EK407 Tailstrike @ ML
Join Date: Aug 2003
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Aha JW411! I have operated 4 man cockpit - Engineers, radio operators et al.
The point I want to stress is the operation and procedures were designed for the extra crew members so all had specific roles. And there was only one captain!
In my opinion its squeezing 4 pilots into a two pilot operation without addressing certain protocols that creates potential human factors problems.
The point I want to stress is the operation and procedures were designed for the extra crew members so all had specific roles. And there was only one captain!
In my opinion its squeezing 4 pilots into a two pilot operation without addressing certain protocols that creates potential human factors problems.
Join Date: May 2005
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Four pairs of eyes including one TRE didn't pick up the embarrassing reason for RTO and subsequent return to stand on the 380 last week.
Reason for RTO = no FMA indications when take off thrust selected.
Reason for no FMA indications= both Flight Directors off.
W.K. does have a point however not very diplomatic put. As woodja says a double edged sword. Should this incident turn out to be a data entry error however then I am sure we will here much more about the active role of augmenting crew.
Reason for RTO = no FMA indications when take off thrust selected.
Reason for no FMA indications= both Flight Directors off.
W.K. does have a point however not very diplomatic put. As woodja says a double edged sword. Should this incident turn out to be a data entry error however then I am sure we will here much more about the active role of augmenting crew.
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To Err is human
We all make mistakes, and this looks like a grave error in performance calcultion. Top job for getting it back on the deck so everyone can tell the tale! I personally knew 7 who are not able to have that privillige in a very similar scenario .
The boys up front are going to take some heat, but don't be fooled,any one of us could be next. Learn from their mistakes.
Bottom line- Stick to SOP's...And if White Knight is in the other seat cut his throat!
Safe flying
The boys up front are going to take some heat, but don't be fooled,any one of us could be next. Learn from their mistakes.
Bottom line- Stick to SOP's...And if White Knight is in the other seat cut his throat!
Safe flying
Join Date: Mar 2007
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Hey Mig 15, where do you get off bringing this thread back to the point??
Why doesn't someone start up an aug crew pros and cons thread somewhere relevant... like JetBlast, and leave this thread alone?
Why doesn't someone start up an aug crew pros and cons thread somewhere relevant... like JetBlast, and leave this thread alone?
Join Date: Oct 2008
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Augmenting crew dont have set /standardized "jobs" to do ,,,if its ad-hoc ,,,it will be looking for an accident to happen ! Distractions are up there in the causal factors leading to accidents. Awareness, situational or otherwise, cause their fair share of prangs ,,,, and this is coming from a Cessna 150 pilot !!! You are either an INTEGRAL part of the crew on that segment OR you are NOT !!!!
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I am not a professional pilot, so it is not really my place to post on this discussion, but one thing is shouting out to be said.
The Turkish incident at Schipol involved a three-man crew with a safety pilot. It is not yet official and we do not know the other circumstances, but there is speculation on the other thread that the third pilot also failed to spot the speed decay etc.
So, my question is, was he operating as White Knight (and others) would like him to? That is, staying out of the picture, not raising a concern? You get my point.
The Turkish incident at Schipol involved a three-man crew with a safety pilot. It is not yet official and we do not know the other circumstances, but there is speculation on the other thread that the third pilot also failed to spot the speed decay etc.
So, my question is, was he operating as White Knight (and others) would like him to? That is, staying out of the picture, not raising a concern? You get my point.
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It's reported that he (the 3rd man) did say '... Boss, power, power!'
Whether that was during the attempted recovery (when the PLs came back again) or before the stick-shaker we don't know yet..
Whether that was during the attempted recovery (when the PLs came back again) or before the stick-shaker we don't know yet..
Join Date: Apr 2008
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Even allowing for the Oz public service record for inertia, am a bit surprised at least some preliminary finding has not emerged.
Even verification of the cargo weight and distribution ought to have been revealed.
After all, some poor sods are paying premium rates to get their cargo delivered by air.
I would assume it is possible to have the FDR analyzed in Oz?
Even verification of the cargo weight and distribution ought to have been revealed.
