Inexperienced Pilots of LX 3597
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As I said earlier on the MK post I find it distasteful to the extreme to start bashing the airline, and now here the crew, before the bodies are burried, let alone the facts known. Rumor network or not.
Think about all those involved possibly reading this !
Would you like your kids to read the above if it was you that died in that crash ?
When the investigation is complete it will be time to reflect of who did what and who did or did not have experience....
At this stage I only want to pass my condoleances to the families of those that lost their lives and my sympathy for Crossair.
Think about all those involved possibly reading this !
Would you like your kids to read the above if it was you that died in that crash ?
When the investigation is complete it will be time to reflect of who did what and who did or did not have experience....
At this stage I only want to pass my condoleances to the families of those that lost their lives and my sympathy for Crossair.
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Give it a rest, Guv, Toli and co. what better environment is there than a professional, well run airline for a new pilot to gain experience. Everyone has to start somewhere and merely having a low number of hours is not a recipe for an air crash. Every 25000hr captain had to pass the 300hr barrier, and the vast majority manage to do it without crashing an aircraft. I believe it is far better to gain your experience under the watchful eye of an experienced captain than to be let lose on a single pilot nighttime freight or airtaxi operation. Yes, you might scare yourself silly, and if you crash you are only going to kill yourself (and maybe a 3 or 4 pax, and maybe a few people on the ground) and if you survive the job, move onto jets after 200 hours or so. It doesn't mean that you have an inate ability to fly a jet, or that you have a full understanding of 2 crew operations. No one knows yet what caused this crash. It may be pilot error, it may be something else. But until the truth is known, stop laying into the crew. As professionals on this website have little respect for the other less fortunate professionals out there, and if you are not a pilot (Guv), then frankly you have no idea what it is like anyway and should retire gracefully from the discussion.
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Just a few points,
I flew into ZRH the next morning with the same basic wx that they had for landing. I know, because we were coasting out from the US at the time of the crash. We were getting many updates, as I was concerned about the visibility going down. My first trip into ZRH. Milan was great, so I was not concerned for alternates. But I was thinking about what has been discussed on this thread. These incidents are normally combinations of unfortunate situations. That night:
My FO was also low time on aircraft.
I had never been to ZRH.
We had terrain to contend with.
The wx was not good.
Because of all this, I started to brief the approach over Lands End!
We flew the approach to 16, but kept breaking in and out of layers.
Had it been a non-precision, it would have been a teaser to keep with the approach, and not go around.
The approach they flew has a high rate of descent built into it already.
My point being:
That all the variables: wx, low time, airport, crew coordination usually take just one more thing like a short turn onto final, late descent on non-precision or last minute runway change to put the situation over the edge. Two good pilots with one variable too much,in my humble opinion.
I flew into ZRH the next morning with the same basic wx that they had for landing. I know, because we were coasting out from the US at the time of the crash. We were getting many updates, as I was concerned about the visibility going down. My first trip into ZRH. Milan was great, so I was not concerned for alternates. But I was thinking about what has been discussed on this thread. These incidents are normally combinations of unfortunate situations. That night:
My FO was also low time on aircraft.
I had never been to ZRH.
We had terrain to contend with.
The wx was not good.
Because of all this, I started to brief the approach over Lands End!
We flew the approach to 16, but kept breaking in and out of layers.
Had it been a non-precision, it would have been a teaser to keep with the approach, and not go around.
The approach they flew has a high rate of descent built into it already.
My point being:
That all the variables: wx, low time, airport, crew coordination usually take just one more thing like a short turn onto final, late descent on non-precision or last minute runway change to put the situation over the edge. Two good pilots with one variable too much,in my humble opinion.
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76CaptainUSA, just one question.
Did you really plan to divert to Milan after a missed approach in ZRH with a possible engine failure? 
Milan was great, so I was not concerned for alternates.
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The question has to be asked why we let such threads continue now and on so many other sad occasions in the past.
The original concept of PPRuNe is as an electronic bar room. If you were in a bar downroute on recent evenings this accident would most likely be a topic of intense debate. On each and every tragic thread at these times there are precious nuggets of pure gold for the thinking professional. The experience of a fine and rational writer such as Captain Peacock in his missive above sums up the reason for allowing these threads and alone makes this one worthwhile.
It doesn't matter if the basic premise of this thread and its title is an utter crock. Its reason for existing is to draw out the thoughts of those like Captain Peacock and Mastergreen and many other veterans. They are rarely driven to write here on PPruNe - it usually is at the time of a significant accident or incident.
