Aeroflot A320 takes off on Oslo Taxiway
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At our outfit we have the ILS ON for all takeoffs for this very purpose. We also, like Dan, must visually and orally positively identify the runway before we enter it. In fact, it's a Before Takeoff checklist item. I've always thought intersection takeoffs are a bad idea and will not leave runway behind me under any circumstances.
However, under the pressure of a slot that's expiring etc, crews can become less than fully professional about this and sh*t happens. Those who have done it and those.......
However, under the pressure of a slot that's expiring etc, crews can become less than fully professional about this and sh*t happens. Those who have done it and those.......
unbelievable.............
...........another balls up....
doesn't appear to matter how many cockpit aids you install, pilots not following correct procedures will cock-up!
Please tell me that it's in their procedures to confirm runway marker boards?
forget about ILS etc, big letters positioned conveniently for you to see.
You'll have to provide their own toilet paper next and they'll probably want you to wipe their butts for them....
refreshing to hear some more robust views on here
saddening to hear comments about need for EFBs etc
Let's not bother with all that expensive runway lighting, marker boards, ATC tower/personnel.......just think of the savings......hey, here's a straight bit of tarmac/concrete, let's try that today!
Am assuming there were 2 'qualified' pilots in the cockpit?
Perhaps too many 'pilot' aids in the cockpit already?
doesn't appear to matter how many cockpit aids you install, pilots not following correct procedures will cock-up!
Please tell me that it's in their procedures to confirm runway marker boards?
forget about ILS etc, big letters positioned conveniently for you to see.
You'll have to provide their own toilet paper next and they'll probably want you to wipe their butts for them....
refreshing to hear some more robust views on here
saddening to hear comments about need for EFBs etc
Let's not bother with all that expensive runway lighting, marker boards, ATC tower/personnel.......just think of the savings......hey, here's a straight bit of tarmac/concrete, let's try that today!
Am assuming there were 2 'qualified' pilots in the cockpit?
Perhaps too many 'pilot' aids in the cockpit already?
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looking at the chart...
... did they take of from M or N ? because M is way shorter. that could have ended in tears.
Last edited by FCS Explorer; 27th Feb 2010 at 13:05. Reason: finger trouble
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I seem to recall just briefly reading something yesterday that mentioned the a/c took off from an intersection that is less the the available runway length, so in short, increases the risks for performance in itself. Good thing there wasn't a tower/hanger at the end!
Pilots do make mistakes, but this is lack of observation/or distraction, which resulted in endangering the a/c, crew and people on the ground. I bet they're having a good de-briefing with the MD.
Pilots do make mistakes, but this is lack of observation/or distraction, which resulted in endangering the a/c, crew and people on the ground. I bet they're having a good de-briefing with the MD.
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Rwy edge lights - white
Twy edge lights - green/blue
They are coloured just to minimize things like this...
Twy edge lights - green/blue
They are coloured just to minimize things like this...
Seriously, this is crazy !
Last edited by leewan; 28th Feb 2010 at 03:45. Reason: Bad English :( Happy Now
What is it with this new 'breed' of pilots that makes it impossible for them to take a p#ss without having some electronic widgit to tell them that their zipper is undone ?
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leewan
'And this is certainly not the first time that a flight crew has mistook a taxiway for a taxiway.'
L don't understand, you wouldn't make a 'mistook' like that would you?
atceng
L don't understand, you wouldn't make a 'mistook' like that would you?
atceng
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Whatever happened, happened.
What is important is to realise that for whatever reason all the holes in the Swiss cheese (but one) lined up on the day. The one that didn't line up being that there was no other aircraft taxying in their take off path.
We have to assume that the pilots did not intend to take off on the taxyway but on the runway, therefore what is important is to understand the procedures in place and to modify them to try to stop it happening again.
Verbalising expectations like ' from here it's a 90 deg right turn, then 2nd right for the runway having crossed a taxiway, correct take off point indicated by A3 or somesuch and centreline by ILS freq 109.5 on the PFD'. Even better, ask your colleague what his/her expectation is to avoid confirmation bias.
Tedious as it may seem for 99.9% of takeoffs, these Ops Manual procedures are the ones that will save your (and others) lives.
As the saying goes, you won't live long enough to make all the mistakes yourself, so learn from others.
What is important is to realise that for whatever reason all the holes in the Swiss cheese (but one) lined up on the day. The one that didn't line up being that there was no other aircraft taxying in their take off path.
We have to assume that the pilots did not intend to take off on the taxyway but on the runway, therefore what is important is to understand the procedures in place and to modify them to try to stop it happening again.
