Qantas emergency landing
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by pattern_is_full
The fault hasn’t occurred with Honeywell equipment
Any more specific info on that telex ?
EMI at FL370
I think I addressed this point when somebody suggested it a possibility in the BA038 incident. At that time I said it would take teraWatts, and that plane was at final approach altitude. Considering the inverse square law, there is not enough power in the grid to support that hypothesis at FL370, unless it was energy resonant to some particular sensitivity of the plane!
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Wingham NSW Australia
Age: 83
Posts: 1,343
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ex-Fighter pilots
To all those wishing to give the former fighter pilots now flying airliners a "backhander", I'm sure the ex-fighter jockeys would rather the newspaper comment had not been printed. Most would not agree with the implication that other than ex-fighter pilots may not have coped. Most of those feeling offended, and saying so on this forum, are likely feeling a bit inadequate. Just remember you are all qualified for the job whether civil or military trained.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 125
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This is interesting:
Litton Industries' System
The QF A330 flight control system was supplied by Litton Industries, a subsidiary of Los Angeles-based Northrop Grumman Corp., according to the telex issued to airlines. Carriers can choose data computers made by Litton or Honeywell Inc. for the model. The fault hasn't occurred with Honeywell equipment.
Northrop, the world's largest warship builder, acquired Litton in 2001 for about $5.18 billion. Northrop is ``involved in the investigation and we're helping in any way we can,'' said Gina Piellusch, a spokeswoman, adding that she didn't immediately have further information.
European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co., Airbus's owner, fell 93 cents, or 8.4 percent to 10.17 euros in Paris trading. Northrop fell as much as $1.84, or 4.1 percent, to $43.37 and was down 3.4 percent as of 11:54 a.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.
Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., which operates 28 A330s or A340s fitted with systems covered by Airbus's alert, is taking the recommended steps, it said in an e-mailed reply to Bloomberg News queries. Actions include changes to checks by flight crews and maintenance procedures, the Hong Kong-based carrier added.
The Fault actually DID occur with Honeywell, but on the B777 of MAS...
Litton Industries' System
The QF A330 flight control system was supplied by Litton Industries, a subsidiary of Los Angeles-based Northrop Grumman Corp., according to the telex issued to airlines. Carriers can choose data computers made by Litton or Honeywell Inc. for the model. The fault hasn't occurred with Honeywell equipment.
Northrop, the world's largest warship builder, acquired Litton in 2001 for about $5.18 billion. Northrop is ``involved in the investigation and we're helping in any way we can,'' said Gina Piellusch, a spokeswoman, adding that she didn't immediately have further information.
European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co., Airbus's owner, fell 93 cents, or 8.4 percent to 10.17 euros in Paris trading. Northrop fell as much as $1.84, or 4.1 percent, to $43.37 and was down 3.4 percent as of 11:54 a.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.
Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., which operates 28 A330s or A340s fitted with systems covered by Airbus's alert, is taking the recommended steps, it said in an e-mailed reply to Bloomberg News queries. Actions include changes to checks by flight crews and maintenance procedures, the Hong Kong-based carrier added.
The Fault actually DID occur with Honeywell, but on the B777 of MAS...
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Roguesville, cloud cuckooland
Posts: 1,197
Likes: 0
Received 16 Likes
on
5 Posts
I think the ex-fighter pilot angle was just the journalist sexing the article up a bit. If you look at what else was said about what we do, no mention was made of having to be a fighter pilot in order to be able to get the aircraft on the ground safely. We all are trained to the same standard. Anyone offended should probably check their egos at the door.
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Skating away on the thin ice of a new day.
Posts: 1,116
Received 13 Likes
on
8 Posts
reply to zeebee re vlf
Hi zb, yes I was going to go on with harmonics beat frequencies ie heterodyning etc but didnt go any further.I was going to cover the inverse square law also but some one else has done that also.Thanks to those folks to cover my laziness.
Radio can do some weird crap so I wouldnt say absolutely impossible but I do seriously doubt it could be a factor.
Looks like pprune scooped the press on the vlf issue, wonder how long before the post re UFO gets a run in the tele or herald sun
Radio can do some weird crap so I wouldnt say absolutely impossible but I do seriously doubt it could be a factor.
Looks like pprune scooped the press on the vlf issue, wonder how long before the post re UFO gets a run in the tele or herald sun
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Skating away on the thin ice of a new day.
