Incident: Delta B763 blew tyre on takeoff

[Mercenary Pilot]

That Boeing FCTM extract is so typical of the way that airmanship and captaincy have been replaced by beancounters' SOPs.

You will find that it is not an SOP, it's a recommendation by the manufacturer after extensive certification, flight testing, previous experience and feedback from the airline training departments and line pilots over the last 50 or so years. The crew did exactly as they have been trained to do and did it well. End result, everyone got home safely and the aircraft was returned to service quickly.

[IGh]

? Only ONE tire failed ??? just lucky.

Back in slot #24 "GoldenRivet" cited the best exemplar:

Nationair / 11Jul91 Canadian registered DC-8-61 C-GMXQ, chartered as "Nigerian Airways flight 2120"

One of the lessons from that investigation focused on the very short life of the sister-tire on that axle, immediately after the failure of the first tire. So, perhaps there were two tire-failures on this recent B767 incident????

Scanning this thread there are WEAKNESSES in two other certification standards that haven't been mentioned:

-- Part 25 still does NOT require Wheel Well Fire Warning. Boeing has provided this as their own standard, DAC did NOT provide it [nor AirBus?]. So all those MD80's are still flying without that Wheel Well protection.

-- The load bearing strength of the TIRE (after failure of the sister-tire on that axle) is poorly regulated [weakness in cert' standards was discussed in NTSB's AAR-79-01, Continental / 1Mar78 ... DC-10-10, N68045, LosAngeles ... Section 2, Analysis, pg 30-1]:
After #2 Tire carcass blew out, the entire load on the axle was imposed upon the #1Tire . . . the #1 Tire failed almost immediately (within two wheel revolutions) after the #2 Tire carcass failed.

The weakness in the tire stds [§ 25.733 Tires] was not a factor in this latest case. In this recent Boeing case, the pilot continued the T/O, and that is good.

The weaknesses in cert' stds might someday be revised if an MD8 suffers a simple TIRE FAILURE on Takeoff, then the sister-tire on that axle FAILs, and both tires shed debris into the engine intake, and remember that DAC never offered Wheel Well Fire Warning ...

[Flightmech]

Captains decision. Just pure luck if you end up at GRU with just a double wheel change or if a piece of tread has put a hole in your flaps and now your grounded for sheet metal repair.

[misd-agin]

Post #22 and the link to the 'hard' landing on it's previous arrival - appears to be normal ops. The windsock is visible. The wind is from the right so the right gear should touch down first. Smoke always occurs on initial wheel spinup.

[Shell Management]

I bet the crew didn't do a risk assessment - just read the FCOM, called Maintrol and carried on.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Shell Management

I bet the crew didn't do a risk assessment - just read the FCOM, called Maintrol and carried on.

I nominate this statement to be one of the least smart posts so far this year.
BTW, where in the FCOM would you look for info on this scenario?

[hfbo]

Caravell accident

Report of the Swissair Caravell III accident. The captain was a pilot college of mine.
http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_306

[aterpster]

Shell Management:

I bet the crew didn't do a risk assessment - just read the FCOM, called Maintrol and carried on.

What would you have expected them to have done?

With operatonal planning and maintenance control concurring in proceeding to destination then by all means press on. Those folks know what logistics that have at the destination.

The airplane would be a normally functioning bird until time for touchdown, a problem to be faced at departure point, ATL, or destination.

[763 jock]

OK Shell Management.

Please enlighten me with what your "risk assessment" would consist of. What factors would you consider in reaching your decision in this scenario?

As a current 767 Captain with 18 years and nearly 10000 hours on type, I would like to know what I don't know.

[RetiredBA/BY]

B767 tyres

As a former 76/75 captain, I consider the desision to carry on as unwise. If a tyre should fail then the load of the failed tyre is mostly transferred to the other tyre on that axle, which could well lead, as a result of the overload, to it being severely overstressed and overheated which could in turn lead to failure, even explosion when in the wheel well. I seem to recall that a Saudia TriStar suffered a wheel explosion with the gear retracted which resulted in a large hole in the cabin floor which led to the loss of several passengers.

