AA crew fed up with JFK ATC - declares emergency.

[ARFOR]

Very hard to discern from the JFK recording. Assuming the initial RT was from the FO [Crosswind i.e. likely the Capt PF], it sounds to me like a different voice [similar accent] assumes the RT as things start to escalate. Relevant? Who knows at this point. With regard comm’s, there is at least one over-transmission apparent [the tail end of a call from AA2 can be heard as ATC finishes a TX].

Time Traveller makes a good point re X-wind limits and emergency conditions, which has me wondering:-

- Were they on the GP? [height, miles to run] even though they are reported ‘visual’ once with the tower.

- Speed? [cross-downwind component aloft] inertia + GS to carry to touchdown?

Even if an ‘emergency’ was declared at that point [due X-wind limits and other factors unknown], where they were and what they had obviously made continuing with 22 a bad decision [in their eyes, which is all that matters].

From the inflections in the early transmissions [regarding LLZ failure] it is probable that the PNF was [generally speaking] not sounding very comfortable, obviously the same applied to the PF given the decision/s then taken.

The crew had time available to discuss/communicate with ATC [in this case the tower] repeatedly both before and during the deviation. It will be most interesting to learn why [at or before the beginning of the deviation from normal operations] they did not [even briefly] alert ATC as to 'why’ they needed immediate visual circling for 31. No services were requested so the approach and landing on 31 is presumed to have been 'normal'.

Timely [as is possible] Emergency [type and intentions] information in a busy environment is critical not only to ATC decision making in support of the emergency aircraft and other affected traffic, but to other surrounding aircrew for their decision making SA also.

Justifying the ‘aviate’, ‘navigate’ and, in this case ‘dictate’ to the exclusion of all else will be an interesting one to learn from.

[protectthehornet]

P51 guy makes a fine point. Sometimes controllers will tell you what you need to hear to land and not always the truth!

And if you listen to 1549/hudson...you will hear scully calling his flight 1539~

so, things do happen and things aren't just like in those great movies.

mayday comes from the French meaning: help me. AA2 didn't need help...he needed the runway he needed and he needed it now.

so he declared an emergency...and that is good enough to DICTATE.

I've gotten a huge kick out of this thread. There are some wimps out there that are pointing fingers ...but you might be the type of guy to get vectored into a mountain rather than question ATC and don't think it hasn't happened.

[340dog]

Just as good tonight in newark....wind 340/20 gusting 30...ils 22L with circle to 29.....50 degrees off runway at night to a non approach aid 65oo foot runway...

finally atis wind 320.20 gusting 30 for ils 22L but tower wind says 310/10 gusting 17 with turbulence below 4000 ft, finally wind at touchdown 310 at 8kts.....why not 4r...quartering tail wind all the way down to touch down.

i guess until you crash or declare an emergency, new york atc will use an out of wind runway....what a joke

[Guy D'ageradar]

arfor

The crew had time available to discuss/communicate with ATC [in this case the tower] repeatedly both before and during the deviation. It will be most interesting to learn why [at or before the beginning of the deviation from normal operations] they did not [even briefly] alert ATC as to 'why’ they needed immediate visual circling for 31. No services were requested so the approach and landing on 31 is presumed to have been 'normal'.

Precisely what I have been getting at.

This particular captain had no problem sniping at the controller that he had declared an emergency 3 times (albeit with the usual US dirsegard for established phraseology) but at no point appears to have given any indication of any problem other than an above limits crosswind.

Can anyone give a reasonable explanation why at least one of those opportunities was not used to give a clear and concise indication of what was wrong? It is much quicker on the RT to say "emergency fuel" than anything on that tape - IF that was the problem.

As for the method of runway selection, I agree completely - a farce.

[ARFOR]

pth

AA2 didn't need help...he needed the runway he needed and he needed it now.

That you can suggest that AA2 "didn't need help" is quite unbelievable.

To follow your argument through, you are implying:-

1. The crew had NO OPTION but to use 31, then and there. period
2. The crew knew where any airborne conflicting traffic was, and what actions those crew were going to take to avoid them
3. That ATC had the space to 'immediately' 'move' everyone else out of the way without causing other serious threats to safety of other airspace and airport users
4. The crew knew that 31 was [at short notice, 2-4mins from crossing the 31 threshold] useable [no vehicles, works etc in progress]
5. The crew knew that 31 was [at short notice, 2-4mins from crossing the 31 threshold] available to the tower controller to provide for its safe use by AA2

so he declared an emergency...and that is good enough to DICTATE.

