American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming
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Airbubba
Wow, that would be a little hard to miss unless he used one of those 'banked' walk arounds. Maybe it was raining or something...
The version of this story that I heard was the F/O saw the spoilers were up on the walkaround but returned to the cockpit to find the Capt in his seat & speedbrake handle down. He thought the Capt had stowed the handle & spoilers were down. Hard to believe he didn't look out the window to verify. It was said that Boeing claimed the airplane would fly in this configuration....
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Reporter looking for comment
I'm a reporter in Jackson, Wyoming. I'm looking for an expert to decipher and comment on the latest NTSB report on the AA overrun. The Wall Street Journal quotes unnamed sources as saying this report indicates errors on the part of the crew. Please contact me at [email protected].
NTSB ISSUES SECOND UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT
In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) weather conditions prevailed around the time of the incident with a ceiling of 400 feet, light snow and visibility of 1 mile. Winds were 10 knots from 240 degrees. Runway friction measurement data obtained before and after the event have been provided by the Jackson Hole Airport Authority for further evaluation by the NTSB.
In the continuing investigation, work groups have been formed to examine the subject areas of air traffic control, airports, meteorology, flight crew operations, airworthiness, maintenance records, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight data recorder (FDR), and airplane performance.
The NTSB systems investigator conducted testing on the incident airplane from December 31, 2010, through January 6, 2011. Operational testing and examination was accomplished on the spoiler/auto speed brake, air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. No discrepancies were found in the air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated.
The maintenance group convened at the American Airlines facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to review airplane logbooks. The group focused primarily on the spoiler/speed brake, air/ground, and thrust reverser systems. No significant issues with any of these systems were recorded prior to the incident, and there were no open minimum equipment list (MEL) items at the time of the incident. The airplane was manufactured in June 1992 and, at the time of the incident, had accumulated 58,879 hours and 20,518 cycles. No discrepancies were noted during the last periodic service maintenance check conducted on December 26, 2010. The last heavy maintenance was accomplished in October 2005. The auto speed brake actuator was replaced in January 2008.
The CVR group convened on January 4, 2011, at the NTSB recorder laboratory. The group completed a transcript of the last 30 minutes of the recording and a summary of the previous 90 minutes. The transcript will be released when the public docket is opened.
The FDR group has begun the process of determining which of the documented parameters are installed and should be functional, and is checking the recorded data for validity. The group has verified the following factual information:
The FDR download contains the last 43.9 hours of data, more than the required 25 hours, and includes all of the incident flight.
The recorded speed brake handle position indicates that the speed brakes were manually extended by the flight crew during the approach after which the handle was left in the armed position until landing. The FDR records only the speed brake handle position and not the individual speed brake (spoiler) panel positions.
The FDR data indicate that the aircraft touched down at approximately 132 knots.
At touchdown, the air/ground parameter changes to "ground" for approximately one second and then switches to "air" for approximately ˝ second before changing back to "ground" for the remainder of the recording.
During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.
Thrust Reverser (T/R) discrete parameters indicate that the T/Rs moved into the in-transit position during the ˝ second that the air/ground logic parameter indicated "air."
The T/Rs remained in the in-transit position for approximately 10 seconds before transitioning to the stowed position for one second. The T/Rs then moved back to the in-transit position for an additional 6 seconds before becoming deployed.
The T/R discrete parameters indicate that approximately 18 seconds elapsed from the time the T/Rs began moving until they were fully deployed.
Additionally, the team has examined security camera videos provided by the airport as well as a video of the landing taken by one of the passengers.
The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the NTSB website
NTSB ISSUES SECOND UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT
In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) weather conditions prevailed around the time of the incident with a ceiling of 400 feet, light snow and visibility of 1 mile. Winds were 10 knots from 240 degrees. Runway friction measurement data obtained before and after the event have been provided by the Jackson Hole Airport Authority for further evaluation by the NTSB.
In the continuing investigation, work groups have been formed to examine the subject areas of air traffic control, airports, meteorology, flight crew operations, airworthiness, maintenance records, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight data recorder (FDR), and airplane performance.
The NTSB systems investigator conducted testing on the incident airplane from December 31, 2010, through January 6, 2011. Operational testing and examination was accomplished on the spoiler/auto speed brake, air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. No discrepancies were found in the air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated.