About 25 years ago, when working with the UKFSC I wrote a paper which was published in the International Journal of Air Safety suggesting that all jet transports be fitted, as a certification requirement, with tyre failure indicators and brake temp guages, Concorde was. We all assume that all tyres and brakes are intact and cool before every take off, and we calculate our take off performance based on those assumptions. I believe we need to know !

Three of the incidents which got me thinking about this problem, were the nose tyre failure of an EastAf VC-10 in Addis which led to the loss of the aircraft, my own severely overheated brake and tyre on a VC10 taxi-ing in at AUH, (we didnt know about it until shutdown) and my own wheel failure on a 737, fortunatley during push back but could have been catastrophic on take off because the damaged wheel also damaged the reverser. (I dread to think of a wheel failure approaching V1, One wheel lost, therefore two brakes lost, possible overload failure of the paired tyre and only one reverser, not much chance of stopping on the hard top !)

Nope, a damaged wheel should NOT be in the well longer a moment longer than neccessary.

[matkat]

Moi/BEagle the argument was not with Me (I was the lead see off guy) and probably me you talked to, the argument was between the GE and the Master FE the GE did not want to take it but the FE pulled rank on him, I told them all captain included that the tyre was a no go. At the board of enquiry they then tried to lie there way out of it however there were 5 off Us 3 x Techies and 2 mover who all witnessed the tyre damage which I am sure you will understand was extensive, the truth did indeed come out but I am unaware of what punishment was given out. All I know I was called up a few days later by the head of the BoI and thanked for our full and frank recollection of the incident, but as you can tell it still annoyes me what they tried to do to not only to me(I was a 30 year old hardned line Corporal) but 2 young lads in there early twenty's who should have been looking up to this crew instead all they witnessed was blatant lying.

[vlkyplky]

Two days ago

Incident: American B772 at Chicago on Jun 5th 2011, blew tyre on takeoff, multiple hydraulic problems

Just two days ago, blown tire, multiple hyd problems... there you go. Can happen, but commonly it is immediatelly noticed.

[bullet190]

So.........20 Min's after the incident the bits of tyre are recovered, they are then taken to the Delta engineers for analisis.....which takes possibly another 20 Min's. Meanwhile Delta 257 is well on it's way.
The Delta engineers can not prove the bits of tyre are from a 767, the crew therefore get a 'possible' tyre burst message on route and act accordingly.

During take off, 'Mr camera man' saw the incident and has film evidence to back up his/her story.

My question therefore is........did he/she try to tell anyone ?

The more accurate information the crew have the more equipped they are to make the best decision.

[A37575]

Three of the incidents which got me thinking about this problem, were the nose tyre failure of an EastAf VC-10 in Addis which led to the loss of the aircraft, my own severely overheated brake and tyre on a VC10 taxi-ing in at AUH, (we didnt know about it until shutdown) and my own wheel failure on a 737, fortunatley during push back but could have been catastrophic on take off because the damaged wheel also damaged the reverser. (I dread to think of a wheel failure approaching V1, One wheel lost, therefore two brakes lost, possible overload failure of the paired tyre and only one reverser, not much chance of stopping on the hard top !)

The East African VC10 nose wheel hit a car wheel jack on the runway that had been inadvertently left there by the pilot of a Cessna. The Cessna I believe had a flat tyre during a night landing so the pilot stopped on the runway and jacked it up and changed the tyre. Which is why the crew of the VC 10 on take off did not see the jack which by coincidence was close to the centre-line of the runway.

The impact of the nose wheels of the VC10 on the jack set up a very strong vibration and nose wheel shimmy - so bad that the VC10 captain aborted the take off. What no one knew at the time was that the anti-skid units of the main wheels of the VC10 had been incorrectly assembled causing alternate sets of wheels to lock on while others released. This degraded braking caused the VC10 to over-run and it went through a fence and ditch causing a massive fuel leak. The fuel caught fire trapping passengers escaping down the ditch. If the captain of the VC 10 had elected to continue the take off he may have got away with it. The incorrectly installed anti-skid system had never been picked up before because no one had carried out a full scale abort before and therefore the defect was hidden.

