EK407 Tailstrike @ ML
Join Date: Jul 2007
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There are some highly intelligent questions asked by the press during the press conference that are worthwhile listening to (or perhaps they are not) It will be interesting to read the press coverage in the next day or so.
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Hours Limit?
Capt & F/O hours for the last 30 days were 98.9 & 89.7 respectively
Join Date: Jul 2007
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From the press conference again
A typical take off weight for the aircraft would be of the order of 362 tonnes
The takeoff weight that was entered was 100 tonnes less.
The takeoff weight on the paperwork given to the cockpit was correct.
The error was made in the cockpit whether human or by the laptop in computing the figures.
Comment as SLF, but with a very much a technical backgound. A takeoff weight that is almost 40% more than that entered into the systems is a hell of a difference. The professionals would be able to say what that would mean in terms of the accident.
A typical take off weight for the aircraft would be of the order of 362 tonnes
The takeoff weight that was entered was 100 tonnes less.
The takeoff weight on the paperwork given to the cockpit was correct.
The error was made in the cockpit whether human or by the laptop in computing the figures.
Comment as SLF, but with a very much a technical backgound. A takeoff weight that is almost 40% more than that entered into the systems is a hell of a difference. The professionals would be able to say what that would mean in terms of the accident.
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I see "The Australian's" leader writer got it utterly wrong with his headline:
Emirates A340 that scraped its tail was 100 tonnes too heavy | The Australian
Emirates A340 that scraped its tail was 100 tonnes too heavy | The Australian
Join Date: Jul 2007
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One could say that - it was 100 tonnes heavier than the figure that finished up in the plane's computer systems 
Anyway enough said from SLF for now - the professionals should take over, but I will be fascinated to follow the debate on systems design that allowed the figure to get into the system in the first place, and how the systems will be modified to decrease the likelihood that it will happen again.
Anyway enough said from SLF for now - the professionals should take over, but I will be fascinated to follow the debate on systems design that allowed the figure to get into the system in the first place, and how the systems will be modified to decrease the likelihood that it will happen again.
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The ATSB report is interesting in that it provides considerable detail on the accident, however there is no mention of any human factors mentioned or impact of same in causing the accident.... rather odd.
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2 - if this was compared to 'the average worker' (whoever that is) working 5 days on, 2 days off, then there would be a maximum of 20 duty days in this 30-day cycle, which equals 5 duty hours per day. This also sounds like a reasonably non-overworked person - working 5 days in 7 for an average of 5 hours a day.
Now averages are misleading - given, but I am trying to understand the basis for comments like "... fatigue has to play a part...."
Now averages are misleading - given, but I am trying to understand the basis for comments like "... fatigue has to play a part...."
Flight time is calculated blocks off to blocks on, ie actually operating the aircraft.
EK limit is max 100hrs in last 28 days in order to commence a flight. Pretty much industry standard. This crew were at the upper end but theoretically ok to fly.
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Report
Looking to get that part of the report
The investigation is ongoing and will include examination of:....
....the risks associated with reduced power takeoffs and how they are
managed
....the risks associated with reduced power takeoffs and how they are
managed
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Just an interested observer (please be gentle). If figures mentioned before in this post are correct, the typical take off weight is around 360 tonnes and the weight entered into the aircraft systems was 100 tonnes less - around 30%.
I assume that, as the take-off was not a '100%' power (please insert correct terminology), the computer systems calculate the amount of thrust required for safe take-off based on, amongst other factors, the entered aircraft weight? Would not such a large discrepancy - 30% - be noticeable, in terms of aircraft performance, early into the the take-off? Putting it simply, if my car tried pulling away from traffic lights using 30% less power, it would be noticed immediately.
I assume that, as the take-off was not a '100%' power (please insert correct terminology), the computer systems calculate the amount of thrust required for safe take-off based on, amongst other factors, the entered aircraft weight? Would not such a large discrepancy - 30% - be noticeable, in terms of aircraft performance, early into the the take-off? Putting it simply, if my car tried pulling away from traffic lights using 30% less power, it would be noticed immediately.
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Actually, I heard listening to the press conference that the investigation was honing in on that as one of the aspects that they were certainly concentrating on.
Somewhere there has been an error made either in input to the laptop, or in the laptop software (very unlikely), or in the transfer from the laptop output to the aircraft's systems, and the design of the system cross checks for such a fundamental input, whether human or computer hasn't picked it up. As I said above, a 40% difference in takeoff weight is fairly fundamental.
Somewhere there has been an error made either in input to the laptop, or in the laptop software (very unlikely), or in the transfer from the laptop output to the aircraft's systems, and the design of the system cross checks for such a fundamental input, whether human or computer hasn't picked it up. As I said above, a 40% difference in takeoff weight is fairly fundamental.
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ATSB report
The full report can be found here - it takes a while to download.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...012_Prelim.pdf
The report gives an account of what happened - with pictures and graphics. But it gives no consideration to why it happened.
There are no comments on the content of the CVR.
I suspect the press q and a would be a little more revealing.
The Sun Herald asks the "WHY" question in its report:
How was the wrong weight entered in Emirates cockpit? | Herald Sun
RAS
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...012_Prelim.pdf
The report gives an account of what happened - with pictures and graphics. But it gives no consideration to why it happened.
There are no comments on the content of the CVR.
I suspect the press q and a would be a little more revealing.
The Sun Herald asks the "WHY" question in its report:
How was the wrong weight entered in Emirates cockpit? | Herald Sun
RAS
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Cross checks
I would like to see the program used for the T/O calcs. Especially the cross checks built in to make sure data is near correct. For instance, if it asked the flight duration, then some basic assumptions can be made about weight. Or am I assuming there are cross checks??
