Human Perfomance of the most/less experience pilot.
How we get to a solution?
If we stay "midway" may be we can protect for the extremes cases.
My condolences and sympathies to Crossair crews.
Fly safe & enjoy life
We are dealing with Human Perfomances and is very difficult to find exact patterns applicable to every pilot, company,......
We are dealing with humans within an unpredictible scenario.
It is impossible to define a rule or a standard profile for the best F/O (or the CPT) suiting all the cases.
We need to develop (or at least try to ...) a "positive attitude" human profile.
Then you define the way you look at a "positive attitude" by the known criterias of professionalism, CRM, pilot technique, systems/automation knowledge, flight experience, hours, type ratings ......
In that way you give a chance to everybody for developing the necessary skills for sitting in the LH/RH seat.
Nevertheless we need to consider the fact that we are not 100% sure the human response will be the same for all the life: different private/external factors may influence the Human Perfomance of the most/less experience pilot.
How we get to a solution?
If we stay "midway" may be we can protect for the extremes cases.
My condolences and sympathies to Crossair crews.
Fly safe & enjoy life
Pegase Driver
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Excllent article on the link given by Hooking fell . ( thanks!)for those that speak German.
The article says that the Rj was 1000 ft too low and slighly off track. But 1000ft below what ? MSA ?
The article says that the Rj was 1000 ft too low and slighly off track. But 1000ft below what ? MSA ?
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Wouldn't it have been wiser for the Cpt to have the F/O fly the and therefore have more thinking space to monitor the approach ?
I understand that a lot of CFIT happen when the Captain is flying the approach.
Anyway this led us to require a NPA to be flown by the F/O under CAPT supervision when visibility in under 5000 m and at night and I think this is very wise.
Well trained 300 H F/O 's have no trouble flying a difficult NPA, it's only the experience and judgement they lack, nothing wrong with that that; that comes with hours blistering your toush in the saddle. Not by magic. Pretty difficult for a very junior F/O to chip in " Captain Sir, I'm afraid you are stuffing up ". Although it shouldn't be the case. It is a lot easier in my view to have the F/O fly the aircraft, monitor him, and have all the room to see what is going on. The reverse is in my view a waste of skills.
I understand that a lot of CFIT happen when the Captain is flying the approach.
Anyway this led us to require a NPA to be flown by the F/O under CAPT supervision when visibility in under 5000 m and at night and I think this is very wise.
Well trained 300 H F/O 's have no trouble flying a difficult NPA, it's only the experience and judgement they lack, nothing wrong with that that; that comes with hours blistering your toush in the saddle. Not by magic. Pretty difficult for a very junior F/O to chip in " Captain Sir, I'm afraid you are stuffing up ". Although it shouldn't be the case. It is a lot easier in my view to have the F/O fly the aircraft, monitor him, and have all the room to see what is going on. The reverse is in my view a waste of skills.
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Anyone in the know with 146 / CX procedures...
Without unnecessary speculation, can anyone point to an SOP / reason / occasion for setting 300' on the Radio Altimeter warner in this case.
Secondly, does the 146 in CX fly NPA to descend and then level at MDA, to then look, or select a VS to fly to hit MDA around MAP (e.g. as per BA 757 SOPs) i.e. with no level portion...
NoD
Without unnecessary speculation, can anyone point to an SOP / reason / occasion for setting 300' on the Radio Altimeter warner in this case.
Secondly, does the 146 in CX fly NPA to descend and then level at MDA, to then look, or select a VS to fly to hit MDA around MAP (e.g. as per BA 757 SOPs) i.e. with no level portion...
NoD
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On the face of it this is disturbing. Radio altimeter decision heights are only for AWOPS approaches with minima below 200’ during auto-coupled approaches. They have no place in non-precision approaches at all. In fact the call of ‘MINIMA’ during the non-precision approach could be profoundly disturbing to the mental model of the crew.
On this approach the missed approach point is defined as either KLO 2d, or in its absence an elapsed time from the FAF. That is the last point during the visual segment that the approach may be continued. Your descent to MDA past the last step down fix and (level) flight to the MAP is the only time that you should expect to acquire visual reference. Outside this segment, you are likely to be looking at the wrong thing.