Posts: 1,116
Received 13 Likes
on
8 Posts
litebulbs
Do we know exactly when and what the crew did?
The crew as best as we can ascertain carried out the non normal checklist.
They've not been slagged by the ATSB to my knowledge.
Its not up to them to second guess the procedures and aircraft architecture.If the NNC said turn off the offending adiru or air data section of it I'm sure they would have after identing exactly what the message was and actions to be carried out.
I dont think going thru a NNC whilst riding a bucking bronco would be terribly easy either.
Given the event appears to be unique on type the urgency to turn off an adiru is easy with Captain Harry Hindsight in command.
I'd have been far too busy slipping out of my seat covered in "adrenalin"
The crew as best as we can ascertain carried out the non normal checklist.
They've not been slagged by the ATSB to my knowledge.
Its not up to them to second guess the procedures and aircraft architecture.If the NNC said turn off the offending adiru or air data section of it I'm sure they would have after identing exactly what the message was and actions to be carried out.
I dont think going thru a NNC whilst riding a bucking bronco would be terribly easy either.
Given the event appears to be unique on type the urgency to turn off an adiru is easy with Captain Harry Hindsight in command.
I'd have been far too busy slipping out of my seat covered in "adrenalin"
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Stockholm Sweden
Age: 74
Posts: 569
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A “preliminary analysis” of the Qantas plunge showed the error occurred in one of the jet’s three air data inertial reference units, which caused the autopilot to disconnect, the ATSB said in a statement on its Web site.
The unit continued to send false stall and speed warnings to the aircraft’s primary computer and about 2 minutes after the initial fault “generated very high, random and incorrect values for the aircraft’s angle of attack.”
The flight control computer then commanded a “nose-down aircraft movement, which resulted in the aircraft pitching down to a maximum of about 8.5 degrees,” it said.
The unit continued to send false stall and speed warnings to the aircraft’s primary computer and about 2 minutes after the initial fault “generated very high, random and incorrect values for the aircraft’s angle of attack.”
The flight control computer then commanded a “nose-down aircraft movement, which resulted in the aircraft pitching down to a maximum of about 8.5 degrees,” it said.
So question is why did the FCS follow ADIRU1, when the other two were showing no high AOA? We are not talking AP here, but envelope protection. Surely this protection system uses inputs from all three ADIRU and should vote off nbr 1?
Or had the crew reengaged AP1? There is a trap on Airbus that with a failed ADIRU1 you can set Capt inst to ADIRU3, but still have ADIRU1 feeding AP1.
I follow with interest.
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: Gatwick
Posts: 1,980
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ampclamp
I agree with you and am not blaming anyone. I am sure the investigation will examine the crew actions and as you said, if they carried out their SOP for the initial fault, then the investigation will move onto SOP's and other areas as to why the incident was allowed to happen.
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: wichita
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
tooldoc1000
What is the update of the Northrop Grumman (Litton) LTN-101 Inertial Reference Units (IRUs)
The current part numbers are 465020-0400-0401 but need to be updated to 465020-0400-0402 (with the 2005 Epoch software). is this correct.
The current part numbers are 465020-0400-0401 but need to be updated to 465020-0400-0402 (with the 2005 Epoch software). is this correct.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Swedish Steve,
I agree with most of what you say, especially that a single ADIRU outputting erroneous values should not cause a flight control upset, there should be some mechanism for excluding the faulty unit, such as median value selection, or something similar. (Navigation, flight displays and AP are another matter, they may be fed only by a single unit).
I understand the flight crew received an "IR 1 fault" ECAM message. Would the ECAM procedure not include turning off the faulty ADIRU?
As to the Autopilot: The ATSB media release said that the pilots hand-flew the aircraft from the time of the first incident (which was a slight pitch-up and the AP disconnect), except for a few seconds. The ATSB does not tell us when those few seconds were, in particular whether or not it was during the two following, more severe nose-down upsets.
On the other hand, the ATSB is quite clear that erroneously high AoA values sent by the ADIRU to the PRIM(s) caused the PRIM to command down-elevator deflection. No AP involved.
Bernd
I agree with most of what you say, especially that a single ADIRU outputting erroneous values should not cause a flight control upset, there should be some mechanism for excluding the faulty unit, such as median value selection, or something similar. (Navigation, flight displays and AP are another matter, they may be fed only by a single unit).
