The Weakest Link?

[PJ2]

Carnage Matey!;

PJ2 - Exeng has quite a bit of experience on the A320 as well as non-FBW types. I think his comment is quite correct. Left to it's own devices the A320 would simply have carried on flying whatever trajectory the crew had set until the low speed protections guided it into whatever terrain was there. The FBW didn't save those onboard, it simply made things easier for the pilots to do it.

Thank you - I appreciate your response.

Your last comment says what I was thinking and what I intended to say.

Langewiesche's last comment, as quoted in Garner's article, and Exeng's fish & chips wrap comment regarding Langewiesche's book as described in the article, are hyperbole. Both are undeserved.

It seems as if Captain Sullenberger and Langewiesche are in agreement however, regarding the essence of the event - fbw made it easier, but would certainly not have "saved" the airplane, but that is blindingly obvious is it not? Are there those who actually believe that "the computers saved the day by 'choosing', etc"?

That's what I meant by observing that "computers/fbw" don't "choose" - Sullenberger did and I think he correctly states that many of his colleagues would have been able to do the same. I have never been a fan of making "heroes" out of those who do what they are trained to do and experienced enough to carry it off. That Captain Sullenberger is a superb spokesperson for our profession is a huge benefit at a time when such a person and such a message is greatly needed; Sully's "hero" status facilitates this but, knowing a bit about him as we now do, I strongly suspect he would be the first to admit he is under no illusions as to what happened and how, and what experience coupled with a facilitating technology is capable of.

If I have offended you through my lack of awareness of your aviation experience, Exeng, I apologize. I suspect however, that we are in agreement in re the fundamentals even though you may not like Mr. Langewiesche's work.

PJ2

BOAC;
Yes, removed the post as it was moot, and posted the above instead. Indeed, I suspect we concur on the broader issues.

[aguadalte]

"After two decades of working as a professional pilot, at the age of 36, Langewiesche began to dedicate himself to his true passion: writing."

In Lettre Ulysses Award.

Has he started professional flying at the age of 16th?
What's his experience as a professional pilot? Does anybody know?

[BOAC]

Thanks PJ - I fully concur with your view of the 'hero' bit as I'm sure the good Captain does. What the brief extract I have seen appears to miss out is the command skills exercised - to bring that a/c to a 'safe' ditching, FBW or not, required a cool head and good teamwork, both of which were in evidence, and I know that a computer would have produced the coolest head of all (MSoft excluded) but I'd like to see someone write the code.

I am in accord with a lot of the content I have seen, but I'm afraid comments like

“His performance was a work of extraordinary concentration, which the public misread as coolness under fire. Some soldiers will recognize the distinction.”

is quite misplaced and demeaning. You do not, after all, have to have bullets flying around to demonstrate a cool head.

PS I'm sure exeng would not have been offended and I am also pretty sure that he will agree with a lot of the work in the book too. Now, where's the vinegar for my chips.....

[PJ2]

BOAC;

You do not, after all, have to have bullets flying around to demonstrate a cool head.

No kidding. There are acts of quiet heroism every day. Today we celebrate the unsung acts of thousands in past and present wars, and of those who gave their lives for their country's cause.

The whole notion of "hero" has been appropriated by media to create a "star" figure; - today, the notion of "hero" has been degraded to "celebrity" status which markets the notion for gain or attention, sometimes making plastic figures; "hero" is an idea, not a thing that is packaged. Thankfully, ordinary people are able to differentiate and still recognize the original meaning of "hero" as " 'he' who has travelled to dangerous places and has safely returned to tell the story of ourselves".

[vaneyck]

According to the NY Times article Langewiesche's book is an expansion of his Vanity Fair article of June 2009, available here:
US Airways Flight 1549: Anatomy of a Miracle | vanityfair.com
It's an analysis of the whole course of the incident in some detail, and I got no sense in it of 'snarkiness' or contempt for pilots: quite the contrary. Unless Langewiesche has changed his tone in the course of turning the article into a book I suspect the Times reviewer has given a false impression of his attitude.

[rmac]

Maybe its safer to draw the conclusion that the human being represents both the weakest and strongest link in any process as we don't all come in the same size and predictability is often a problem ..............

[Huck]

You folks know the difference between involvement and commitment?

In a ham 'n eggs breakfast, the chicken's involved; the pig's committed....

Same goes for pilot vs. UAV programmer. I can name you a half-dozen mishaps where the guy in the pointy end pulled off something amazing, operating to the limits of himself and his machine - just to save his own bacon, so to speak.

