AA crew fed up with JFK ATC - declares emergency.

[Guy D'ageradar]

jj330

He now gives the BINGO code (emergency in his mind) because he is fuel tight and makes an alternative plan

I have only listened to one part of this tape (the "declaration" of emergency) and at no point was any "bingo" code or other indication of the type of emergency given.

Please provide a link to any other tape that does contain such a statement.

As for the controller's "fly runway heading" - I am unaware of policy in the US, however, in many busy airports elsewhere, the tower controllers (or, at least, a large percentage of them) are NOT radar rated and therefore absolutely forbidden from given anything other than "straight ahead" in the event of a g/a unlesss otherwise approved by local instructions/procedures.

Again, I know not the procedures in force at JFK but this could easily account for the instruction, while coordination was effected with the appropriate radar guy/gal.

Perhaps someone more enlightened can confirm or otherwise.

[Pugilistic Animus]

As painful as it maybe... perhaps nothing came of his emergency actions 91.3 states...written report ...if requested
if I were captain I would want to assure traffic clearance hence I would perhaps keep ATC more in the loop---I might suspect the vectors were for traffic separation...this did not seem like a falling out of the sky emergency..hence 91.3 has the extent required provision...and folks have been violated... in one case a suspension for an airspace incursion despite having declared an emergency...suspended on 91.3 and 91.13 and 91...the one about adherence to clearance...

PS he did not initially declare an emergency only the he would if he did not get 31R so the declaration came late...very late

enough Monday morning quarterbacking from me ...I can't fly another guy's ship

[Bearcat]

I made a post and was moderated and deleted forthwith as it was obviously deemed too searching. From what I see the crew could have advised ATC on appr to 22 that w/v was out of limits and requested rwy 31R.....no, the ATC tx's certainly do not advance confidence from the AA crew.....panic imo. They then after declaring an emergency, were requested to go straight ahead off 22.....nope, they did a split ars@ visual LH turn to line up with rwy 31. If they were on final reserve fuel executing the orignial approach, they had a onus to report same to ATC. From my findings they did not land with less than 30mins fuel on board.....likewise La Guardia,etc etc airports were at their disposal.........

[Jetjock330]

From my findings they did not land with less than 30mins fuel on board.....likewise La Guardia,etc etc airports were at their disposal

Picture this:
He diverts to La Guardia, to land with 30 minutes and all is well until the controller gives him a new crosswind component that exceeds his limitation on final approach. If he goes around, he will land with less than 30 minutes and be in an emergency. There fore he informs the controller the exact phrase, as in the current tape, "we can't accept that crosswind limitation, we are landing on XX runway and if you don't give to us, we are declaring an emergency". As you can see, even by diverting, it can put us back to square one as per this case. Is is possible to divert to LA Guardia and not exactly going to solve this scenario!

[WhatsaLizad?]

Just a couple of experiences from a US pilot dealing with busy US controllers (one of the top 3 busy airports, another not so):

We had weather and holding and ended up telling approach "one more turn, then it's direct to the airport or divert"

Right at keying the mic for divert we are cleared out of the hold, and promised " to get us right in, you're number one, direct to the airport"

Fuel was planned and "ok" for the approach...............

What happened? 20 mile downwind, 180 degree turn to airport, 20 mile final, 40 mile round trip that was considered "direct". Those who are crew here can do the fuel burn plan at 180Kts with flaps and slats out. 14 extra minutes with 1 available extra minute of flight sometimes doesn't add up.

We fly the airplanes, not ATC, they have enough work to do and we help them as much as we can, but sometimes (very rarely) they need to be told who's the Skipper.

Example #2: We are cruising by another airport and hear a B757 declare an emergency, smoke in the cockpit, emergency descent into major US airport. Following along the frequencies, we can tell the crew was serious, yet professional and calm, yet obviously were on oxygen masks.

What happened? on switchover to tower while proceeding to the airport, (also cleared 300Kts+ below 10K), tower tells them, "Roger emergency aircraft airline XYZ,.........slow to 180Kts,.....you're number 3 for the runway 10".

Both of us monitoring pilots were stunned what we heard.

