EK407 Tailstrike @ ML

[Dysag]

And the winner is...

If the Aussies still have a spare ball-and-chain, I'd like to attach it to DeltaRed who in his first ever post wrote:

"The ground staff claim they dead-headed on the next direct service to Dubai which left "immediately".

[Bird On]

PJ2

just to clarify for you, at EK the final loadsheet is mostly recieved by ACARS but all T/O performance calculations are calculated by the flight crew using the onboard Laptop computer and then inserted into the MCDU.

[Getzo]

Conf,


I get those numbers because they are the actual ones, move on!

[PJ2]

CONF iture;

A FRA type error in the Vr speed would explain a tailstrike half down the runway, but not an airplane still on the ground after 12000 feet.

No, I agree it doesn't, so perhaps V speed calculation and entry seem less plausible as one explanation. The other notion (not established fact, yet) that has been expressed, twice now, is the indication of 3 separate strikes on the runway. We might expand on this, given the cautions expressed in the FCOM which I offered on page 1. The airplane is in Direct Law in the rotation phase. I know for a fact that if the rotation of this airplane is mishandled, (ie, PF senses a high rotation rate (cautioned against) and does not strictly adhere to the FCOM procedures and instead checks forward on the sidestick), the airplane will respond very sharply to a reduced up-elevator command. I asked the question about "porpoising" because that it what the airplane may do if control of the rotation maneuver is lost through PIO, [pilot-induced oscillation]. This has happened on this type but not to those with experience on type. The key is a steady pull of 2/3rds back-stick. Check forward and the airplane will respond very sharply.

Now, this is absolutely in the realm of speculation but it is informed through knowledge and experience and not just guesswork. The cautions in the FCOM are there for a reason.

This may or may not explain the long takeoff run.

Unless thrust setting procedures were badly abused (warnings ignored and I can't see that happening), I can't see a "low power" issue on this airplane - that's not the way the airplane works.

If the thrust levers are not in either the TOGA or FLX/MCT detents a warnings, ECAM message, "THR LEVERS NOT SET" + chime + Master Caution, occur. If the Flex temperature entered in the MCDU (FMC interface) is too high (ie., higher than the OAT), the A/T - FADEC system will reference and the engines will produce, MCT - Max Continuous which would be at least equal to the maximum Flex thrust available anyway.

A weight entry error here as you describe, (ZFW into the GTOW) will not, I believe (not certain here), reduce the thrust setting dramatically, but that remains an open question for me, obviously, for the moment.


Bird On:

just to clarify for you, at EK the final loadsheet is mostly recieved by ACARS but all T/O performance calculations are calculated by the flight crew using the onboard Laptop computer and then inserted into the MCDU.

Thank you very much - very helpful info. The procedure I am familiar with is different, as described. Both methods work well.

[misd-agin]

White Knight - THE FACTS about the crew...... They are still here in MELBOURNE (this very minute, late on sunday evening).... EK has not whisked the crew away, and they were dealing with CASA TODAY..
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Of course you realize, with this simple post, that you've ruined the chances for pages and pages of posts.

[Getzo]

Quoting PJ 2

"A weight entry error here as you describe, (ZFW into the GTOW) will not, I believe (not certain here), reduce the thrust setting dramatically, but that remains an open question for me, obviously, for the moment."

Yes it will and is possible.

G

[Wiley]

If the Flex temperature entered in the MCDU (FMC interface) is too high (ie., higher than the OAT),

PJ2, slip of the finger there? The flex temp is, by definition, always higher than the IOAT. Isn't it?

Wouldn't it be nice if everyone would take the advice of one poster above and desist from speculation and wait until the official report comes out? The only fact we have to date is that the aeroplane suffered substantial damage on takeoff for reason or reasons unknown and that the pilots managed to get the damaged aircraft back on the ground in one piece without injuring one of their passengers or other crew.

I don't know it for a fact, but judging by the hearsay evidence of wheel tracks off the end of the runway and clipped LLZR aerials, they appear to have managed with some skill to avert what could well have been a catastrophic accident.

[PJ2]

Wiley;

PJ2

, slip of the finger there? The flex temp is, by definition, always higher than the IOAT. Isn't it?

Thanks, yes I thought so too. Now I'm trying to make sense of the following from the FCOM:

When the thrust lever is in the FLX-MCT detent :

–

On the ground :

The engine runs at the flex takeoff thrust rating if the MCDU has selected a flex takeoff temperature that is higher than the current total air temperature (TAT). Otherwise the engine produces maximum continuous thrust (MCT).

[9v-SKA]

For those still confused about Localizer antennas, check this out:
Localizer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For me, I wouldn't want to say anything about the accident until the official report comes out. Let us not argue about what happen shall we and wait for the report?

One painful accident. I went "outch!" when I saw the damage.

[ekwhistleblower]

I have read the posts and get the drift from many (particularly perhaps aussies/Q crew) that EK have handled it completely unprofessionally.

Yet, they have supported the crew and kept them in Mel. Sent a team down to support CASA's investigation and offered complete cooperation to all parties involved bar (I suspect) the press. So a nasty incident, lots of unfounded speculation and an on-going investigation. Are the comments maybe nationalistic in foundation? Bloody ***** have had a problem bet they did this, that and the other to avoid meeting their responsibilities. Its amazing how people join the dots based upon the registry of the airline rather than facts. Wait a week and you'll find out what happened in Flight and then see whether it was a crew issue, HF issue or technical issue.

[James7]

MK Flight 1602

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 747-244B (SF) 9G-MKJ Halifax International Airport, NS (YHZ)

I hope history has not repeated itself.

MK Airlines Flight 1602, suffered 2 tailstrikes due to incorrect V speeds, eventually got airborne but crashed into the earthen berm 100m from the runway.