After all, some poor sods are paying premium rates to get their cargo delivered by air.
I would assume it is possible to have the FDR analyzed in Oz?
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Keep it simple, and well-defined
I have no practical experience of any aspect of aircraft operation, other than those that become obvious to fequent SLF. However, at various time during a long working life I have been involved in the design and programming of computer systems, ancient and modern, been Quality Manager in a software development activity, and worked as an ISO 9000 Lead Auditor.
From a quality management perspective, I am amazed at the divergence of opinions expressed by apparently experienced flight crew about the correct way to use (or not use) relief crew during flight preparation. As an ISO 9000 Auditor observing the activity I would almost certainly have raised an "Observation" if the SOP did not address the situation and a "Non-conformance" if the SOP said something and it was not followed. But then, I have not seen any airline claiming ISO 9000 conformance for any aspect of its business.
Calculation of V1 (and other critical speeds) depends on the mass of the aircraft, and in the case of V1 on the runway length and surface condition. In all the relevant posts I have encountered in this and other threads there seems to be an assumption that the mass fed into the calculation is accurate and the assumed power will be achieved. These assumptions are obviously realised fairly closely in most cases. However, if you are much heavier than assumed or pushing less hard than necessary, V1 may be achieved with too little concrete left to stop on and v2 might not be achieved in the available distance. If I had been given the job of designing such a safety-critical system I would have built an additional output into the calculation, the time to achieve V1. Failure to meet that time would require the takeoff to be rejected. "Reject" calls at other, lower speeds could be included in the system, but are not really necessary. If you are accelerating too slowly, then you will have even more distance to stop in than if you had reached V1 in the expected time. Going by the stopwatch is surely much simpler than looking for external markings or markers on and around the runway.
The idea of having an aircraft sit on a weighing machine at the gate is superficially attractive, but I can appreciate that there are vast complicaions of cost and reliability. However, it is not necessary to weigh the whole aircraft. Simply measuring the weight on the nose gear, along with the assumed total weight, should give enough information to calculate the position of the centre of gravity. A gross error in weight would show up as a CofG far removed from what was expected. In principle it should also be possible for an aircraft to weigh itself without external equipment, by use of strain gauges on the undercarriage legs, or through a computation based on oleo internal pressures and suspension displacement.
And finally, I am horrified by the need, or even just commonly used technique, of giving the engine control system an inaccurate air temperature in order to operate at reduced thrust. Specifying the required thrust, either directly or as a proportion of the nominal maximum, would surely be less error-prone. Say what you want, and let the computers work out how to give it to you.
From a quality management perspective, I am amazed at the divergence of opinions expressed by apparently experienced flight crew about the correct way to use (or not use) relief crew during flight preparation. As an ISO 9000 Auditor observing the activity I would almost certainly have raised an "Observation" if the SOP did not address the situation and a "Non-conformance" if the SOP said something and it was not followed. But then, I have not seen any airline claiming ISO 9000 conformance for any aspect of its business.
Calculation of V1 (and other critical speeds) depends on the mass of the aircraft, and in the case of V1 on the runway length and surface condition. In all the relevant posts I have encountered in this and other threads there seems to be an assumption that the mass fed into the calculation is accurate and the assumed power will be achieved. These assumptions are obviously realised fairly closely in most cases. However, if you are much heavier than assumed or pushing less hard than necessary, V1 may be achieved with too little concrete left to stop on and v2 might not be achieved in the available distance. If I had been given the job of designing such a safety-critical system I would have built an additional output into the calculation, the time to achieve V1. Failure to meet that time would require the takeoff to be rejected. "Reject" calls at other, lower speeds could be included in the system, but are not really necessary. If you are accelerating too slowly, then you will have even more distance to stop in than if you had reached V1 in the expected time. Going by the stopwatch is surely much simpler than looking for external markings or markers on and around the runway.