These threads provide a great deal for the thinking professional and future professional. From using your critical faculties to filter out noise and nonsense to reviewing your SOPs at similar fields it's all worthwhile especially when it brings out the basic philosophical and operational clarity of someone like those already mentioned.
Many will instinctively wish to counter our thoughts and policy. Well. that's fine by us but please don't bother with the standard respect, decency and wait for the report arguments - they are a given.
Rebut the real reasons for our policy instead:
It makes people think while the events are still fresh in their minds - that is the real opportunity to effectively begin modifying behaviour to enhance safety.
There will be at least one and possibly two winters of flying before any full report is published.
More aviation professionals have already read this thread than will ever read the eventual report. Basic wheat from chaff skills allow the thinking person to derive far more from this thread than any potentially politically and commercially neutered report.
Trainers and Check Airmen can see useful themes to bring into their work now.
Technical, company and ATC issues will be addressed in the future and far, far removed from us on the line. In the meantime some of the thoughts of folks such as 76Captain above are extremely valuable right now for us - the Professional Pilots.
[ 28 November 2001: Message edited by: PPRuNe Towers ]
The original concept of PPRuNe is as an electronic bar room. If you were in a bar downroute on recent evenings this accident would most likely be a topic of intense debate. On each and every tragic thread at these times there are precious nuggets of pure gold for the thinking professional. The experience of a fine and rational writer such as Captain Peacock in his missive above sums up the reason for allowing these threads and alone makes this one worthwhile.
It doesn't matter if the basic premise of this thread and its title is an utter crock. Its reason for existing is to draw out the thoughts of those like Captain Peacock and Mastergreen and many other veterans. They are rarely driven to write here on PPruNe - it usually is at the time of a significant accident or incident.
These threads provide a great deal for the thinking professional and future professional. From using your critical faculties to filter out noise and nonsense to reviewing your SOPs at similar fields it's all worthwhile especially when it brings out the basic philosophical and operational clarity of someone like those already mentioned.
Many will instinctively wish to counter our thoughts and policy. Well. that's fine by us but please don't bother with the standard respect, decency and wait for the report arguments - they are a given.
Rebut the real reasons for our policy instead:
It makes people think while the events are still fresh in their minds - that is the real opportunity to effectively begin modifying behaviour to enhance safety.
There will be at least one and possibly two winters of flying before any full report is published.
More aviation professionals have already read this thread than will ever read the eventual report. Basic wheat from chaff skills allow the thinking person to derive far more from this thread than any potentially politically and commercially neutered report.
Trainers and Check Airmen can see useful themes to bring into their work now.
Technical, company and ATC issues will be addressed in the future and far, far removed from us on the line. In the meantime some of the thoughts of folks such as 76Captain above are extremely valuable right now for us - the Professional Pilots.
[ 28 November 2001: Message edited by: PPRuNe Towers ]
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I'm afraid inexperience is here to stay so long as airlines try to skimp on training costs. I don't criticise new or relatively inexperienced pilots in that remark, they are the future of the business. They play the hand they're dealt. The responsibility lies with us knackered old sh*&s to pass on our experience. We were all there once 
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My sympathies and condolences to all Crossair crews.
In such a tragic situation people should understand that the investigation board will give us all the details and everybody will take his own considerations.
It is a lack of respect to give suggestions/comments/conclusions, like someone here, when we DO NOT KNOW what's happened.
Pandora, I agree with about Guv: he/she (!) should consider seriously to apply for a Manager's Forum instead of giving controversial and unhappy sentences on this
forum.
Cheers.
Fly safe & enjoy life.
In such a tragic situation people should understand that the investigation board will give us all the details and everybody will take his own considerations.
It is a lack of respect to give suggestions/comments/conclusions, like someone here, when we DO NOT KNOW what's happened.
Pandora, I agree with about Guv: he/she (!) should consider seriously to apply for a Manager's Forum instead of giving controversial and unhappy sentences on this
forum.
Cheers.
Fly safe & enjoy life.
Perfect passenger
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Absolutely, Grease Weasel.
All I do is sit a few rows behind the likes of Capt H Peacock trying to get that last drink from the trolley, but I have learned a lot from his posting and would gladly have him fly me somewhere. I wish he were tomorrow, but I'm going Ryanair...
