Did the pilot originally scheduled to fly [i]that[/i] Concorde refuse?
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Did the pilot originally scheduled to fly [i]that[/i] Concorde refuse?
Have just heard a suggestion that the pilot originally scheduled to fly the Air France Concorde that crashed at Gonesse on 25 July 2000 refused because it was so badly overweight?
Anyone know any more about this?
Anyone know anything about a report by 'Ordinex' or who they are?
Anyone know any more about why the accident report rejected theories about the missing spacer, the overweight aircraft, the CofG being too far aft, the engine ingesting lumps of runway light, the FE shutting down the No.2 engine without being asked even as contributory factors?
Can anyone calmly and rationally explain why the 'Single Cause' (tyres and vulnerable fuel tank) explanation is OK, and why ignoring these other factors is sensible?
If there is good reason, I'd love to have my mind put at rest... but otherwise....
Anyone know any more about this?
Anyone know anything about a report by 'Ordinex' or who they are?
Anyone know any more about why the accident report rejected theories about the missing spacer, the overweight aircraft, the CofG being too far aft, the engine ingesting lumps of runway light, the FE shutting down the No.2 engine without being asked even as contributory factors?
Can anyone calmly and rationally explain why the 'Single Cause' (tyres and vulnerable fuel tank) explanation is OK, and why ignoring these other factors is sensible?
If there is good reason, I'd love to have my mind put at rest... but otherwise....
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... and can anyone explain why BA implemented ADs relating to tyre-bursts puncturing fuel tanks and Air France didn't?
I'd have thought that would have been the most pertinent question - or is it simply a case of economic expediency winning over safety at Air France again?
I'd have thought that would have been the most pertinent question - or is it simply a case of economic expediency winning over safety at Air France again?
www.ordinex.net/a-index.html . The 'International Organisation of Experts', apparently. Couldn't find anything listed about the Concorde accident; perhaps you'd need to contact them directly?
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Jackonicko,
I've read (at least) part of the scrupuleous work made by the Sun's (or the Mirror) journalits on the Concorde crash (fortunately, there's scrupuleous and serious journalists as the Sun's (or the Mirror's) ones are well known for, to make the investigations while the professionals experts botched it)
and :
I) J.C. Marty was the scheduled pilot for this flight, and came for it from the "Cote d'Azur" were he lived
All the other stuff is of this water: aproximations or occasionally pure lear:
exemple: the "unofficial investigation" blame the pilot for having made the rotation well above the nominal VR (Rotation speed), if you take the time to read the Concorde-FDR informations, in the BEA web site, you'll soon see than the Concorde began his rotation at 200 Kts, the nominal VR
IE: the above blame is pure lear...And the whole thing is of this sort of stuff....
MGloff
I've read (at least) part of the scrupuleous work made by the Sun's (or the Mirror) journalits on the Concorde crash (fortunately, there's scrupuleous and serious journalists as the Sun's (or the Mirror's) ones are well known for, to make the investigations while the professionals experts botched it)
and :
I) J.C. Marty was the scheduled pilot for this flight, and came for it from the "Cote d'Azur" were he lived
All the other stuff is of this water: aproximations or occasionally pure lear:
exemple: the "unofficial investigation" blame the pilot for having made the rotation well above the nominal VR (Rotation speed), if you take the time to read the Concorde-FDR informations, in the BEA web site, you'll soon see than the Concorde began his rotation at 200 Kts, the nominal VR
IE: the above blame is pure lear...And the whole thing is of this sort of stuff....
MGloff
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JN
The circumstances you mention were all contributory factors but none in isolation precipitated the accident.
- The overweight issue generated by ATOW together with the tailwind and some 'hidden' fuel.
-The CG position being aft of the optimum
All served to make the handling of a single EFATO at it's most demanding - Although probably not outside the capability of the aircraft.
The pilot did not use full rudder to control the yaw - we don't really know why but it was not a causal factor.
The F/E evidently (uncommanded) did shut down a poorly looking but still running engine at or about Vr. Subsequently the other engine on the same side failed.
2 engines out on the left means no gear retract, means no acceleration, means they were dead from that moment on.
Go bless 'em
The circumstances you mention were all contributory factors but none in isolation precipitated the accident.