The idea of having an aircraft sit on a weighing machine at the gate is superficially attractive, but I can appreciate that there are vast complicaions of cost and reliability. However, it is not necessary to weigh the whole aircraft. Simply measuring the weight on the nose gear, along with the assumed total weight, should give enough information to calculate the position of the centre of gravity. A gross error in weight would show up as a CofG far removed from what was expected. In principle it should also be possible for an aircraft to weigh itself without external equipment, by use of strain gauges on the undercarriage legs, or through a computation based on oleo internal pressures and suspension displacement.
And finally, I am horrified by the need, or even just commonly used technique, of giving the engine control system an inaccurate air temperature in order to operate at reduced thrust. Specifying the required thrust, either directly or as a proportion of the nominal maximum, would surely be less error-prone. Say what you want, and let the computers work out how to give it to you.
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Dairyground,
Well constructed post. Note that, in answer to your last comment, there are two methods of operating the engine at reduced thrust: one is a 'fixed % derate' and the other is 'assumed temperature'.
In the former, should additional thrust be required, the crew will find that it is not available. In the latter, while the temperature that the engine is being asked to 'assume' will be higher than the ambient (at least 1°C higher), this calculation can be done with tables and charts, based on all the usual performance criteria, though is typically done by a performance computer of some kind. This 'assumed temp' is then passed to the aircraft system. Should the crew decide that 'max chat' is required (there are a number of scenarios), full power will be available to them. This undoubtedly saved the day in MEL recently.
It should also be noted that in the assumed temp method, there is a significant performance margin, starting with the aeroplane (aerodynamically) not knowing that the engine is assumign it to be warmer than it is. This will have also helped in MEL.
In short, the assumed temp thrust reducted method is safer than a perormance limited full thrust take-off. As for the sysem of determining and entering data, that is another story (and would affect all departures).
Acceleration times to V1, and he mointoring thereof, is interesting and seems to be confined to some military ops. Frankly, I don't need to be monitoring a stopwatch approaching V1 on many departures, where the V1 can approach three miles per minute. That said, I'd be surprised if it were not a simple thing to automate. The side effect might be that we begine to find out how much heavier the aircraft are than the loadsheet says, given pax and carry-on baggage weights...
Well constructed post. Note that, in answer to your last comment, there are two methods of operating the engine at reduced thrust: one is a 'fixed % derate' and the other is 'assumed temperature'.
In the former, should additional thrust be required, the crew will find that it is not available. In the latter, while the temperature that the engine is being asked to 'assume' will be higher than the ambient (at least 1°C higher), this calculation can be done with tables and charts, based on all the usual performance criteria, though is typically done by a performance computer of some kind. This 'assumed temp' is then passed to the aircraft system. Should the crew decide that 'max chat' is required (there are a number of scenarios), full power will be available to them. This undoubtedly saved the day in MEL recently.
It should also be noted that in the assumed temp method, there is a significant performance margin, starting with the aeroplane (aerodynamically) not knowing that the engine is assumign it to be warmer than it is. This will have also helped in MEL.
In short, the assumed temp thrust reducted method is safer than a perormance limited full thrust take-off. As for the sysem of determining and entering data, that is another story (and would affect all departures).
Acceleration times to V1, and he mointoring thereof, is interesting and seems to be confined to some military ops. Frankly, I don't need to be monitoring a stopwatch approaching V1 on many departures, where the V1 can approach three miles per minute. That said, I'd be surprised if it were not a simple thing to automate. The side effect might be that we begine to find out how much heavier the aircraft are than the loadsheet says, given pax and carry-on baggage weights...
Join Date: Feb 2001
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Different aircraft and in test configuration, but interesting video nevertheless -
Airbus A380 Tailstrike 1 - Video
Airbus A380 Tailstrike 1 - Video
Good post Dairlyground.
All I would add is that the distance/time check could be done before V1, and still leave room to reject. As some other posters have said, pick a speed, and if you're not there by "x" time, then abort because something is wrong.
All I would add is that the distance/time check could be done before V1, and still leave room to reject. As some other posters have said, pick a speed, and if you're not there by "x" time, then abort because something is wrong.
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No need for a speed / time check on 777 as ASI has a speed trend vector incorporated in its display. Effectively it is an obvious indicator of your level of acceleration during takeoff. On 777 it will usually extend 30 knots. I would think the Airbus would have similar.
