United 967 diverted to DIA -- turbulence injuries

[aterpster]

protectthehornet:

(and please, I do know a plane can't go straight down....a bit of circling might have been involved for a divert to MCI...but not so very much)

Very little with spoilers out.

They must have flown for almost an hour to get to KDEN. They could have been on the ground at KMCI in 10-15 minutes.

I suspect more than a few questions are being asked about "nearest suitable."

[protectthehornet]

aterpster, yes I agree with you. I put that bit in for some of the guys who would say that you need a long time to get down etc. I figure about 102 flying miles to get down, with slow down at 10k.

MCI would have been just fine, the choice of Denver was money related(plane would be on the ground for awhile getting checked over) in my view as a convenience to United. Granted, finding a plane to continue would be easier at Denver, though it could have been flown quickly to MCI to pick up people.

I think MCI is an under utilized airport these days.

[SaturnV]

protectthehornet, the remain in your seat rule for KDCA flights (for 30 minutes after takeoff and for 30 minutes before landing) was ended around 2005 or 2006.

[SaturnV]

aterpster:

at 8:00PM EDT, began descending from FL 380 to 340, and changed heading from 255 to 247. Groundspeed 464 knots.

at 8:14 PM EDT (time of the turbulence) was at FL 340 and a heading of 254. Groundspeed of 459 knots. (Had been at 482 knots at 8:09 PM.) Then ramped up the groundspeed to as high as 499 knots.

Began the descent into Denver at 9:07 PM; at FL 240 at 9:19PM; at FL 146 at 9:27 PM; at FL 54 at 9:35 PM; landed at 9:40 PM.

Doubt they could have been on the ground at MCI in 10 or 15 minutes.

[aterpster]

SaturnV:

at 8:00PM EDT, began descending from FL 380 to 340, and changed heading from 255 to 247. Groundspeed 464 knots.

at 8:14 PM EDT (time of the turbulence) was at FL 340 and a heading of 254. Groundspeed of 459 knots. (Had been at 482 knots at 8:09 PM.) Then ramped up the groundspeed to as high as 499 knots.

Began the descent into Denver at 9:07 PM; at FL 240 at 9:19PM; at FL 146 at 9:27 PM; at FL 54 at 9:35 PM; landed at 9:40 PM.

Doubt they could have been on the ground at MCI in 10 or 15 minutes.

I based my previous statement on an earlier statement that the encounter happened 60 miles west of MCI.

Your time-line of the events does not have position, but nonetheless strongly suggests landing at MCI would have been the nearest suitable airport (assuming reasonable terminal area weather).

[protectthehornet]

I read in an earlier post that theplane was 60 miles SouthEast of MCI when it hit turbulence. MCI was 10 minutes flying time to over the top of the airport (direct) Even at a relaxed 2000fpm, the plane would have been over the top at about 14000feet or so. Vectors for final and descent another 10 minutes or so and that is being pretty conservative.

Granted, the crew would have had to declare an emergency to get priority handling and I don't know what the surface wx was at MCI.

I've got alot of respect for a nearby first class airport with a major city nearby. But flying another hour plus 26 minutes isn't my first choice.

(didn't know thay had dropped the DCA rule...thanks)

[pattern_is_full]

According to the radar track: FlightAware > United Air Lines #967 > 20-Jul-2010 > KIAD-KDEN

the diversion turn begins about 1/2 way across Kansas (actually south into Oklahoma) - so more like 200 nm from KMCI, not 60 nm.

The actual event may have occured closer to KMCI, but presumably it took a few flying minutes for the shaken-up cabin crew to triage the injuries and report to the cockpit, and for the cockpit to decide a diversion was in order - at which point the difference in flight time between KDEN and KMCI (with a 180 turn) may have been less significant.

Also - IF the event took place near Kansas City, somehow turning back into the same weather pattern does not seem like a prime choice. "Hey, that was fun! Let's go back and see if we can hit that bump again!"

[lomapaseo]

pattern is Full

the diversion turn begins about 1/2 way across Kansas (actually south into Oklahoma) - so more like 200 nm from KMCI, not 60 nm.

The actual event may have occured closer to KMCI, but presumably it took a few flying minutes for the shaken-up cabin crew to triage the injuries and report to the cockpit, and for the cockpit to decide a diversion was in order - at which point the difference in flight time between KDEN and KMCI (with a 180 turn) may have been less significant.

Also - IF the event took place near Kansas City, somehow turning back into the same weather pattern does not seem like a prime choice. "Hey, that was fun! Let's go back and see if we can hit that bump again!"