Not so sure a guy in a trailer in Las Vegas is going to be quite so motivated. Think Sioux City. Think Hudson River. Think of the Brasilia into the cow pasture outside Atlanta in 1995. Think of the Aloha 737, one engine out and missing a bunch of hydraulics, big ol' hole in the fuselage, zero-flap landing with no checklists because they all got expelled into the ether when the top came off.

A guy in a cubicle might have been able to pull off a few of those, if he was really good. But you know what you'd call that guy? A pilot. And you know what you'd have to pay him? Pilot's wages. Difference is... he'd be involved, not committed.....

[mary meagher]

Fly by wire?

No, I havn't read Mr. Langewiesch's book, only the NY Times Review, but am all the same amused by his quoted assertion that the great Airbus engineer Zeigler's Fly by Wire system "cradled them all the way to the water"!

It reminded me of that early airbus flight that was cradled all the way into the trees....now where was that?

Sully and Crew chose the runway, with not a lot of time to make the choice. His decision was correct.
His approach was impeccable, as we hope many other pilots could manage.
To my mind his true heroism was displayed when he went back into the cabin twice to make sure all his passengers had safely debarked.

AnthonyGA remarks that in certain situations, damaging the airframe might be preferable to crashing the aircraft, something the Airbus systems may be reluctant to allow. I've been having trouble coming to terms with my Chief Flying Instructor's insistence that it is better to pull excess G than it is to fly the glider faster than VNE. Wonder if that applies to an Airbus?

[Pugilistic Animus]

his dad or grand dad is rolling in his plot right now

[PJ2]

mary;

It reminded me of that early airbus flight that was cradled all the way into the trees....now where was that?

Actually the fbw system kept the aircraft straight through the initial descent through the trees while Asseline and his passengers rode his decision to the ground.

It's energy-management 101 - the aircraft was at about 115kts or less. if you don't have energy and therefore lift, you're going down. Asseline complained about the power not being available, but any kid who was consumed by the magic of the new jet airliners and their engiens has known since 1960 or so about acceleration times of turbojet engines, especially high-bypass ones. The caution is in the DC8 manuals dated from 1963 from a great friend who gave me all his books on the airplane when he was transitioning from the DC6, and the caution is still in my A330 manuals - 6 to 10 seconds to accelerate from idle thrust to 90%+. No computer caused that crash. Asseline did.

Sully and Crew chose the runway, with not a lot of time to make the choice. His decision was correct.

Yup.

His approach was impeccable, as we hope many other pilots could manage.

I think most could, and Sully thinks so too.

To my mind his true heroism was displayed when he went back into the cabin twice to make sure all his passengers had safely debarked.

The best statement in this thread by far. THAT is indeed the act that separated "doing the job" from heroism. THAT is what an "airman" is.

[Microburst2002]

The Right Stuff

This Langewiesche is very enthusiastic about the FBW.
He sounds like the young guys doing the 320 type rating course.
And many of the wonders he describes are avionics related, common to many types, such as the speed trend vector.

Everytime I read that the airplane will hold wings level even if I don't touch the sidestick I get angry. It is not true! It rolls if you let it, even without significan gusts.
I also hate that many people believe the FBW is like the CWS of a Boeing. It is not! 320's FBW keeps 1g flight path. It is not an attitude hold mode.
A conventional pitch trim will make an airplane to maintain airspeed, which is as good as maintaining flight path, if not better.

If Sully had not flown the airplane it would have crashed, of course. Maybe at alfa max, but crashing is crashing. And certainly not wings level.
A well trimmed 737 would fly at the required speed very well. No 737 pilot would have needed extraodinary ability and muscle to glide and ditch. Having hidraulics, of course.

By the way. It is possible to stall a 320 in normal law. Airbus says.

Rmac
You've got it: The human being is both the weakest and strongest link in an airplane's safety.

Trying to build "pilot proof" airplanes, or UAVs or whatever is going in the wrong way. Same as trying to train error proof pilots.
What they have to build are airplanes that enhance human beings. Then they will really increase safety. The technology required for that is in the field of avionics, rather than in the field of flight controls.

The GPWS is a human enhancing device, for instance. Gives us the "aracnid sense" that only spiderman has. It warns us and we pull up. Then, the airbus FBW gives us 2,5g without exceeding limits. Great!
I want more of this. I don't want stuff that will try to substitute me, but stuff that will enhance me, that will give me "superpowers", and, very important, stuff that I will not have to struggle with for the control of the airplane.
In airbus they have had to rewrite some code and algorithms in the flight control FBW after the crash landing of a 320, about 8 years ago.

