*** FLASH *** G-3 down in ASE
Guest
Posts: n/a
SAD ONE -
Non-precision approaches are typically not taught to the necessary degree in the USA, as they are rarely used.
I suspect that the crew wasn't in tune with the obstacles on the approach plate & tried to 'duck-under' the weather to maintain visual conditions & got a high sink rate going. In all probability, the GPWS warning wasn't heeded in time. It sounds as though they figured out their plight at the last moment & tried too late to outclimb the hill.
By all that's right, they should have flown the MDA & had a Visual Descent Point established. I fear they didn't go the extra step.
I also fear this will be another example of CRM failure.
I'm also curious as to the duty times of the pilots.
Now we must wait for the details.
My heart goes out to the families. May the victims rest in peace.
Non-precision approaches are typically not taught to the necessary degree in the USA, as they are rarely used.
I suspect that the crew wasn't in tune with the obstacles on the approach plate & tried to 'duck-under' the weather to maintain visual conditions & got a high sink rate going. In all probability, the GPWS warning wasn't heeded in time. It sounds as though they figured out their plight at the last moment & tried too late to outclimb the hill.
By all that's right, they should have flown the MDA & had a Visual Descent Point established. I fear they didn't go the extra step.
I also fear this will be another example of CRM failure.
I'm also curious as to the duty times of the pilots.
Now we must wait for the details.
My heart goes out to the families. May the victims rest in peace.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I was in my hotel room, downtown Aspen, when the fire sirens sounded just after 19:00. When I went out on my balcony the wind here was calm, with good vis and I could snow showers toward the airport. From what I understand the winds were light at the airport also.
We'll just have to wait.
We'll just have to wait.
Guest
Posts: n/a
As for hazardous airports as a general topic, one of our pilots stated that when he worked for a charter "netjet" type of operation, they were not dispatched into the most hazardous airports, especially at the last minute. It sounded as if they did not go into such airports. I know nothing about the pilots or the company involved in this tragedy in Aspen, but a previous comment stated that the pilots were familiar with Aspen. Knowing that a Lear was lost while attempting a night approach into Eagle (EGE) makes me really wonder whether operational pressure from any managements was a factor in any of these type of accidents, not to mention crew duty periods and fatigue. The Air Force 737 accident (NDB approach) in Dubrovnik, Croatia sems to have had some very strange factors involved. That is a bizarre topic in itself.
Out of curiosity, do very many US charter or corporate operations dispatch pilots into such dangerous locations without prior training? I would not be surprised if the ##st Wing at Andrews AFB flew VIPs into such areas. A regular C-130 crew was lost while departing Jackson Hole, WY years ago. The Air Force NOS chart had no graphic depiction for the SID or the mountains, from what I read in either "Aviation Week & ST" or "Flying" magazine, just the typical paragraph of very tiny print, which attempts to describe a hazardous departure by using radial, DMS and altitudes.
Do the Jeppesen SIDS use graphics (vs compressed text) much more often than the US government (military) NOS charts?
Out of curiosity, do very many US charter or corporate operations dispatch pilots into such dangerous locations without prior training? I would not be surprised if the ##st Wing at Andrews AFB flew VIPs into such areas. A regular C-130 crew was lost while departing Jackson Hole, WY years ago. The Air Force NOS chart had no graphic depiction for the SID or the mountains, from what I read in either "Aviation Week & ST" or "Flying" magazine, just the typical paragraph of very tiny print, which attempts to describe a hazardous departure by using radial, DMS and altitudes.
Do the Jeppesen SIDS use graphics (vs compressed text) much more often than the US government (military) NOS charts?
Guest
Posts: n/a
ASPEN, Colo. (Reuters) - Aspen airport control tower failed to receive a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) order barring the type of night landing which resulted in a crash this week that killed 18 people, investigators said on Saturday.
The chartered Gulfstream III, carrying friends on a weekend skiing trip, was flying from Los Angeles to Aspen when it crashed into a hill in snowy weather at 7 p.m. on Thursday just 500 yards short of the runway.
The single-runway Aspen-Pitkin County Airport is at 7,815 feet and can be hazardous even in clear weather because it is surrounded by mountains.
Officials said on Saturday that an order known as a notice to airmen, or "notam," had been widely disseminated two days before the accident prohibiting aircraft from using a circling maneuver at night while landing at the Aspen airport.
Acting FAA Chairman Carol Carmody told a briefing officials were troubled that the notice to airmen somehow never made it to the traffic control tower at the Aspen-Pitkin County Airport.