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There has been stuff all media on the press conference so far but I notice the guy who writes Plane Talking points to a 60 second delay from brakes off to any sort of reaction in the cockpit, and that TOGA wasn't slotted into position until the plane was hitting stuff at the end of the runway.
How Emirates flight EK 407 struck it lucky three times leaving Melbourne and no-one died - Plane Talking
How Emirates flight EK 407 struck it lucky three times leaving Melbourne and no-one died - Plane Talking
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Not a pilot in any respect however...
As much as the documentation on this incident points to a manual error and whilst I am glad it was not a tragic outcome - I cant help but feel that more could have been done to avert this situation from a systems point of view.
I am not for a second criticising the crew although it would appear from the report that a large element of the blame seems to lay there. My concern is simply mis-typing one digit into a laptop or during transferring the data to the FMC is what is alledged to be what has been the fundamental underlying issue.
As a software developer myself and not a pilot this seems to be a case of the software and procedure biting the crew in the ass. In my own personal opinion the crew is not so much to blame as the procedure. Humans may not intend to make the odd typo here and there but we do, and yes we should be double checking and triple checking things but it is a fact of life when we look at things we tend to see what we expect to see not what is really there (check this if you want to see how good the mind can be at correcting what is actually there with what you expect to see Do You Have An Amazing Mind?) - we can be our own worst enemies without even knowing or realising it quite easily.
I think the aviation industry should not just be concentrating on what the errors were with what was entered in the FMC but more with how the software can deal with such erroneous entries. For a start eliminating the step of transfer from a laptop to the FMC would be good but it would be better if the the FMC could (maybe it can I dont know) check that the parameters entered are acceptable with axel weights - Pressures on the axels would not have to be that accurate and could probably be easily measured on oleo movement all that would be required would be an acceptable margin.
Apologies for my tuppence worth but I think the problem highlighted is alot bigger than pilot error. As the saying goes - to err is human, to really cock things up requires a computer (add in a few stages in between and your asking for trouble).
As much as the documentation on this incident points to a manual error and whilst I am glad it was not a tragic outcome - I cant help but feel that more could have been done to avert this situation from a systems point of view.
I am not for a second criticising the crew although it would appear from the report that a large element of the blame seems to lay there. My concern is simply mis-typing one digit into a laptop or during transferring the data to the FMC is what is alledged to be what has been the fundamental underlying issue.
As a software developer myself and not a pilot this seems to be a case of the software and procedure biting the crew in the ass. In my own personal opinion the crew is not so much to blame as the procedure. Humans may not intend to make the odd typo here and there but we do, and yes we should be double checking and triple checking things but it is a fact of life when we look at things we tend to see what we expect to see not what is really there (check this if you want to see how good the mind can be at correcting what is actually there with what you expect to see Do You Have An Amazing Mind?) - we can be our own worst enemies without even knowing or realising it quite easily.
I think the aviation industry should not just be concentrating on what the errors were with what was entered in the FMC but more with how the software can deal with such erroneous entries. For a start eliminating the step of transfer from a laptop to the FMC would be good but it would be better if the the FMC could (maybe it can I dont know) check that the parameters entered are acceptable with axel weights - Pressures on the axels would not have to be that accurate and could probably be easily measured on oleo movement all that would be required would be an acceptable margin.
Apologies for my tuppence worth but I think the problem highlighted is alot bigger than pilot error. As the saying goes - to err is human, to really cock things up requires a computer (add in a few stages in between and your asking for trouble).
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There's a really east to implement procedure that would be a great aid to avoiding a gross error, and that would be for the optimum takeoff figures for the expected runway (which is already included in the flight plan) and the planned ZFW and fuel load to be included in the printed flight plan immediately above where the actual figures are to be hand written.
These figures would not be used by the operating crew other than to provide a crosscheck with the figures they come up with after recieving the latest information (actual ZFW and runway/weather conditions.)
It wouldn't be fool-proof. (For instance, the runway actually used is frequently different to the one planned, and notams may or may not become an issue.) However, it would provide a gross error check, and I can't help but think this would be more useful than both pilots doing separate calculations immediately before engine start.
These figures would not be used by the operating crew other than to provide a crosscheck with the figures they come up with after recieving the latest information (actual ZFW and runway/weather conditions.)
It wouldn't be fool-proof. (For instance, the runway actually used is frequently different to the one planned, and notams may or may not become an issue.) However, it would provide a gross error check, and I can't help but think this would be more useful than both pilots doing separate calculations immediately before engine start.
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What a load of nonsense!
The procedures to ensure these mistakes do not happen have been in place for the last 40 yrs!
Apply standard operating procedures, as per your company's manual, and standard ops will occur.
The crew stuffed up, that's obvious, let's find out why!
The procedures to ensure these mistakes do not happen have been in place for the last 40 yrs!
Apply standard operating procedures, as per your company's manual, and standard ops will occur.
The crew stuffed up, that's obvious, let's find out why!
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What a load of nonsense!
The procedures to ensure these mistakes do not happen have been in place for the last 40 yrs!
Apply standard operating procedures, as per your company's manual, and standard ops will occur.
The crew stuffed up, that's obvious, let's find out why!
The procedures to ensure these mistakes do not happen have been in place for the last 40 yrs!
Apply standard operating procedures, as per your company's manual, and standard ops will occur.
The crew stuffed up, that's obvious, let's find out why!
These pre-emptive 33 years took into account human error I guess - your assertion is that the crew did not follow SOP's - people do however make mistakes, that you will never eliminate - but you can at least try to spot them.