Originally Posted by Swedish Steve
Or had the crew reengaged AP1? There is a trap on Airbus that with a failed ADIRU1 you can set Capt inst to ADIRU3, but still have ADIRU1 feeding AP1.
As to the Autopilot: The ATSB media release said that the pilots hand-flew the aircraft from the time of the first incident (which was a slight pitch-up and the AP disconnect), except for a few seconds. The ATSB does not tell us when those few seconds were, in particular whether or not it was during the two following, more severe nose-down upsets.
On the other hand, the ATSB is quite clear that erroneously high AoA values sent by the ADIRU to the PRIM(s) caused the PRIM to command down-elevator deflection. No AP involved.
Bernd
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: France
Posts: 2,315
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm baffled...
Wouldn't there have been a sudden large discrepancy between pitch attitude, pitch rate and AoA? Inertia and all that?
AoA presumably came from the "AD" part of the ADIRU, and pich attitude and pitch rate from the "IRU" part.
Were they still sufficiently coherent for the ADIRU not going totally offline?
Wouldn't there have been a sudden large discrepancy between pitch attitude, pitch rate and AoA? Inertia and all that?
AoA presumably came from the "AD" part of the ADIRU, and pich attitude and pitch rate from the "IRU" part.
Were they still sufficiently coherent for the ADIRU not going totally offline?
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by ChristiaanJ
I'm baffled...
Wouldn't there have been a sudden large discrepancy between pitch attitude, pitch rate and AoA? Inertia and all that?
AoA presumably came from the "AD" part of the ADIRU, and pich attitude and pitch rate from the "IRU" part.
Were they still sufficiently coherent for the ADIRU not going totally offline?
AoA presumably came from the "AD" part of the ADIRU, and pich attitude and pitch rate from the "IRU" part.
Were they still sufficiently coherent for the ADIRU not going totally offline?
But another thing is still interesting:
I only just realised that the "IR" and the "ADR" parts of the ADIRUs can be turned off separately.
As the ATSB said there was a "IR 1 fault" message. The abnormal procedure apparently says to turn off "IR 1" only if "IR totally faulty" (continuously lit fault light, instead of flashing, we don't know which it was in this case). Neither IR nor ADR fault procedures call for turning off the ADIRU completely, only for disconnecting the respective data output (IR and/or ADR, and also setting the Captain's instruments to use ADIRU 3). It is also not clear to me if this inhibits the output at the ADIRU, or just the transmission of the data to specific recipients (which ones? PRIM, Navigation/AP, Displays, ...).
Even so, if they had disconnected IR 1, the ADR part would still be operational and continue to send data.
The Captain's PFD would then have displayed the (presumably correct) data from ADIRU 3, while the PRIM will have continued to receive (erroneous) data from ADIRU 1 (and -2 and -3), even if only from the ADR portion.
AoA is obviously an "air data" value, and not IR. The upsets were triggered by incorrect AoA values.
Thus, apparently, both the ADR and the IR parts of the ADIRU were faulty. What exactly went wrong there is for the manufacturer to investigate.
Bernd
Last edited by bsieker; 16th Oct 2008 at 21:27. Reason: Another thought.
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Skating away on the thin ice of a new day.
Posts: 1,116
Received 13 Likes
on
8 Posts
baffled?
The aoa input prob has priority over the IR part in given situations.
primarys/flt comp's likely analyse the info and drive the flt ctls to protect the aircraft from a dangerous attitude.
still gets back to the basic question everyone is asking , how could it be allowed to happen given all the comparing and monitoring going on at altitude in crz?
litebulbs, no problem sometimes the written word does not always come across as we intend.
primarys/flt comp's likely analyse the info and drive the flt ctls to protect the aircraft from a dangerous attitude.
still gets back to the basic question everyone is asking , how could it be allowed to happen given all the comparing and monitoring going on at altitude in crz?
litebulbs, no problem sometimes the written word does not always come across as we intend.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A copy of a post by Veruka Salt over on D & G.
Our fleet management has just published a memo to Airbus crew, containing an extract from the Airbus Operator Information Telex.
It's a detailed account of "what" actually happened, if not "why".
It's a detailed account of "what" actually happened, if not "why".
'As the incident is subject to a formal ICAO Annex 13 investigation led by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the updated data about the incident included in this OIT have been approved for release by the ATSB.
The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE (Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following preliminary sequence of events:
The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected. From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the flight except for a short duration of few seconds.
From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.
This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as follows:
* unjustified stall & overspeed warning
* loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD).