"The FAA issued a 'notam' stating quote 'circling not authorized at night,' which would effectively make that instrument approach not usable at night," Carmody said.
"The controllers here in Aspen that night were not aware of the notam and therefore cleared the pilot for this instrument approach," she said.
FAA officials said they would review their procedures for distributing notices to towers.
Meanwhile, relatives of the 18 who perished in the crash made a brief visit to the crash site on Saturday.
The chartered Gulfstream III, carrying friends on a weekend skiing trip, was flying from Los Angeles to Aspen when it crashed into a hill in snowy weather at 7 p.m. on Thursday just 500 yards short of the runway.
The single-runway Aspen-Pitkin County Airport is at 7,815 feet and can be hazardous even in clear weather because it is surrounded by mountains.
Officials said on Saturday that an order known as a notice to airmen, or "notam," had been widely disseminated two days before the accident prohibiting aircraft from using a circling maneuver at night while landing at the Aspen airport.
Acting FAA Chairman Carol Carmody told a briefing officials were troubled that the notice to airmen somehow never made it to the traffic control tower at the Aspen-Pitkin County Airport.
"The FAA issued a 'notam' stating quote 'circling not authorized at night,' which would effectively make that instrument approach not usable at night," Carmody said.
"The controllers here in Aspen that night were not aware of the notam and therefore cleared the pilot for this instrument approach," she said.
FAA officials said they would review their procedures for distributing notices to towers.
Meanwhile, relatives of the 18 who perished in the crash made a brief visit to the crash site on Saturday.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Terrible tragady in such a beautiful place.
I haven't had a window seat flying in ASE, but I have ridden in the jumpseat, of Air Wisconsins BAE 146s, lucky it was a crystal clear day, what a sight!
Our airline also flys the Avro into ASE, but only on a seasonal basis, the flight actually ended to day.
Anyway, I will wait for the final word from the NSTB, but I just have to comment on a few things.
Could complacency have played a roll in this accident? According to Chicken Noodle News and the others, this pilot/crew had been into ASE quite a few times this month alone, not to mention several flights before. As one gets comfortable with an airport, they tend to let their guard down a bit, I seems to me that during the time I spent in ASE, its not an unforgiving airport. I personally witness a brand new Lear 60 slide of the runway, and an MU-2 pan-cake it on (possibel windshear) while I was loading bags into the Beast-146. I also saw a few "close" missed approaches due to snow, and quickily changing conditions.
I guess what I'm trying to say is that no matter how many times we've been into an airport, we should never let our guard down. ASE is a unique place, not only for its airport, but EVERY landing & appraoch should be treated as a new situation, no matter how many times its been done before.
It never changes, just when I think I have the tiger by the tail, its turns around and bits me!
Is it also possible that maybe they started to align with the runway to soon, seeing as how they ended up to the right of the centerline, possibly lossing site of the hills, etc?
Also, the SID I'm looking at doesn't have any graphics, just text, I DO think the JEPP charts are much better for ASE than the NOS or US gov't charts.
------------------
-----------
FLY SAFE!!!
I haven't had a window seat flying in ASE, but I have ridden in the jumpseat, of Air Wisconsins BAE 146s, lucky it was a crystal clear day, what a sight!
Our airline also flys the Avro into ASE, but only on a seasonal basis, the flight actually ended to day.
Anyway, I will wait for the final word from the NSTB, but I just have to comment on a few things.
Could complacency have played a roll in this accident? According to Chicken Noodle News and the others, this pilot/crew had been into ASE quite a few times this month alone, not to mention several flights before. As one gets comfortable with an airport, they tend to let their guard down a bit, I seems to me that during the time I spent in ASE, its not an unforgiving airport. I personally witness a brand new Lear 60 slide of the runway, and an MU-2 pan-cake it on (possibel windshear) while I was loading bags into the Beast-146. I also saw a few "close" missed approaches due to snow, and quickily changing conditions.
I guess what I'm trying to say is that no matter how many times we've been into an airport, we should never let our guard down. ASE is a unique place, not only for its airport, but EVERY landing & appraoch should be treated as a new situation, no matter how many times its been done before.
It never changes, just when I think I have the tiger by the tail, its turns around and bits me!
Is it also possible that maybe they started to align with the runway to soon, seeing as how they ended up to the right of the centerline, possibly lossing site of the hills, etc?
Also, the SID I'm looking at doesn't have any graphics, just text, I DO think the JEPP charts are much better for ASE than the NOS or US gov't charts.