The maintenance group convened at the American Airlines facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to review airplane logbooks. The group focused primarily on the spoiler/speed brake, air/ground, and thrust reverser systems. No significant issues with any of these systems were recorded prior to the incident, and there were no open minimum equipment list (MEL) items at the time of the incident. The airplane was manufactured in June 1992 and, at the time of the incident, had accumulated 58,879 hours and 20,518 cycles. No discrepancies were noted during the last periodic service maintenance check conducted on December 26, 2010. The last heavy maintenance was accomplished in October 2005. The auto speed brake actuator was replaced in January 2008.
The CVR group convened on January 4, 2011, at the NTSB recorder laboratory. The group completed a transcript of the last 30 minutes of the recording and a summary of the previous 90 minutes. The transcript will be released when the public docket is opened.
The FDR group has begun the process of determining which of the documented parameters are installed and should be functional, and is checking the recorded data for validity. The group has verified the following factual information:
The FDR download contains the last 43.9 hours of data, more than the required 25 hours, and includes all of the incident flight.
The recorded speed brake handle position indicates that the speed brakes were manually extended by the flight crew during the approach after which the handle was left in the armed position until landing. The FDR records only the speed brake handle position and not the individual speed brake (spoiler) panel positions.
The FDR data indicate that the aircraft touched down at approximately 132 knots.
At touchdown, the air/ground parameter changes to "ground" for approximately one second and then switches to "air" for approximately ˝ second before changing back to "ground" for the remainder of the recording.
During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.
Thrust Reverser (T/R) discrete parameters indicate that the T/Rs moved into the in-transit position during the ˝ second that the air/ground logic parameter indicated "air."
The T/Rs remained in the in-transit position for approximately 10 seconds before transitioning to the stowed position for one second. The T/Rs then moved back to the in-transit position for an additional 6 seconds before becoming deployed.
The T/R discrete parameters indicate that approximately 18 seconds elapsed from the time the T/Rs began moving until they were fully deployed.
Additionally, the team has examined security camera videos provided by the airport as well as a video of the landing taken by one of the passengers.
The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the NTSB website
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Hmmmm... This ought to be interesting.....
I'm not sure how you could possible glean a crew issue from this investigation update. It is far from complete and only addresses systems and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data.
The FDR points to a normal approach and landing with the speed brake lever momentarily moving toward the down position during the touchdown sequence before returning to the armed position for the duration of the event (Normally, the speed brake lever would be set to armed and and automatically move to the Up or extended position upon landing. This should be automatic so long as certain parameters are met). They also note an error in the way the speed brake handle was installed, but did not definitively state that it was a contributing factor. They also discuss the operation of the thrust reversers and ground logic circuits and relate the timing of the thrust reverser deployment and speedbrake handle movement to the ground logic. Thus far they have not found any system performance issues or maintainence issues but have not ruled them out.
They also do not discuss aircraft performance, which will undoubtedly become a major area of the investigation.
While one could speculate about crew actions that could have caused this scenario, the NTSB has made no comment regarding the crew's performance. To report a crew issue at this point would be speculation based upon rumor and opinion, which does not make good journalism.
I'm not sure how you could possible glean a crew issue from this investigation update. It is far from complete and only addresses systems and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data.
The FDR points to a normal approach and landing with the speed brake lever momentarily moving toward the down position during the touchdown sequence before returning to the armed position for the duration of the event (Normally, the speed brake lever would be set to armed and and automatically move to the Up or extended position upon landing. This should be automatic so long as certain parameters are met). They also note an error in the way the speed brake handle was installed, but did not definitively state that it was a contributing factor. They also discuss the operation of the thrust reversers and ground logic circuits and relate the timing of the thrust reverser deployment and speedbrake handle movement to the ground logic. Thus far they have not found any system performance issues or maintainence issues but have not ruled them out.
They also do not discuss aircraft performance, which will undoubtedly become a major area of the investigation.
While one could speculate about crew actions that could have caused this scenario, the NTSB has made no comment regarding the crew's performance. To report a crew issue at this point would be speculation based upon rumor and opinion, which does not make good journalism.
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To report a crew issue at this point would be speculation based upon rumor and opinion, which does not make good journalism.
I would speculate...more AA pilot complete nonsense.
IE: can't determine the forest for the trees.
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411A, it sounds like you are feeding the journo N&G guy with BS info. Please STFU. He is trying to write a story to put in the press so just STFU. You are speculating on what happened. Let the NTSB figure it out. He will probably put in the press anything interesting you say but you will look like an idiot if it is not true.
By the way, I know the 757, flying it for years, and pilot inputs without mechanical failure, in my opinion, would not allow this to happen. Obviously the pilots tried to deploy the reversers by the reverser moving an inch. 18 seconds later they finally came out but do you see the auto spoilers come out as required with deployment in the video? Are they visible in the video?