- The overweight issue generated by ATOW together with the tailwind and some 'hidden' fuel.
-The CG position being aft of the optimum
All served to make the handling of a single EFATO at it's most demanding - Although probably not outside the capability of the aircraft.
The pilot did not use full rudder to control the yaw - we don't really know why but it was not a causal factor.
The F/E evidently (uncommanded) did shut down a poorly looking but still running engine at or about Vr. Subsequently the other engine on the same side failed.
2 engines out on the left means no gear retract, means no acceleration, means they were dead from that moment on.
Go bless 'em
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Captain Marty was alway scheduled to fly the service.
What was not originaly scheduled was for F-BTSC to make the flight. F-BVFA was set to do the morning flight to JFK with F-BVFC designated for AF4590. Overnight probems meant that F-BVFA was withdrawn and F-BVFC flew the AF 001 and F-BTSC, as the standby aircraft was brought in to fly AF4590. F-BVFC was then left stranded for 2months at JFK when Air France suspended operations after the accident. (I think F-BVFB had already taken off from JFK and was possibly in transit when the accident occured, can someone confirm?)
There are lots of bits and pieces flying around that add to the cause. I personnaly believe that some of them did not help matters, but with the damage that was done by the original tyre bust they were still heading for a bad day.
Yes, if they had wieghed a little less and not shut down the engine so soon they may have made it to a very heavy crash landing at Le bourget, but with the fire causing the different systems to fail and along with the parts of the aircraft sturcture that were falling from the aircraft due to this initial tyre burst and its aftermath would have made making Le Bouget a very big challenge.
What was not originaly scheduled was for F-BTSC to make the flight. F-BVFA was set to do the morning flight to JFK with F-BVFC designated for AF4590. Overnight probems meant that F-BVFA was withdrawn and F-BVFC flew the AF 001 and F-BTSC, as the standby aircraft was brought in to fly AF4590. F-BVFC was then left stranded for 2months at JFK when Air France suspended operations after the accident. (I think F-BVFB had already taken off from JFK and was possibly in transit when the accident occured, can someone confirm?)
There are lots of bits and pieces flying around that add to the cause. I personnaly believe that some of them did not help matters, but with the damage that was done by the original tyre bust they were still heading for a bad day.
Yes, if they had wieghed a little less and not shut down the engine so soon they may have made it to a very heavy crash landing at Le bourget, but with the fire causing the different systems to fail and along with the parts of the aircraft sturcture that were falling from the aircraft due to this initial tyre burst and its aftermath would have made making Le Bouget a very big challenge.
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The interim report from the BEA makes a number of corrections to the initial publication. Firstly and perhaps most significantly, there was a 7kt tailwind for the take-off roll. With the aircraft at, at the very least, at maximum structural weight (185072kg I think), the aircraft would have been 7 tons over maximum weight and the take-off should never have been attempted.
The lack of the spacer in the left-hand undercarriage leg meant that the truck would have been creating an asymmetric pull on the aircraft, inexorably to the left. This would probably explain the ingestion of the edge light, and in my opinion is probably where the tyre found the notorious strip of metal.
The Captain rotated the aircraft well below Vzrc for three engines and when the engineer decided that number two should be shut down, the aircraft was irrecoverable. A delta wing aircraft like the Concorde can be flown at any speed, so long as you have the thrust to go with it. The slower the speed, the greater the drag, and the usual standard procedure is to rotate as close to tyre limit speed as possible so as to reduce the drag once airborne. In this case, with two engines out, it is staggering that the aircraft reached 200ft at all. What is certain is that the speed he traded for height meant he ran out of control and could not prevent the final roll and descent before impact.
The accident was entirely preventable in my opinion. Firstly by rigorous engineering practices ensuring that the undercarriage was correctly maintained. Secondly the slap-dash loading which allowed the aircraft to be so heavy. Thirdly the refuelling procedures that allowed no expansion gaps in the wing tanks, leading to the hydraulic rupture process of the skin. Fourthly, the Captain at any stage right up to the beginning of the take off could have decided not to go.
I hear that the Captain was something of a folk hero in AF. I also hear, though I cannot substantiate, that the first officer was very unhappy with the aircraft weight and the performance calculations, but was unable to impose his concerns on the other flight crew.