Assumed temp method of calculating reduced thrust take-offs is the most conservative method because the various takeoff speeds it provides assume conditions are more restrictive than they really are. Full thrust can always be selected after V1 without fear of being below Vmcg.
Its very simple in practice and not a factor so long as correct data is input.
Assumed temp method of calculating reduced thrust take-offs is the most conservative method because the various takeoff speeds it provides assume conditions are more restrictive than they really are. Full thrust can always be selected after V1 without fear of being below Vmcg.
Its very simple in practice and not a factor so long as correct data is input.
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This gets interesting!
Notwithstanding the different oppinions on how to integrate the augmenting crew, it will run down to whether a misinput will be determined as fault, and subsequently HOW the enquiring bodies will define the role of the second set of crew. Will they have any mention of beeing in the slightest way implicated and therefore blamed not having helped to pick up the mistake? Or will the active crew make any statement as to any distraction by too many people in the cockpit?
If an augmenting crew will in any way be held co-responsable, what will be the definition as per when their participation starts? Once they are in the cockpit? Once on board, as their time is logged as well?
If so, then the forcing of them beeing on the deck (by not providing seats) will be very delicate. In my former company they had seats and it was the active crew who would allow or disallow, or ask them to be present, the augmenting guys able to deny.
By forcing them to attend and if they will in any way be held responsible, a subsequent question will be: What happens enroute, when they are sequestred in the rearside topedo tube? If the signing skipper is there and unable to regain his seat in case of a emergency, will he be also implicated in any verdict?
The report and verdict of the concerned authorities will be very, very interesting. It might have huge implications on future SOPs, even hardware solutions ....
Notwithstanding the different oppinions on how to integrate the augmenting crew, it will run down to whether a misinput will be determined as fault, and subsequently HOW the enquiring bodies will define the role of the second set of crew. Will they have any mention of beeing in the slightest way implicated and therefore blamed not having helped to pick up the mistake? Or will the active crew make any statement as to any distraction by too many people in the cockpit?
If an augmenting crew will in any way be held co-responsable, what will be the definition as per when their participation starts? Once they are in the cockpit? Once on board, as their time is logged as well?
If so, then the forcing of them beeing on the deck (by not providing seats) will be very delicate. In my former company they had seats and it was the active crew who would allow or disallow, or ask them to be present, the augmenting guys able to deny.
By forcing them to attend and if they will in any way be held responsible, a subsequent question will be: What happens enroute, when they are sequestred in the rearside topedo tube? If the signing skipper is there and unable to regain his seat in case of a emergency, will he be also implicated in any verdict?
The report and verdict of the concerned authorities will be very, very interesting. It might have huge implications on future SOPs, even hardware solutions ....
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The speed trend arrow is extremely useful in determining airspeed acceleration, but provides no direct information as to how much ground you have covered doing so (correct me if I am wrong please) the time/distance check is the only way of ensuring that..
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Well, it is a good gross error check. And I love the way on the 77L it shoots up to the top of the scale.
Distance/time check has certain practical difficulties, particularly at night which is most of our ops.
And think about this: even a distance/time check would have to be something calculated for each takeoff to account for weight/rwy etc etc. The key word is "calculated". It would be subject to the same input error.
Distance/time check has certain practical difficulties, particularly at night which is most of our ops.
And think about this: even a distance/time check would have to be something calculated for each takeoff to account for weight/rwy etc etc. The key word is "calculated". It would be subject to the same input error.
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The speed trend arrow is extremely useful in determining airspeed acceleration, but provides no direct information as to how much ground you have covered doing so (correct me if I am wrong please) the time/distance check is the only way of ensuring that..
An hour or so later the pilot had another go at getting off and this time was successful. We were later told by ATC that the B-66 had aborted because it had not reached a certain speed by a certain distance down the runway. Yet when the pilot did the second take off the wind and OAT were same as before.
From that, we got the impression that the speed versus distance abort policy was primitive at its best, and a risk laden way of determining whether to stop or go. Certainly no way would you try that sort of approximation in a modern jet transport.