Verbalising expectations like ' from here it's a 90 deg right turn, then 2nd right for the runway having crossed a taxiway, correct take off point indicated by A3 or somesuch and centreline by ILS freq 109.5 on the PFD'. Even better, ask your colleague what his/her expectation is to avoid confirmation bias.
Tedious as it may seem for 99.9% of takeoffs, these Ops Manual procedures are the ones that will save your (and others) lives.
As the saying goes, you won't live long enough to make all the mistakes yourself, so learn from others.
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I recall reading the accident report and feel there was a degree of company inspired and weather related time pressures on this SQ006 crew.
I felt they were being required to expedite their departure and get airborne that black night before more severe weather arrived.
As with most all local national crews under pressure with only "my airline" experience from "hour one" I notice they tend... due no fault of their own... to do what they are told.. or think they are told.. by anyone and anybody they fear may if upset... impinge on their employment.
These are company pilots... not true Pilots in Command...they think company first and not always safety first...I have seen this cause fatal and near fatal mistakes in my old airline.
I believe there is no substitute for the deep and varied experience of Captains (like 411A) who have been around the block a few times to easily handle such pressures.
The staff who applied this pressure should be resisted by a true PIC and told to go f.... themselves... in the nicest possible politest way... as the PIC is not about to be rushed into a go decision and take off into the teeth of a typhoon simply because they want to get home on time and back in their beds.
The left hand seat does not have to be stressful and you can wear you four gold bars like feathers and not lead...provided you behave like a proper PIC.
and not a company whimp.
I felt they were being required to expedite their departure and get airborne that black night before more severe weather arrived.
As with most all local national crews under pressure with only "my airline" experience from "hour one" I notice they tend... due no fault of their own... to do what they are told.. or think they are told.. by anyone and anybody they fear may if upset... impinge on their employment.
These are company pilots... not true Pilots in Command...they think company first and not always safety first...I have seen this cause fatal and near fatal mistakes in my old airline.
I believe there is no substitute for the deep and varied experience of Captains (like 411A) who have been around the block a few times to easily handle such pressures.
The staff who applied this pressure should be resisted by a true PIC and told to go f.... themselves... in the nicest possible politest way... as the PIC is not about to be rushed into a go decision and take off into the teeth of a typhoon simply because they want to get home on time and back in their beds.
The left hand seat does not have to be stressful and you can wear you four gold bars like feathers and not lead...provided you behave like a proper PIC.
and not a company whimp.
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Rwy edge lights - white
Twy edge lights - green/blue
They are coloured just to minimize things like this...
Twy edge lights - green/blue
They are coloured just to minimize things like this...
Mind also that runway markings in Norway are nonstandard, they are yellow, and not white. So the crew would expect to see a yellow marking on the concrete...which they did.
In fact, in 2006, pretty much the exact same thing happened to a Pegasus 737. Luckily in that case, the tower controller was able to stop them; they reached a speed just over 80 kts according to the report (2006/20 | sht, norwegian only).
The interesting thing here is not that the pilots screwed up. Pilots have done so for ages and there is nothing to indicate that we will stop screwing up even the simplest task if performed often enough. The question is why; how could it have been avoided; what were the underlying causes. How many layers of swiss cheese was there, how did the holes line up?
You can hang these two, maybe it will make you feel good, but that in itself will not prevent this from happening again.
A refreshing view from bfisk; well said.
We should not judge the crew, but look at how they might have seen the situation at that time.
Many people posting in this thread suffer hindsight bias – stating failure, asking how or why didn’t they, and using derogatory descriptions.
Most people have difficulty in relating human limitations or weaknesses with the often hidden opportunities for error in a situation.
Some people express surprise, not able to believe what has occurred. To some extent we all bare the pain of other’s misfortunes (it’s a way of learning), yet few people look deeply into an occurrence to gain sufficient understanding needed for learning. Others gloss over the event, give glib responses which might indicate that they would not have suffered the same error – that in itself represents a problem with their thinking or an attitude of resignation that nothing more can be done excepting to automate the aircraft. These are missed opportunities for learning.
Errors often originate at the interface of the environment and the human, thus both the situational and the human aspects must be considered in seeking an understanding. We choose crew for their attitude and train for aptitude; these are not closed entities, thus we must also review the situation – the organisation, and the variability within situations and operations.
James Reason indicates that we should first look to the organisation (the situation) as this could have precipitated the error. Furthermore, seeking to change the organisation might be a more practical, easier, and cost effective solution.
