Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Lawsuit
Cornelis,
Remember the TAP carsh at Madeira. The case against Boeing was won by the Claimant for the computation of the loss. With the American judgement, they did an action against the owner of TAP (Portuguese government) and were indemnified according to the US judge figures.
Remember the TAP carsh at Madeira. The case against Boeing was won by the Claimant for the computation of the loss. With the American judgement, they did an action against the owner of TAP (Portuguese government) and were indemnified according to the US judge figures.
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REPORT: Err detection & correction
Comment about three slots above:
"It [report] is ... later ... to negotiate (with Turkish Airlines, ATC and Boeing)... a report should be independent to be absolutely sure ... Negotiations should not be part of it...."
This report-writing method of first, a draft, and then await reply-comments, and THEN finally publish a report, saves the "investigating authority" from dumb mistakes. And that method provides more accurate final reports. Not all "investigating authorities" send-out their draft for err-correction/ comments, some won't even correct their dumb mistakes once published.
Pegase Driver
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This report-writing method of first, a draft, and then await reply-comments, and THEN finally publish a report, saves the "investigating authority" from dumb mistakes.
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Quote:
This report-writing method of first, a draft, and then await reply-comments, and THEN finally publish a report, saves the "investigating authority" from dumb mistakes.
This report-writing method of first, a draft, and then await reply-comments, and THEN finally publish a report, saves the "investigating authority" from dumb mistakes.
And it has also other advantages : The french BEA does this since its creation and the comparison of the 2 reports ( the draft and the final ) on some "politically sensitive" crashes is revealing the dependance of the National investigation institution towards powers in place.
So far about finding the truth, something we should learn from...
So the report between draft form and final form changes words and opinions from conclusions to considerations
I guess that's why they call it a draft.
But where's the issue
It's the recomendations towards preventive measures that counts. If we don't agree there then why isn't this the discussion point among us?
I guess that's why they call it a draft.
But where's the issue
It's the recomendations towards preventive measures that counts. If we don't agree there then why isn't this the discussion point among us?
lomapaseo;
Precisely.
The report must explain to the aviation community including all transport flight crews, to THY, to AMS ATC, to the Dutch regulator, to Boeing and, most importantly to the families of those killed, why an airliner in VMC conditions with just a faulty radio altimeter which provided inappropriate data to the autothrust, stalled and crashed on final killing the crew and six passengers; then the report must make recommendations on how to avoid repeating such an accident. What are we missing?
I can't wait to read what the report has to say.
PJ2
But where's the issue
It's the recomendations towards preventive measures that counts. If we don't agree there then why isn't this the discussion point among us?
It's the recomendations towards preventive measures that counts. If we don't agree there then why isn't this the discussion point among us?
The report must explain to the aviation community including all transport flight crews, to THY, to AMS ATC, to the Dutch regulator, to Boeing and, most importantly to the families of those killed, why an airliner in VMC conditions with just a faulty radio altimeter which provided inappropriate data to the autothrust, stalled and crashed on final killing the crew and six passengers; then the report must make recommendations on how to avoid repeating such an accident. What are we missing?
I can't wait to read what the report has to say.
PJ2
Pegase Driver
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This all means an investigation team not capable for theire job or a report without "politically sensitive" issues...
PJ2 :
What are we missing?
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I think what we are concerned with is censorship. I feel fairly confident that the Dutch are fairly free of big brother influence. The final report will be, I am sure unbiased and accurate. After all, given the preliminary report we are all well informed of the facts and the general consensus of opinion has been human factors, ie pilot error. So all that now remains is for the final report to set out the causal chain of events which have led, yet again for the holes to line up perfectly.
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Press conference investigation Turkish Airlines crash
The Dutch Safety Board will present its report on the investigation into the airplane crash on the 25th February 2009 near Schiphol Airport on 6 May 2010. The press conference will be held at International Press Center Nieuwspoort, Lange Poten 10, The Hague and starts at 11.00 hrs.
We kindly request you to inform us in advance of your presence at the press conference via: Press conference investigation Turkish Airlines crash - Press - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid
During final approach for the Polderbaan the aircraft crashed and ended up in a field at a distance of approximately 1.5 kilometre from the runway threshold. Four crew members and five passengers died and three crew members and 117 passengers were injured.
