BA Subsidiary - OpenSkies - Boeing 757 High Speed RTO -Wrong Flap Setting
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Feathers,
If there is a noticed discrepancy, the best course of action during the t/o roll is to do what the crew did - RTO.
The flaps and slats take time to run to position, so they may not get there, apart from the fact that if you have noticed such an error whilst hurtling along, you may not have time to agree what the setting should be.
Also, this is outside SOPs!
If there is a noticed discrepancy, the best course of action during the t/o roll is to do what the crew did - RTO.
The flaps and slats take time to run to position, so they may not get there, apart from the fact that if you have noticed such an error whilst hurtling along, you may not have time to agree what the setting should be.
Also, this is outside SOPs!
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OK, thanks for that.
I had thought of those things, but I was trying to get an idea of how dodgy making a flap selection under pressure would be in contrast with ending up with wheel, tyre and brake entertainment after a high energy RTO,
As a matter of interest, about how long would you say it takes for the flaps to run out to the maximum T/O position? On a 752.
And yes, I'd thought about SOPs and the chance of making things even worse by mistake.
I had thought of those things, but I was trying to get an idea of how dodgy making a flap selection under pressure would be in contrast with ending up with wheel, tyre and brake entertainment after a high energy RTO,
As a matter of interest, about how long would you say it takes for the flaps to run out to the maximum T/O position? On a 752.
And yes, I'd thought about SOPs and the chance of making things even worse by mistake.
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Aircraft are obviously certified to be able to carry out and RTO at just before V1. If you get a wheel fire - you are in a position to evacuate if necessary before it becomes more serious.
If you try to take off with the wrong/no flap setting - you could end up in a smoking heap.
Don't operate the 757, and haven't timed the flaps on my type. It isn't just a matter of the time taken to reach the correct setting, it is the fact that the wrong setting is there and there may not be time to discuss/sort it - you can always stop. You can get airborne on 1 engine (type dependant), but you may not get airborne with no/incorrect flap on modern airliners due to the wing design
If you try to take off with the wrong/no flap setting - you could end up in a smoking heap.
Don't operate the 757, and haven't timed the flaps on my type. It isn't just a matter of the time taken to reach the correct setting, it is the fact that the wrong setting is there and there may not be time to discuss/sort it - you can always stop. You can get airborne on 1 engine (type dependant), but you may not get airborne with no/incorrect flap on modern airliners due to the wing design
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First part is 99% accurate, latter part just rumour. Then again, there were lots of good stories from that carrier.
Discovering a misset flap at high speed is a different story of course.
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Re-selecting a flap position on the take-off role? Never!!
The full accident report into the Northwest DC-9-82 accident at Detroit on 18th Aug 1987 makes very interesting reading. The crew were distracted following engine start and a lot of the post-start actions had been missed. This included setting flap and arming the autothrottle (TLC). Due to numerous subtle distractions they had also failed to complete the relevant checklist.
On the take-off role they recognised that the autothrottle had not been engaged but continued with the take-off. This was the final clue that they were given that something was not right.
They crashed shortly after rotation with the loss of 153 lives!
The full accident report into the Northwest DC-9-82 accident at Detroit on 18th Aug 1987 makes very interesting reading. The crew were distracted following engine start and a lot of the post-start actions had been missed. This included setting flap and arming the autothrottle (TLC). Due to numerous subtle distractions they had also failed to complete the relevant checklist.
On the take-off role they recognised that the autothrottle had not been engaged but continued with the take-off. This was the final clue that they were given that something was not right.
They crashed shortly after rotation with the loss of 153 lives!
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Open Skies Safety Department Investigation Outcome
Open Skies completed the RTO investigation.
The crew rejected the take off at 21 kts below Vee one due to incorrect setting of flap one instead of flap 5. The F/O set flap 1 in the after start set up and this was not discovered by the Captain during the before taxi checklist, and again both pilots missed it during the before takeoff checklist. The error was only discovered during take-off. Then, the crew did not properly check brake cooling times and were preparing for another take off when they were advised of smoke from gear. The crew only became aware of the problem when the aircraft behind in the taxi queue for the second take off attempt called that he could see smoke from the gear. They cleared the taxiway and then 6 wheels deflated so the crew decided not to try another take off!