Because... Human error also affects engineers! (remember the extremely expensive space probe crashing in Mars because of a Kg-Lbs mistake?). Dissimilar redundancy will not always prevent gross errors that can render a crew unable to prevent a disaster having perfecly operational flight surfaces and hydraulic power in a given circunstances.

Sully has "the Right Stuff" as Tom Wolfe put it. Most of us like to think that we have it, but few know it, as we haven't been tested. If you re-read Wolfe's book you will see that many well high in the ranking fell out of the group of those with "the Right Stuff" when they had their test.

[Stop Stop Stop]

No knock against Sully, he suggests, but almost any decent pilot could have done it.

I'm sure they could- but could they have made that decision in the first place? That is what took real command experience- and I wonder how many of us would have made that decision rapidly, knowing the potential consequences of a water landing.

[ChristiaanJ]

It reminded me of that early airbus flight that was cradled all the way into the trees....now where was that?

PJ2,
Thanks, you already answered that quote better than I could have done...

To me, Asseline will always remain the best example of an "anti-hero"... one that blames everything but his own stupidity.

CJ

[KAG]

But he and his co-pilot, Jeffrey B. Skiles, did fly by wire during the glide.


How funny... Everybody were saying he flew entirely manually...
So today we have to understand that even with 2 engines off, the airplane was still assited by the computers?

[PJ2]

Originally Posted by Stop Stop Stop

I'm sure they could- but could they have made that decision in the first place? That is what took real command experience- and I wonder how many of us would have made that decision rapidly, knowing the potential consequences of a water landing.

"Real command experience" - fully agree. I think choosing the Hudson over LaGuardia, Teterboro or Newark was a decision deeply rooted in experience - the airplane and it's particular flight control design only mattered after the decision to ditch was made; it permitted an optimum speed to ditch at; I strongly suspect that a seasoned professional would be able to do this in any other aircraft but the information presented to the crew (primarily via the PFD) enabled a fine-tuning that might otherwise not have obtained. That to me is what fbw and the energy-management information available to the crew contributed.

One "knows" one's business and one's airplane after putting a long, long time in. Almost certainly, the experienced, intuitive sense of energy the airplane had left and the sense of distance including manoeuvering (which costs lift and therefore altitude and distance) to achieve LaGuardia or Teterboro was instantaneous as there was no time for rational analysis. I think what is meant by Sully's statement, aside from an abiding graciousness from a great commander, was that it was experience that rendered the decision and that those with similar time in would likely be capable of the same quality of decision-making. I think Sully would be the first to observe that a certain amount of "good fortune" also attended the day - good weather, relatively few boats/ships in the touchdown path, intact airframe after touchdown which served as a "liferaft", etc.

KAG;

How funny... Everybody were saying he flew entirely manually...
So today we have to understand that even with 2 engines off, the airplane was still assited by the computers?

This was dealt with in the original thread on the accident - you can do a search but I'm not sure what you're point is.

Most understand what "manual" means in an A320. Also, the engines weren't "off", they were developing some thrust/rpm - enough to power hydraulics and electrics. The flight control computers were working normally.

regards,
PJ2

[Jim Boehme]

the vital action was his courageous decision to ditch

Being of a military background, Sully may've had the advantage when it came to making the decision to ditch. Being used to the concept of ejection (F-4 Phantom) or other end results not faced by civvie pilots might've given Sully the edge in committing to a drastic course of action. I wonder if your average civvie pilot would do the same as readily.

[Graybeard]

Did he intentionally not tell the cabin they were ditching, or just too busy to do it?

GB

[Jet_A_Knight]

The human being is both the weakest and strongest link in an airplane's safety

I think it would be more accurate to say that the human is more likely the most flexible link in the chain, rather than the strongest.

Regarding the Airbus FBW - it would probably be better if pilots and people in general understood the Airbus protections as 'defenses' rather than ' restrictions'. As with any aeroplane, you work within its limitations and abilities - warts and all.

The article itself is a self - seeking crock written by someone who's quotes show he has little understanding or experience of the equipment - or what being an airline pilot really involves, and reeks of sour grapes and undermines the fact that what Sully and Skiles achieved really was a result of the professional, experienced and switched-on aviators at the controls - not the equipment itself.

[protectthehornet]

aquadalte

I knew William Langweische way back in 1980 or so. Not well mind you, but we both were flight instructors at Palo Alto airport, near San Francisco, Ca. USA...earth.