Consider also that in the JFK case, it may have been both a New "Yawk" controller and a New "Yawk pilot. Given the right conditions, they probably would be buying each other beers and laughing about it 2 hours later while we here on PPrune go on for days. Those guys up there are in a whole different country compared to the rest of us in the USA.

[p51guy]

Advising JFK you would continue approach but unless you were at 29 knot xwind restriction before landing you would be required to go around would have been an easier way of handling it. I think then you would have got that 22 knot report. Adding we have min fuel would have guaranteed it. It has been done this way since I got out of props. My last airport I frequented in Honduras we played this game all the time. We told them what the max tailwind could be and within minutes we had it. We were both happy.

For the doomsday people we took off over a cliff so it didn't matter much how high we were or rate of climb in our powerful 757. I know this post will make some people crazy but sometimes common sense prevails. Just make sure the report of wind keeps you legal. It is not your job to go up in the tower and verify it.

[NVpilot]

IRISHinUS

The controller's mistake, in my view, was to say that he would "pass on the request" or something to that effect, that showed an undue concern

I think maybe a trip to the tower would be in order, the approach controller is responsible to sequence / feed aircraft from the IFR system to the Local controller (VFR) who is in charge of the active runways, he does his sequencing with his eyes, from what I remember from the tape, the crew advised the Local controller that the runway was not acceptable and if you don't give us RW31 we will...yada yada. The controller acknowledges this, but the AA crew up to this point made no indication that the aircraft needed to be on the ground NOW, so without proper communication by the AA crew, the controller plans to advise the TRACON so re-sequencing can occur.

this would have transmitted to the crew that "this guy just doesn't get it"

Get what, again, the AA crew made no indication to ATC that I remember, that there is some urgency to land ASAP, so ATC did a fine job, and when the crew finally indicated that they had to turn left now and to move traffic out of the way, the controller immediately went into action.

Again, my advise is to go to the facility and get a little bit of an education on how the two facilities; TRACON and Tower work together.

[mustangsally]

Have not seen it here, maybe it is but, Boeing usually puts crosswind limits as demonstrate. There is a difference between demonstrated and limit. Some companys may turn this demonstrated into a limit.

The flight came from the west coast, as I understand. So the forcast wind was better than six hours old on arrival.

Fuel burn may have been over planned.

The flight might have been a redispatch. In some cases the alternate can be dropped along with the fuel to reach the alternate.

So the flight arrives near JFK with just holding fuel. Enters the hold, then gets vectored as only major airports can do. I don't know where he was holding or how many miles his vector intotal.

(EWR and LGA are close, say within 15 miles, but me thinks if you say we are going to EWR....you will end up almost over PHL if EWR is using the 4's. LGA would be the same. Today and for several years I've always brief Bradley, it is almost a straight shot to a not real busy airport.)

Aircraft had been landing with the winds, gusts very. When AA checked it was out of his limits, maybe when the next guy came in the winds were within that companies limits.

The crews performance or communication may seem to be lacking to some, but it got the job done and no metal was damaged. More importantly every one walked safely of the airplane.

Me thinks this tread is getting over extended.

[SeniorDispatcher]

I'm not privy to what went on behind the scenes as to the planning and conduct of the AAL flight, so I'll not comment on the validity of some of the comments here.

That said, compare and contrast the recording of the AAL2/JFK emergency with that of this one (just a day or two later) between COA9 and various EWR/N90 controllers as the 777 air interrupted back to EWR after a hydraulic issue.

COA9 edit.mp3 - File Shared from Box.net - Free Online File Storage

Granted, the context of what was driving the emergency declaration was different, but from a human factors perspective, I think the difference in tone and tenor is interesting.

[sabenaboy]

Originally Posted by SeniorDispatcher

Granted, the context of what was driving the emergency declaration was different,...

Indeed it was.

COA9 probably suffered a failure of a single hydraulic system. (I'll admit that I even didn't listen to more then the first few minutes of the conversation)

I'm not familiar with the 777, but I suppose that basically it means that the crew had no controllability problems and just needed some time to run through the check-list and to make an operational decision (return? divert? which rwy? etc.)

In this case there's no urgency whatsoever and the crew had plenty of fuel (perhaps still overweight for landing?) to sort thing out without having to hurry.

