Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC
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One other thing to consider for those second-guessing the crew...
Ditching into the river, worst case scenario, you have 155 dead on the plane, possibly a few more if it were to hit a boat.
On the other hand - try for an airport and don't make it, going over heavily populated areas and tall buildings - there could easily be ten times that many dead.
Ditching into the river, worst case scenario, you have 155 dead on the plane, possibly a few more if it were to hit a boat.
On the other hand - try for an airport and don't make it, going over heavily populated areas and tall buildings - there could easily be ten times that many dead.
PJ2
Agree!
and I believe that this answers your original question, thanks for the heads up
So the statement that the aircraft was in Normal Law is important - I don't see it as merely coming from a Safety Department without supporting information directly from the investigation, for precisely the above reasons.
and I believe that this answers your original question, thanks for the heads up
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To all those tempted to pontificate about the 'decision', please take a MOMENT to remember it will take days to assimilate the necessary parameters and performance details, and they had minutes.
And this is why the action of GAPAN in awarding medals now rather than waiting for the NTSB to confirm the heroic nature of Captain S's actions in the light of all the gathered evidence would appear to be so premature.
Second Guessing
In the long run, Captain Sully might possibly be criticized for bashing up the airplane, but he cannot be blamed for killing anyone. He did the best he could with the information available (energy) and made a splendid choice.
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Adding to the return-to-LGA question asked earlier:
It is a very well proven rule of thumb that if you make an unrestricted climb out of an airport, it is always more than 5% (the angle of an ILS). That allows you to return on a glide return to your airport of origin. Plus or minus. The two-engine-climb is mostly more than 10%. A all-engine-out gliding path is around 5%, if you don't extend any flaps or gear.
If you watch the actual path of the A320 in question, you see that he did a shallow turn towards TBO, but finally saw that it was out of question. Then he turned to the Hudson. If he would have turned directly back as the rule of thumb suggests, he would have made it. That still doesn't guarantee that he would have made a precision gliding landing on the runway and that he could have stopped there (remember: only 7 brakes applications!)
Sully's decision was the right one because he succeeded. But I'm still convinced that I would have decided differently in his case. I hope I never have to be in his position...
Dani
It is a very well proven rule of thumb that if you make an unrestricted climb out of an airport, it is always more than 5% (the angle of an ILS). That allows you to return on a glide return to your airport of origin. Plus or minus. The two-engine-climb is mostly more than 10%. A all-engine-out gliding path is around 5%, if you don't extend any flaps or gear.
If you watch the actual path of the A320 in question, you see that he did a shallow turn towards TBO, but finally saw that it was out of question. Then he turned to the Hudson. If he would have turned directly back as the rule of thumb suggests, he would have made it. That still doesn't guarantee that he would have made a precision gliding landing on the runway and that he could have stopped there (remember: only 7 brakes applications!)
Sully's decision was the right one because he succeeded. But I'm still convinced that I would have decided differently in his case. I hope I never have to be in his position...
Dani
This argument reminds me of the Star Trek episode when the ship is being attacked by the Klingons. A lady commander is in charge on the bridge. It all starts to go wrong with the ship disintegrating as she issues various orders to the crew. Everything suddenly stops and then Captain Kirk walks in - they are in the simulator. Kirk proceeds to debrief the commander in unequivocal terms. When he has finished she asks "Captain Kirk, permission to speak?", "Granted" he replies.
"If I may say so, Captain Kirk, I was in a 'no-win' situation" Kirk replies "One of the things you have to learn as a Starship Commander is that sometimes you are in a no-win situation!"
Human beings do the best they can with the resources available at the time. In fact Sullenberger and his crew did win - everyone is still around to tell the tale.
"If I may say so, Captain Kirk, I was in a 'no-win' situation" Kirk replies "One of the things you have to learn as a Starship Commander is that sometimes you are in a no-win situation!"
Human beings do the best they can with the resources available at the time. In fact Sullenberger and his crew did win - everyone is still around to tell the tale.