Nice guy. Intelligent. Well spoken. His dad wrote : "STICK AND RUDDER" truly a fine analysis of the art of flying. It is one of my favorite books on flying and I spent quite awhile praising it to the son, in lieu of the father (flown west)

I don't think he went on to an airline, but am not sure. I think he spent more time writing...a journalist too. Did some stuff for PBS...wearing a flack jacket I think.

Now...I would rip the book apart based on the review. I won't be buying the book anytime soon...

1. I think a plane of the older generation would not have been brought down by the birds from hell. Maybe the engines were protecting themselves more than the passengers and crew....?

2. I think a better landing in the river/on the river would have been possible with an older non FBW airplane...the plane sully flew didn't have a big ''flare reserve'' to cushion the landing.

3. FBW is an excuse to lessen the skills a pilot needs to fly an airliner. I had a huge argument with the resident professor at MIT, in the Boeing chair, that skilled pilots would not be needed and that a 200 hour pilot could handle a FBW airplane just fine...AND THAT THIS WOULD BE THE MAJOR SELLING POINT to certain countries that had more MONEY than good pilots.

4. If you look in the past...french planes used to have the throttles set up so that you pull the throttle back to add power! I'm not impressed with french planes. And while FBW has some pluses...I would be happier flying with my skills than a computer.

[PJ2]

PTH;

1. I think a plane of the older generation would not have been brought down by the birds from hell. Maybe the engines were protecting themselves more than the passengers and crew....?

Well, that's just plain nonsense. Birds have been bringing airplanes down since we began sharing the airspace with them. Polemics such as "brought down by the birds from hell" is not exactly a discussion point, nor is "...protecting themselves more than the passengers and crew" which is poorly defined and meaningless implying, I think, that the FADEC design intentionally restricts available engine thrust to "protect" the engine. At the very least, the statement requires elaboration and some kind of supporting information.

2. I think a better landing in the river/on the river would have been possible with an older non FBW airplane...the plane sully flew didn't have a big ''flare reserve'' to cushion the landing.

Nonsense again. What do you mean by "flare reserve"? What do you mean by "cushion" a water landing? How does one "cushion" a water impact with "flare reserve"? I'm unfamiliar with the term. My own point, if you read my post at all, was, the PFD provides accurate information on lowest selectable speeds and stall speeds and thus gives a very good, accurate and clear picture of the energy level of the aircraft, which the pilot then must manage with traditional skill and experience. I suspect this kind of information is also available on later Boeings as well - it is a function of the "computers" such as the IRS's and FMGECs which you seem all too ready to dismiss, or do you believe that all this can be done "by the seat of the pants"?

3. FBW is an excuse to lessen the skills a pilot needs to fly an airliner. I had a huge argument with the resident professor at MIT, in the Boeing chair, that skilled pilots would not be needed and that a 200 hour pilot could handle a FBW airplane just fine...AND THAT THIS WOULD BE THE MAJOR SELLING POINT to certain countries that had more MONEY than good pilots.

I won't argue with the selling point you make because I agree with you - part of the Airbus claim was aimed at the bean-counters and perhaps fbn's (fly-by-night) operators looking for a reason to cheapen training and those ignorant of what it takes to run an airline fell for Airbus's line but the pilots didn't and soon sorted things out; I know that from personal experience.

The skills it takes to fly an airliner manually on raw data are different but no less complex than the skills it takes to run the autoflight system with a depth of comprehension and airmanship. What you and many exhibit is simple prejudice, not understanding and it is to that I object. Come with good arguments against such technologies and there might be a basis for discussion.

4. If you look in the past...french planes used to have the throttles set up so that you pull the throttle back to add power! I'm not impressed with french planes. And while FBW has some pluses...I would be happier flying with my skills than a computer.

"If you look in the past..." is no basis for an informed discussion on the merits and problems with any technology - one judges in the present, as to whether technology meets/exceeds expectations or results in more severe problems than it is intended to come to terms with.

Though many here share your view of "computers flying an airplane", I submit these views are grounded not in a comprehensive knowledge of such automation systems but in an abiding experience with bread-and-butter, older technologies which are held onto by some who refuse to accept the way the industry and not just Airbus, have developed. Older technology is fine - nothing wrong with it but as usual, the unacknowledged ignorance behind the statement that "French fly-by-wire = bad", implying that Boeing fly-by-wire" = good", is at the very least, frustrating because it isn't a discussion anymore, it is simple, blind prejudice.

I think we can do better than that. When you have something interesting and informed to say about autoflight in which a discussion can be engaged perhaps we can talk about the benefits and problems of same.

PJ2