It must be worse to hear news like this if you are in the aviation business, though I feel sad too. Perhaps because I have many happy memories of Zurich and of being taken there by the fine people of Swissair and Crossair.
A view from the passenger cabin - I hope I'm not intruding too much here. Back to Passengers and SLF.
[ 28 November 2001: Message edited by: Behind the Curtain ]
All I do is sit a few rows behind the likes of Capt H Peacock trying to get that last drink from the trolley, but I have learned a lot from his posting and would gladly have him fly me somewhere. I wish he were tomorrow, but I'm going Ryanair...
It must be worse to hear news like this if you are in the aviation business, though I feel sad too. Perhaps because I have many happy memories of Zurich and of being taken there by the fine people of Swissair and Crossair.
A view from the passenger cabin - I hope I'm not intruding too much here. Back to Passengers and SLF.
[ 28 November 2001: Message edited by: Behind the Curtain ]
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Swiss media report that pilot in control of aircraft on approach has been identified by evaluating the CVR. They are, however, witholding his identity for reasons not explained.
More at http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ta/taOnl...l?ArtId=144757
More at http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ta/taOnl...l?ArtId=144757
Hardly Never Not Unwilling
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We don't know what happened, sure, but the topic of required experience is important. Any pilot with 300 hours who thinks he's good is dangerous. I'd vote for at least 1000 hours minimum to operate a plane with pax. Old timers can get lazy and complacent, but they generally know what to expect and deal with events as they come. If nothing else, under 1000 hour pilots, even if suitably assertive, need experience to validate their opinions.
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This tread is starting up the experience issue again – and why not – it is a hairy problem that will never go away.
Low hour FOs are here to stay and they have always been with us. I was one once – so were we all. The real issue is how low is low. I am not going to trot out all the usual suspects in this part of the debate. It has all been well said before. Suffice to put my cards on the table before I start to say that I fly with lots of “young”, low hour FOs and I will be the first to admit that they are good at what they do.
That is not to say that they wouldn’t be better after a few 1000 more hours – but where are they going to get them? The older, traditional routes to the RHS of an airliner are still with us. But who is to say whether a 300 hr FO who has been through a structured and focused course is any better than a 2000 hr FO who has been hacking around as a light aircraft instructor – whatever. There is merit to both sides and it is a very hard call.
In the context of this latest accident the experience card is out. However I would like to turn it over and think about awareness here.
We don’t know yet what happened or what went wrong – but something did. Something happened that was fundamental enough to overwhelm an experienced Captain and a qualified FO. To use the chain analogy, somewhere a link or links failed and the aircraft departed a safe and correct flightpath and hit the ground.
To digress a moment. I was reading the write up of the John Denver accident last week. The sequence and errors there are so obvious in the cold light of hindsight that it almost makes you cry. So many places where that accident could have been stopped. So many mistakes. And I sat there thinking to myself, in a moment of hubris, that I would never have been caught out like that. But then I reflected on my past and thought about all the stupid, foolish things I have got away with in similar circumstances (light aircraft / gliders etc). So what is the difference? Is MG luckier than JD? Certainly, but lucky why? All I can assume is that my errors came one at a time and the absence of compounding factors kept me aloft. BTW I am not assuming errors or foolishness in the accident under discussion – I am just thinking aloud here.
So back to our two crew, 4 engined public transport aircraft on a Non Precision Approach (NPA) that went wrong. As has been correctly said before, there is nothing intrinsically dangerous about the approach. But that is not to say it is easy either. No IFR NPA is easy and in fact they get harder as we do less of them. The ILS and the Magenta Line are both our salvation and our nemesis. On the one hand they keep the workload down and keep us further from harm’s way. But when they are absent, or in error (more of a worry) we have to work that much harder to keep situational awareness and safe.
Without trying to pre-empt what actually happened here, I would like to engage our minds onto some of the issues regarding NPAs. Because you certainly don’t need to be Richard Feynman to figure that it is an area where more than the fair share of problems occur.
As is usual with my little rants I will issue the caveat about Grandmother sucking eggs since there is a wide range of experience reading this. Bear with me if you know more than me – and that will not be hard.
To put everyone on the same page to start, here are a couple of simple, off the wall definitions. (I am making these up as I go. They are in my notebook somewhere – but hopefully these are near enough for the purpose of this exercise.)