AAL2 was (probably) low on fuel and did (probably) not have much time to lose. VERY different scenarios, I would think.

I will refrain from commenting on the AAL2 case. The audio file does not give enough information about what exactly the situation was or about what happened earlier during the flight.

Best regards,
Sabenaboy

[747JJ]

FAA AIM Section 3. Distress and Urgency Procedures

I am a bit at loss with some of the comments here regarding the use of word MAYDAY in declaring an emergency. As it is many of the North American contributors seem to think that it is merely enough to state that you are declaring an emergency to the very strange view that the use of the word MAYDAY is discouraged. I hold and FAA ATP with several type ratings on large jets on my licence and while doing my PPL and CPL in US many moons ago had similar text in the AIM. Alas nothing has really changed.

You will find that AIM is quite clear with the matter.


6-3-1. Distress and Urgency Communications

c. The initial communication, and if considered necessary, any subsequent transmissions by an aircraft in distress should begin with the signal MAYDAY, preferably repeated three times. The signal PAN-PAN should be used in the same manner for an urgency condition

[de facto]

Thomson 757 engine stall during take off/bird strike

Proper RT,(maydayx3 ,Actions,Intentions)proper CRM(ATC/Crew). English text book work.

YouTube - ThomsonFly 757 bird strike & flames captured on video

[ONE GREEN AND HOPING]

Useful RT for Out-Of-Town visitors...

A while back, following the Avianca incident, I seem to recall a bulletin....or possibly a local Notam, reminding us foreigners that the words "MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY" will be recognised and provide a terse and immediately understood opening gambit for those whose first language is not American English. On a busy intermediate approach frequency, we can appreciate that this will give a highly pressured controller a couple of seconds to concentrate on your particular place in the scheme of things ahead of responding. For all you know, could be someone else with a problem having checked in ahead of you on frequency, or, again, also inbound on a different sector frequency.

I confess to being now around five years into retirement and therefor way out of date on the knock-on effect of current runway maintenance schedules, but on a normal day, I remember feeling a bit itchy when many of us were being fed into a Canarsi towards deteriorating conditions onto 13L, and although everyone ahead of us was going around, nothing mentioned on ATIS or approach freq prior to late change to Tower......bit of a waste of fuel, but I suppose time was needed by ATC to come up with a new plan, and turn everyone around and vector for a runway change. Rush hours at JFK are never going to be dull.....in the air, or on the ground.

Now, back in the early 1970s, when things were really..... ZZZzzzzzz....

[stator vane]

two cents--

i sit in the moving office and have several friends who sit in the tower office-

my take on the event--both were under stress, both were being human, both eventually got the job done--both will stay awake at night rethinking things they could have said and done better, but in my opinion-NO ONE should receive any blame! and we all are better for having listened to the tape.
but i don't understand this tendency to take sides on an event like this!

personally, all the tower/enroute personnel i have met, deserve all my respect-they are playing 3 dimensional chess with high speed chess pieces-

and yes, i do think that the airplanes started flying before ATC started, but they came in after a few aircraft flew into each other.

we need each other-

[Ditchdigger]

Originally Posted by 747JJ

I think no more arguments about what wording is required to declare an emergency in US of A.

FAA AIM Section 3. Distress and Urgency Procedures

6-3-1. Distress and Urgency Communications

c. The initial communication, and if considered necessary, any subsequent transmissions by an aircraft in distress should begin with the signal MAYDAY, preferably repeated three times. The signal PAN-PAN should be used in the same manner for an urgency condition

But, at the same time, the ATC Order 7110.65 says:

10-1-1. EMERGENCY DETERMINATIONS

a. An emergency can be either a Distress or an Urgency condition as defined in the “Pilot/Controller Glossary.”

b. A pilot who encounters a Distress condition should declare an emergency by beginning the initial communication with the word “Mayday,” preferably repeated three times. For an Urgency condition, the word “Pan‐Pan”should be used in the same manner.

c. If the words “Mayday” or “Pan‐Pan”are not used and you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency.

d. Because of the infinite variety of possible emergency situations, specific procedures cannot be prescribed. However, when you believe an emergency exists or is imminent, select and pursue a course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances and which most nearly conforms to the instructions in this manual.