There are two schools as to how these non-precision approaches should be flown, but as I mentioned before I advocate a continuous descent approach with the aim of arriving at MDA at the same point as if the approach had been followed on a standard glidepath. The ‘level segment’ is equally valid but in my opinion compromises a stabilised approach because it requires large power/trim changes at a late stage. It might make you feel more comfortable to have visual contact with the surface, but it won’t do you any favours.
In the same vein, some companies treat the MDA as a decision altitude. This is flawed since obstacle clearance criteria for a precision approach allow for the fact that the aircraft may descend transitionally through decision height during the go-around. No such transient is allowed for a non-precision approach. It is a Minimum Descent Altitude and nothing else.
Of the different philosophies as to who flys what. I have to say that I favour a split approach with the ‘Co-pilot’ operating the aircraft through the profile whilst the ‘Captain’ monitors, supervises and polices the gates of the approach. This also allows him/her to transition to the visual segment in a controlled manner, whilst the ‘Co-pilot’ is preparing him(her)self for the go-around.
Once again, none of this is intended to imply criticism of the crew involved in this tragic event. I seek only to reinforce operational integrity amongst all operators.
On this approach the missed approach point is defined as either KLO 2d, or in its absence an elapsed time from the FAF. That is the last point during the visual segment that the approach may be continued. Your descent to MDA past the last step down fix and (level) flight to the MAP is the only time that you should expect to acquire visual reference. Outside this segment, you are likely to be looking at the wrong thing.
There are two schools as to how these non-precision approaches should be flown, but as I mentioned before I advocate a continuous descent approach with the aim of arriving at MDA at the same point as if the approach had been followed on a standard glidepath. The ‘level segment’ is equally valid but in my opinion compromises a stabilised approach because it requires large power/trim changes at a late stage. It might make you feel more comfortable to have visual contact with the surface, but it won’t do you any favours.
In the same vein, some companies treat the MDA as a decision altitude. This is flawed since obstacle clearance criteria for a precision approach allow for the fact that the aircraft may descend transitionally through decision height during the go-around. No such transient is allowed for a non-precision approach. It is a Minimum Descent Altitude and nothing else.
Of the different philosophies as to who flys what. I have to say that I favour a split approach with the ‘Co-pilot’ operating the aircraft through the profile whilst the ‘Captain’ monitors, supervises and polices the gates of the approach. This also allows him/her to transition to the visual segment in a controlled manner, whilst the ‘Co-pilot’ is preparing him(her)self for the go-around.
Once again, none of this is intended to imply criticism of the crew involved in this tragic event. I seek only to reinforce operational integrity amongst all operators.
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Tks again to Capt H.P. for his experienced comments on pilot's techniques.
I agree for the RA setting during NPA.
Normally the companies where I was flying suggested the use of the RA setting during NPA/Visuals to have some sort of "advice" on an instrument approach since no glide information (apart from the PAPI,..).
My condolences for the people involved.
I agree for the RA setting during NPA.
Normally the companies where I was flying suggested the use of the RA setting during NPA/Visuals to have some sort of "advice" on an instrument approach since no glide information (apart from the PAPI,..).
My condolences for the people involved.
ex-Tanker
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The 300ft RA setting on a non-precision or visual approach is an old established Swissair procedure, which may have been used by Crossair too. I do not know.
The call out on a radio altimeter is usually a function of the GPWS programme. Depending on the model, you can have it call "minimum", "decision height" or (and this was the Swissair configuration - what it is in Crossair I don't know) just a rising tone when approaching/reaching the bug.
The reason why Swissair had this procedure, so they said, was because the Radio Altimeter was an expensive and useful tool, which should be utilised where possible. As they always did a "power and rate" check at 300ft height on a non precision or visual approach to check stabilised configuration, the procedure was to use the Radio Altimeter to trigger this check. They then went further and set 150ft Radio Altimeter on any precision approach where no Radio Altimeter minimum was published (remember they printed their own charts - based on measured Radio minima where possible). This 150ft warning was an unnecessary nuisance.
I did not like the way people tended to call out "power and rate OK" when they heard the warning out of habit, even when the bug was set to a proper minimum on a precision approach. It seemed like a negative training habit to me. Couldn't get it changed though.