A very sad, very tragic event. I am concerned that all of the facts surrounding this event should be made public so that all of the lessons can be learned. I fear however that the politics which surround it will produce the classic rafistolage Français
The lack of the spacer in the left-hand undercarriage leg meant that the truck would have been creating an asymmetric pull on the aircraft, inexorably to the left. This would probably explain the ingestion of the edge light, and in my opinion is probably where the tyre found the notorious strip of metal.
The Captain rotated the aircraft well below Vzrc for three engines and when the engineer decided that number two should be shut down, the aircraft was irrecoverable. A delta wing aircraft like the Concorde can be flown at any speed, so long as you have the thrust to go with it. The slower the speed, the greater the drag, and the usual standard procedure is to rotate as close to tyre limit speed as possible so as to reduce the drag once airborne. In this case, with two engines out, it is staggering that the aircraft reached 200ft at all. What is certain is that the speed he traded for height meant he ran out of control and could not prevent the final roll and descent before impact.
The accident was entirely preventable in my opinion. Firstly by rigorous engineering practices ensuring that the undercarriage was correctly maintained. Secondly the slap-dash loading which allowed the aircraft to be so heavy. Thirdly the refuelling procedures that allowed no expansion gaps in the wing tanks, leading to the hydraulic rupture process of the skin. Fourthly, the Captain at any stage right up to the beginning of the take off could have decided not to go.
I hear that the Captain was something of a folk hero in AF. I also hear, though I cannot substantiate, that the first officer was very unhappy with the aircraft weight and the performance calculations, but was unable to impose his concerns on the other flight crew.
A very sad, very tragic event. I am concerned that all of the facts surrounding this event should be made public so that all of the lessons can be learned. I fear however that the politics which surround it will produce the classic rafistolage Français
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good morning.
can anyone confirme the empty weight of f-btsc ( ex test aircraft f-wtsc ) supposedly an heavier aircraft than its sister ships.
and in comparison what is the same question for f-bvfa for instance?
best regards from lax,
can anyone confirme the empty weight of f-btsc ( ex test aircraft f-wtsc ) supposedly an heavier aircraft than its sister ships.
and in comparison what is the same question for f-bvfa for instance?
best regards from lax,
Thread Starter
Enigmatic, if the weight, cg, silly engine shut down, etc. were factors, that needs to be widely known, 'cos one day, some-one else's life might depend on it. What does it matter if the boat is rocked now? They've made mods which will make the aircraft safer, they're hardly going to remove them, are they?
Static Discharge, what a helpful contribution! Perhaps if you could explain why these questions are irrelvant, we'd all be able to have the same faith in the investigation and report that you do.
Mgloff, sorry if I've upset you, but my understanding that they were 11 kts below the appropriate VR for the tailwind, and perhaps even lower than that for the excess weight. Do correct me if I'm wrong. Also I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by 'lear'.
Magplug, you have hit the nail on the head. If these were contributory factors, why doesn't the accident report make this clear, and why the unseemly haste to blame the entire accident on the tyre failure alone? And is it reasonable to say that if a tyre failure (however caused) leads to a catastrophe, certification should be withdrawn? Was it the tyre or the poor FOD prevention on the runway? With everything else (weight, cg, engines) all going for them, would they have survived this accident - that's the key question I'm trying to get to the bottom of.
Gordo, you say that: "with the fire causing the different systems to fail and along with the parts of the aircraft structure that were falling from the aircraft due to this initial tyre burst". What systems had failed at the time of impact as a result of the fire, rather than the decision to shut down both port engines? What pieces of structure (other than skin from the lower surface of the wing) fell off before the final plunge?
With more airspeed (and thus control) why would it have been so difficult to make it the few thousand yards to Le Bourget - or even its under-run - it's always best to go in flat with minimal rate of descent than straight down with a high rate!
Captain P, can you elaborate/translate as appropriate?
"Thirdly the refuelling procedures that allowed no expansion gaps in the wing tanks, leading to the hydraulic rupture process of the skin."
"classic rafistolage Français"
"I hear that the Captain was something of a folk hero in AF. I also hear, though I cannot substantiate, that the first officer was very unhappy with the aircraft weight and the performance calculations, but was unable to impose his concerns on the other flight crew." Could you E-mail me if you have any suggestions as to how I might get further confirmation of this (admittedly anecdotal) evidence, please?