Questions concerning this investigation can be directed to the spokespersons of the Board, Fred Sanders, +31 70 3337000, +31 70 3563922 of +31 6 53 111389 or Sandra Groenendal, +31 623 175 701 of +31 70 333 70 59.
We kindly request you to inform us in advance of your presence at the press conference via: Press conference investigation Turkish Airlines crash - Press - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid
During final approach for the Polderbaan the aircraft crashed and ended up in a field at a distance of approximately 1.5 kilometre from the runway threshold. Four crew members and five passengers died and three crew members and 117 passengers were injured.
Questions concerning this investigation can be directed to the spokespersons of the Board, Fred Sanders, +31 70 3337000, +31 70 3563922 of +31 6 53 111389 or Sandra Groenendal, +31 623 175 701 of +31 70 333 70 59.
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The report has been presented.
summary in Dutch
NOS Nieuws - Piloten reageerden niet goed
Animation one could see if one cannot read Dutch
NOS Nieuws - Animatie van de crash van het Turkish Airlines-toestel
English summary:
Reuters AlertNet - Altimeters, human error led to Schiphol crash-board
summary in Dutch
NOS Nieuws - Piloten reageerden niet goed
Animation one could see if one cannot read Dutch
NOS Nieuws - Animatie van de crash van het Turkish Airlines-toestel
English summary:
Reuters AlertNet - Altimeters, human error led to Schiphol crash-board
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Final report published
Crashed during approach, Boeing 737-800, Amsterdam Schiphol AIrport - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid
Haven't read it yet but near the beginning:-
Haven't read it yet but near the beginning:-
The Board concludes that the improper functioning of the left-hand radio altimeter system led to the thrust from both engines being reduced by the autothrottle to a minimal value too soon, ultimately causing too big a reduction in speed. The airspeed reached stall speed due to a failure of
monitoring the airspeed and pitch attitude of the aircraft and a failure to implement the approach to stall recovery procedure correctly. This resulted in a situation where the wings were no longer providing sufficient lift, and the aircraft crashed.
(Emphasis added)
monitoring the airspeed and pitch attitude of the aircraft and a failure to implement the approach to stall recovery procedure correctly. This resulted in a situation where the wings were no longer providing sufficient lift, and the aircraft crashed.
(Emphasis added)
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1. A bizarre random fault (like all aircraft have) that had a secondary effect that needed catching and managing. Nothing too difficult.
2. A tight approach, that needed managing. Again, not tricky.
3. Breaking SOPs by continuing on an unstable approach with several parameters out. Still messing around at low level after this with the PM just selecting flap without the PF asking, doing checklists and communicating with cabin crew.
4. Very poor recovery attempt from a stall.
If a miss had been flown at 1000' as it should have been, then the next approach should have been stable and relaxed, with time to monitor and spot the misbehaviour of the A/T.
Once again, and with depressing regularity, we see the effects of crews continuing with an unstable approach and paying the price. Of course continuing unstable will not make a crash, but how many crashes have occurred that would have been saved had an unstable approach not been continued?
Will we ever learn?
2. A tight approach, that needed managing. Again, not tricky.
3. Breaking SOPs by continuing on an unstable approach with several parameters out. Still messing around at low level after this with the PM just selecting flap without the PF asking, doing checklists and communicating with cabin crew.
4. Very poor recovery attempt from a stall.
If a miss had been flown at 1000' as it should have been, then the next approach should have been stable and relaxed, with time to monitor and spot the misbehaviour of the A/T.
Once again, and with depressing regularity, we see the effects of crews continuing with an unstable approach and paying the price. Of course continuing unstable will not make a crash, but how many crashes have occurred that would have been saved had an unstable approach not been continued?
Will we ever learn?
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Originally Posted by BBC News
The report said the pilots had been slow to notice warning signals and had reacted inadequately.
Originally Posted by THY's response
As the speed approached the required minimum controllable speed, aural and visual warning systems were activated, and the crew immediately initiated steps to recover control of the aircraft. But the prompt advancement of the thrust levers by the flight crew was initially counteracted by the autothrottle system, which retarded the thrust levers again. The crew disengaged the autothrottle and advanced the thrust levers again, but the loss of time due to this system behavior in close proximity to the ground resulted in the recovery efforts being unsuccessful. The aircraft manufacturer’s documents had previously advised the pilots of the need to advance the thrust levers immediately, but the documents had not mentioned the need to disconnect the autothrottle system during such a recovery.