An experienced AA 76 crew would not take the action they did without compelling reasons [we hope]. Let's see how "to the extent required" pans out

As for runway selection. Didn't someone mention that it is not the ATC's on the frequencies that decide, it is companies and FAA flow management that do!?!?

Presumably if all three airport traffic flows are co-dependent, then wind variations [maybe as WX patterns are moving through] at short notice are probably unavoidable in the short term whilst the complex trio of airport flows [Taxiing, Ready waiting, SID's, Vectoring, Sequencing] is turned around into wind.

[Pablo26]

MarkD, according to the AWE 1549 transcript Sully did transmit a "mayday mayday mayday" call to ATC:

http://imgsrv.wcbs880.com/image/wcbs...ile/420471.pdf

Apparently the first part of the transmission was blocked by the controller so you don't hear the mayday call on the ATC tape.

So for the "mayday" partisans -- Sully is on your side!

For what it's worth, I was taught during PPL training in southern California that "mayday mayday mayday" and "declaring an emergency" were both acceptable.

[Torquetalk]

@ protectthehornet

...and that is good enough to DICTATE.

I've gotten a huge kick out of this thread. There are some wimps out there that are pointing fingers ...but you might be the type of guy to get vectored into a mountain rather than question ATC and don't think it hasn't happened...

blah blah blah

Much-too-much tub-thumping IMO. The full information is NOT available, but what is clear is that good commucation and an established system of procedures broke down. Discussing this in such a ****-waving fashion sets an irresponsible tone for new pilots.

And the man's name is Sully (bless his cool, calm, collected shoes). Scully was a character from the x-files

[slip and turn]

I suggest the heavily edited recording on AVWeb has been most unhelpfully compiled. The first report in the edited clip is American 2 reporting visual for 22L at about 16 secs into the clip.


Clearly (but not from the AvWeb clip) four minutes earlier the pilot was expecting 31R as it was being approached by another heavy when wind was reported at 33026. Subsequently wind was given as 33025 and a minute before the AVWeb clip begins, wind is given at 32022 and American 2 then finds himself first to be cleared to land upon switching approaches to the other runway 22L, which is acknowledged and all is quiet for about 50 secs.

He then, as we know from AVWeb, reports visual for 22L but then two additional external items increased his workload unacceptably:

First, it appears that he had found the localizer on 22L was not working and there was actually a 12 second delay while ATC checked that out (not instantaneous as might be inferred from the clip) and reset. Was it now working? ... Do we care? ... Pure distraction ...

Then quiet for another approx 50 seconds while the information is assimilated and checked....................

............................................................ ...................................

............................................................ ...................................

Then wham! ATC kindly broadcasts wind 32023G35 - just what the doc ordered!

I suggest that was the point at which the pilot quite rightly firmly communicates his dismay at being somewhat led down the garden path with the winds (no mention of any gusts up to that point) and thus made his emergency intentions known.


What then follows descends into an unholy mess but ATC were not without sin - wasting time and bandwidth after the emergency was already both declared and understood - somewhat uselessly attempting to justify why the emergency might not have been initially understood ...


Then some 90 seconds after the emergency is initially declared, on hearing Cactus 12 still cleared on approach, American 2 has to remind ATC that it most definitely is HIS sky as of yesterday.

Overall, of course, and very easy to say, being still up there with some other pressing reason for being down ten minutes ago was the first hole in the cheese.

[AerocatS2A]

Just to continue the mayday discussion briefly. Some of you are saying that "declaring an emergency" is perfectly acceptable because it works, well I say it didn't work this time. The controller did not seem to get his head around the fact that AA2 had declared an emergency. He was bamboozled by the rapid escalation from "give us 31R or we will declare an emergency" to "we are declaring an emergency." The ATC was still trying to give AA2 vectors when AA2 was flying a visual circuit and he was still confirming that AA2 had declared an emergency. I think that if AA2 had said "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY..." the ATC would have been much quicker to respond appropriately.

[alwaysmovin]

Going from what we hear on the tapes its no wonder the controller didn't realise AA was declaring an emergency......the pilot said he would declare an emergency IF he didn't get 31...........perhapas the controller was coordinating....(something some pilots don't realise takes a little time) for him to get 31, hence the heading.... so was surprised!! However we won't know until the transcripts come out......