I'm not trying to generate a massive scandal, I'm just concerned that I should consider all the evidence and not just accept the BEA's version without subjecting it to some degree of rigorous analysis. Thanks for all your help.
[ 21 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
Static Discharge, what a helpful contribution! Perhaps if you could explain why these questions are irrelvant, we'd all be able to have the same faith in the investigation and report that you do.
Mgloff, sorry if I've upset you, but my understanding that they were 11 kts below the appropriate VR for the tailwind, and perhaps even lower than that for the excess weight. Do correct me if I'm wrong. Also I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by 'lear'.
Magplug, you have hit the nail on the head. If these were contributory factors, why doesn't the accident report make this clear, and why the unseemly haste to blame the entire accident on the tyre failure alone? And is it reasonable to say that if a tyre failure (however caused) leads to a catastrophe, certification should be withdrawn? Was it the tyre or the poor FOD prevention on the runway? With everything else (weight, cg, engines) all going for them, would they have survived this accident - that's the key question I'm trying to get to the bottom of.
Gordo, you say that: "with the fire causing the different systems to fail and along with the parts of the aircraft structure that were falling from the aircraft due to this initial tyre burst". What systems had failed at the time of impact as a result of the fire, rather than the decision to shut down both port engines? What pieces of structure (other than skin from the lower surface of the wing) fell off before the final plunge?
With more airspeed (and thus control) why would it have been so difficult to make it the few thousand yards to Le Bourget - or even its under-run - it's always best to go in flat with minimal rate of descent than straight down with a high rate!
Captain P, can you elaborate/translate as appropriate?
"Thirdly the refuelling procedures that allowed no expansion gaps in the wing tanks, leading to the hydraulic rupture process of the skin."
"classic rafistolage Français"
"I hear that the Captain was something of a folk hero in AF. I also hear, though I cannot substantiate, that the first officer was very unhappy with the aircraft weight and the performance calculations, but was unable to impose his concerns on the other flight crew." Could you E-mail me if you have any suggestions as to how I might get further confirmation of this (admittedly anecdotal) evidence, please?
I'm not trying to generate a massive scandal, I'm just concerned that I should consider all the evidence and not just accept the BEA's version without subjecting it to some degree of rigorous analysis. Thanks for all your help.
[ 21 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
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Another interesting question would be: did Aéroport De Paris (ADP) perform the runway search for FOD as they should have done (they are paid for this service) before the Concorde took off?
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JN,
<<If these were contributory factors, why doesn't the accident report make this clear, and why the unseemly haste to blame the entire accident on the tyre failure alone?>>
You are missing the point old chap. It is a cornerstone of aircraft certification that the failure of one single component (however precipitated) should not lead to the loss of an aircraft.
The other factors, including the lack of ADP FOD sweep, whilst all unsafe in isolation did not cause the loss of this aircraft - They only served to exacerbate a progressively unmanageable situation.
Any accident of this kind is a chain of events where perhaps the removal of one link might have saved the day.
I would suggest that the prospect of reaching Le Bourget was minute - the fast increasing fuel assymetry would have put paid to that even if control were available.
Unfortunately the discussion of pre-flight conversation between crew over loading or any other subject would not have been recorded so the only testimony might be from the redcap or G/E.
I understand the Skipper was highly regarded in AF. As I recall so was the KLM guy at TFN?
<<If these were contributory factors, why doesn't the accident report make this clear, and why the unseemly haste to blame the entire accident on the tyre failure alone?>>
You are missing the point old chap. It is a cornerstone of aircraft certification that the failure of one single component (however precipitated) should not lead to the loss of an aircraft.
The other factors, including the lack of ADP FOD sweep, whilst all unsafe in isolation did not cause the loss of this aircraft - They only served to exacerbate a progressively unmanageable situation.
Any accident of this kind is a chain of events where perhaps the removal of one link might have saved the day.
I would suggest that the prospect of reaching Le Bourget was minute - the fast increasing fuel assymetry would have put paid to that even if control were available.
Unfortunately the discussion of pre-flight conversation between crew over loading or any other subject would not have been recorded so the only testimony might be from the redcap or G/E.