A Precision Approach is a pilot or aircraft systems interpreted, ground sourced approach aid that defines both the horizontal and vertical flightpath within precise limits. It will ensure a safe and acceptable glideslope (nominally 3 degrees) and localiser (horizontal guidance) to the aircraft, which if followed, will ensure a safe terrain clearance and stable approach from which a visual or automatic landing may be made. This is known as the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and it comes in various flavours of accuracy and reliability. None of which we need to go into now.
A Non Precision Approach is just that. The principle difference is that there is no formal glideslope guidance. There are also many different ways of obtaining horizontal guidance. It might be a localiser, a VOR radial, an NDB bearing. You may or may not have a final approach fix or direct or indirect distance to run to the threshold available. You may or may not have a clear approach run from initial descent point down to minimums or there may be altitude steps imposed. These steps may be a terrain problem or a political problem due to noise etc. Larger aircraft usually attempt to smooth these steps out by using a continuous descent technique and each company SOP has a slightly different take on the method used. A NPA has, depending upon all the factors above, a much high minimum than a Precision Approach.
The executive summary of the last two paragraphs would be (at the risk of being misunderstood / misquoted) : An ILS is relatively easy and an NPA can be seriously hard work.
And all that said, if you have an NPA ahead then you really do need to study the charts. Some NPAs are well designed and relatively straightforward. Some though are absolute dogs. The charts can be evasive at best and there are traps everywhere. Now add an unfamiliar airport / approach at night with poor cockpit lighting (even my 777 has a 50 year old wander light!!) and a miniscule chart and you really are starting to put the stress in. Now no excuses. A qualified, current instrument rated pilot will cope. However he is working hard. Now back to our chain.
Add to the link analogy and think stress. Stress as in tension, materials. Now, with nothing else to distract, good briefing, good unhurried setup and it will all go fine. Now add a little problem to the soup. Time to play the awareness card. At this point the handling pilot is well into his performance / awareness capacity. The Non Handling should also be well engaged cross monitoring. There is slack available, but maybe not that much. The more experienced the crew the more slack there may be.
Let’s assume something relatively trivial comes up, pick one. Nothing serious or that will affect the coming landing and force a go around anyway. But it is there and demands attention and it must be dealt with. Either by ignoring it or not. If you know your airplane and systems then you know what you can dismiss and ignore at that stage. If you can’t ignore it for whatever reason then you must deal with it. Now we have a problem. There is now a distraction. Let’s assume that the Captain is the handling pilot here. It takes great personal discipline to tell your NHP to deal with a problem and hold your total attention on the main job at hand – which is of course, flying that airplane and that Non Precision Approach. Some drills just will not allow you the luxury of non involvement. And if you are distracted just how much distraction can you afford? How long is this piece of string?
Sitting comfortably in front of our PCs we can all say, with that perfect hindsight that a cold beer brings, “Of course – if it too much of a problem you must go around.” The cemeteries are full of people (and not just from aviation) who overestimated their ability to cope.
What is the answer? I’d be a happy man if I knew. All I can offer up here is how I see it and how I would like to see it.
If you anticipate a NPA in live conditions, and by that I mean anything but Day CAVOK with no terrain problems, DO :
1. Study that Chart
2. Brief carefully. Don’t just drone on and on and read the chart. Brief it. That means get the important and essentials firmly across to your other pilot and rehearse exactly how you intend it to happen. (S)He is going to be your safety rope. Make sure you are both onside.
3. Set it up properly. Check and double check the FMC setup. Remember that canned approach was done by someone else – and they are not in the cockpit.
4. Give yourself plenty of time. Time is your friend and lack of it is definitely a serious stress point. At 2 to 3 miles a minute there is never enough.
5. Think and brief on what you expect to see and where you will see it when you break out. Think lights and runway QDM v Approach course and wind.
6. Look for the traps. This is last, but by far the most important. Think – If it is going to go bad – where will it go bad and how can I ensure that it doesn’t. And if it does – what am I going to do about it.
I am a little bit away from where I started, but it seems obvious where experience fits in here. “If you know what the enemy looks like it is easier to fight”.
Enough already. Hopefully there’s some stuff above to think on and maybe discuss in more detail. This is a topic that will never end until the last aircraft is parked in the desert. We are all at risk from this and but for the grace of God goes any of us. The only defense is knowledge and awareness of the problem.