By the way, I know the 757, flying it for years, and pilot inputs without mechanical failure, in my opinion, would not allow this to happen. Obviously the pilots tried to deploy the reversers by the reverser moving an inch. 18 seconds later they finally came out but do you see the auto spoilers come out as required with deployment in the video? Are they visible in the video?
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I fly into Jackson Hole routinely in an A319. On the A319/320, at my airline, the procedure and required callout by the PNF immediately after touchdown is, "Spoilers up" or "Spoilers not up". It's the same at Jackson Hole as it is anywhere with a long dry runway. Given the quality of my landings, that's usually the first indication we have touched down, not having felt anything.
Is the 757 similar? Does a display pop up showing the position of the flight controls at touchdown?
If spoilers did not deploy, the pilot must immediately use manual braking aggressively to assure stopping the airplane on the available remaining runway.
Is the 757 similar? Does a display pop up showing the position of the flight controls at touchdown?
If spoilers did not deploy, the pilot must immediately use manual braking aggressively to assure stopping the airplane on the available remaining runway.
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You can twist this deal anyway you want but if the spoilers did not deploy for any reason, it becomes the responsibility of the PM to call them out and the PF to deploy them. It would appear at this point, that this did not happen. Boeing FCTM spells this out very clearly and I'm sure AA trains this procedure as the FAA has made a fairly big issue of it in the past.
Hey, **** happens!
Hey, **** happens!
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Not B757 but as it is a common endorsement with the B767 the Boeing 767 FCOM Landing Roll Procedure has as its first item -
Pilot Flying
Verify that the thrust levers are closed.
Verify that the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is UP
Pilot Not Flying
Verify that the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is UP
Call "SPEEDBRAKES UP"
If the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is not UP, call "SPEEDBRAKES NOT UP"
Now after 16 years on type I don't remember exactly when this procedure was added and I believe it wasn't there when I came on type but it certainly wasn't added recently.
BandAide it is the lever which gives the indication. As I indicated above it is a standard Boeing call the same as the standard Airbus "Ground Spoilers" call.
Pilot Flying
Verify that the thrust levers are closed.
Verify that the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is UP
Pilot Not Flying
Verify that the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is UP
Call "SPEEDBRAKES UP"
If the SPEEDBRAKE LEVER is not UP, call "SPEEDBRAKES NOT UP"
Now after 16 years on type I don't remember exactly when this procedure was added and I believe it wasn't there when I came on type but it certainly wasn't added recently.
BandAide it is the lever which gives the indication. As I indicated above it is a standard Boeing call the same as the standard Airbus "Ground Spoilers" call.
From a human factors view, the call "SPEEDBRAKES UP" is very similar to "SPEEDBRAKES NOT UP". This could result in ‘wish think’ – hearing what is expected, particularly as the emotive ‘speedbrake’ is called in all normal operations – expectation error.
Some aircraft changed the crew calls and indications to remove this kind of anomaly; the resulting predominance is to only call the failed case - NO SPEEDBRAKE / SPOILER !
Some aircraft changed the crew calls and indications to remove this kind of anomaly; the resulting predominance is to only call the failed case - NO SPEEDBRAKE / SPOILER !
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The correct callout at AA is either: "Deployed" or "No Spoilers."
And yes it is very emphasized at our recurrent training every 9 months, so much so that on many occasions the instructor will fail the spoilers on a landing/abort, just to make sure we are up to speed on the procedure.
I would withhold judgment on the JAC incident until all the facts come out.
And yes it is very emphasized at our recurrent training every 9 months, so much so that on many occasions the instructor will fail the spoilers on a landing/abort, just to make sure we are up to speed on the procedure.
I would withhold judgment on the JAC incident until all the facts come out.
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For probably the umpteenth time. AA 757/767 procedure after touchdown, regarding the spoilers.... PNF, if spoiler handle does not move aft to the deployed position immediately after TD, announce "NO SPOILERS"....the Captain then immediately grabs the spoiler handle and manually deploys them
The PNF is simultaneously monitoring engine display for REVERSE indication, and if amber followed by green REVERSE does not occur, announces "NO REVERSE Left" or "No REVERSE Right" or, if both not indicating, calls out "NO REVERSE". The PNF is also monitoring speed, runway position (center, left or right) runway remaining and speed relative to the end of runway. If speed is greater than 80 knots and 3,000 feet of runway remaining, the callout is "MAX BRAKES"
Whether or not the spoilers were armed, they should have deployed when the reverser (s) deployed, of course it was too late by then. If the spoilers are used in flight (NTSB said they were used in flight) the handle must first be returned to the full down stop, then moved into the "armed" detent prior to landing for the spoilers to actually arm for auto-deployment.
