BA pax tried to halt 777 take-off after taxiing error
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M. Mouse: Extensive research in the oil industry has shown that a just culture trumps a no-blame culture as reckless and irressponsible behaviour deserves blame and retrubution (errors don't).
411: 'BA responsbile for one 777 accident' - applying a blame culture there?
411: 'BA responsbile for one 777 accident' - applying a blame culture there?
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So, I gather that with your statement, re intersection takeoffs, you were quite OK and in agreement with the concerned pilots actions?
The shorter the runway the better, perhaps?
The shorter the runway the better, perhaps?
Utter rubbish.
You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.
Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.
You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.
Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.
As for this quote....hmmm...sometimes its more the "runway ahead" of you when you do a high speed RTO.........
So I beg to differ - I am not talking utter rubbish.
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Shell Management: M.Mouse wrote:
My bold. Isn't that the same as a just culture? I think you may be getting into semantics.
Given that BA has an open and 'no blame' safety reporting culture with the exception of actions deemed negligent
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With only one tiller, I presume the F/O would fly the aircraft from right hand seat, land, stop it on runway, apply brakes and await tug?
(or am I being unkind?)
Quote:
A take off from the full length would have used a higher derate, and consequently the aircraft would need more runway, than from an intersection where a higher power setting would be used, and consequently less runway needed. A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade.
Utter rubbish.
You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.
Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.
Quote:
A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade
As for this quote....hmmm...sometimes its more the "runway ahead" of you when you do a high speed RTO.........
A take off from the full length would have used a higher derate, and consequently the aircraft would need more runway, than from an intersection where a higher power setting would be used, and consequently less runway needed. A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade.
Utter rubbish.
You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.
Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.
Quote:
A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade
As for this quote....hmmm...sometimes its more the "runway ahead" of you when you do a high speed RTO.........
What surprises me the most is those at BA here (both retired and 'current'), whom are trying (with very limited success) to justify the actions of these two bozos, under discussion.
It is quite clear from the AAIB report, that the UKCAA thinks otherwise.
I was quite willing to present this as a learning experience, thereby saving these guys their positions.
However, having read a few 'odd' comments from former and retired BA pilots, I have changed my mind.
Rather than change this into a 'learning experience' for BA, these bozos deserve to be sacked (or severely demoted), forthwith.
Wonder if they were?
BA, perhaps trying to tie AirFrance in the hull loss ratings?
It can't be long before this happens, with BA 'obtuse' flight ops procedures
This very serious incident has exposed BA for what they truly are...an airline whose aircraft are crewed by pilots whom have few (perhaps outdated) ideas of what they are correctly doing.
Oh, how the mighty have fallen.
How very sad.
Last edited by 411A; 4th Sep 2010 at 18:18.
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to justify the actions of these two bozos
Did anyone die? No
Did we all learn from the mistake? Yes
Are they "bozos"? There but for the grace of your non existent God........
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By 411A
Did sim training for several ex BA pilots, most are OK but rather long winded self absorbed individuals. Yada, yada,yada .......
Having said this, as I have personally flown with several BA secconded crew at other airlines, found them to be quite good operators.
Just as good, in fact, as secconded QF crew, some years ago.
Just as good, in fact, as secconded QF crew, some years ago.
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fdr....
Bollocks! KAL did sack the national captain but the foreign squealer was done in by his own arrogance. When it was time for his contract renewal, flight administration did contact him asking about his interest in continuing. However his arrogance knew no bounds; to quote, " there're much better opportunities out there; we'll see about it ". Well flight administration thought it was better to be done with him!
His identity was divulged by a fellow expat, the hamburger!
Coming back to the incident, he made no attempt to reach the crew ( when he was augment captain sitting in the forward cabin within reach of the cockpit or interphone ). He let the incident happened so that he can be " one up ". My fellow pilots know him as a self aggrandizing individual with a lot of heroic schemes and anecdotes which we have to bear with on long flights with him.
Better outcome so far than the KAL 30 ton over weight departure from Chicago in a B777.
KAL sacked the national captain, messed over the FO, and ultimately got rid of the foreign pilot who reported the problem confidentially on the undertaking that the captain, aircraft, and airport would not be identified, due to the pathologically punitive culture. Apparently the reporters confidentiality was breached in about a week following the undertaking by the head of safety
KAL sacked the national captain, messed over the FO, and ultimately got rid of the foreign pilot who reported the problem confidentially on the undertaking that the captain, aircraft, and airport would not be identified, due to the pathologically punitive culture. Apparently the reporters confidentiality was breached in about a week following the undertaking by the head of safety
His identity was divulged by a fellow expat, the hamburger!