The crew were questioned for poor use of two checklists, crosschecks and the decisions for preparing to make another take off inside the brakes cool down time. Open Skies management was questioned about the poor introduction of a new SOP and for then issuing a 150 page amendment a month after bringing the new Ryanair style procedures into use. It was questioned if the new procedures may have given the crew confusion from the old procedures but the Flaps checking procedure was considered clear.
After completion of the investigation Open Skies chiefs decided the Captain of the RTO aircraft would keep his job as a Captain and stay as Deputy Head of Training. The F/O will also kept his job as Deputy Director of Flight Operations. The F/O involved also passed his command assessment with the same Captain the week before the RTO (he was one of only 2 of 14 F/O’s that pass the assessment). He will still be promoted in January. Both pilots received additional simulator training in the use of the flap lever and checklist, but no other action was taken against the crew.
The RTO happened at a time of much discontent over pay, contracts, procedures and allegations of heavy handed tactics by the (ex Ryanair) DFO, big issues and big distractions for the pilots. The RTO, all the distractions and the survival of the DFO’s two most senior manager’s has raised big credibility issues for the flight operations department both inside the company. Only last week managers were called into question again after an unsecured cart ran out of control along the complete length of a B757 cabin smashing into an open flight deck door during landing. This will be a separate topic.
battered BA subsidiary’s problems. The CEO recently sent an internal memo about direct entry captains joining from BA next month. It stated Open Skies was not making a profit. After almost 3 years, how much longer can the subsidiary survive?
The crew rejected the take off at 21 kts below Vee one due to incorrect setting of flap one instead of flap 5. The F/O set flap 1 in the after start set up and this was not discovered by the Captain during the before taxi checklist, and again both pilots missed it during the before takeoff checklist. The error was only discovered during take-off. Then, the crew did not properly check brake cooling times and were preparing for another take off when they were advised of smoke from gear. The crew only became aware of the problem when the aircraft behind in the taxi queue for the second take off attempt called that he could see smoke from the gear. They cleared the taxiway and then 6 wheels deflated so the crew decided not to try another take off!
The crew were questioned for poor use of two checklists, crosschecks and the decisions for preparing to make another take off inside the brakes cool down time. Open Skies management was questioned about the poor introduction of a new SOP and for then issuing a 150 page amendment a month after bringing the new Ryanair style procedures into use. It was questioned if the new procedures may have given the crew confusion from the old procedures but the Flaps checking procedure was considered clear.
After completion of the investigation Open Skies chiefs decided the Captain of the RTO aircraft would keep his job as a Captain and stay as Deputy Head of Training. The F/O will also kept his job as Deputy Director of Flight Operations. The F/O involved also passed his command assessment with the same Captain the week before the RTO (he was one of only 2 of 14 F/O’s that pass the assessment). He will still be promoted in January. Both pilots received additional simulator training in the use of the flap lever and checklist, but no other action was taken against the crew.
The RTO happened at a time of much discontent over pay, contracts, procedures and allegations of heavy handed tactics by the (ex Ryanair) DFO, big issues and big distractions for the pilots. The RTO, all the distractions and the survival of the DFO’s two most senior manager’s has raised big credibility issues for the flight operations department both inside the company. Only last week managers were called into question again after an unsecured cart ran out of control along the complete length of a B757 cabin smashing into an open flight deck door during landing. This will be a separate topic.
battered BA subsidiary’s problems. The CEO recently sent an internal memo about direct entry captains joining from BA next month. It stated Open Skies was not making a profit. After almost 3 years, how much longer can the subsidiary survive?
Second Law
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With gain up to full BOAC we have:
"If you can't do it, teach.
If you can't teach, teach teachers.
If you can't teach teachers, go into educational administration."
CW
"If you can't do it, teach.
If you can't teach, teach teachers.
If you can't teach teachers, go into educational administration."
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Sounds like they handled it better than a well known middle european flag carrier some years back - 747, Hong Kong. Rushed pushback, taxi and lineup - no one set takeoff flaps. Captain sets takeoff thrust, hits TO/GA, config warning, chooses to continue and instead sets the flap lever to 20. Only 10 knots before Vr (according to the post-incident analysis) were the flaps in the correct position for takeoff. Sound judgement....
Mistrust in Management
Same thing happened in BA (real BA, not Open Skies) out of BHX some number of years ago. 737, no flaps at start of roll - take-off config warning so the Capt selected flap 5 which was achieved by rotate - the Capt found himself in the RH seat in double quick time.
Regards
Exeng
Regards
Exeng