* several ECAM system warnings.
About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:
1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered
The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.
The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes. A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.
The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.
Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.
At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.
The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMAN (previously LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.'
The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE (Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following preliminary sequence of events:
The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected. From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the flight except for a short duration of few seconds.
From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.
This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as follows:
* unjustified stall & overspeed warning
* loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD).
* several ECAM system warnings.
About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:
1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered
The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.
The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes. A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.
The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.
Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.
At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.
The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMAN (previously LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.'
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Apparently for that specific type of ADIRU, Airbus has substantially modified the checklist in response to an Inertial Reference fault. It is now question to turn off both parts of that unit : IR + ADR
Due to the nature of the fault in the ADIRU 1 "random spikes" it is hard to say if the crew had the proper tools to determine if the ADR part was at fault too and to turn it off before the sudden pitch down ?
How strange is it, the protection which is supposed to protect, sent the pax through the roof, and for no good reason !?
That Airbus is a VERY complex machine …
Due to the nature of the fault in the ADIRU 1 "random spikes" it is hard to say if the crew had the proper tools to determine if the ADR part was at fault too and to turn it off before the sudden pitch down ?
How strange is it, the protection which is supposed to protect, sent the pax through the roof, and for no good reason !?
That Airbus is a VERY complex machine …
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 125
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It still sounds remarkably similar to the Boeing 777 incident, and they had a Honeywell kit, only that this aeroplane pitched up 3000 Feet!!:
At approximately 1703 Western Standard Time, on 1 August 2005, a Boeing Company 777-200 aircraft, (B777) registered 9M-MRG, was being operated on a scheduled international passenger service from Perth to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The crew reported that, during climb out, they observed a LOW AIRSPEED advisory on the aircraft’s Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS), when climbing through flight level (FL) 380. At the same time, the aircraft’s slip/skid indication deflected to the full right position on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The PFD airspeed display then indicated that the aircraft was approaching the overspeed limit and the stall speed limit simultaneously. The aircraft pitched up and climbed to approximately FL410 and the indicated airspeed decreased from 270 kts to 158 kts. The stall warning and stick shaker devices also activated. The aircraft returned to Perth where an uneventful landing was completed.
The aircraft’s flight data recorder (FDR), cockpit voice recorder and the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) were removed for examination. The FDR data indicated that, at the time of the occurrence, unusual acceleration values were recorded in all three planes of movement. The acceleration values were provided by the aircraft’s ADIRU to the aircraft’s primary flight computer, autopilot and other aircraft systems during manual and automatic flight.
Subsequent examination of the ADIRU revealed that one of several accelerometers had failed at the time of the occurrence, and that another accelerometer had failed in June 2001.
At approximately 1703 Western Standard Time, on 1 August 2005, a Boeing Company 777-200 aircraft, (B777) registered 9M-MRG, was being operated on a scheduled international passenger service from Perth to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The crew reported that, during climb out, they observed a LOW AIRSPEED advisory on the aircraft’s Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS), when climbing through flight level (FL) 380. At the same time, the aircraft’s slip/skid indication deflected to the full right position on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The PFD airspeed display then indicated that the aircraft was approaching the overspeed limit and the stall speed limit simultaneously. The aircraft pitched up and climbed to approximately FL410 and the indicated airspeed decreased from 270 kts to 158 kts. The stall warning and stick shaker devices also activated. The aircraft returned to Perth where an uneventful landing was completed.
The aircraft’s flight data recorder (FDR), cockpit voice recorder and the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) were removed for examination. The FDR data indicated that, at the time of the occurrence, unusual acceleration values were recorded in all three planes of movement. The acceleration values were provided by the aircraft’s ADIRU to the aircraft’s primary flight computer, autopilot and other aircraft systems during manual and automatic flight.
Subsequent examination of the ADIRU revealed that one of several accelerometers had failed at the time of the occurrence, and that another accelerometer had failed in June 2001.
Just plain weird
Re Willoz269's previous post.
Using Google Earth, have a look at the geographic location of the instigating event in each of the two incidents. I agree with others about the very unlikely notion that EMI could have been a factor, so . . .
I guess that leave's Western Australia's famous UFO's.
Using Google Earth, have a look at the geographic location of the instigating event in each of the two incidents. I agree with others about the very unlikely notion that EMI could have been a factor, so . . .
I guess that leave's Western Australia's famous UFO's.