Agree

I've been aboard a similar flight where it took some time (more than a hundred miles of flight) to assess the injuries, coordinate with ground and then decide on the availability of emergency resources to treat the injuries on the ground the quickest. Ultimately we continued for 2 more hours to our destination and were met by several ambulances to take the injured off.

Importantly the first priority was to determine if the persons were in a stable or worsening condition. Lots of help is available both on the flight as well as from ground communications to lessen the load on the captain.

[protectthehornet]

in many modern jetliners, the turbulence is ''felt'' more in the back than the front.

However, do you really think it took 10 minutes for the cabin crew to intercom the pilots and say...we have injuries back here.?

And certainly, descending while changing heading would likely take you out of the area of turbulence. it wasn't convective turbulence ,or so we have been lead to believe.

with some 30 injuries, triage, while a nice term, should have been almost immediate...people screaming, thrown around the cabin and so forth.

while coordinating with the ground is nice, situational awareness (nearest good airport) and command decisions should have been a bit quicker.

and how do you know the turbulence near the rockies and Denver wouldn't be worse?

Turbulenece...(as pilot, control the plane, check on pax)

hear of injuries...do I waste time and call the doctor on the sat phone (many airlines have medical advisory units available)? Or do I say, Kansas City, one of the largest metro areas in the midwest, with an airport designed with the SST in mind (ancient history now) is 10 minutes away?

Yeah, 1hour and 26 minutes to Denver...

Well, we truly don't know all the details, but I will say this, over and over: its time to remember SAFETY over money and convenience.

But good United Pilots do what they are told by dispatch...oh forget that I even wrote that!!! I wonder what they would have done if all the engines quit out of LGA? Would they have called dispatch for an idea?

[IGh]

20July -- Afternoon-evening TRWs SQ

Suggestion in message #37:

"... hope someone does some nice Forensic Meteorology work to find out what was going on..."

The surface wx-reports tell why the pilots elected to NOT descend into MCI.

?? Please, could one of you computer-guys post the image of the MCI (EAX) Radar Summary Chart for 21July at 0015z ???

“… about 60 miles southeast of Kansas City ... 40 miles north of Springfield, Missouri …”

Mishap turbulence reported on 20Jul, at "1814 MDT" =1914 CDT (= 21Jul/0014z)

Here are surface wx rpts near that mishap position ---

KSZL (SE of Kansas City, aka Sizzling Misery, a bomber base)
OBS:Whiteman Air Force Base

At Whiteman AFB, 20July was a hot summer day, 91F; until TRW moved-in after 5pm CDT;
temperatures then cooled 21 degrees-F between 5pm and 7:18pm.

Time............ Temp. Dew Relative... Wind ..Visibility... WX Clouds
(CDT) ............ (f) .... (f) ..... (%) .... (mph).. (miles)

20 Jul 4:55 pm 91 78 67 S9 10.00 FEW210

20 Jul 5:27 pm 88 79 75 SSE6 6.00 -TSRA BKN035

20 Jul 5:41 pm 86 79 79 CALM 4.00 TSRA BKN016 BKN030

20 Jul 5:55 pm 84 79 86 SSE6 3.00 -TSRA BKN017 BKN032CB BKN095

20 Jul 6:38 pm 79 72 79 WNW30 10.00 TS SQ BKN039

20 Jul 6:46 pm 75 72 89 NW23G48 1.50 +TSRA FEW002 SCT022CB OVC040

20 Jul 6:48 pm 73 70 89 NNW23G48 1.00 +TSRA BR FEW002 SCT022CB OVC040

20 Jul 6:55 pm 73 70 90 NNW18G40 0.75 +TSRA BR FEW002 BKN017 OVC040

20 Jul 7:18 pm 70 68 94 NNE16G31 3.00 -TSRA BR FEW002 SCT008 OVC055

20 Jul 7:55 pm 72 67 87 NE7 6.00 -TSRA BKN080

20 Jul 8:43 pm 73 68 83 NE3 7.00 -TSRA BKN044CB SCT095

[protectthehornet]

airport wx observations are very important and I mentioned that I didn't have them for MCI at the time.

I still don't. You didn't post MCI.

Now, if MCI had thunderstorms in progress and no one else was landing or taking off, your point will be quite valid.

When I spoke of Forensic meteorology, I meant for the cause of the turbulence...and if there were Thunderstorms nearby, well, NO one should have been out of their seats. So far, i am under the impression it was not due to convective activity...but we shall see.