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The referral to electrical systems (AC and DC) remaining powered, all three hydraulic systems remaining operational and the flight control law remaining Normal Law comes directly from an Airbus Flight Safety Department Accident Information Telex, which also states that No. 1 engine delivered minimum thrust (about 35% N1) until a restart attempt at about 500ft height.
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When the captain looked back at LGA after the turn to the west they were trying to do a restart checklist. He probably thought he could make it back for a downwind landing on a short runway if the gear and flaps came down on schedule but by the time the restart failed it probably wasn't an option any more. If they had tried to land at LGA and failed to get configured and not get on the short runway it would have been a disaster. He had seconds to decide what was the best chance of survival and I think he made the right decision. 155 people are very happy he chose the river.
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AIT N°2 DATED 23rd JANUARY 2009
Since it is not classified, and for the sake of Flight Safety, here it goes:
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK
OUR REF: USA US1549 AIT N°2 DATED 23rd JANUARY 2009
Previous ref: USA US1549 AIT N°1 DATED 16 JANUARY 2009
SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK
This is an update to the AIT N°1 issued on 16th January 2009.
The information which follow has been approved for release by the US National Transport Safety
Board (NTSB) and represent the highlights from the initial analysis of the available data: mainly
Digital Flight Data Recorder, aircraft components, ATC script and radar.
The A320 aircraft was operating a scheduled flight US1549 from New York, La Guardia airport to
Charlotte, Virginia on 15th January 2009, when the aircraft ditched on the Hudson river shortly
after take-off at 15:30 local time.
The aircraft performed a normal flex take-off in slats/flaps configuration 2 from La Guardia airport
with the co-pilot as Pilot Flying.
At time T0, soon after the aircraft was in clean configuration at an airspeed of about 210kts, both
engines suffered a simultaneous and sudden loss of thrust at about 3000ft pressure altitude. The
engines N1 decreased abruptly to 35% and 15% on engines 1 & 2 respectively. This sudden and
simultaneous loss of engine thrust is consistent with the reported bird strike on both engines and
also with the initial observations from the remaining engine 2. (Recovery of engine 1 being still in
progress).
The captain took immediately control of the aircraft making smooth nose-down pitch inputs to
maintain the airspeed at about 200kts.
At approximately T0+20 sec, the crew changed the aircraft heading towards the Hudson river.
There was no more response from the engine N°2. The engine N°1 continued to deliver a
minimum thrust (N1 around 35%) for about 2 minutes and 20 seconds after T0.
At approximately T0+2min20sec, the crew attempted at about 500ft/200kts a quick relight on
engine 1 without success.
The crew then selected slat/flap configuration 2 which was achieved.
From then on and until the ditching, the heading remained almost constant. The speed decreased
from 200kts to 130kts.
Ditching occurred 3 minutes and 30 seconds after the thrust loss in the following conditions:
- Airspeed was about 130kts (at the Gross Weight, Valpha max is 125kts and Valpha prot is
132kts)
- Pitch attitude was 10 degrees up and bank attitude was at 0 degree.
- Flaps and slats were in configuration 2. Landing gear up
It is to be noted that at all times during the event and up until the ditching, the normal electrical
supply (AC and DC buses) and all three hydraulic systems were fully operational and the flight
control law remained in Normal law.
In line with ICAO Annex 13 International convention, the US NTSB (National Transportation
Safety Board) continues the investigation assisted by Accredited Representatives from the
French BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) as State of aircraft manufacturer. Airbus
continues to support the NTSB investigation with advisors on-site and in the various investigation
working groups.
Airbus has no specific recommendations at this stage. Should there be the need for
recommendation as a result of the investigation, operators will be notified accordingly.
ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK
OUR REF: USA US1549 AIT N°2 DATED 23rd JANUARY 2009
Previous ref: USA US1549 AIT N°1 DATED 16 JANUARY 2009
SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK
This is an update to the AIT N°1 issued on 16th January 2009.
The information which follow has been approved for release by the US National Transport Safety
Board (NTSB) and represent the highlights from the initial analysis of the available data: mainly
Digital Flight Data Recorder, aircraft components, ATC script and radar.
The A320 aircraft was operating a scheduled flight US1549 from New York, La Guardia airport to
Charlotte, Virginia on 15th January 2009, when the aircraft ditched on the Hudson river shortly
after take-off at 15:30 local time.