------------------
-----------
FLY SAFE!!!
Guest
Posts: n/a
BAD NEWS -
Assuming the NOTAM story is correct (circling approach actually assigned), there could be a mess over that, as the pilots are responsible for being current on those, as well. If the company has an official "dispatch" function, it could also fall back on the company. It isn't clear that a circling approach was assigned, so the NOTAM matter might be a coincidence, but not a factor.
In any event, the CVR is the next matter, then the NTSB report.
It sounds as though - if a circling approach was issued - they didn't make it to the circling part.
Assuming the NOTAM story is correct (circling approach actually assigned), there could be a mess over that, as the pilots are responsible for being current on those, as well. If the company has an official "dispatch" function, it could also fall back on the company. It isn't clear that a circling approach was assigned, so the NOTAM matter might be a coincidence, but not a factor.
In any event, the CVR is the next matter, then the NTSB report.
It sounds as though - if a circling approach was issued - they didn't make it to the circling part.
Guest
Posts: n/a
WHAT'S WRONG IN THIS REPORT???
According to the report below, two aircraft were illegally cleared for the approach, ahead of the G-3. If the NOTAM account is accurate, why did the aircraft get clearance from center / approach control to initiate the approach?
Again, WAS a circling approach issued?
More information is needed. This is going to be an interesting one.
------------------------------------
Apr 1, 2001
Lead National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator Al Dickinson said yetserday that weather conditions at Aspen were so bad that a landing should not have been attempted by a charter jet that crashed, killing all 18 people aboard.
Carol Carmody, the National Transportation Safety Board's acting chairwoman, said three planes trying to land before the plane that crashed had been forced to abort approaches. One missed two approaches. Only one of the three managed to land.
The plane carrying nine NTSB investigators to Aspen the next day also missed approaches before landing, said NTSB spokesman Terry Williams.
The National Weather Service reported light snow at the time of the crash; visibility dropped from 10 miles to less than 2 miles in about 20 minutes just before the plane went down.
Aspen's single runway is surrounded by mountains that force approaching aircraft to make steep descents.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued a notice just two days before the crash saying that planes should not be allowed to make an instrument landing at the airport at night, Carmody said.
The Gulfstream III, with 15 passengers and 3 crew members, had approached the airport on instruments on Thursday night when it crashed near the runway.
Carmody said pilots leaving other airports for Aspen had been notified against night instrument landings, but that controllers at the Aspen airport had not been and were not warning incoming pilots.
Carmody said that the crew of the plane had received the notice to pilots, or NOTAM, in California before takeoff, and that the conditions apparently meant the pilot should not have been cleared for an instrument approach.
"I find it troubling, no question," Carmody said. "I find it interesting that the flight service station in California had the NOTAM and the airport affected did not."
After the accident, the FAA issued a new notice barring night instrument landings at Aspen. Carmody said there may have been some confusion about the earlier notice because it was not worded clearly.
Carmody said investigators would now look into FAA procedures for distributing the notices to try to learn why the Aspen airport wasn't using it.
Carmody said the plane's left wing hit the ground first, moments after radio transmissions indicated that the runway lights were on and the pilot saw the landing strip. No distress calls were reported.
"Fifty-five seconds after the hour, the pilot said 'Yes, I have the runway in sight,' and that was the last transmission from the pilot," Carmody said.
Avjet Corp., which managed and maintained the Gulfstream, said the plane's captain, Bob Frisbie, regularly flew to Aspen and had 10,000 hours of flight time.
Apr 1, 2001
Lead National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator Al Dickinson said yetserday that weather conditions at Aspen were so bad that a landing should not have been attempted by a charter jet that crashed, killing all 18 people aboard.
Carol Carmody, the National Transportation Safety Board's acting chairwoman, said three planes trying to land before the plane that crashed had been forced to abort approaches. One missed two approaches. Only one of the three managed to land.
The plane carrying nine NTSB investigators to Aspen the next day also missed approaches before landing, said NTSB spokesman Terry Williams.
The National Weather Service reported light snow at the time of the crash; visibility dropped from 10 miles to less than 2 miles in about 20 minutes just before the plane went down.
Aspen's single runway is surrounded by mountains that force approaching aircraft to make steep descents.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued a notice just two days before the crash saying that planes should not be allowed to make an instrument landing at the airport at night, Carmody said.
The Gulfstream III, with 15 passengers and 3 crew members, had approached the airport on instruments on Thursday night when it crashed near the runway.