[Checkboard]

If you declare a "fuel emergency", or "we have an emergency" in the UK, without explaining the details you will be asked to confirm as ATC in the UK would much prefer the formal declaration via the standard phraseology.

Yes, I am aware we are talking about the US here, and that "declaring an emergency" is acceptable phraseology in the US, however many US pilot fly in both arenas and being in the habit of using "USA only" radio procedures could result in confusion in other parts of the world.

Having said that, I am firmly on this Captain's side. The situation deteriorated to the point where it was necessary for him to take control of the situation to provide a safe outcome for his passengers - and a safe outcome was achieved.
Job Done.

As an aside, I have never seen a preferred runway system which stays in place at more than 15 knots crosswind, when a more into wind runway is available (and the usual standard is 10 knots). I am rather shocked that such a situation has been allowed to occur.

[LeadSled]

As a matter of interest does the US recognise the term "REQUIRE" ie I REQUIRE runway XXX.

As does Australia.

Tootle pip!!

[jackieofalltrades]

ARFOR post # 127, that is very well put, as is Guy D'ageradar in post # 108.

ATC is here to aid the pilots, no controller I know wilfully gives an aircraft anything but the best service s/he can. Now that might mean that the pilot won't always get what they immediately want, but once an emergency has been declared properly, the controller with the assistance of colleagues will do everything they can to aid the pilot get the aircraft safely on the ground.

My concern with this AA into JFK was the pilot's refusal to listen to the controller. For me the major concern is did the AA pilot know where all the other planes into/out of JFK were at this moment and that he would not have a collision with any.

I hope that certain pilots like PTH are commenting with such huge egos just in an attempt to wind up controllers on the forum, and aren't really that arrogantly naive to think that their flying would be so much easier with ATC telling them what to do.

I would strongly urge you to visit a local ATC centre and see what your green dot on the screen is like in relation to all the other green dots. Having been involved with numerous pilots visiting the centres in the UK, I can say that every single one of them has gone away with a much better understanding of what ATC is doing, especially what it takes to coordinate something with an adjacent sector/airfield. So many pilots commented that they had no idea how many and how close aircraft were, nor how they interacted with so many various routes and flights into other airfields.

[LeadSled]

By definition ATC are in charge.

Folks,
Just to put things in perspective, think of ATC as "the talking traffic lights"

What is the difference between a controller and a pilot??

If the pilot screws up, the pilot dies;
If ATC screws up, the pilot dies.

Last time I looked, B767-200/300 X-wind limit for the aircraft I operated: 30kt, plus 5kt gust ---- maximum demonstrated crosswind.

The control limited maximum X-wind ( full rudder and a big handful of aileron on the rollout) is about 44 kt., about the same as a B744.
Unlike the 747/744, you can sideslip across the wind in a B767, pod clearance is never a problem.

Tootle pip!!

[Guy D'ageradar]

leadsled

What is the difference between a controller and a pilot??

If the pilot screws up, the pilot dies;
If ATC screws up, the pilot dies.

The part you forget to mention is that, if the contoller is not given the heads up as to what it going on, enabling him to do something about it, a lot of other people may well die.

I fully understand your concern for yourelf. As has already been stated, you are responsible for your aircraft. I, however, am responsible for all of them.

[DowneastGuy]

"As an aside, I have never seen a preferred runway system which stays in place at more than 15 knots crosswind, when a more into wind runway is available (and the usual standard is 10 knots). I am rather shocked that such a situation has been allowed to occur".

In Toronto it's my understanding that operations will stay on the east/west runways unless the steady state crosswind exceeds 25 knots or someone complains. Makes for some interesting arrivals.

[Jetjock330]

Having read all these posts and as a 15000 hour experienced pilot. I seem to think they worked out that they are landing within there normal legality and will have 30 minutes on landing in the tanks. They monitor the winds on approach from what is being broadcast ahead of them and decided to continue and no need to warn ATC of their limits. Each aircraft ahead has its limits, and then when cleared to land, the limits go over their legality when cleared to land.
The captain has prepared an answer in the event this happens and there is now not enough fuel to complete the full go around and re-alignment with 31R. (same as a diversion with minimum fuel to any alternate) He now gives the BINGO code (emergency in his mind) because he is fuel tight and makes an alternative plan. A basic circle to land, break off approach!