Over
MG
Low hour FOs are here to stay and they have always been with us. I was one once – so were we all. The real issue is how low is low. I am not going to trot out all the usual suspects in this part of the debate. It has all been well said before. Suffice to put my cards on the table before I start to say that I fly with lots of “young”, low hour FOs and I will be the first to admit that they are good at what they do.
That is not to say that they wouldn’t be better after a few 1000 more hours – but where are they going to get them? The older, traditional routes to the RHS of an airliner are still with us. But who is to say whether a 300 hr FO who has been through a structured and focused course is any better than a 2000 hr FO who has been hacking around as a light aircraft instructor – whatever. There is merit to both sides and it is a very hard call.
In the context of this latest accident the experience card is out. However I would like to turn it over and think about awareness here.
We don’t know yet what happened or what went wrong – but something did. Something happened that was fundamental enough to overwhelm an experienced Captain and a qualified FO. To use the chain analogy, somewhere a link or links failed and the aircraft departed a safe and correct flightpath and hit the ground.
To digress a moment. I was reading the write up of the John Denver accident last week. The sequence and errors there are so obvious in the cold light of hindsight that it almost makes you cry. So many places where that accident could have been stopped. So many mistakes. And I sat there thinking to myself, in a moment of hubris, that I would never have been caught out like that. But then I reflected on my past and thought about all the stupid, foolish things I have got away with in similar circumstances (light aircraft / gliders etc). So what is the difference? Is MG luckier than JD? Certainly, but lucky why? All I can assume is that my errors came one at a time and the absence of compounding factors kept me aloft. BTW I am not assuming errors or foolishness in the accident under discussion – I am just thinking aloud here.
So back to our two crew, 4 engined public transport aircraft on a Non Precision Approach (NPA) that went wrong. As has been correctly said before, there is nothing intrinsically dangerous about the approach. But that is not to say it is easy either. No IFR NPA is easy and in fact they get harder as we do less of them. The ILS and the Magenta Line are both our salvation and our nemesis. On the one hand they keep the workload down and keep us further from harm’s way. But when they are absent, or in error (more of a worry) we have to work that much harder to keep situational awareness and safe.
Without trying to pre-empt what actually happened here, I would like to engage our minds onto some of the issues regarding NPAs. Because you certainly don’t need to be Richard Feynman to figure that it is an area where more than the fair share of problems occur.
As is usual with my little rants I will issue the caveat about Grandmother sucking eggs since there is a wide range of experience reading this. Bear with me if you know more than me – and that will not be hard.
To put everyone on the same page to start, here are a couple of simple, off the wall definitions. (I am making these up as I go. They are in my notebook somewhere – but hopefully these are near enough for the purpose of this exercise.)
A Precision Approach is a pilot or aircraft systems interpreted, ground sourced approach aid that defines both the horizontal and vertical flightpath within precise limits. It will ensure a safe and acceptable glideslope (nominally 3 degrees) and localiser (horizontal guidance) to the aircraft, which if followed, will ensure a safe terrain clearance and stable approach from which a visual or automatic landing may be made. This is known as the Instrument Landing System (ILS) and it comes in various flavours of accuracy and reliability. None of which we need to go into now.
A Non Precision Approach is just that. The principle difference is that there is no formal glideslope guidance. There are also many different ways of obtaining horizontal guidance. It might be a localiser, a VOR radial, an NDB bearing. You may or may not have a final approach fix or direct or indirect distance to run to the threshold available. You may or may not have a clear approach run from initial descent point down to minimums or there may be altitude steps imposed. These steps may be a terrain problem or a political problem due to noise etc. Larger aircraft usually attempt to smooth these steps out by using a continuous descent technique and each company SOP has a slightly different take on the method used. A NPA has, depending upon all the factors above, a much high minimum than a Precision Approach.
The executive summary of the last two paragraphs would be (at the risk of being misunderstood / misquoted) : An ILS is relatively easy and an NPA can be seriously hard work.
And all that said, if you have an NPA ahead then you really do need to study the charts. Some NPAs are well designed and relatively straightforward. Some though are absolute dogs. The charts can be evasive at best and there are traps everywhere. Now add an unfamiliar airport / approach at night with poor cockpit lighting (even my 777 has a 50 year old wander light!!) and a miniscule chart and you really are starting to put the stress in. Now no excuses. A qualified, current instrument rated pilot will cope. However he is working hard. Now back to our chain.