V speeds entered (incorrectly) from the BLT (Boeing Laptop Computer).

The full safety report is well worth reading.

[CONF iture]

Originally Posted by PJ2

Now, this is absolutely in the realm of speculation but it is informed through knowledge and experience and not just guesswork. The cautions in the FCOM are there for a reason.

So obviously it is quite important to have some specific information on the way the 500 serie behaves during rotation.
The way I understand it, that behavior is almost an involuntary invitation for a dual input when the guy on the left/right side don't know what is done on the other side ...
IF the triple strikes is confirmed, it could be an indication of CIO (Crew Induced Oscillation) ... Only a thought of course.

Originally Posted by Bird On

just to clarify for you, at EK the final loadsheet is mostly recieved by ACARS but all T/O performance calculations are calculated by the flight crew using the onboard Laptop computer and then inserted into the MCDU

So there is here a real possibility for the crew to receive wrong data especially regarding cargo weight, so the crew determines a FLEX that does not match the real GW in case of substantial cargo was loaded without notice to the crew.

Originally Posted by Getzo

I get those numbers because they are the actual ones, move on!

Getzo, as you do have facts, how much cargo was on board that airplane ?
225 pax cannot justify a 50 tonnes PAYLOAD matching your EZFW of 227 tonnes ... Did you try the average pax + baggage weight ?

[Midland63]

Not a pilot, just a SLF. I have read the whole thread but with so many posts, it’s hard to remember all of them and some of the very techie ones are beyond my comprehension. So I’m not trying to promote any theories, second guess investigations, impugn anyone’s reputation or tell them how to do their jobs – just trying to understand.

To my untutored mind, the more serious aspect of this event is not the tailstrike(s) but why the plane used up nearly the whole runway (a very long one, as I understand it, well capable of allowing an A340 loaded for a non-stop flight to DXB to get off safely) and then was still so low that it took out antennae (or whatever) beyond the end of the r/w. The tailstrike(s) were a symptom of the bigger problem of the delayed t/o

Posters who sound like they know what they're talking about seem to be suggesting it's very hard to cock up take-off computations (speeds, powers settings) and that weight or flap setting miscalculations/errors should not have had that much of an effect on such a long runway.

I'm guessing that professional airline pilots don't just sit there going "Computer says no" while they gobble up 7/8ths of the r/w length without having reached take off speed and then yank the stick fully back and scrape the tail along the ground in a last gasp attempt to get the thing off the ground.

So, as I understand it, a more plausible theory is that (and, as I say, I'm not having a go at anyone) the pilot misjudged the rotation, put the nose back down leading to "porpoising" with one or tail strikes (and loss of speed?) and by the time this situation had stabilised, they were nearly at the end of the runway - is that right?

Thanks.

[helen-damnation]

how much cargo was on board that airplane ?

The figures will come out in the report but at this stage that is not something you need to know. In the good old days is was called "commercial in confidence". I've seen the figures and they are correct. You can do the maths if you need to.

almost an involuntary invitation for a dual input

Like all Airbus FBW, there is an audio/visual warning of dual input. If either pilot takes control with or without saying so (take over PB), there is also an audio/visual warning for that as well. They won't stop PIO/CIO but should reduce the chances/time. Having said that, if you're running out of runway, everyone pull together!

Midland 63

All bets are open at this time and your theory is certainly one of many that the investigators will look at.

Whatever happened on the take off, well done to the crew for getting her safely back onto the ground

[plt330]

Sorry you might've talked about it earlier,

Does anybody know if they actually used TOGA ??

[emiratesson]

:-) please, dont mention whatever mosques or forgiveness, i am an emirates staff and i assure, all are treated the same, whoever does a "careless mistake" gets the punishment... dont involve brothers or whatever else.. it has nothing to do with it anywhere..

[helen-damnation]

whoever does a "careless mistake" gets the punishment...

This should get some thread creep

[40&80]

A Boeing and an Airbus have trouble getting airborne....one hits an obstruction there are fatalities...one misses obstructions by a few feet and everyone lives...Fate is still the hunter.
B7x7 how is your recall?...If similar is happening at....you can bet the mortage on the same results...somtimes it appears there is nothying new
under the sun.

[FarQEK]

The culture at EK and particularly AAR

I urge every pilot who has had dealings with ek flight operations management recently to lodge a report with the ATSB about flight ops culture at Emirates, particularly the man at the top AaR. His 'i'll just sack em' approach to anyone below him who raises health and safety concerns about his uninformed dictates creates a culture where safety is very seriously compromised - there is no safe haven at ek to express safety/sleep/rest/family-impact concerns without seriously jepordising your career. Any subordination will be met with disciplinary. AaR is a serious danger to the future viability of the company, almost like your worst captain who knows everything before crm was even dreamt of. I am aware his closest managers are only following his line to keep there jobs but I know one has lodged a report about the unsafe flight operations culture thats driven from the top. AaR must be stood down immediately - for the sake of peoples lives. The positive out of this incident is that it didn't happen in the UAE where it would have been covered up. A full a thorough investigation is heading emirates way for the whole world to see. To the previous, TOGA was used at V1 when observed that they were running out of tar, that only JUST saved their lives

[GPRS]

Triton140
" what does puzzle me is why the airline concerned chose to potentially upset the Australian regulatory agencies, the same agencies who could presumably hold the aircraft as evidence for a long time, the same agencies who ultimately determine the right of Emirates to fly to Oz, etc."

You are extreamely wrong to think that the ATSB is not aware about the action plan !! otherwise, since the incident ,a dozen of flights touched down and departed from YMML,YPPH,YSSY,YBBN...where were the ATSB ??? probably waiting for you to wake them up

Not surprisingly, that does puzzle me (as does the lack of media attention)

Now, you are absoluately naive in seeking media's help