I understand the Skipper was highly regarded in AF. As I recall so was the KLM guy at TFN?
Thread Starter
Magplug,
Many thanks for your polite and helpful reply - I no longer take such courtesy for granted.
I do indeed seem to be having trouble getting my head arpound the very issue which you highlight - "It is a cornerstone of aircraft certification that the failure of one single component (however precipitated) should not lead to the loss of an aircraft."
My question is whether the failure of a single component (the tyre) did directly (and ON IT'S OWN) lead to the accident. Concorde tyres have burst before, and tanks have leaked as a result before - sometimes just as badly. But there was also an ignition source, and, it seems, that the fire alone would not have caused the crash if the aircraft had not:
a) taken off dramatically overweight, making it difficult to attain V2
b) taken off outside its C of G limits - making a violent uncontrollable departure more likely
c) Had a dragging undercarriage which reduced acceleration, pulled the aircraft away from the runway centreline and forced the Captain to rotate early, making it even less likely that he would attain a safe airspeed
d) had one functioning engine shut down before V2 was reached.
On top of that, there is the question of whether ADs already incorporated on BA aircraft would not have prevented the tyre failure from leading to catastrophe anyway.
Without any of these links in the chain, would we not just be talking about (yet ) another Concorde tyre failure, albeit one which resulted in a severe fire and a skillful landing at Le Bourget?
And even if I'm wrong, and even if the tyre failure was the primary cause, why are these other factors not highlighted in the accident report, and why do they not form part of the chain of events described in the report and its synopses and conclusions?
I do hope I'm not being blind and/or stupid here.....
Many thanks for your polite and helpful reply - I no longer take such courtesy for granted.
I do indeed seem to be having trouble getting my head arpound the very issue which you highlight - "It is a cornerstone of aircraft certification that the failure of one single component (however precipitated) should not lead to the loss of an aircraft."
My question is whether the failure of a single component (the tyre) did directly (and ON IT'S OWN) lead to the accident. Concorde tyres have burst before, and tanks have leaked as a result before - sometimes just as badly. But there was also an ignition source, and, it seems, that the fire alone would not have caused the crash if the aircraft had not:
a) taken off dramatically overweight, making it difficult to attain V2
b) taken off outside its C of G limits - making a violent uncontrollable departure more likely
c) Had a dragging undercarriage which reduced acceleration, pulled the aircraft away from the runway centreline and forced the Captain to rotate early, making it even less likely that he would attain a safe airspeed
d) had one functioning engine shut down before V2 was reached.
On top of that, there is the question of whether ADs already incorporated on BA aircraft would not have prevented the tyre failure from leading to catastrophe anyway.
Without any of these links in the chain, would we not just be talking about (yet ) another Concorde tyre failure, albeit one which resulted in a severe fire and a skillful landing at Le Bourget?
And even if I'm wrong, and even if the tyre failure was the primary cause, why are these other factors not highlighted in the accident report, and why do they not form part of the chain of events described in the report and its synopses and conclusions?
I do hope I'm not being blind and/or stupid here.....
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flyblue - ADP are (for many very genuine reasons, in my opinion and experience) known as Arriver, Dormir, Partir... so the answer to your question is ALMOST certainly no....
And, although I unfortunately don't have the time to search the archives right now and post the link, I take it that the majority of ppruners on this thread have seen the post on the Observer article including photographs of the runway after the incident....?
TA
And, although I unfortunately don't have the time to search the archives right now and post the link, I take it that the majority of ppruners on this thread have seen the post on the Observer article including photographs of the runway after the incident....?
TA
short flights long nights
I am a bit confused, am I to believe that the aircraft REALLY took off above its MTOW? Is this just talk, or are there facts to back up this claim? I mean I find it amazing that at a major airline, operating the worlds "premier aircraft", that it could "just" depart over weight. FlyUsAlnight Airlines from Upper Bigawatsgoingon, Ok I would accept it, but AF with a Concorde? Please fill me in with the information. Thanks all.
Thread Starter
About one tonne over for the planned take-off, until Monsieur le Vent (wind) intervened and produced a seven-to-eight knot tailwind, for which the aircraft was about six tonnes overweight. Check the Concorde/Observer thread referred to above.