In Japan, the Radio altimeter was set by some companies to 200feet on a precision approach, with no reference to the surrounding topography, although they are flying to a QNH (altimeter to the state side boys) minimum. The reason for this was never made clear and as Capt Peacock assumes above, could cause confusion when the "minimum" call came, just before or just after the real minimum. Other Japanese companies set Radio Altimeter below zero when not pertinant to the approach. My present company does this too.
In my opinion there should be no use of a Radio Altimeter when the minimum is referenced to QNH, except as a terrain awareness check at say 2,500 feet. Any lower use of the system for terrain awareness during a QNH referenced final should require the voice callouts to be deactivated and tone only to be used.
Once again, this post is a general discussion, with no implied criticism of the approach in question.
The call out on a radio altimeter is usually a function of the GPWS programme. Depending on the model, you can have it call "minimum", "decision height" or (and this was the Swissair configuration - what it is in Crossair I don't know) just a rising tone when approaching/reaching the bug.
The reason why Swissair had this procedure, so they said, was because the Radio Altimeter was an expensive and useful tool, which should be utilised where possible. As they always did a "power and rate" check at 300ft height on a non precision or visual approach to check stabilised configuration, the procedure was to use the Radio Altimeter to trigger this check. They then went further and set 150ft Radio Altimeter on any precision approach where no Radio Altimeter minimum was published (remember they printed their own charts - based on measured Radio minima where possible). This 150ft warning was an unnecessary nuisance.
I did not like the way people tended to call out "power and rate OK" when they heard the warning out of habit, even when the bug was set to a proper minimum on a precision approach. It seemed like a negative training habit to me. Couldn't get it changed though.
In Japan, the Radio altimeter was set by some companies to 200feet on a precision approach, with no reference to the surrounding topography, although they are flying to a QNH (altimeter to the state side boys) minimum. The reason for this was never made clear and as Capt Peacock assumes above, could cause confusion when the "minimum" call came, just before or just after the real minimum. Other Japanese companies set Radio Altimeter below zero when not pertinant to the approach. My present company does this too.
In my opinion there should be no use of a Radio Altimeter when the minimum is referenced to QNH, except as a terrain awareness check at say 2,500 feet. Any lower use of the system for terrain awareness during a QNH referenced final should require the voice callouts to be deactivated and tone only to be used.
Once again, this post is a general discussion, with no implied criticism of the approach in question.
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Few Cloudy - agree with you that the RA setting should only be made when it is relevant... so I'm afraid to disagree with DGF...
In terrain like ZRH, what on earth use is setting the RA warner, unless you are setting it IAW a surveyed procedure (necessarily for a precision approach since glide information is needed to make Rad Alt info mean anything).
I am not suggesting this is the case here, but to me, anyone who "sets a RA warner to a general setting regardless of terrain / actual minima" is setting themselves in a mind-set that could lead to an accident like this...
I do not know accurately the terrain short of 28, but less us say at 2.2D there was a 1750' hill (300' AAL) - with terrain at 0D (the airfield) and also at 3-4D of 1416'. The RA warner will then promptly state at 3D "300'" just before you hit the rising ground....
Please could anyone justify to me this RA setting procedure? I am mystified about it, and it seems the most basic airmanship mistake to use it, let alone condone it in an airline as a general SOP? This is the sort of myth that Route Checks and Training should completely eliminate!
NoD
In terrain like ZRH, what on earth use is setting the RA warner, unless you are setting it IAW a surveyed procedure (necessarily for a precision approach since glide information is needed to make Rad Alt info mean anything).
I am not suggesting this is the case here, but to me, anyone who "sets a RA warner to a general setting regardless of terrain / actual minima" is setting themselves in a mind-set that could lead to an accident like this...
I do not know accurately the terrain short of 28, but less us say at 2.2D there was a 1750' hill (300' AAL) - with terrain at 0D (the airfield) and also at 3-4D of 1416'. The RA warner will then promptly state at 3D "300'" just before you hit the rising ground....
Please could anyone justify to me this RA setting procedure? I am mystified about it, and it seems the most basic airmanship mistake to use it, let alone condone it in an airline as a general SOP? This is the sort of myth that Route Checks and Training should completely eliminate!
NoD
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NoD,
As I wrote above, and I was talking about Swissair, it was used for the trigger for the "power and rate" check. The way this worked is that at 300ft Radio Altitude, the flying pilot (P1) checked that the engines were in the spinup range and the RoD was less than 1,000 ft/minute.