Simulator tests carried out after this event show that an altitude of at least 500ft is required for B737-800 aircraft to recover from stall. According to the report, stall warning was received at an altitude of about 460ft and, as a result of the above evaluation, stall was unrecoverable.
In light of the information revealed in the accident investigation, Turkish Airlines have informed all its B737-800 pilots how the aircraft's error-prone design can result in the autothrottle using incorrect radio altimeter data. Turkish Airlines have also trained these pilots in the simulator in stall-recovery techniques at low altitudes.
Simulator tests carried out after this event show that an altitude of at least 500ft is required for B737-800 aircraft to recover from stall. According to the report, stall warning was received at an altitude of about 460ft and, as a result of the above evaluation, stall was unrecoverable.
In light of the information revealed in the accident investigation, Turkish Airlines have informed all its B737-800 pilots how the aircraft's error-prone design can result in the autothrottle using incorrect radio altimeter data. Turkish Airlines have also trained these pilots in the simulator in stall-recovery techniques at low altitudes.
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Stall might not be recoverable, but APPROACH TO STALL would have been perfectly recoverable had they monitored correctly. Mind you report says failed to recover from approach to stall, not from stall.
PanPanPanYouself,
May I suggest it's THY.
My Boeing FCTM dated Oct 31, 2003 for the 737 300-900 says on page 7.26:
THY, it appears, are lying.
The THY crew failed to execute a mandatory go-around, failed to monitor the instruments, failed to recover from the onset of a stall and failed to recover from a fully developed stall.
Previous crews had the same fault on the previous flights - but recovered within a few seconds. Those crews failed to report the fault though.
Autopilots and autothrottles always have to be monitored (especially close to the ground) since they are prone to failure. It's what pilots are meant to do.
May I suggest it's THY.
My Boeing FCTM dated Oct 31, 2003 for the 737 300-900 says on page 7.26:
Originally Posted by Boeing FCTM
... a stall is an out of control, but recoverable, condition.
Note: Anytime the airplane enters a fully developed stall, the autopilot and autothrottle should be disconnected.
To recover from a stall, angle of attack must be reduced...
Note: Anytime the airplane enters a fully developed stall, the autopilot and autothrottle should be disconnected.
To recover from a stall, angle of attack must be reduced...
The THY crew failed to execute a mandatory go-around, failed to monitor the instruments, failed to recover from the onset of a stall and failed to recover from a fully developed stall.
Previous crews had the same fault on the previous flights - but recovered within a few seconds. Those crews failed to report the fault though.
Autopilots and autothrottles always have to be monitored (especially close to the ground) since they are prone to failure. It's what pilots are meant to do.
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The THY response you quote is a bit misleading - the report is clear that had the correct actions been taken at the stick shaker, the situation was recoverable.
Once the aircraft was allowed to stall, there was insufficient height for recovery - which is THYs point that you quote, but it should never have got to a stall. Earlier warnings weren't picked up, and then at the last warning, stick shaker, it was mishandled.
Somewhat sadly (to me) the report reads as though the FO (PF) was in the middle of reacting rapidly (<1 sec) and correctly to the stick shaker when his captain took control and forgot about the throttles for several, critical, seconds.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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PPPY- As ifl789 says, in fact THY's first paragraph is correct.
Leaving aside any issues of airmanship/flying skills, I suspect THY are taking the litigation defence route of pointing out that Boeing did not call for autothrottle disengagement for stick shaker recovery and that technically the crews actions followed the QRH. It then went badly wrong. I have not read every word in the report, but I also suspect THY will claim that the subsequent full stall recovery was initially 'correctly' flown.
Out of interest, why is the report published with deletions etc still showing?
Leaving aside any issues of airmanship/flying skills, I suspect THY are taking the litigation defence route of pointing out that Boeing did not call for autothrottle disengagement for stick shaker recovery and that technically the crews actions followed the QRH. It then went badly wrong. I have not read every word in the report, but I also suspect THY will claim that the subsequent full stall recovery was initially 'correctly' flown.
Out of interest, why is the report published with deletions etc still showing?