Carmody said pilots leaving other airports for Aspen had been notified against night instrument landings, but that controllers at the Aspen airport had not been and were not warning incoming pilots.
Carmody said that the crew of the plane had received the notice to pilots, or NOTAM, in California before takeoff, and that the conditions apparently meant the pilot should not have been cleared for an instrument approach.
"I find it troubling, no question," Carmody said. "I find it interesting that the flight service station in California had the NOTAM and the airport affected did not."
After the accident, the FAA issued a new notice barring night instrument landings at Aspen. Carmody said there may have been some confusion about the earlier notice because it was not worded clearly.
Carmody said investigators would now look into FAA procedures for distributing the notices to try to learn why the Aspen airport wasn't using it.
Carmody said the plane's left wing hit the ground first, moments after radio transmissions indicated that the runway lights were on and the pilot saw the landing strip. No distress calls were reported.
"Fifty-five seconds after the hour, the pilot said 'Yes, I have the runway in sight,' and that was the last transmission from the pilot," Carmody said.
Avjet Corp., which managed and maintained the Gulfstream, said the plane's captain, Bob Frisbie, regularly flew to Aspen and had 10,000 hours of flight time.
According to the report below, two aircraft were illegally cleared for the approach, ahead of the G-3. If the NOTAM account is accurate, why did the aircraft get clearance from center / approach control to initiate the approach?
Again, WAS a circling approach issued?
More information is needed. This is going to be an interesting one.
------------------------------------
Apr 1, 2001
Lead National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator Al Dickinson said yetserday that weather conditions at Aspen were so bad that a landing should not have been attempted by a charter jet that crashed, killing all 18 people aboard.
Carol Carmody, the National Transportation Safety Board's acting chairwoman, said three planes trying to land before the plane that crashed had been forced to abort approaches. One missed two approaches. Only one of the three managed to land.
The plane carrying nine NTSB investigators to Aspen the next day also missed approaches before landing, said NTSB spokesman Terry Williams.
The National Weather Service reported light snow at the time of the crash; visibility dropped from 10 miles to less than 2 miles in about 20 minutes just before the plane went down.
Aspen's single runway is surrounded by mountains that force approaching aircraft to make steep descents.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued a notice just two days before the crash saying that planes should not be allowed to make an instrument landing at the airport at night, Carmody said.
The Gulfstream III, with 15 passengers and 3 crew members, had approached the airport on instruments on Thursday night when it crashed near the runway.
Carmody said pilots leaving other airports for Aspen had been notified against night instrument landings, but that controllers at the Aspen airport had not been and were not warning incoming pilots.
Carmody said that the crew of the plane had received the notice to pilots, or NOTAM, in California before takeoff, and that the conditions apparently meant the pilot should not have been cleared for an instrument approach.
"I find it troubling, no question," Carmody said. "I find it interesting that the flight service station in California had the NOTAM and the airport affected did not."
After the accident, the FAA issued a new notice barring night instrument landings at Aspen. Carmody said there may have been some confusion about the earlier notice because it was not worded clearly.
Carmody said investigators would now look into FAA procedures for distributing the notices to try to learn why the Aspen airport wasn't using it.
Carmody said the plane's left wing hit the ground first, moments after radio transmissions indicated that the runway lights were on and the pilot saw the landing strip. No distress calls were reported.
"Fifty-five seconds after the hour, the pilot said 'Yes, I have the runway in sight,' and that was the last transmission from the pilot," Carmody said.
Avjet Corp., which managed and maintained the Gulfstream, said the plane's captain, Bob Frisbie, regularly flew to Aspen and had 10,000 hours of flight time.
Apr 1, 2001
Lead National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator Al Dickinson said yetserday that weather conditions at Aspen were so bad that a landing should not have been attempted by a charter jet that crashed, killing all 18 people aboard.
Carol Carmody, the National Transportation Safety Board's acting chairwoman, said three planes trying to land before the plane that crashed had been forced to abort approaches. One missed two approaches. Only one of the three managed to land.
The plane carrying nine NTSB investigators to Aspen the next day also missed approaches before landing, said NTSB spokesman Terry Williams.
The National Weather Service reported light snow at the time of the crash; visibility dropped from 10 miles to less than 2 miles in about 20 minutes just before the plane went down.
Aspen's single runway is surrounded by mountains that force approaching aircraft to make steep descents.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued a notice just two days before the crash saying that planes should not be allowed to make an instrument landing at the airport at night, Carmody said.