In other words in this case the Radio Altimeter was NOT being used for any kind of minimum information - just as a reminder to perform this check. The Crossair procedure I do not know.
Trouble was, on your next flight the Radio Altimeter could very well be used for minimum information, thus opening the possibility of misinterpretation of the warning.
In cases where Swissair flew to a Radio Altitude minimum (not only cat 111 as Capt Peacock claims) the terrain was actually surveyed and an exact Radio Altitude minimum was calculated and published on the company approach plate and probably still is. If the terrain was too complicated for this, only the QNH minimum was published. (By the way, if you look carefully at some Jeppesen plates, a Radio Altitude minimum can also be published for cat 1 and cat 11 approaches - I believe GVA is one ).
Hope this helps.
As I wrote above, and I was talking about Swissair, it was used for the trigger for the "power and rate" check. The way this worked is that at 300ft Radio Altitude, the flying pilot (P1) checked that the engines were in the spinup range and the RoD was less than 1,000 ft/minute.
In other words in this case the Radio Altimeter was NOT being used for any kind of minimum information - just as a reminder to perform this check. The Crossair procedure I do not know.
Trouble was, on your next flight the Radio Altimeter could very well be used for minimum information, thus opening the possibility of misinterpretation of the warning.
In cases where Swissair flew to a Radio Altitude minimum (not only cat 111 as Capt Peacock claims) the terrain was actually surveyed and an exact Radio Altitude minimum was calculated and published on the company approach plate and probably still is. If the terrain was too complicated for this, only the QNH minimum was published. (By the way, if you look carefully at some Jeppesen plates, a Radio Altitude minimum can also be published for cat 1 and cat 11 approaches - I believe GVA is one ).
Hope this helps.
The Swiss AAIB initial report gives a 3-D map of the flight (but not terrain contour) which shows an even descent without level-off from 6 DME to the point of impact about 1/2 mile South of the Approach course about 1/3 the distance between 2 and 6 DME = approx. 1.3 miles short of the 2 DME point. The reproduction of the Jepp chart shows the threshold at .9 DME (1.1 miles from 2 DME if I read the pixels correctly); so the impact point is approximately 1.1 + 1.3 = 2.4 miles from the threshold.
The 6 DME point is 5.1 miles from the threshold with a crossing altitude of 964' HAT.
So a constant slope from 6 DME to the threshold (zero screen height) would give the expected HAT at the impact point as
964 x (2.4/5.1) = 444' and a slope of 189' per nm or about 3.2% -- not degrees -- assuming 1 nm = 6000' (too lazy to look it up or do the trig for degrees)
"The first point of impact was on the top of a tree at an altitude of 1784 ft/AMSL"; so 1784 - 1416 Threshold Rwy 28 = 368' HAT.
444 - 368 = 76' seems to me a rather thin terrain clearance if this off-track distance is within the protected area and if the impact altitude turns out to be taken at the base of the tree, the a/c would have been very close to the constant slope. Possibly the approach has been around for a long time and the trees grew into the protected airspace (I don't really believe the approach designers used a constant slope from 6 DME).
A constant slope descent from 6 DME is too shallow and I am unable to make out from the Jepp plate reproduction beyond:
Descent Gradient D0.0 ??????? 5.3%
We have the crew visual at MDA and descending to the airport and I speculate the crew thought itself closer to the airport than they really were until the airport lights disappeared behind the hill.
If the windshield was wet, refraction may have induced the crew to perceive themselves as higher relative to the airport than they really were. Was there a VASI or anything like it?
While the VOR signal was checked and found good, was the signal checked on the path taken by the accident aircraft, especially where the hill shadows the airport (don't try this with a 146)? It might be interesting to see the instrument indications, even given that the VOR would still be line of sight as the threshold LOS was becoming blocked.
The chart shows a descent path below MDA beginning before 2 DME. Is that point noted in the indecipherable pixels? If not, the do not descend below MDA point before ??? DME needs to be there.
[ 03 December 2001: Message edited by: RatherBeFlying ]
[ 03 December 2001: Message edited by: RatherBeFlying ]
The 6 DME point is 5.1 miles from the threshold with a crossing altitude of 964' HAT.