We should look to ourselves, could we suffer the same error; how can this be avoided.
Then consider how errors may be detected, trapped, or mitigated.
Don’t try to put the human in a box (bad apples), look at the aspects where humans excel, note the weaknesses, and ensure that the operational situations do not allow these weaknesses to lead to error. A positive outlook may provide many answers – share these aspects in this forum.
How do people create safety in their daily operations?
What features are there at other airports which help the human overcome the risks in operations and avoid error?
We should not judge the crew, but look at how they might have seen the situation at that time.
Many people posting in this thread suffer hindsight bias – stating failure, asking how or why didn’t they, and using derogatory descriptions.
Most people have difficulty in relating human limitations or weaknesses with the often hidden opportunities for error in a situation.
Some people express surprise, not able to believe what has occurred. To some extent we all bare the pain of other’s misfortunes (it’s a way of learning), yet few people look deeply into an occurrence to gain sufficient understanding needed for learning. Others gloss over the event, give glib responses which might indicate that they would not have suffered the same error – that in itself represents a problem with their thinking or an attitude of resignation that nothing more can be done excepting to automate the aircraft. These are missed opportunities for learning.
Errors often originate at the interface of the environment and the human, thus both the situational and the human aspects must be considered in seeking an understanding. We choose crew for their attitude and train for aptitude; these are not closed entities, thus we must also review the situation – the organisation, and the variability within situations and operations.
James Reason indicates that we should first look to the organisation (the situation) as this could have precipitated the error. Furthermore, seeking to change the organisation might be a more practical, easier, and cost effective solution.
We should look to ourselves, could we suffer the same error; how can this be avoided.
Then consider how errors may be detected, trapped, or mitigated.
Don’t try to put the human in a box (bad apples), look at the aspects where humans excel, note the weaknesses, and ensure that the operational situations do not allow these weaknesses to lead to error. A positive outlook may provide many answers – share these aspects in this forum.
How do people create safety in their daily operations?
What features are there at other airports which help the human overcome the risks in operations and avoid error?
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bfisk
Why, please, are runway markings in Norway non standard? As you are based in Norway, can you tell us the history of this? And perhaps suggest to the Norwegian authorities that it would be a good idea, in view of this occurence, to adopt the standard colour scheme?
The reason is snow.
Norway, historically, gets rather a lot of it, and they probably found it would be prudent to mark runways with a colour different from snow. Having yellow runway markings is not unusal in places where snow is common.
Norway, historically, gets rather a lot of it, and they probably found it would be prudent to mark runways with a colour different from snow. Having yellow runway markings is not unusal in places where snow is common.
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Flat screen nav displays and TAWS have proved their worth by improving situational awareness in the air. Many new aircraft now come fitted with moving maps for the airport surface, showing the whole airport layout and 'own ship' position. All accidents are preceeded by the so called 'precurser incidents' - well, we seem to be having rather a lot of these lately. The pressure of modern operations, increasing traffic (despite the recent downturn) and complex airport layouts are all likely to contribute to even more of them.
I know that good airmanship and adherence to the correct cockpit procedures should eliminate these mistakes - but we know they still happen.
The CAST in the USA estimate that moving maps showing the airport surface, own ship position and having aural warnings can reduce these mistakes by 80%. I would go even further and suggest that, by using ADS-B-out and ADS-B-in, other traffic could be shown as well. UPS have been using an already certificated system (ACSS SafeRoute) in EFBs on their B757s and B767s at Louisville, and the FAA have recently funded similar trials at Philadelphia on US Airways A330s. So the technology is becoming reasonably mature.
Perhaps in the not too distant future such systems will become as commonplace as TAWS and eliminate these mistakes.
I know that good airmanship and adherence to the correct cockpit procedures should eliminate these mistakes - but we know they still happen.
The CAST in the USA estimate that moving maps showing the airport surface, own ship position and having aural warnings can reduce these mistakes by 80%. I would go even further and suggest that, by using ADS-B-out and ADS-B-in, other traffic could be shown as well. UPS have been using an already certificated system (ACSS SafeRoute) in EFBs on their B757s and B767s at Louisville, and the FAA have recently funded similar trials at Philadelphia on US Airways A330s. So the technology is becoming reasonably mature.
Perhaps in the not too distant future such systems will become as commonplace as TAWS and eliminate these mistakes.
""What is it with this new 'breed' of pilots that makes it impossible for them to take a p#ss without having some electronic widgit to tell them that their zipper is undone ?""
Maybe they are spoilt by having SatNav in the cars.
Maybe they are spoilt by having SatNav in the cars.