(Bold added for emphasis.)

That puts the onus on the controller to treat the situation as an emergency even if the pilot never says the magic words.

I think the problem here is that the pilot essentially presented ATC with a potential "emergency" as a threat, in order to get his preferred runway. (on edit: Or at least that's how it comes across from the limited information that's publically available at this time--the LiveATC recording.) From the perspective of the controller, that really muddies the waters with respect to the "course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances." A more cooperative tone from the pilot earlier on might've led to this appearing to be the non-event that it ended up being.

(And as always, since I don't post here frequently, I add the disclaimer, I'm neither a pilot nor a controller, but my wife is an ATC, and this is the stuff of our dinner table conversations, and pillow talk...)

[Guy D'ageradar]

stator vane

Nicely put. ATC can greatly help pilots and vice versa. It should not be a wi!!y waving contest.

Notwithstanding the validity of the emergeny call, I believe the development of this situation would have been significantly different if the aircrew had simply indicated the nature of the problem. No need for snide remarks / repetition and everyone is immediately reading from the same script.

[de facto]

I agree we all make mistakes.However we are trained to break the chain as soon as possible,which i believe he didn't do,just making things worse by his actions and poor RT/poor CRM.
You are right in the fact that the Thomson event is often trained during the sim,and apparently the training paid off as they handled the engine stall quite well,therefore a relaxed PM and a proper RT.
Unfortunately pilots think the RT is some of a second grade (especially in the US, i flew there)but i believe it is essential to keep all in the loop and use all available help possible.
The AA had the A/P engaged,both engines running,in an airport quite used by AA.
If they had their last reserve of fuel they could have easily maintained the initial runway vector and taken an extra minute to allow the ATC to digest what is happening and come with a quick plan safe for ALL.
I just believe the captain over reacted in a somewhat non normal situation but what i am most worried about is the personality of such pilot and the risk he took just to make a point, that declaring an emergency gives you the right to engage other traffic into a potential lethal ending.

[controllerzhu]

Lack of clear communication is what I got from the transmissions (on both sides of the exchange). If the pilot was that concerned about his fuel situation in the U.S., Minimum or Emergency Fuel is declared with the word Emergency placing him at the front of the line. The Minimum fuel transmission would only alert us that he should not receive any undue delay. And what is a undue delay? That is subject to as many interpetations as there are pilots and controllers.

I have only heard one mayday call in my career with not a good outcome. But a clear, straight forward I AM DECLARING AN EMERGENCY will get any controllers immediate attention and they will move heaven and earth to get the flight safely on the ground. They really is no place in the pilot/controller on air relationship for bad attitudes. CZHU

[aterpster]

de facto:

I just believe the captain over reacted in a somewhat non normal situation but what i am most worried about is the personality of such pilot and the risk he took just to make a point, that declaring an emergency gives you the right to engage other traffic into a potential lethal ending.

That is a tad speculative and contrary to the layout of the airport. Check an airport diagram for the relative position of Runway 22L/R and Runway 31R. AAL 2 was visual, had Runway 31R in sight, and was aware that it was not being used (even though a very strong wind was right down the runway). It sounds to me that he had made an assessment that his safest and quickest course of action would be a left turn to a short downwind, base and final to 31R. Of course, this could have conflicted with traffic landing 22L or R, or it may not have. That conflict would have likely been the same had the controller mucked around with AAL 2. But, there was likely no traffic conflict south/southwest of the airport that the controller's heading assignment would have resolved.

I suspect the captain of AAL 2 sensed a "Long Island Tour" because of the heading assignment when a short circuit downwind, base, and final, in visual weather conditions, would have complied with the declared pilot's (read priority aircraft at this point) plan.

We still don't have the facts as to AAL 2's actual fuel state. Could be he has flown into JFK enough to recall Avianca in 1990 and how that was handled by the tower and the TRACON. Heaven forbid he may have acutally read that accident report.

[Auberon]

Make of this what you will, but AAL 2 is scheduled to take 5 hours, 35 minutes, arriving at KJFK at 17:35 local. According to FlightAware, on May 4 AAL 2 was in the air for 4:48, arriving at 16:56.