So a constant slope from 6 DME to the threshold (zero screen height) would give the expected HAT at the impact point as
964 x (2.4/5.1) = 444' and a slope of 189' per nm or about 3.2% -- not degrees -- assuming 1 nm = 6000' (too lazy to look it up or do the trig for degrees)
"The first point of impact was on the top of a tree at an altitude of 1784 ft/AMSL"; so 1784 - 1416 Threshold Rwy 28 = 368' HAT.
444 - 368 = 76' seems to me a rather thin terrain clearance if this off-track distance is within the protected area and if the impact altitude turns out to be taken at the base of the tree, the a/c would have been very close to the constant slope. Possibly the approach has been around for a long time and the trees grew into the protected airspace (I don't really believe the approach designers used a constant slope from 6 DME).
A constant slope descent from 6 DME is too shallow and I am unable to make out from the Jepp plate reproduction beyond:
Descent Gradient D0.0 ??????? 5.3%
We have the crew visual at MDA and descending to the airport and I speculate the crew thought itself closer to the airport than they really were until the airport lights disappeared behind the hill.
If the windshield was wet, refraction may have induced the crew to perceive themselves as higher relative to the airport than they really were. Was there a VASI or anything like it?
While the VOR signal was checked and found good, was the signal checked on the path taken by the accident aircraft, especially where the hill shadows the airport (don't try this with a 146)? It might be interesting to see the instrument indications, even given that the VOR would still be line of sight as the threshold LOS was becoming blocked.
The chart shows a descent path below MDA beginning before 2 DME. Is that point noted in the indecipherable pixels? If not, the do not descend below MDA point before ??? DME needs to be there.
[ 03 December 2001: Message edited by: RatherBeFlying ]
[ 03 December 2001: Message edited by: RatherBeFlying ]
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Sorry but are you not supposed to go around if at MAP/MDA you have insufficient visual references. From what I can gather the captain with 20,000 hours decided to do his own thing and flew a perfectly serviceably aircraft into the ground and killed 21 people. Experience.
Condolences to all those relatives and family of those killed - doesn't help that the accident was entirely preventable.
Condolences to all those relatives and family of those killed - doesn't help that the accident was entirely preventable.
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Few Cloudy - <<if you look carefully at some Jeppesen plates, a Radio Altitude minimum can also be published for cat 1 and cat 11 approaches - I believe GVA is one ).>> In BA we often have CAT 1 Radio Minima specified, but not always... presumably where the terrain has been surveyed, and is fairly level....
RatherBeFlying - I'll try and get one of our BA plates tomorrow and do the maths! You have raised some interesting thoughts...
I've only done one VOR/DME 28 into ZRH (in a 757), and it was hard work (especially since 28 was being used due to strong winds, so turbulent), with cloudbase not far from minima. It was made much HARDER work by ZRH ATC who:
1. Insisted we route direct to the ZUE on an easterly heading after radar vectors, so very hard to "pick up" the horizontal profile. In fact, we edged north of this to try and nearly overfly the ZUE to be outbound on the correct radial. This in turn caused a TA on the next traffic coming in from the east... I see from the inquiry diagram, an element of this happened in the accident flight (although not related).
2. Then "demanded" we turn onto the inbound KLO radial prior to reaching the "lead radial" - and we were still IMC! Naturally this was "declined", but we were now into our second argument with ZRH ATC (and what's new you ask...)
NoD
RatherBeFlying - I'll try and get one of our BA plates tomorrow and do the maths! You have raised some interesting thoughts...
I've only done one VOR/DME 28 into ZRH (in a 757), and it was hard work (especially since 28 was being used due to strong winds, so turbulent), with cloudbase not far from minima. It was made much HARDER work by ZRH ATC who:
1. Insisted we route direct to the ZUE on an easterly heading after radar vectors, so very hard to "pick up" the horizontal profile. In fact, we edged north of this to try and nearly overfly the ZUE to be outbound on the correct radial. This in turn caused a TA on the next traffic coming in from the east... I see from the inquiry diagram, an element of this happened in the accident flight (although not related).
2. Then "demanded" we turn onto the inbound KLO radial prior to reaching the "lead radial" - and we were still IMC! Naturally this was "declined", but we were now into our second argument with ZRH ATC (and what's new you ask...)
NoD