The Gulfstream III, with 15 passengers and 3 crew members, had approached the airport on instruments on Thursday night when it crashed near the runway.
Carmody said pilots leaving other airports for Aspen had been notified against night instrument landings, but that controllers at the Aspen airport had not been and were not warning incoming pilots.
Carmody said that the crew of the plane had received the notice to pilots, or NOTAM, in California before takeoff, and that the conditions apparently meant the pilot should not have been cleared for an instrument approach.
"I find it troubling, no question," Carmody said. "I find it interesting that the flight service station in California had the NOTAM and the airport affected did not."
After the accident, the FAA issued a new notice barring night instrument landings at Aspen. Carmody said there may have been some confusion about the earlier notice because it was not worded clearly.
Carmody said investigators would now look into FAA procedures for distributing the notices to try to learn why the Aspen airport wasn't using it.
Carmody said the plane's left wing hit the ground first, moments after radio transmissions indicated that the runway lights were on and the pilot saw the landing strip. No distress calls were reported.
"Fifty-five seconds after the hour, the pilot said 'Yes, I have the runway in sight,' and that was the last transmission from the pilot," Carmody said.
Avjet Corp., which managed and maintained the Gulfstream, said the plane's captain, Bob Frisbie, regularly flew to Aspen and had 10,000 hours of flight time.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I'm back home now and I have a few thoughts about the accident and the FAA notam.
First off we will no longer land at ASE at night untill the approach is reapproved for night operations. As far as I am concerned the ONLY safe way to land at ASE at night is to shoot the VOR/DME approach to a point were you can aquire the VASI and make a straight-in landing. The following conditions must exist; 1. The MAP cannot be at 10,200ft. 1.4 miles from the runway. (No jet airplane I have flown, and I have flown a lot, can land on the the runway from that point.) Your'e just too close and too high. 2. No circling in the valley at night, period. 3. The weather reported at the airport can be very misleading. There are times that the wx reported at aiport is well below the approach minimuns and you can shoot a visual approach and never fly through a cloud. Conversely there have been times that the weather at the airport have been damn near clear and you have to miss the approach. In other words, the weather down the valley is more important than the weather over the airport.
I don't know why the FAA issued the notam banning the use of the approach after sunset two days berfore the accident. I can understand and agree that there be no circling at night. Therefore I feel that there need to be two MAPs, one for daylight and one for night.
One very important fact about the accident. The approach had nothing to do with accident. The crew had visualy acquired the runway and had left the approach course. At what point they turned toward the runway I hope will be on the radar tapes.
As far as the idiot from the NTSB that proclaimed the landing should never have attempted, what the hell did he know what really happened. It has not been confirmed the accident was CFIT. There could have been an electrial failure, pilot incapacitation and god knows what else happen to cause the accident. Until all the facts are in no one should make stupid statments like that, especially people in his position.
To be honest, I am not upset in the least that we will not be landing at night in Aspen for the near future. As I have posted above, it ain't much fun.
First off we will no longer land at ASE at night untill the approach is reapproved for night operations. As far as I am concerned the ONLY safe way to land at ASE at night is to shoot the VOR/DME approach to a point were you can aquire the VASI and make a straight-in landing. The following conditions must exist; 1. The MAP cannot be at 10,200ft. 1.4 miles from the runway. (No jet airplane I have flown, and I have flown a lot, can land on the the runway from that point.) Your'e just too close and too high. 2. No circling in the valley at night, period. 3. The weather reported at the airport can be very misleading. There are times that the wx reported at aiport is well below the approach minimuns and you can shoot a visual approach and never fly through a cloud. Conversely there have been times that the weather at the airport have been damn near clear and you have to miss the approach. In other words, the weather down the valley is more important than the weather over the airport.
I don't know why the FAA issued the notam banning the use of the approach after sunset two days berfore the accident. I can understand and agree that there be no circling at night. Therefore I feel that there need to be two MAPs, one for daylight and one for night.
One very important fact about the accident. The approach had nothing to do with accident. The crew had visualy acquired the runway and had left the approach course. At what point they turned toward the runway I hope will be on the radar tapes.
As far as the idiot from the NTSB that proclaimed the landing should never have attempted, what the hell did he know what really happened. It has not been confirmed the accident was CFIT. There could have been an electrial failure, pilot incapacitation and god knows what else happen to cause the accident. Until all the facts are in no one should make stupid statments like that, especially people in his position.
To be honest, I am not upset in the least that we will not be landing at night in Aspen for the near future. As I have posted above, it ain't much fun.
