BA056 JNB-LHR Incident.
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Pinkman
I think the key word in your posting was "impatient."
And I think I'll be the judge of whether I think it's a forum I frequent.
You'll find many people do, without needing to comment.
Sorting out the wheat from the chaff as we go.
I just get tired of people poring over detail, try to be wise after an event, especially when the event in question didn't have the luxury of time.
I appreciate the time you took to reply but all I really took out of it was you telling me to go elsewhere if I disagreed with the contents of people's postings.
I think the key word in your posting was "impatient."
And I think I'll be the judge of whether I think it's a forum I frequent.
You'll find many people do, without needing to comment.
Sorting out the wheat from the chaff as we go.
I just get tired of people poring over detail, try to be wise after an event, especially when the event in question didn't have the luxury of time.
I appreciate the time you took to reply but all I really took out of it was you telling me to go elsewhere if I disagreed with the contents of people's postings.
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There will always be what there is here. Much to criticise in the writing, the level of expertise and experience, etc. Personally I am mildly annoyed by those whose main contribution is to "wait for the report". Rather obvious that those who post here aren't waiting for the "Report". A report that is generally years away, when there is so much to discuss, as professionals, while the investigate body is getting ALL their Ducks in a row.
I appreciate everyone who adds to the commentary, ruffled feathers and all. I take away much in new perspective, patience and a sense that many fellow pilots are engaged in a worthwhile endeavor. Flying commercially requires nothing if not a thick skin.
Will
I appreciate everyone who adds to the commentary, ruffled feathers and all. I take away much in new perspective, patience and a sense that many fellow pilots are engaged in a worthwhile endeavor. Flying commercially requires nothing if not a thick skin.
Will
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Will
Are you saying that if there was something fundamental about the situation that we needed to know, manufacturers, airlines or authorities wouldn't be letting us know about it?
Mildly annoyed?
Steady !!!!!!!!
Are you saying that if there was something fundamental about the situation that we needed to know, manufacturers, airlines or authorities wouldn't be letting us know about it?
Mildly annoyed?
Steady !!!!!!!!
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Postulates of Fuel icing in the Trent were broached well before NTSB, Boeing, and FAA made the mechanism known. Not that that saved the day by any means, but posters here were questioning items like "in spec" fuel well after AAIB held that fuel icing was not the problem (after all, the fuel was in spec!). Yes, I would say that the authority drags its feet at times. Who's to say they weren't reading PPRuNe? The upshot of that massive thread is that all who posted may well have come away with a good deal more knowledge about, and caution for, the possibilities of heretofore unanticipated faults. Professional communication to me, is a good thing.
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Will is right. Another good example is the Bristol (BRS) runway resurfacing incidents where at least three "serious incidents" (AAIB) occurred in a short space of time in late 2007. The debate happened in real time, and without question the PPrune commentary, which spilled over into the media, influenced operators decisions to suspend ops (initially EZY then others), prompted a visit by the regulator, and forced the closure of the airport, potentially preventing more incidents. Revisions to the CAP, that were being considered at the time, were reviewed in the light of that incident. The airport chief executive left shortly afterwards. In that particular case I KNOW that the regulators were reading PPrune.
You have to ask yourself what would have happened if everyone had sat back and "waited for the official report". Thankfully, we'll never know.
You have to ask yourself what would have happened if everyone had sat back and "waited for the official report". Thankfully, we'll never know.
Last edited by Pinkman; 29th May 2009 at 12:12.
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Just a bit of back ground to Will Fraser's last post.
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http://www.pprune.org/3860762-post771.html
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We can treat Pprune like a Lighthouse, some people may not like the way they look, but Lighthouse's have saved many a man !!! (boats and planes)
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http://www.pprune.org/3860762-post771.html
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We can treat Pprune like a Lighthouse, some people may not like the way they look, but Lighthouse's have saved many a man !!! (boats and planes)
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Pinkman, Joetom. Two of those writing in the 038 thread I've read with interest. Also many others, I've read and reread that entire thread many times, and enjoyed it each time for the insights its provided. Machaca, Airfoilmod, FE Hoppy, etc.
I also would note that with each new thread I see new people posting, most certainly up to the challenge. It takes nerve to lay out one's writing, but as I've said, commercial aviation requires nothing if not nerve, (also cheek, if I have UK usage correct).
Knowing the story involves collecting information. So much presents itself here, the benefits must be noticed and affirmed. It is not like pilots and aviation pros to be shrinking violets, some don't understand this. I'm trying to think of anyone I've met who would hush someone in earnest discussion re: incident/accident by saying "We mustn't discuss; the report will be out in time."
Will
I also would note that with each new thread I see new people posting, most certainly up to the challenge. It takes nerve to lay out one's writing, but as I've said, commercial aviation requires nothing if not nerve, (also cheek, if I have UK usage correct).
Knowing the story involves collecting information. So much presents itself here, the benefits must be noticed and affirmed. It is not like pilots and aviation pros to be shrinking violets, some don't understand this. I'm trying to think of anyone I've met who would hush someone in earnest discussion re: incident/accident by saying "We mustn't discuss; the report will be out in time."
Will
You have to ask yourself what would have happened if everyone had sat back and "waited for the official report". Thankfully, we'll never know.