Flew the 757 for AA as a line CKA in and out of KJAC numerous times checking out pilots from the mid 90's when it was a unicom field, thru it's getting a Tower and part time tower operators sometime around the beginning of the Bush administration (V.P. Cheney lived/s in JAC and often had his 2 Air Force C-32 jets parked on the tarmac. (C32 = B757-200)
The PNF is simultaneously monitoring engine display for REVERSE indication, and if amber followed by green REVERSE does not occur, announces "NO REVERSE Left" or "No REVERSE Right" or, if both not indicating, calls out "NO REVERSE". The PNF is also monitoring speed, runway position (center, left or right) runway remaining and speed relative to the end of runway. If speed is greater than 80 knots and 3,000 feet of runway remaining, the callout is "MAX BRAKES"
Whether or not the spoilers were armed, they should have deployed when the reverser (s) deployed, of course it was too late by then. If the spoilers are used in flight (NTSB said they were used in flight) the handle must first be returned to the full down stop, then moved into the "armed" detent prior to landing for the spoilers to actually arm for auto-deployment.
Flew the 757 for AA as a line CKA in and out of KJAC numerous times checking out pilots from the mid 90's when it was a unicom field, thru it's getting a Tower and part time tower operators sometime around the beginning of the Bush administration (V.P. Cheney lived/s in JAC and often had his 2 Air Force C-32 jets parked on the tarmac. (C32 = B757-200)
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you american pilots and former american pilots, I applaud the terminology you use:
deployed or no spoilers...it is much clearer than using the word spoilers in both scenarios.
I do hope we find out what happened soon. Sadly, and I do mean sadly, I am concerned that the problem lies within the human element on this landing.
we, as the human component, must be alert to mechanical failure and be prepared to act.
I think that the 757 is just fine for this airport...the more wheels on the runway, the better for stopping.
american is one of the oldest lines in the country...if they screwed up, anyone could screw up.
we must all be ready to act until we have turned the ship over to the ground mx crew or another flight crew.
I do think that the Southwest over run at Chicago Midway should have taught us all a lesson on what to do if the reversers don't come out very soon after touchdown.
deployed or no spoilers...it is much clearer than using the word spoilers in both scenarios.
I do hope we find out what happened soon. Sadly, and I do mean sadly, I am concerned that the problem lies within the human element on this landing.
we, as the human component, must be alert to mechanical failure and be prepared to act.
I think that the 757 is just fine for this airport...the more wheels on the runway, the better for stopping.
american is one of the oldest lines in the country...if they screwed up, anyone could screw up.
we must all be ready to act until we have turned the ship over to the ground mx crew or another flight crew.
I do think that the Southwest over run at Chicago Midway should have taught us all a lesson on what to do if the reversers don't come out very soon after touchdown.
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spooky 2, are you talking to me? do you mean KMDW?
if so...the difficulty in getting into reverse on the SW flight is pretty important...18 seconds after touchdown to getting into reverse. Should the copilot have taken over? Did the captain blank out for a second or two too much? Was their problems in the mechanics of the thrust reverser throttle?
Certainly landing into wind would have helped a bit. When you DO GET TO USE Reverse thrust in your landing calculations, getting into reverse better be part of the equation of stopping the plane and the pilots need to get into reverse PRONTO.
As most of the forum readers know, reverse thrust is not used in landing calculations in the great majority of planes and situations. SW and Boeing managed to get reverse thrust ''counted'' in their plane and situation.
if so...the difficulty in getting into reverse on the SW flight is pretty important...18 seconds after touchdown to getting into reverse. Should the copilot have taken over? Did the captain blank out for a second or two too much? Was their problems in the mechanics of the thrust reverser throttle?
Certainly landing into wind would have helped a bit. When you DO GET TO USE Reverse thrust in your landing calculations, getting into reverse better be part of the equation of stopping the plane and the pilots need to get into reverse PRONTO.
As most of the forum readers know, reverse thrust is not used in landing calculations in the great majority of planes and situations. SW and Boeing managed to get reverse thrust ''counted'' in their plane and situation.
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My situation on a short runway and one reverser not working was not known until touchdown and reverser deployment was not possible on that engine. Using reverse thrust on landing for stopping only works if the reversers deploy. Reverse thrust is not guaranteed so should not be used for landing criteria.