Guest
Posts: n/a
THIS IS THE FAA THAT MINETA WANTS TO GIVE MORE LATITUDE - ENHANCING PROFITS FOR THE AIRLINES!
InfoBeat - NTSB: FAA warning not received
By JUDITH KOHLER
Associated Press Writer
ASPEN, Colo. (AP) - The Investigation of the crash of a chartered plane that slammed into a hillside short of Aspen's airport runway is extending into the handling of a warning issued by the Federal Aviation Administration, an official said Monday.
Just two days before last week's crash, the FAA had issued a notice that planes should not be allowed to make instrument landings there at night. Surrounding mountains force pilots to make
steep descents to the airport's single runway, making landings tricky even in daylight.
However, air traffic controllers apparently did not receive the warning and gave the charter pilot permission for an instrument landing at about 7 p.m. Thursday. Moments later, the twin-engine Gulfstream III crashed a few hundred yards from the runway, killing all 15 passengers and three crew members.
Investigators have not yet Determined how large a part the mistake played in the crash.
The ban, which officials admit Was confusing, was supposed to be distributed by facsimile by the FAA's Denver office.
"The FAA says there is no record of a fax being sent or received from the Denver center to Aspen,'' Carol Carmody, acting chairwoman for the National Transportation and Safety Board, said
Sunday.
On Monday, Mike Fergus, spokesman for the FAA's accident investigation division in Seattle, said the agency was
investigating the Denver office's handling of the notice.
"Now that the NTSB has raised the issue, it is part of our investigation. We are not trying to hide anything,'' Fergus said.
In addition, NTSB investigators went to Oklahoma City on Monday to meet with the FAA inspectors who issued the original notice.
The pilot had received the warning when the plane, which departed from Burbank, Calif., stopped in Los Angeles, Carmody said. But the warning, she said, was not written clearly and the pilot may not have understood it.
After the crash, the FAA issued a new notice explicitly banning nighttime instrument landings at the airport.
Also Monday, other investigators expected to finish clearing the wreckage of the jet. The airplane's cockpit voice recorder was to be analyzed in Washington.
Investigators said Sunday that the plane's takeoff from Los Angeles was delayed by 45 minutes. That lead to speculation the pilot originally expected to land before nightfall, but the NTSB
said it would draw no conclusions from the late departure.
"We don't really know what was in his head and we have to find that out,'' NTSB investigator Al Dickinson said.
The airport banned all nighttime landings by noncommercial jets until 1994, when several groups persuaded the FAA to reverse the policy.
Some Aspen residents, including the late singer-songwriter John Denver, had said safety would be compromised at the airport if the restriction was lifted. Denver was killed in a 1997 plane crash in
California.
"Even in my great desire to hurry home after weeks on the road, I have no problem honoring the present curfew,'' Denver wrote in a 1994 letter to Pitkin County commissioners. "I am quite happy to
land in Grand Junction or Denver and drive the extra distance for safety's sake.''
On the Net:
FAA: http://www.faa.gov
NTSB: http://www.ntsb.gov
Aspen Airport: http://www.aspenairport.com
--------------------------------------
If the pilots knew of the NOTAM, they were responsible for knowing it's meaning. Beyond the fact that mountains advance 'civil twilight,' dark is dark, let alone dark in weather.
This is the jurisdiction of the same FAA office (Seattle - Northwest Mountain Region) that brought us AK-261, then tried (and continues to) facilitate the carrier. Jane Garvey labels them as 'the best team.'
[This message has been edited by SKYDRIFTER (edited 03 April 2001).]
InfoBeat - NTSB: FAA warning not received
By JUDITH KOHLER
Associated Press Writer
ASPEN, Colo. (AP) - The Investigation of the crash of a chartered plane that slammed into a hillside short of Aspen's airport runway is extending into the handling of a warning issued by the Federal Aviation Administration, an official said Monday.
Just two days before last week's crash, the FAA had issued a notice that planes should not be allowed to make instrument landings there at night. Surrounding mountains force pilots to make
steep descents to the airport's single runway, making landings tricky even in daylight.
However, air traffic controllers apparently did not receive the warning and gave the charter pilot permission for an instrument landing at about 7 p.m. Thursday. Moments later, the twin-engine Gulfstream III crashed a few hundred yards from the runway, killing all 15 passengers and three crew members.
Investigators have not yet Determined how large a part the mistake played in the crash.
The ban, which officials admit Was confusing, was supposed to be distributed by facsimile by the FAA's Denver office.