The aircraft performed a normal flex take-off in slats/flaps configuration 2 from La Guardia airport
with the co-pilot as Pilot Flying.
At time T0, soon after the aircraft was in clean configuration at an airspeed of about 210kts, both
engines suffered a simultaneous and sudden loss of thrust at about 3000ft pressure altitude. The
engines N1 decreased abruptly to 35% and 15% on engines 1 & 2 respectively. This sudden and
simultaneous loss of engine thrust is consistent with the reported bird strike on both engines and
also with the initial observations from the remaining engine 2. (Recovery of engine 1 being still in
progress).
The captain took immediately control of the aircraft making smooth nose-down pitch inputs to
maintain the airspeed at about 200kts.
At approximately T0+20 sec, the crew changed the aircraft heading towards the Hudson river.
There was no more response from the engine N°2. The engine N°1 continued to deliver a
minimum thrust (N1 around 35%) for about 2 minutes and 20 seconds after T0.
At approximately T0+2min20sec, the crew attempted at about 500ft/200kts a quick relight on
engine 1 without success.
The crew then selected slat/flap configuration 2 which was achieved.
From then on and until the ditching, the heading remained almost constant. The speed decreased
from 200kts to 130kts.
Ditching occurred 3 minutes and 30 seconds after the thrust loss in the following conditions:
- Airspeed was about 130kts (at the Gross Weight, Valpha max is 125kts and Valpha prot is
132kts)
- Pitch attitude was 10 degrees up and bank attitude was at 0 degree.
- Flaps and slats were in configuration 2. Landing gear up
It is to be noted that at all times during the event and up until the ditching, the normal electrical
supply (AC and DC buses) and all three hydraulic systems were fully operational and the flight
control law remained in Normal law.
In line with ICAO Annex 13 International convention, the US NTSB (National Transportation
Safety Board) continues the investigation assisted by Accredited Representatives from the
French BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) as State of aircraft manufacturer. Airbus
continues to support the NTSB investigation with advisors on-site and in the various investigation
working groups.
Airbus has no specific recommendations at this stage. Should there be the need for
recommendation as a result of the investigation, operators will be notified accordingly.
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As for building height, the highest buildings I've seen around 125th st. (where you end up if you extend the centerline of 31) are on the order of 21 stories. So I'd liberally put building height at 300 feet ASL.
Could he have made it? Maybe -- I'll wait for the reports from the simulator on that one. But they'd have to have been luckier than they were.
Let's be honest here: it'd have to be a spectacular screwup such that in those final feet of low-power flight, the aircraft caused anywhere near the casualties on the ground than people it had on board.
The "worst case" on ditching in the Hudson *might* be 155 dead, but that would require a spectacular screwup as well. On the other hand, the odds of the majority of passengers surviving a controlled-flight water landing are pretty good, while the same numbers for an urban landing are not so great. So "worst case" for a ditch is a significant number of survivors.
You can argue out the details: was flying over water and attempting a relight a good idea, or should they have just kept it where it was, since it was working to some degree, and tried to put it on a runway, hoping that the situation didn't get worse?
But, what it boils down to is this: there's the moment to make a decision. That decision's not always the best one, but it is best to make it. And there's the moment to realize that the planned course of action isn't going to work out. That moment is way before it starts to fail: ideally, it's when you catch the first whiff of cognitive dissonance. When the odds look good, but the number of unknown and uncontrolled critical variables starts to increase, that's when it's time to simplify. You can only get so lucky.
And these guys couldn't have gotten luckier.
Could he have made it? Maybe -- I'll wait for the reports from the simulator on that one. But they'd have to have been luckier than they were.
Let's be honest here: it'd have to be a spectacular screwup such that in those final feet of low-power flight, the aircraft caused anywhere near the casualties on the ground than people it had on board.
The "worst case" on ditching in the Hudson *might* be 155 dead, but that would require a spectacular screwup as well. On the other hand, the odds of the majority of passengers surviving a controlled-flight water landing are pretty good, while the same numbers for an urban landing are not so great. So "worst case" for a ditch is a significant number of survivors.