Coming back to the incident, he made no attempt to reach the crew ( when he was augment captain sitting in the forward cabin within reach of the cockpit or interphone ). He let the incident happened so that he can be " one up ". My fellow pilots know him as a self aggrandizing individual with a lot of heroic schemes and anecdotes which we have to bear with on long flights with him.
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Did sim training for several ex BA pilots, most are OK but rather long winded self absorbed individuals........
It never changes, I suspect.
Endemic for the breed.
411A, note the following...
Coincidence or maybe not, but I've twice been lined up by assertive FO's at the wrong intersection and I've not picked it up due to the confident nature in which they have assured me that the performance calculations have permitted it. The first time it happened I was distracted during taxi by a cabin issue, and as we lined up (FO's tiller) I queried as to whether my colleague had rechecked the perf data for the intersection we were using, as it wasn't the one we'd briefed for and he assured me he had. Once airborne, owing to the fact that the piano keys had come up a lot sooner than I'd expected, I got the book out and found that we didn't have any figures for that intersection, even though other companies were using it...(confirmation bias??)., and the second time, the FO was polite enough to admit to me and to the TWR, he'd got the wrong intersection and we backtracked to the one we'd briefed for. (BA franchise operation/geriatric early jets)
Now, both these lads were ex Air Force, and both went on to BA (back in the 90s) and I'm wondering if the psychometric profiles that each of these employers used then had sufficient bias on airmanship to truly support a leg and leg about P1 / P1(S) operation, as even though whilst I was the Captain in each case, I attributed too much credibility to their advocacy and their decision making due to the confident nature of the pre take off brief and the "captaincy" being demonstrated. In effect I was a left hand seat co pilot. They didn't seem to understand the role of the captain as the final arbiter of the decision making process and to my shame I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".
Having therefore been there, done that, got the T shirt, I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.
Now, both these lads were ex Air Force, and both went on to BA (back in the 90s) and I'm wondering if the psychometric profiles that each of these employers used then had sufficient bias on airmanship to truly support a leg and leg about P1 / P1(S) operation, as even though whilst I was the Captain in each case, I attributed too much credibility to their advocacy and their decision making due to the confident nature of the pre take off brief and the "captaincy" being demonstrated. In effect I was a left hand seat co pilot. They didn't seem to understand the role of the captain as the final arbiter of the decision making process and to my shame I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".
Having therefore been there, done that, got the T shirt, I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.
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...I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.
ANY airline management that would allow a co-pilot to presume that they are in charge of anything, is daft in the extreme.
BA is a perfect example of the odd man out, IE: daft ideas in progress.
British Airways...complete and utter malfeasance, of the highest order, with the crew under discussion.
Last edited by 411A; 4th Sep 2010 at 23:23.
Controversial, moi?
M. Mouse: Extensive research in the oil industry has shown that a just culture trumps a no-blame culture as reckless and irressponsible behaviour deserves blame and retrubution (errors don't).
As usual, the best contribution to this thread has come from PJ2, thank you sir for your eminently sensible and logical contributions on this and many other threads over the years.
Risk assessment is mandatory in most organisations that operate a Safety Management System nowadays whenever a new or changed procedure is introduced. Runway incursions are a fact of life, especially at busy airports so any procedure that helps to mitigate the risk should be identified. This can range from what my mob does - a simple reiteration of the taxy routing and a turn by turn commentary from the PF (who always taxies the a/c 411) on where he is going before he makes the turn, to relatively cheap RAAS from Honeywell et al which is available at very little cost.
This loss of SA by the BA crew could be due to any number of reasons - all of them human and all of them traps lying in wait for the rest of us - no matter that 411 appears to be immune to these! Identifying threats and preventing them turning into mistakes is at the very heart of Threat and Error Management. We are all humans and WILL make mistakes, nothing is surer. Being aware of the potential threats and enunciating them as a team - such as the FSF ALAR Risk Assessment Checklist for approach and landing is just one way of doing this. There are many others, all of them useful. What should not be acceptable in the modern world is the concept of nobody being prepared to speak up whenever he's not happy with something. Unfortunately is continues to happen due to experience and cultural reasons, especially in those parts of the world where authority is almost sacrosanct. Perhaps a factor in the A321 accident at Islamabad?