Imagine if every pilot now gives their endurance remaining to ATC when they start the approach, in case of "in the event of". ATC wouldn't want this either.


We did a go-around with 20kts tail wind after 15 hours flying to get to JFK and went around due to high tail wind. We called go-around in the A340-500 and changed frequency 5 times by 2500ft and were asked the remaining endurance. With 5% on 150 000kgs to start with, we had sufficient gas and we were told we were going to be number 17 to land with a runway change. The go-around cost 3500kg. Our flight time crossed the 16 hours to wheels touch down. Had we gone to EWR, we would be in an even worse case scenario, looking for a straight in approach bypassing everyone else, and this is the norm on any diversion, TO LAND WITH 30 MINUTES WITH STRAIGHT IN APP! Every one else in that pattern would have to give way, anyway! A diversion is not an emergency, but you are required to land with no less than 30 minutes in the tanks, who ever you are, otherwise the boss will say you could have spent more time at original destination, even by a minute if you did it any sooner.

But landing/flying anywhere with less than 30 minutes remaining is an EMERGENCY and calling for an emergency to get on the ground by minutes remaining is a good call, no matter how late, due unexpected last minute parameters.

Maybe the captain landed with 6500lbs, his 30 minutes (in B767, can't confirm this), but he walked away legally, he will fly again with a letter to explain. But land with 29 minutes and no emergency, you are going fishing for a long time somewhere and forget about checking a roster again, ever!

Hats off to the captain, in conciliation to the ATC who understood and did his job too, the system worked and the passengers, all went home safely! That is, both our jobs!

[Avman]

I may be stating the obvious for most of you, but I would presume the 22s would have been prefered as this enabled parallel ops (1 departure and 1 arrival runway). With the closure of 31L, the use of 31R for landing and 22R for departures would have caused additional and significant delays.

[IRISHinUS]

Just my 2 cents as a New York based pilot:

1. As repeated previously, in the US, under FAA regs, the declaration of an emergency does NOT require use of "Mayday", i.e. it is a non-ICAO standard, in fact it's discouraged (obviously doesn't apply to non-US pilots who must comply with their own ICAO-compliant standards). We are required to state "declaring an emergency" and that's it. (Of course for international destinations we must comply with the ICAO standard etc etc, we're talking here about a US airline in the US). So no retraining required on that front.

2. Also under US regs you may declare "Min fuel" as a heads up to ATC that any "undue delay" will result in a fuel emergency, frequently used in New York airspace. It is a non-emergency call and one still typically follows the flow of aircraft to the airport. It would be a surprise for a US controller to suddenly receive a fuel emergency from a US airline without first receiving the "min fuel" call. (that's in defence of the controller)

3. However, the controller was told that they would declare an emerg. if they didn't get the required runway. To me that sounds like a sort of "min fuel" call. The controller's mistake, in my view, was to say that he would "pass on the request" or something to that effect, that showed an undue concern that would have transmitted to the pilots that they were about to get sent out 50 miles to join the end of the line. Under those circumstances the pilots subsequent emergency call seems not only reasonable but required.

4. After receiving the emergency call, rather than ask what they intended, the controller's reaction was to issue an instruction (runway heading for the moment), this would have transmitted to the crew that "this guy just doesn't get it". If they have an emergency that absolutely allowed them to tell the controller what they were doing and it was the controllers job to get traffic out of their way.

5. I have had to go-around in New York recently and immediately declare min fuel, the controllers reaction was to FIRST say, "Ok, I'll get you right back in after the three on final, turn to XXX heading ...". That reassured me that this controller "gets it" and wont force me to declare an emergency. If the controller had said "I'll pass that on blah blah .." I would have done precisely what this crew did. All pilots think of Avianca Flight 52 when put in this situation, the pilots were not clear or decisive and let themselves get intimidated by the NY controllers, it got them killed along with scores of passengers.

6. I would say that the post-emergency investigatory interview with the pilots would have two questions, 1) were you low on fuel? 2) Why didn't you declare min fuel earlier? If those questions can be answered reasonably their interview would probably be no more than 5 minutes. I'd think the controller will have many more questions to answer.

[MarkD]

I am obliged to Pablo26 for the link provided - I stand corrected.