Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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Stick and Rudder; Gimli Glider incident.
>"every commercial pilot should be required to have some basic aerobatic training and some stick time in an aircraft designed to be landed power off. Basic stick and rudder skills should be the foundation of every commercial pilot's armory..."
It sure helped in the Gimli Glider incident wherein the airline pilot who suddenly found himself flying a glider was comfortable with the situation due to his hobby of flying gliders on his days off. However, its clear that flying now means managing avionics. Just as accountants now make computer entries rather than using quill pens and bottled ink, pilots now select system modes rather than actually flying the plane.
It sure helped in the Gimli Glider incident wherein the airline pilot who suddenly found himself flying a glider was comfortable with the situation due to his hobby of flying gliders on his days off. However, its clear that flying now means managing avionics. Just as accountants now make computer entries rather than using quill pens and bottled ink, pilots now select system modes rather than actually flying the plane.
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The PNF should never push the condition levers to the max without an affirmative command from the PF and without making sure that the PF is in the loop and intends to increase torque to compensate for the ensuing large increase in drag and the consequent detrimental effect on speed control.
It's not unusual in the airline business to get an FO who has more time in type than the newly qualified captain they are paired with. Neither would it be all that unusual to get an FO who in this situation will attempt to mentor and lead the captain, and it's up to the captain to take control and exert their command authority to slow the pace of operations to one they are comfortable with and be quite clear with the FO that having the FO usurp their authority by forcing the pace is unacceptable. I think we might be seeing the vestiges of something like this dynamic going on in the cockpit of the accident aircraft.
It's not unusual in the airline business to get an FO who has more time in type than the newly qualified captain they are paired with. Neither would it be all that unusual to get an FO who in this situation will attempt to mentor and lead the captain, and it's up to the captain to take control and exert their command authority to slow the pace of operations to one they are comfortable with and be quite clear with the FO that having the FO usurp their authority by forcing the pace is unacceptable. I think we might be seeing the vestiges of something like this dynamic going on in the cockpit of the accident aircraft.
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When one "dirties" his airframe, it is prudent to enable power, should the need to unwind the landing present. In this case, it is important to apply power with the fine pitch of the propellors. This is fundamental. The case could be made that leaving the Power levers alone was the direct cause of the accident. Poor communication? Fear? Exhaustion? For both pilots to miss the need to hear more power from the engines with selection of fine pitch is a glaring error. Both pilots missed it. Who to fault? Left seat.
Will
Will
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Just as accountants now make computer entries rather than using quill pens and bottled ink, pilots now select system modes rather than actually flying the plane.
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Mu's point about pace is excellent. A CFI friend instructed a man who owned a Bonanza. This pilot was so intent on his sequencing of actions after lift off it was unsettling to the instructor, who frequently pointed out there was no prize for having the fastest hands.
Inevitably, this Bonanza pilot once retracted his gear before taking off from the runway. Very expensive and not very impressive.
Don't get behind the a/c, but don't get too far ahead of it either.
Inevitably, this Bonanza pilot once retracted his gear before taking off from the runway. Very expensive and not very impressive.
Don't get behind the a/c, but don't get too far ahead of it either.
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>"...that having the FO usurp their authority by forcing the pace is unacceptable. I think we might be seeing the vestiges of something like this dynamic going on in the cockpit of the accident aircraft. ..."
Frankly, I somehow doubt the co-pilot making burger-flipper wages was trying to usurp the Captain's authority. If the pace was too fast for his comfort, he is the one who must assert himself. If there is an ad-hoc blending of PF and NFP roles, he is the one who has to make the adjusted line of demarcation clear. I think she would have been without intent to usurp his authority and I certainly think she would have been without the energy or alertness to do so.
>Who to fault?
Well, its more important to define what he fault was than to allocate blame. However, Left Seat is always the final say and therefore the final repository of fault.
I just wonder how if this "condition levers means add power" is so well known and so critical how it can be that each of the two pilots flubbed this task. Neither did it and neither said anything about it. One of them making a mistake would be strange, two of them seems even more unlikely. Same with the holding the nose up. One of them making that mistake seems very strange, the other apparently not noticing seems very strange indeed.
I just now thought of a take off from decades ago wherein the pilot was pushing the throttle all the way to the firewall and the copilot had his hand over the pilots hand and was also making sure the throttle didn't somehow decrease. Its just too critical a task to be left to one pilot.
It seems that the "PF must increase power" part is similarly critical and should be an Announce and Confirm task.
Frankly, I somehow doubt the co-pilot making burger-flipper wages was trying to usurp the Captain's authority. If the pace was too fast for his comfort, he is the one who must assert himself. If there is an ad-hoc blending of PF and NFP roles, he is the one who has to make the adjusted line of demarcation clear. I think she would have been without intent to usurp his authority and I certainly think she would have been without the energy or alertness to do so.
>Who to fault?
Well, its more important to define what he fault was than to allocate blame. However, Left Seat is always the final say and therefore the final repository of fault.
I just wonder how if this "condition levers means add power" is so well known and so critical how it can be that each of the two pilots flubbed this task. Neither did it and neither said anything about it. One of them making a mistake would be strange, two of them seems even more unlikely. Same with the holding the nose up. One of them making that mistake seems very strange, the other apparently not noticing seems very strange indeed.
I just now thought of a take off from decades ago wherein the pilot was pushing the throttle all the way to the firewall and the copilot had his hand over the pilots hand and was also making sure the throttle didn't somehow decrease. Its just too critical a task to be left to one pilot.
