A340 of Iberia skids off runway in Quito
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I spoke with some passenger of that flight, and they told me that they remained for half an hour inside the plane before the evacuation.
Do you think it´s normal, considering the circumstances of the accident?
Regards
Do you think it´s normal, considering the circumstances of the accident?
Regards
Re half an hour before evacuation
Would it not be that the first concern on the flight deck is to ascertain whether there is any indication of fire, and where? In one of the Ecuavisa clips a pilot mentioned the fire trucks were on the spot very quickly. They would, presumably, have relayed what they saw, including any indications of fire or fuel fumes, to the tower and thence to the aircraft. They could have shouted up to an open cockpit window. There would be no language difficulty so it’s safe to assume the flight deck were able to assess damage and risk within a few minutes of stopping.
That said, they’d have to decide what the best way to get the passengers off. No chance of airstairs, nose too low, tail too high. Forward slides might not have the necessary angle for sliding; overwing exits much more risk of fractures and cuts. Getting everyone off via the rear slides or slide in an orderly way seems to me at least to have been the safest, most sensible decision.
Would it not be that the first concern on the flight deck is to ascertain whether there is any indication of fire, and where? In one of the Ecuavisa clips a pilot mentioned the fire trucks were on the spot very quickly. They would, presumably, have relayed what they saw, including any indications of fire or fuel fumes, to the tower and thence to the aircraft. They could have shouted up to an open cockpit window. There would be no language difficulty so it’s safe to assume the flight deck were able to assess damage and risk within a few minutes of stopping.
That said, they’d have to decide what the best way to get the passengers off. No chance of airstairs, nose too low, tail too high. Forward slides might not have the necessary angle for sliding; overwing exits much more risk of fractures and cuts. Getting everyone off via the rear slides or slide in an orderly way seems to me at least to have been the safest, most sensible decision.
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Evacuation
We have to be careful when we question the decissions of other colleagues. First we should ask ourselves, do I have all the information that the crew was handling at the moment? certainly not, unless you are part of the investigation comission. At any rate, no injuries after evacuating 350+ souls? Good job!!
Good clip on YouTube showing the aircraft once again on all four legs and about to be towed back to the apron for on-site repairs expected to last 60dd. In YouTube look for "IBERIA RETIRA AVION DE QUITO".
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Youtube Footage
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Hi,
Spoke to the same source within IB tonight. They say its emerged that windshear contributed to a float and there was a "reverse thrust problem " on 2 engines. Still maintains they reckon it will be a write off and efforts are at insurance companies request. As this is a rumour forum , im just reporting what has come down a chain.
Spoke to the same source within IB tonight. They say its emerged that windshear contributed to a float and there was a "reverse thrust problem " on 2 engines. Still maintains they reckon it will be a write off and efforts are at insurance companies request. As this is a rumour forum , im just reporting what has come down a chain.
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ILS fixed
They have repaired the antennas of the ILS in SEQU that were damaged by the Iberia crash. A King Air made flights with test equipment to get it certified. There was a TV report on Tele Amazonas about this on December 17th.
Windshear? Was that with or without the stationary mist visible on the video?
I also might inquire as to IB performance numbers for SEQU. Are TR's required for their stopping computations?
I will add my best wishes for the crew involved. I've been operating in there for 12+ years. Challenging place, I can imagine even more so after a 8-9 hour flight.
I also might inquire as to IB performance numbers for SEQU. Are TR's required for their stopping computations?
I will add my best wishes for the crew involved. I've been operating in there for 12+ years. Challenging place, I can imagine even more so after a 8-9 hour flight.
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from airbus
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
TO : ALL AIRBUS OPERATORS / ATTN. : FLIGHT SAFETY
SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT N°1 dated 12 November 2007
This AIT is an update of AIT IB6463 N°1 regarding the A340-600 accident during landing on runway 35 at Quito, Ecuador, on the 09th of November 2007 at 17:10 local time.
The data which follows has been approved for release by the commission of investigation led by the Ecuador Investigation Authorities.
The analysis of available data, including the accident recorderas (DFDR & CVR),
indicates the following sequence of events.
IB6463 was approaching on ILS 35 to Quito airport. Latest reported information to the crew during the final approach were:
- wind 170/06;
- visibility 3000m;
- wet runway.
The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF).
Quito runway 35 altitude is 9198ft. The total runway length is 3120 m. The Landing Distance Available (LDA) is 3120 m. The runway is equipped with a PAPI. However this runway has an ILS displaced threshold of 510 m (remaining LDA for ILS approach is then 2610 m).
The CVR records confirm the crew intent was initially to follow the ILS until sufficient visual references were available, then to leave the Glide Slope to visually capture and follow the PAPI path and use the full runway for landing.
The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track
modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t, Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS "SINK RATE" warning was triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
The "SINK RATE" warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
The touch-down occurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining distance was 2920 m).