Our Ops Manual allows us to accept intersection departures but I will never intentionally leave runway behind me and I teach my student F/Os and Captains my reasons for this. While the RTOW figures may state that we have the performance for an intersection takeoff, how would you feel if, having performed one of these, something went wrong in the RTO case and you ended up with just the nosewheel in the grass? You're now facing a serious incident enquiry instead of a simple RTO had you used the full length! It may be a cliche but runway behind you is still of those three most useless things in aviation and that hasn't changed since the Wright Brothers.
The division of responsibilities on the flight deck will always be a source of argument among pilots. BA operates a particular type of monitored system that works perfectly well for them. In another existence, I used these procedures and they work very well and are particularly useful during an approach to minimums. There are many other SOPs that work equally well for their operators and I wouldn't have the arrogance to presume that my particular set is better than anyone else's. What is important is that the crew sticks exactly to whatever procedures they have in their company as they give a certain level of certainty to each pilot that he knows what to expect from the other. In this sense, there are probably no bad SOPs - just that some may be better thought out than others.
For 411: you are perfectly entitled to your view on the role of the F/O. However, I firmly believe that giving the F/O as musch authority as possible from the very beginning is the best way to go in the long run. Our 250hr F/Os start the engines, handle all comms with the ground engineer and taxy, takeoff and fly the aircraft from A to B perfectly safely. They do not have the arrogance to believe that they are in charge of the a/c but we give them the licence to make as many of the decisions as possible and if I'm not happy with a course of action I will (gently) query why he/she thinks he/she would do it his/her way and try to educate them on what I believe they may have missed. For 411's benefit, in the past 15 years my F/O has picked up my mistakes more often that I have picked up his! It is a two-man operation with the Captain as leader of the team but with input required and expected from the F/O - even if it happens to be wrong. It is how the Capt handles this kind of situation that will ultimately determine the lesson that the F/O learns from it. mY sincere thanks to all those Captains who over the years gently educated me to get to where I am today.
Risk assessment is mandatory in most organisations that operate a Safety Management System nowadays whenever a new or changed procedure is introduced. Runway incursions are a fact of life, especially at busy airports so any procedure that helps to mitigate the risk should be identified. This can range from what my mob does - a simple reiteration of the taxy routing and a turn by turn commentary from the PF (who always taxies the a/c 411) on where he is going before he makes the turn, to relatively cheap RAAS from Honeywell et al which is available at very little cost.
This loss of SA by the BA crew could be due to any number of reasons - all of them human and all of them traps lying in wait for the rest of us - no matter that 411 appears to be immune to these! Identifying threats and preventing them turning into mistakes is at the very heart of Threat and Error Management. We are all humans and WILL make mistakes, nothing is surer. Being aware of the potential threats and enunciating them as a team - such as the FSF ALAR Risk Assessment Checklist for approach and landing is just one way of doing this. There are many others, all of them useful. What should not be acceptable in the modern world is the concept of nobody being prepared to speak up whenever he's not happy with something. Unfortunately is continues to happen due to experience and cultural reasons, especially in those parts of the world where authority is almost sacrosanct. Perhaps a factor in the A321 accident at Islamabad?
Our Ops Manual allows us to accept intersection departures but I will never intentionally leave runway behind me and I teach my student F/Os and Captains my reasons for this. While the RTOW figures may state that we have the performance for an intersection takeoff, how would you feel if, having performed one of these, something went wrong in the RTO case and you ended up with just the nosewheel in the grass? You're now facing a serious incident enquiry instead of a simple RTO had you used the full length! It may be a cliche but runway behind you is still of those three most useless things in aviation and that hasn't changed since the Wright Brothers.
The division of responsibilities on the flight deck will always be a source of argument among pilots. BA operates a particular type of monitored system that works perfectly well for them. In another existence, I used these procedures and they work very well and are particularly useful during an approach to minimums. There are many other SOPs that work equally well for their operators and I wouldn't have the arrogance to presume that my particular set is better than anyone else's. What is important is that the crew sticks exactly to whatever procedures they have in their company as they give a certain level of certainty to each pilot that he knows what to expect from the other. In this sense, there are probably no bad SOPs - just that some may be better thought out than others.