It seems that the "PF must increase power" part is similarly critical and should be an Announce and Confirm task.
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easy question for /about Q400 stick pusher
in one of the types I flew, a series of lights illuminated indicating the pusher was commanding nose down.
Does a light illuminate on the Q400 saying PUSHER ACTIVIATED or something similiar
IF THERE ISN'T, there ought to be!
Does a light illuminate on the Q400 saying PUSHER ACTIVIATED or something similiar
IF THERE ISN'T, there ought to be!
in one of the types I flew, a series of lights illuminated indicating the pusher was commanding nose down.
Does a light illuminate on the Q400 saying PUSHER ACTIVIATED or something similiar
IF THERE ISN'T, there ought to be!
Does a light illuminate on the Q400 saying PUSHER ACTIVIATED or something similiar
IF THERE ISN'T, there ought to be!
Everyone talking about the movement of the condition levers uncommanded by the FO, I have not seen anything that attributes this action to the FO or that it is not SOP for the company for it to be done uncommanded. Before suggesting that the FO was acting inappropriately by doing that we'd have to get confirmation that it was actually her who moved the levers (it could have been the captain) and whether what happened was in accordance with their SOPs or not.
In OUR company it must be commanded by the pilot flying, but different companies have different procedures, it may be the SOPs that are at fault here.
There's not enough information to come to any conclusions about the movement of the condition levers.
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There's not enough information to come to any conclusions about the movement of the condition levers.
Last edited by E.Z. Flyer; 16th May 2009 at 03:17. Reason: alt ref = stall reference speed switch
No, I just mean that there is not enough information given to know WHO pushed up the condition levers, and whether the manner that it occurred was in accordance with Colgan's SOPs. Without knowing who did it and whether they did it in accordance with procedures you can't possibly come to any conclusions about the FO acting on her own. If they did it in accordance with SOPs, then the SOPs are poor.
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I don't care who pushed the condition lever forward...WHO DIDN'T PUSH THE Throttles forward?
Thanks Aerocat for the info on the pusher light.
SO, the pusher light comes on and pusher pushes...Either the light was burned out or the pilots really didn't have a clue...and I think fatigue is part , but just part of the equation.
Thanks Aerocat for the info on the pusher light.
SO, the pusher light comes on and pusher pushes...Either the light was burned out or the pilots really didn't have a clue...and I think fatigue is part , but just part of the equation.
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Either Ms. Shaw raised the levers, or Captain Renslow raised them. I suggest that is not near as important as who then did not push throttles.
Renslow was flying, he needed to advance the torque. Had Shaw raised them (correctly?) then Renslow missed it. If Renslow raised them and then failed to power up? very unlikely. I doubt the SOPS don't address linking these actions. My instinct tells me Renslow had his right on the power, he left them to raise the condition levers? When his F/O was right there to lower gear and change propellor pitch? Video on the F/D anyone?
Renslow was flying, he needed to advance the torque. Had Shaw raised them (correctly?) then Renslow missed it. If Renslow raised them and then failed to power up? very unlikely. I doubt the SOPS don't address linking these actions. My instinct tells me Renslow had his right on the power, he left them to raise the condition levers? When his F/O was right there to lower gear and change propellor pitch? Video on the F/D anyone?
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AerocatS2A
I think, everyone who has experience flying turboprops required by type certification to have two pilots, is assuming that no company SOP could be that poor. I could be wrong and Colgan's SOP's may well leave this important aspect of speed control on final approach to the discretion of the NFP, but I don't think so. Doesn't make any sense whatsoever. I doubt the manufacturer would recommend such a procedure either, which would make it difficult for the airline to have their regulatory authority sign off on it.
I think, everyone who has experience flying turboprops required by type certification to have two pilots, is assuming that no company SOP could be that poor. I could be wrong and Colgan's SOP's may well leave this important aspect of speed control on final approach to the discretion of the NFP, but I don't think so. Doesn't make any sense whatsoever. I doubt the manufacturer would recommend such a procedure either, which would make it difficult for the airline to have their regulatory authority sign off on it.
Well, it's the PF who should be pushing the power levers forward.
I had a look at some of the Q400 flight deck photos on Airliners.net and the stick pusher shut off button/light is there on the glare shield. It's not a very big button though, not particularly attention getting. When I did the stick pusher sequence in the Q300 training, I tried to push the wrong button to shut it off. It's the same size as a few others on the glare shield.
I had a look at some of the Q400 flight deck photos on Airliners.net and the stick pusher shut off button/light is there on the glare shield. It's not a very big button though, not particularly attention getting. When I did the stick pusher sequence in the Q300 training, I tried to push the wrong button to shut it off. It's the same size as a few others on the glare shield.
WingoWango - I would have to politely disagree with your last line of your recent post,
"After all when the holes in the swiss cheese are starting to line up the SOPs are a last line of defense. " SOPs are near the end but not the last line.
When the crap has hit the fan, the last line of defence is ones basic flying skills!
"After all when the holes in the swiss cheese are starting to line up the SOPs are a last line of defense. " SOPs are near the end but not the last line.
When the crap has hit the fan, the last line of defence is ones basic flying skills!
MU3001A, I agree, but without knowing what the Colgan procedures are you can't fully understand what was happening on the flight deck. It could be that the PNF is to advance the condition levers automatically after selecting the gear down, or maybe the PF is to do it himself at his discretion, or maybe they were acting outside the SOPs. Maybe the PNF was doing actions in an expected sequence rather than in the sequence commanded, it wouldn't surprise me if she was very tired.