You can argue out the details: was flying over water and attempting a relight a good idea, or should they have just kept it where it was, since it was working to some degree, and tried to put it on a runway, hoping that the situation didn't get worse?
But, what it boils down to is this: there's the moment to make a decision. That decision's not always the best one, but it is best to make it. And there's the moment to realize that the planned course of action isn't going to work out. That moment is way before it starts to fail: ideally, it's when you catch the first whiff of cognitive dissonance. When the odds look good, but the number of unknown and uncontrolled critical variables starts to increase, that's when it's time to simplify. You can only get so lucky.
And these guys couldn't have gotten luckier.
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error in post 1171
it seems that there is a significant error in the telex from airbus in post 1171 above.
The destination is listed as Charlotte, Virginia.
Quite a mistake.
Charlotte is in the great state of North Carolina. There is a significant town in Virginia called Charlottesville.
SO, if airbus can get the state wrong, why not other things too?
Very interesting about the engines producing some thrust
The destination is listed as Charlotte, Virginia.
Quite a mistake.
Charlotte is in the great state of North Carolina. There is a significant town in Virginia called Charlottesville.
SO, if airbus can get the state wrong, why not other things too?
Very interesting about the engines producing some thrust
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On the other hand, the odds of the majority of passengers surviving a controlled-flight water landing are pretty good, while the same numbers for an urban landing are not so great. So "worst case" for a ditch is a significant number of survivors.
The sad example of Air Florida Flight 90 would also rather suggest that ditchings in to freezing rivers in January do not normally go at all well for passengers or crew and that despite his clearly exceptional level of skill as a glider pilot Captain Sully cannot have set down on the Hudson at all confident of the kind of result he actually achieved. That result was no doubt his best possible case but probably only a 5% or so expected probability at best.
Any review of the history of loss of all engine power incidents would probably have suggested that some kind of controlled landing on to a runway was far more likely to have more survivors so one can only assume that the pilot took his decision virtually certain that an attempt to return to La Guardia would not result in a landing on the runway. And British Midland at Kegworth clearly indicates just how appalling the results usually are when loss of all engine power and an attempt at a controlled landing instead sees the afflicted aircraft landing just short of the target runway.
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it seems that there is a significant error in the telex from airbus in post 1171 above.
The destination is listed as Charlotte, Virginia.
The destination is listed as Charlotte, Virginia.
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Awards?
Personally, I think it is a little early to be handing out awards. The crew obviously did a fine job, but I think that even they would agree the award-givers might be politically motivated.
If it were me, I would rather wait until the investigation is finished; and then, if the aviation community were to decide that I was deserving, I would humbly accept whatever accolades were bestowed upon me.
Most of the professionals here would have done a fine job given the same circumstances. I think it is important to remember that we are all trained to deal with similar situations. If only one in a million pilots and crews are up to the task, I don't think I would feel comfortable flying again, with anyone, including myself.
If it were me, I would rather wait until the investigation is finished; and then, if the aviation community were to decide that I was deserving, I would humbly accept whatever accolades were bestowed upon me.
Most of the professionals here would have done a fine job given the same circumstances. I think it is important to remember that we are all trained to deal with similar situations. If only one in a million pilots and crews are up to the task, I don't think I would feel comfortable flying again, with anyone, including myself.
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Just to make it clear to the non-technical observers:
35% N1 is NOT 35% thrust, but indeed a great deal less - perhaps 10% thrust or even less.
35% N1 is NOT 35% thrust, but indeed a great deal less - perhaps 10% thrust or even less.
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Capvermell -
"The sad example of Air Florida Flight 90 would also rather suggest that ditchings in to freezing rivers in January do not normally go at all well for passengers or crew....."
The Air Florida accident could hardly be called a planned/controlled ditching.
"The sad example of Air Florida Flight 90 would also rather suggest that ditchings in to freezing rivers in January do not normally go at all well for passengers or crew....."
The Air Florida accident could hardly be called a planned/controlled ditching.
35% N1 is NOT 35% thrust, but indeed a great deal less - perhaps 10% thrust or even less.