"The FAA says there is no record of a fax being sent or received from the Denver center to Aspen,'' Carol Carmody, acting chairwoman for the National Transportation and Safety Board, said
Sunday.
On Monday, Mike Fergus, spokesman for the FAA's accident investigation division in Seattle, said the agency was
investigating the Denver office's handling of the notice.
"Now that the NTSB has raised the issue, it is part of our investigation. We are not trying to hide anything,'' Fergus said.
In addition, NTSB investigators went to Oklahoma City on Monday to meet with the FAA inspectors who issued the original notice.
The pilot had received the warning when the plane, which departed from Burbank, Calif., stopped in Los Angeles, Carmody said. But the warning, she said, was not written clearly and the pilot may not have understood it.
After the crash, the FAA issued a new notice explicitly banning nighttime instrument landings at the airport.
Also Monday, other investigators expected to finish clearing the wreckage of the jet. The airplane's cockpit voice recorder was to be analyzed in Washington.
Investigators said Sunday that the plane's takeoff from Los Angeles was delayed by 45 minutes. That lead to speculation the pilot originally expected to land before nightfall, but the NTSB
said it would draw no conclusions from the late departure.
"We don't really know what was in his head and we have to find that out,'' NTSB investigator Al Dickinson said.
The airport banned all nighttime landings by noncommercial jets until 1994, when several groups persuaded the FAA to reverse the policy.
Some Aspen residents, including the late singer-songwriter John Denver, had said safety would be compromised at the airport if the restriction was lifted. Denver was killed in a 1997 plane crash in
California.
"Even in my great desire to hurry home after weeks on the road, I have no problem honoring the present curfew,'' Denver wrote in a 1994 letter to Pitkin County commissioners. "I am quite happy to
land in Grand Junction or Denver and drive the extra distance for safety's sake.''
On the Net:
FAA: http://www.faa.gov
NTSB: http://www.ntsb.gov
Aspen Airport: http://www.aspenairport.com
--------------------------------------
If the pilots knew of the NOTAM, they were responsible for knowing it's meaning. Beyond the fact that mountains advance 'civil twilight,' dark is dark, let alone dark in weather.
This is the jurisdiction of the same FAA office (Seattle - Northwest Mountain Region) that brought us AK-261, then tried (and continues to) facilitate the carrier. Jane Garvey labels them as 'the best team.'
[This message has been edited by SKYDRIFTER (edited 03 April 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
After reading the previous postings I have a few comments.
First of all I do not believe that they were circling. Where they ended up tends to discount that. I go there on a very regular basis and I refuse to circle my Lear at this airport. Even in the day time. And from what I have seen, most other jet pilots feel the same way. It has been my experience that the tower will only issue circling clearances if requested. Further more if the winds were light like one of the postings suggested, why did this issue even come up?
As for the night part, it is my understanding that there are training, experience and currency issues that have to be met. I normally do not worry about it as I have an understanding with my boss that we do not go there at night. And a further understanding with his wife that she won't let him.
If you think this airport is fun in a jet, you ought to try it in a large turboprop like a CV-580. It gets very interesting then.
Eagle is mild compared to Aspen.
I can not imagine anyone being complacent going into Aspen. Like I said, I go in there almost once a week in the winter, and I am antcy every time I shoot the approach. The approach is one of the most difficult I have ever shot, including Narcy in Greenland.
Unfortunately, it still is too easy to be pushed in the charter industry. It sometimes is hard to say not just "NO" but "HELL, NO"
First of all I do not believe that they were circling. Where they ended up tends to discount that. I go there on a very regular basis and I refuse to circle my Lear at this airport. Even in the day time. And from what I have seen, most other jet pilots feel the same way. It has been my experience that the tower will only issue circling clearances if requested. Further more if the winds were light like one of the postings suggested, why did this issue even come up?
As for the night part, it is my understanding that there are training, experience and currency issues that have to be met. I normally do not worry about it as I have an understanding with my boss that we do not go there at night. And a further understanding with his wife that she won't let him.
If you think this airport is fun in a jet, you ought to try it in a large turboprop like a CV-580. It gets very interesting then.
Eagle is mild compared to Aspen.
I can not imagine anyone being complacent going into Aspen. Like I said, I go in there almost once a week in the winter, and I am antcy every time I shoot the approach. The approach is one of the most difficult I have ever shot, including Narcy in Greenland.