As a backseater in the first flight into Bristol after the necessary work was completed in Jan 2007, a Continental B757-200 ex Newark, I can only add "Hear! Hear!"
Jack
As a backseater in the first flight into Bristol after the necessary work was completed in Jan 2007, a Continental B757-200 ex Newark, I can only add "Hear! Hear!"
Jack
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I believe that the inbound crew had reported a failure of the autospeedbrake on landing. The outbound crew would probably have been faced with an engineering item saying that some 'tests as per Maintenance Manual x.y.z carried out, and system satisfactory.'
They would not know what specifically had been carried / have reason to suspect that the reversers had even been part of that procedure and would have taken it as read that the engineers had done everything as per the b
They would not know what specifically had been carried / have reason to suspect that the reversers had even been part of that procedure and would have taken it as read that the engineers had done everything as per the b
The answer was tested as per AMM 27-62-00 and all chks sat.
There was no way the crew would have known that T/Rev was involved unless they were very clued up.
Part of the autospeedbrake test is lifting the T/Rev levers to check that the spoilers respond correctly. The reversers are not supposed to move, as you do this test with pneumatics off. But the RB211 has a pneumatic thrust reverser. It can happen that, even with the air off and APU shut down, that moving the thrust reverser lever on the ground can cause the reverser to move, using air trapped in the ducts. It has happened to me on a B767 (with the same engine). It really surprised me at the time. The APU was shut down, but the reverser moved nearly full travel on trapped pressure when I wasn't expecting it to.
The AMM does point this out, but at the end of the test there is no specific reference to ensure the reversers are stowed and locked.
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Duct px may read zero on EICAS.
Px inside air pipes inside engine may be more and volume is enough to operate a Rev through a full cycle (stowed/full deployed/stowed) in some conditions.
Sounds like a change to the AMM is not far away.
Best way to test Rev is when engine is operating, using APU or cart air can be ok, but if normal operation is with engine running, we can only expect different results in different conditions/supplies of air, it's a lot less hassle to use APU or cart air.
May be reduce the limits/values of the Rev pos tx (TRCP), however think they were increased to keep the FADEC happy in flight !!!
Px inside air pipes inside engine may be more and volume is enough to operate a Rev through a full cycle (stowed/full deployed/stowed) in some conditions.
Sounds like a change to the AMM is not far away.
Best way to test Rev is when engine is operating, using APU or cart air can be ok, but if normal operation is with engine running, we can only expect different results in different conditions/supplies of air, it's a lot less hassle to use APU or cart air.
May be reduce the limits/values of the Rev pos tx (TRCP), however think they were increased to keep the FADEC happy in flight !!!
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The AMM does point this out, but at the end of the test there is no specific reference to ensure the reversers are stowed and locked.
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So the solution is.... what?
- Specify higher performance air carts at high altitute airports?
- Mandate that the crew of the next leg cycle the T/Rs after startup of APU and/or engines prior to departure whenever the T/Rs have been deployed on the ground? (would need to be in the log!!)
- Redesign the limit switches?
- Improve the L/E device stowing logic to prevent stowage when going from ground -->air mode as opposed to air -->ground mode.
- All of the above?
- Specify higher performance air carts at high altitute airports?
- Mandate that the crew of the next leg cycle the T/Rs after startup of APU and/or engines prior to departure whenever the T/Rs have been deployed on the ground? (would need to be in the log!!)
- Redesign the limit switches?
- Improve the L/E device stowing logic to prevent stowage when going from ground -->air mode as opposed to air -->ground mode.
- All of the above?
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Premature slat/leading edge flap retraction occurring without a conscious, deliberate pilot-made lever selection equals basic design flaw in my opinion. And why do we need spoilers that deploy `automatically`? Don`t we trust pilots to make their own manual selections anymore?
Thank goodness I fly a first generation (British) 4-jet airliner.
Thank goodness I fly a first generation (British) 4-jet airliner.
Last edited by Stanley Eevil; 31st May 2009 at 10:06.
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Does the AMM tell you to make sure there is no trapped air before reverse selection, e.g. by opening packs valves? Or does it just point out that it can happen?
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Just innocent bystander SLF, but something occurs to me.. What was the ambient Temp on that day? Early winter in JNB at the mo, so temp in the evening must have been around 21C at the most. What would the outcome have been if this had occurred in the height of summer when ambient temp and density altitude would have been much higher? December evening temps can reach 27-28C easily. Would this have changed outcome, or would the aircraft have been more lightly loaded negating the difference? Anyhoo, good work by the PIC saved the day..... Creeps back under rock......
The FAA has issued an AD to correct the unsafe condition. This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. The AD requires a modification to the wiring of the thrust reverser control system to the FCU within 60 days from 6th July.
FR Doc E9-15255
FR Doc E9-15255
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As humble SLF, I just find it so extraordinary that a twenty-year old aircraft model, with hundreds of examples in service and a long statistical history of perhaps millions of takeoffs, can be discovered at this late stage of its life to have a very serious logic bomb in its control software. Amazing, simply amazing...
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Rainboe has been very quiet of late.
Surely he would have figured it all out on Page 2, suggested what additional training the crew may be in need of, and advised Boeing on possible system retrofits.
Surely he would have figured it all out on Page 2, suggested what additional training the crew may be in need of, and advised Boeing on possible system retrofits.