The landing was extremely hard (more than 3g vertical acceleration, about 19ft/sec 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
TO : ALL AIRBUS OPERATORS / ATTN. : FLIGHT SAFETY
SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT N°1 dated 12 November 2007
At touchdown, engine throttles were retarded to idle thus A/THR disengaged, and the ground spoilers deployed immediately.
The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
Full manual braking was applied 5 seconds after touchdown for the whole rollout. The average deceleration achieved during this landing phase was 0.15g. It was consistent with:
- the wet condition of runway;
- the 4 MLG front wheel tyre burst;
- the non-deployment of the engine thrust reversers.
The runway overrun occurred at 85kt in a right turn sideslip attitude resulting from right rudder pedal inputs. The aircraft finally came to a rest at about 200m from the runway end. All passengers and crew members were safely evacuated.
At this stage of the investigation, Airbus reminds operators to comply with Standard Operating Procedure to achieve stabilized approach conditions. Go-around must be initiated if the stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes.
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
TO : ALL AIRBUS OPERATORS / ATTN. : FLIGHT SAFETY
SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT N°1 dated 12 November 2007
This AIT is an update of AIT IB6463 N°1 regarding the A340-600 accident during landing on runway 35 at Quito, Ecuador, on the 09th of November 2007 at 17:10 local time.
The data which follows has been approved for release by the commission of investigation led by the Ecuador Investigation Authorities.
The analysis of available data, including the accident recorderas (DFDR & CVR),
indicates the following sequence of events.
IB6463 was approaching on ILS 35 to Quito airport. Latest reported information to the crew during the final approach were:
- wind 170/06;
- visibility 3000m;
- wet runway.
The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF).
Quito runway 35 altitude is 9198ft. The total runway length is 3120 m. The Landing Distance Available (LDA) is 3120 m. The runway is equipped with a PAPI. However this runway has an ILS displaced threshold of 510 m (remaining LDA for ILS approach is then 2610 m).
The CVR records confirm the crew intent was initially to follow the ILS until sufficient visual references were available, then to leave the Glide Slope to visually capture and follow the PAPI path and use the full runway for landing.
The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track
modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t, Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS "SINK RATE" warning was triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
The "SINK RATE" warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
The touch-down occurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining distance was 2920 m).
The landing was extremely hard (more than 3g vertical acceleration, about 19ft/sec 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE
TO : ALL AIRBUS OPERATORS / ATTN. : FLIGHT SAFETY
SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT N°1 dated 12 November 2007
At touchdown, engine throttles were retarded to idle thus A/THR disengaged, and the ground spoilers deployed immediately.
The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
Full manual braking was applied 5 seconds after touchdown for the whole rollout. The average deceleration achieved during this landing phase was 0.15g. It was consistent with:
- the wet condition of runway;
- the 4 MLG front wheel tyre burst;
- the non-deployment of the engine thrust reversers.
The runway overrun occurred at 85kt in a right turn sideslip attitude resulting from right rudder pedal inputs. The aircraft finally came to a rest at about 200m from the runway end. All passengers and crew members were safely evacuated.
At this stage of the investigation, Airbus reminds operators to comply with Standard Operating Procedure to achieve stabilized approach conditions. Go-around must be initiated if the stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes.
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Re posts about evac, etc.
FWIW QFA B744 VH-OJH overrun onto the golf course at VTBD (Bangkok Don Muang) in 1999... once the crew had determined there was no immediate fire, there was no evac until the crew had more info on the status of the aircraft. At least you know where the SLF all are then. But, the cabin crew remained by their exits in case an immediate evac became necessary.
There's a fair bit of discussion about evac vs. precautionary disembarkation in the final ATSB report.
There's a fair bit of discussion about evac vs. precautionary disembarkation in the final ATSB report.
Last edited by Taildragger67; 19th Dec 2007 at 11:56.
The landing was extremely hard (more than 3g vertical acceleration, about 19ft/sec 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
Some similarity with the Britannia accident at Gerona...
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stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes
The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
Says a lot.....
Jeff
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J.O.,
I suspect the comment from Alternate Law - which wingview then highlighted - is with respect to the aircraft's computers apparently seeming to think it was still flying when the PIC was standing on the brakes and had manually selected reverse-thrust.
I suspect the comment from Alternate Law - which wingview then highlighted - is with respect to the aircraft's computers apparently seeming to think it was still flying when the PIC was standing on the brakes and had manually selected reverse-thrust.
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I'm sure somebody will be along shortly to say that it must have been Airbus design at fault and it couldn't happen in a Boeing. If I remember correctly in the aforementioned Gerona incident the 757s engines did something weird due to the control lines being damaged in the impact, which just goes to show that if you crash any aircraft into the ground hard enough you can break it.
Nevertheless, computers which prevent the manual selection of reverse thrust (or even ground idle) because they won't be told that the (damaged) aircraft is actually on the ground......
Hmmm
Hmmm