Add to the link analogy and think stress. Stress as in tension, materials. Now, with nothing else to distract, good briefing, good unhurried setup and it will all go fine. Now add a little problem to the soup. Time to play the awareness card. At this point the handling pilot is well into his performance / awareness capacity. The Non Handling should also be well engaged cross monitoring. There is slack available, but maybe not that much. The more experienced the crew the more slack there may be.
Let’s assume something relatively trivial comes up, pick one. Nothing serious or that will affect the coming landing and force a go around anyway. But it is there and demands attention and it must be dealt with. Either by ignoring it or not. If you know your airplane and systems then you know what you can dismiss and ignore at that stage. If you can’t ignore it for whatever reason then you must deal with it. Now we have a problem. There is now a distraction. Let’s assume that the Captain is the handling pilot here. It takes great personal discipline to tell your NHP to deal with a problem and hold your total attention on the main job at hand – which is of course, flying that airplane and that Non Precision Approach. Some drills just will not allow you the luxury of non involvement. And if you are distracted just how much distraction can you afford? How long is this piece of string?
Sitting comfortably in front of our PCs we can all say, with that perfect hindsight that a cold beer brings, “Of course – if it too much of a problem you must go around.” The cemeteries are full of people (and not just from aviation) who overestimated their ability to cope.
What is the answer? I’d be a happy man if I knew. All I can offer up here is how I see it and how I would like to see it.
If you anticipate a NPA in live conditions, and by that I mean anything but Day CAVOK with no terrain problems, DO :
1. Study that Chart
2. Brief carefully. Don’t just drone on and on and read the chart. Brief it. That means get the important and essentials firmly across to your other pilot and rehearse exactly how you intend it to happen. (S)He is going to be your safety rope. Make sure you are both onside.
3. Set it up properly. Check and double check the FMC setup. Remember that canned approach was done by someone else – and they are not in the cockpit.
4. Give yourself plenty of time. Time is your friend and lack of it is definitely a serious stress point. At 2 to 3 miles a minute there is never enough.
5. Think and brief on what you expect to see and where you will see it when you break out. Think lights and runway QDM v Approach course and wind.
6. Look for the traps. This is last, but by far the most important. Think – If it is going to go bad – where will it go bad and how can I ensure that it doesn’t. And if it does – what am I going to do about it.
I am a little bit away from where I started, but it seems obvious where experience fits in here. “If you know what the enemy looks like it is easier to fight”.
Enough already. Hopefully there’s some stuff above to think on and maybe discuss in more detail. This is a topic that will never end until the last aircraft is parked in the desert. We are all at risk from this and but for the grace of God goes any of us. The only defense is knowledge and awareness of the problem.
Over
MG
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First I want to thank Capt Peacock and PPRuNe Towers for superb postings here - now and again in life one come's across pure nuggets of gold and these are two!
Second, it has just occurred to me, as a non-commercial pilot (y'all know this by now but I need you to realise I am not a professional pilot)!, that there surely should be a categorisation of airports/wx conditions for new pilots. Everyone has to start somewhere but, accepting the vagaries of ATC and accents and busy skies for a moment, if an approach has few natural obstacles/difficulties then surely it is on such approaches that a 200hr RH seat should be flying and building confidence in all wx.. and then after suitable time on type, attempt the trickier approaches wherever they may be ...surely it is a question of building up the coping mechanism so sending a "beginner" commercial pilot into a situation fraught with EVERYTHING difficult including terrain cannot be helpful!!
Or am I totally wrong??!!!
Second, it has just occurred to me, as a non-commercial pilot (y'all know this by now but I need you to realise I am not a professional pilot)!, that there surely should be a categorisation of airports/wx conditions for new pilots. Everyone has to start somewhere but, accepting the vagaries of ATC and accents and busy skies for a moment, if an approach has few natural obstacles/difficulties then surely it is on such approaches that a 200hr RH seat should be flying and building confidence in all wx.. and then after suitable time on type, attempt the trickier approaches wherever they may be ...surely it is a question of building up the coping mechanism so sending a "beginner" commercial pilot into a situation fraught with EVERYTHING difficult including terrain cannot be helpful!!
Or am I totally wrong??!!!
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It's pretty common in the states to require that the Captain make the landing if the F/O has less than 500 hours in type and wx is <3/4 of a mile, as well as a laundry list of restrictions if the F/O has less than 100 hours in type.
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Media reports just out confirm that Captain Lutz was at the controls of LX3597 at time of approach.