[IGh]

Convective activity in mishap area at that time

MCI obs' are available for seven days, go look:
OBS:Kansas City, Kansas City International Airport

I was more interested to see if convective activity was passing near that SZL- mishap location. Judging from surface wx-obs, it appears there were cells passing that mishap area. Hope somebody can recover the archived EAX radar composite at 21Jul/ 0015z.

[SaturnV]

IGh, the archived composite radar for 21 July is not up yet. The image from 2300 hours on July 20 suggests a deviation north was not an inviting option.



Here is the link to the composite radar archives (national)
Selected NEXRAD National Mosaic Reflectivity Image

[protectthehornet]

if the image is along the flight path as I might think...everyone should have been in their seats including the FA's... we shall see

[Loose rivets]

There's a growing tendency for the skipper to play safe and leave the seat belts on for hours at a time - once recently after a prolonged announcement about staying put in one's seat. This is fine, for freight, but hundreds of people can't do without the loos. They've become miniaturized and down in number anyway, saying you can't get to them is just another last straw. (about the 10th last straw on one flight, last time.)

I was one of the first people I know of that asked my passengers to 'Keep your seat-belts lightly fastened whenever possible when the lights are not on.' People knew what I meant, and when I put the SB lights on, it meant I needed people to get strapped in.

Last 10 SLF I did, the lights were on so much that they were meaningless. There was some occasional light chop, and of course, I wasn't privy to met reports, but there was nothing but blue sky. People just gave up waiting for permission to go to the loo. CC made no comment during the whole 10 hours.

[aterpster]

pattern is full:

Also - IF the event took place near Kansas City, somehow turning back into the same weather pattern does not seem like a prime choice. "Hey, that was fun! Let's go back and see if we can hit that bump again!"

If TRWs were involved I qould agree. But, if it were only CAT, turning around at a significantly lower altitude would almost certainly avoid a repeat.

[pattern_is_full]

"However, do you really think it took 10 minutes for the cabin crew to intercom the pilots and say...we have injuries back here.?" PTH

I'm just going by the radar track - for whatever reason, the flight did not deviate off course (and towards Denver) until about 200 nm past the reported location of the upset.

I suppose the crew may have made the decision earlier and was just staying south to avoid that long line of storms (a pretty impressive demarkation of the "dry line," BTW) - the same line that ends in a big patch of red right over KMCI. Their eventual path to KDEN goes through/over the thinnest part of the line.

[IGh]

Nice squall line -- THANKS for that image

SaturnV -- Thanks for that 23z radar image. AND thanks for posting the B777's TRACK, showing that pilots had TURNED (?perhaps a deviation around TRW displayed on the ship's Wx-Radar ?).

The mishap happened about one-hour later than that 23z Radar image. The B777 was south EAST of Kansas City at 1914cdt (21st/0014z).

Surface obs' suggest the squall line was passing MCI more than an hour before it pushed over KSZL. With that typical squall line there, I wouldn't try to penetrate in the lower altitudes, for fear of too many adjacent-cells composing the LINE of TRWs. Be easier just to keep laterally far from cells.

No Cockpit Image Recorder onboard to show just what the pilots observed on their Wx-Radar displays. Since today's airliners now have ONBOARD internet, ??? I wonder if now pilots can use the real-time web-display of the midwest thunderstorms, far before ship's Wx-Radar begins to show the 160mn display??? [Maybe only the passengers get to see the EAX dopplar composite on their laptops, pilots still must not use any modern real-time ground-based radar images for planning TRW-avoidance.]

[vanHorck]

Loose rivets,

Thank you for that. Your statement is 100% true. It has to do with the psychology of dealing with the clients, but last time I attempted to state the same here, I got slammed by several "pilots"....

[IGh]

? L1011 atop cell over Salina -- cont'd to LAX ?

Aterpster -- can't find the records on that L10 that topped that cell over Salina, FO told me that the erupting HAIL from the cell-top engulfed the L10 for more than a minute, busted (cracks) the Windscreen too badly for any forward visibility, crew cont'd to LAX, then did an autoland at LAX, found baseball sized dings in the Wing LE and Eng Cowl. (Someone wrote-up that case but I can't locate the records.)

You surely recall that case --- ? when was that ?

= = = = // = = ==

Looking at past TRW-Turb injury cases, I see that Air France 4 / 13May74 encountered Moderate/ Severe Turb, over O'Neil Nebraska, lasting four minutes, with serious injuries -- pilots elected to continue to Paris, landed Orly seven hours after the injuries were suffered.