[ManaAdaSystem]

I dread to think of a wheel failure approaching V1, One wheel lost, therefore two brakes lost, possible overload failure of the paired tyre and only one reverser, not much chance of stopping on the hard top !

That is why Boeing does not want us to abort for tire failures above 80 knots. For those of you who think the FCTM is a substitute for airmanship, maybe you should open the book and have a look at consequence of such an abort?

[brakedwell]

I experience a tyre/wheel disintegration on take off in a DC8 55F and knew nothing about it until we established VHF contact at our destination ten hours later. We took over the aircraft at Winnipeg and after a quick turnround were the last departure before the airport closed at 2300. Shortly after V1 we had a bird strike on the port side. I saw a large white (Owl?) bird flash down the port side before hearing a dull thump. After making VHF contact with Honolulu approach they advised us that Winnipeg had found tyre and aluminium wheel wreckage on the runway during the first inspection of the day. We were instructed to hold for as long as possible to allow the incoming morning rush of traffic to subside. Eventually we were cleared for an approach. The strong gusting crosswind and turbulence didn't make life easy after a long night, but the touchdown was smooth and there were no problems until the speed dropped below 100 knots, when the juddering started and worrying graunching noises increased as we slowed down and cleared the runway at the first opportunity. It turned out the rear inboard wheel on the port bogie was missing and the adjacent rear tyre had deflated and partially shredded, on landing maybe. The port flap had suffered some minor damage and the anti-skid cable had been severed down to one last thin wire. Had we lost that the outcome could have been serious. I spoke to the grooms & stable girls looking after the bloodstock horses on board and they said they had heard a bang during take-off, but thought it was normal! Whether the noise was caused by the bird strike or the wheel disintegrating we shall never know. A new anti-skid cable was fitted together with 2 main wheels from the hold and the flaps were repaired temporarily with speedtape. On completion we we handed the airplane over to the new crew and the flight departed for Auckland just three hours late.

[cairndow_123]

Peanuts grinder

Swiss air flight SE210, September 4, 1963, a nearly new Caravelle, flight from Zurich to Rome via Geneva Runway visibility 60m, crew requested permission to taxi the runway then back track for take off.

As it was later evident, the crew taxed at high power, keeping taxi speed by braking, with the purpose of clearing the fog with their jet efflux.

With the consequential over heating of the wheel assembly a I tire had exploded during this full power runway fog dispensing exercise ,shrapnel from the burst caused a hydraulic fluid leak soon after gear retraction a trail of white smoke was observed, an indicator of fire resulting in a fatal crash

[matkat]

Surprised no one has mentioned this one.
Nigeria Airways Flight 2120 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[captjns]

The airplane does not care where it lands. However, it does not want to land too heavy that for sure... even under normal situations. It does care about the quality of MX it gets no matter where. The US is certainly not the king, nor the worst when it comes to the subject of MX issues.

The destination airport has the same emergency equipment at the departure airport.

Wx considerations were analyized as well.

Passengers did not want to return to the departure airport.

There are numerous airports along the way during the initial phase of flight if a quick landing were required too.

With that being said, the aircraft was airworthy, the crew were airworthy, and maintrol and the crwe did not have any issues prceeding to their destination with some element of caution to be maintained.

Communications today are far better than those pointed out about their former colleagues in the Caravelle, L-1011 and any other aircraft brought into this thread.

[stilton]

Well if the passengers don't want to return that's all I need to know..



Seriously, this is a divided issue, continuing worked out for this crew but that doesn't prove anything except they were lucky.


A burst tyre can cause a lot more damage than you think or would be aware of immediately.


The Aircraft QRH offers guidance but does not substitute for good judgement.


I would have dumped fuel and returned