Source: http://www.facts.ch/facts/factsArtik...6&rubrikid=780
Source: http://www.facts.ch/facts/factsArtik...6&rubrikid=780
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The above mentioned article (facts.ch) does not speak kindly about Capt Lutz. It described him as a mediocre pilot who had failed twice in his unsuccessful upgrade attempt to the MD80 in 1996.
Join Date: Mar 2000
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Having trained many very low hours' F/O's in heavy jets (base, sim, line), I would have to say that "most" do quite surprisingly well, and can be relied upon in nearly every situation, emergency or otherwise. It is the training that counts, if it's good, the product is good.
At around 2000 hours or so, a very few then think they "know it all", and can be a real pain. Best left ignored...usually they wise up later on.
At around 2000 hours or so, a very few then think they "know it all", and can be a real pain. Best left ignored...usually they wise up later on.
Just some notes to contrast with what has already been said numerous times here.
The US military allows (at least years ago) new copilots into line flying with maybe 300 hours total, although a limited number had a bit of civilian experience beforehand. This applied to tactical, single-pilot planes and widebody transports/tankers etc.
Some of our company pilots with 10,000 hours and years as jet captains were/are known to bid around trips which go to mountainous Eagle (KEGE), Colorado. I went there once as FO and can understand the desire to avoid it. There are so many unique procedures required for each arrival and departure there, using the FMC/autopilot (after extending the gear and full flaps abput twenty miles out), that the company requires a requal sim for each 757 crewmember every year for Eagle, in addition to the regular training/checking events. Among our various fleets, only our 757s are allowed in because of very demanding departure second-segment requirements.
Using an aircraft FMC for non-precision approaches in itself can expose us to extra serious hazards. This is why my company focused mostly on non-precision training during the initial full-flight sim approach syllabus. Unless I've forgotten, our pilots on the 757 rarely use the VS descent (versus VNAV/FLCH) mode except during some visual approaches or a rare VOR or LOC, i.e. at SFO.
Don't forget: for laymen, especially for certain species of know-it-all-journalists, even the phrase "non-precision approach" can tempt many to jump to very erroneous conclusions, since most have no knowledge of the subject (among many others which they "report" on, as if knowledgeable). Remember-even many "aviation experts" have almost no instrument flying experience. So many of them in the US have either no pilot license or little total experience, except for rides on cockpit jumpseats or watching in simulators. Some think they know it all, with exactly such backgrounds. One of our pilots (who flew all-night cargo Learjets for years before coming here: he once was on continuous duty for over 30 hours under Parts 135/91) has a father-in-law, who is such an "expert", but is only qualified in the academic sector.
[ 30 November 2001: Message edited by: Ignition Override ]
The US military allows (at least years ago) new copilots into line flying with maybe 300 hours total, although a limited number had a bit of civilian experience beforehand. This applied to tactical, single-pilot planes and widebody transports/tankers etc.
Some of our company pilots with 10,000 hours and years as jet captains were/are known to bid around trips which go to mountainous Eagle (KEGE), Colorado. I went there once as FO and can understand the desire to avoid it. There are so many unique procedures required for each arrival and departure there, using the FMC/autopilot (after extending the gear and full flaps abput twenty miles out), that the company requires a requal sim for each 757 crewmember every year for Eagle, in addition to the regular training/checking events. Among our various fleets, only our 757s are allowed in because of very demanding departure second-segment requirements.
Using an aircraft FMC for non-precision approaches in itself can expose us to extra serious hazards. This is why my company focused mostly on non-precision training during the initial full-flight sim approach syllabus. Unless I've forgotten, our pilots on the 757 rarely use the VS descent (versus VNAV/FLCH) mode except during some visual approaches or a rare VOR or LOC, i.e. at SFO.
Don't forget: for laymen, especially for certain species of know-it-all-journalists, even the phrase "non-precision approach" can tempt many to jump to very erroneous conclusions, since most have no knowledge of the subject (among many others which they "report" on, as if knowledgeable). Remember-even many "aviation experts" have almost no instrument flying experience. So many of them in the US have either no pilot license or little total experience, except for rides on cockpit jumpseats or watching in simulators. Some think they know it all, with exactly such backgrounds. One of our pilots (who flew all-night cargo Learjets for years before coming here: he once was on continuous duty for over 30 hours under Parts 135/91) has a father-in-law, who is such an "expert", but is only qualified in the academic sector.
[ 30 November 2001: Message edited by: Ignition Override ]