For 411: you are perfectly entitled to your view on the role of the F/O. However, I firmly believe that giving the F/O as musch authority as possible from the very beginning is the best way to go in the long run. Our 250hr F/Os start the engines, handle all comms with the ground engineer and taxy, takeoff and fly the aircraft from A to B perfectly safely. They do not have the arrogance to believe that they are in charge of the a/c but we give them the licence to make as many of the decisions as possible and if I'm not happy with a course of action I will (gently) query why he/she thinks he/she would do it his/her way and try to educate them on what I believe they may have missed. For 411's benefit, in the past 15 years my F/O has picked up my mistakes more often that I have picked up his! It is a two-man operation with the Captain as leader of the team but with input required and expected from the F/O - even if it happens to be wrong. It is how the Capt handles this kind of situation that will ultimately determine the lesson that the F/O learns from it. mY sincere thanks to all those Captains who over the years gently educated me to get to where I am today.
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Now, both these lads were ex Air Force, and both went on to BA (back in the 90s) and I'm wondering if the psychometric profiles that each of these employers used then had sufficient bias on airmanship to truly support a leg and leg about P1 / P1(S) operation, as even though whilst I was the Captain in each case, I attributed too much credibility to their advocacy and their decision making due to the confident nature of the pre take off brief and the "captaincy" being demonstrated. In effect I was a left hand seat co pilot. They didn't seem to understand the role of the captain as the final arbiter of the decision making process and to my shame I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".
....I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".
I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.
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411a, your immaturity is truly quite scary.
If I didn't think you were a 17 year old wind-up merchant sitting there in your undies flicking endlessly between pprune and PPorn hoping to god your mum don't walk in I might actually take offence at your drivel.
One things for sure with the regularity of your posts you seem to have very little else to do with your day.
If I didn't think you were a 17 year old wind-up merchant sitting there in your undies flicking endlessly between pprune and PPorn hoping to god your mum don't walk in I might actually take offence at your drivel.
One things for sure with the regularity of your posts you seem to have very little else to do with your day.
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I'm surprised that 411a allows mere co-pilots to actually fly the aircraft at all, if taxying is beyond them and dangerous. It beggars belief that such attitudes still exist in management and trainers. We can argue all day as to the role reversal and BA, but to suggest that a commercial pilot is incapable of safely taxying an aircraft is just plain stupid.
In the Olde Days of Yore, when BEA were introducing their monitored approach technique, to the amazement of all the rest of the Worlds' Airline Pilots, a Pan Am ( Ahhhh ! ) Captain approached us in the Idlewild Customs Hall under the impression that BOAC and BEA were one and the same ( 15 years later they were ) and told us that Pan Am had always used a monitored approach !
Oh! Really ? Yes, he said - I fly, he monitors.
I had left BA before the procedure had spread to the 747 fleet, so cannot comment, but I had no problem with the concept that one pilot handled the hardware start to finish, and the other carried out the co-pilot duties, didn't matter which seat was handling the hardware, but as Captain I made the decisions for actions that weren't obvious, or routine. Seemed to work, but then we had a Flight Engineer to do all the real work !
Oh! Really ? Yes, he said - I fly, he monitors.
I had left BA before the procedure had spread to the 747 fleet, so cannot comment, but I had no problem with the concept that one pilot handled the hardware start to finish, and the other carried out the co-pilot duties, didn't matter which seat was handling the hardware, but as Captain I made the decisions for actions that weren't obvious, or routine. Seemed to work, but then we had a Flight Engineer to do all the real work !
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I agree with you Juan, as per my last post on the matter.
411a says in one breath a F/O is capable, inteligent, qualified to fly the aircraft, even if said genius as 411a become incapcitated or God forbid, die and get the aircraft not only from A to B but actually get the aircraft on the ground, where in his second breath the F/O suddenly becomes so incompetent, unqualified, uninteligent and incapable of moving same aircraft from one slab of concrete to another.
The F/O is clearly capable to handle throttles to make the aircraft go forward/faster, but is incapable to handle the tiller to control the aircraft on the ground
The bloke is a joke beyond anything resembling credible.
AFOS
411a says in one breath a F/O is capable, inteligent, qualified to fly the aircraft, even if said genius as 411a become incapcitated or God forbid, die and get the aircraft not only from A to B but actually get the aircraft on the ground, where in his second breath the F/O suddenly becomes so incompetent, unqualified, uninteligent and incapable of moving same aircraft from one slab of concrete to another.
The F/O is clearly capable to handle throttles to make the aircraft go forward/faster, but is incapable to handle the tiller to control the aircraft on the ground
The bloke is a joke beyond anything resembling credible.
AFOS
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Ryanair boss says air stewardesses should be allowed to land planes in an emergency - Telegraph