Unfortunately, it still is too easy to be pushed in the charter industry. It sometimes is hard to say not just "NO" but "HELL, NO"
Guest
Posts: n/a
*** Initial NTSB report taken from www.airwise.com ***
Apr 6, 2001
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) today released an update of its investigation into the March 29 crash of a chartered Gulfstream III (N303GA) in Aspen, Colorado that killed all 18 persons aboard.
NTSB said the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) Group convened Tuesday April 3, 2001 and finished on Wednesday April 4.
A representative from each of the following parties participated in the group activity: AVJet, Gulfstream and the FAA.
NTSB said a transcript will be available at a later date. Meanwhile it released the following bullets derived from that group's activities and from radio communications between the aircrew and air traffic controllers:
"* The CVR from N303GA was a Fairchild A100A recorder. The continuous recording was 31 minutes and 42 seconds in duration.
* Although, the CVR showed signs of structural damage, the tape was intact within the crash-protected case.
* The CVR recording consisted of 3 channels of good audio quality. The aircraft appeared to have had hot mics, as each of the two pilot station audios was distinctly recorded on separate channels. The third channel contained audio information from the cockpit area microphone.
* Shortly after the recording began, the Denver Center air traffic controller cleared N303GA direct to PITMN intersection.
* Aspen airport weather information was recorded on one of the pilot's audio channels.
* After N303GA was transferred to the Aspen approach controller, the aircraft was given vectors to intercept the final approach course for the VOR/DME C approach into the Aspen airport.
* While on the final approach course, N303GA was switched to the Aspen tower controller.
* The crew of N303GA asked the tower if the lights were all the way up; the tower responded that they were, and on high.
* When the tower asked N303GA if they had the runway in sight, the crew responded affirmatively.
* At about 32 seconds before the end of the CVR recording an electronic system voice called altitude at 1000 feet, and continued in increments of 100 feet.
* At approximately twelve seconds prior to the end of the recording an electronic voice called "sink rate".
* Shortly after the 200-foot call out, there was an electronic voice call out of "bank angle" and the recording ended.
* The recording did not appear to contain evidence of aircraft malfunction."
The Safety Board's investigation continues.
Apr 6, 2001
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) today released an update of its investigation into the March 29 crash of a chartered Gulfstream III (N303GA) in Aspen, Colorado that killed all 18 persons aboard.
NTSB said the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) Group convened Tuesday April 3, 2001 and finished on Wednesday April 4.
A representative from each of the following parties participated in the group activity: AVJet, Gulfstream and the FAA.
NTSB said a transcript will be available at a later date. Meanwhile it released the following bullets derived from that group's activities and from radio communications between the aircrew and air traffic controllers:
"* The CVR from N303GA was a Fairchild A100A recorder. The continuous recording was 31 minutes and 42 seconds in duration.
* Although, the CVR showed signs of structural damage, the tape was intact within the crash-protected case.
* The CVR recording consisted of 3 channels of good audio quality. The aircraft appeared to have had hot mics, as each of the two pilot station audios was distinctly recorded on separate channels. The third channel contained audio information from the cockpit area microphone.
* Shortly after the recording began, the Denver Center air traffic controller cleared N303GA direct to PITMN intersection.
* Aspen airport weather information was recorded on one of the pilot's audio channels.
* After N303GA was transferred to the Aspen approach controller, the aircraft was given vectors to intercept the final approach course for the VOR/DME C approach into the Aspen airport.
* While on the final approach course, N303GA was switched to the Aspen tower controller.
* The crew of N303GA asked the tower if the lights were all the way up; the tower responded that they were, and on high.
* When the tower asked N303GA if they had the runway in sight, the crew responded affirmatively.
* At about 32 seconds before the end of the CVR recording an electronic system voice called altitude at 1000 feet, and continued in increments of 100 feet.
* At approximately twelve seconds prior to the end of the recording an electronic voice called "sink rate".
* Shortly after the 200-foot call out, there was an electronic voice call out of "bank angle" and the recording ended.
* The recording did not appear to contain evidence of aircraft malfunction."
The Safety Board's investigation continues.
Guest
Posts: n/a
EXCUSE ME!
What kind of an account does the NTSB think this is??? Talk about NTSB 'newspeak.'
What happened to the verbal exchanges you know had to be there???
"...an electronic voice...", what happened to "...the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)?"
Something smelly is in the wind on this one.
What kind of an account does the NTSB think this is??? Talk about NTSB 'newspeak.'
What happened to the verbal exchanges you know had to be there???
"...an electronic voice...", what happened to "...the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)?"
Something smelly is in the wind on this one.
