A340 of Iberia skids off runway in Quito
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: flyover country USA
Age: 82
Posts: 4,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Globally asks -
I don't know any way to make a "safe" vs "unsafe" binary distinction. To the professional, safety is a numerical quantity - measured perhaps in events per 100,000 operations. Such statistics should be generally available from the insurance industry - and I'd be surprised if an operator's route structure (compared to the requirements of his constituent fleet) didn't help determine the annual insurance premium.
And thus, the insurers and the operators would seem to have some leverage to bring about airfield improvements.
The question is how much runway is necessary to make that operation safe?
And thus, the insurers and the operators would seem to have some leverage to bring about airfield improvements.
SkyGod
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Palm Coast, Florida, USA
Age: 67
Posts: 1,542
Likes: 0
Received 10 Likes
on
1 Post
TowerDog proposes mechanical failure, but without supporting fact.
Just bringing up the possibility of a brake or anti-skid failure.
Too easy to hang the crew or Iberia or Airbus at this stage.
Lets look at all the possible scenarios since we are here yakking away.
Even Chuck Yeager would run off the end if his brakes (or reversers) failed in Quito.
No supporting facts though, just looking at this from other angles.
Landing long at high speed would of course trigger a no-fault go-around.
Surely the Iberia crews are trained to think that way.
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: Earth
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Globally,
I do not believe that this accident is an indicator of UIO's safety. While the threshold for error is smaller than an airport with a longer runway, there is a clear and established procedure for landing at UIO... pilots who follow procedure do not experience a runway over run, at most they execute a go-around for another landing attempt.
As there has been no volcanic activity for some time here with the local volcano's I do not see how ash is a factor??!!
I do not believe that this accident is an indicator of UIO's safety. While the threshold for error is smaller than an airport with a longer runway, there is a clear and established procedure for landing at UIO... pilots who follow procedure do not experience a runway over run, at most they execute a go-around for another landing attempt.
As there has been no volcanic activity for some time here with the local volcano's I do not see how ash is a factor??!!
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: Earth
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TowerDog,
Video evidence indicates that this incident was long landing at most likely high speed. We still do not know the reason that a go-around was not initiated.
http://www.ecuavisa.com/NewsGallery/Video.aspx?e=826&f=6780
Video evidence indicates that this incident was long landing at most likely high speed. We still do not know the reason that a go-around was not initiated.
http://www.ecuavisa.com/NewsGallery/Video.aspx?e=826&f=6780
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: RH base 36R
Posts: 34
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Alf:
I guess the photos posted by GearDown&Locked settle the PAPI-thing. Should have thought of that myself (photos).
Yes, MD11. But the whole thing has nothing to do with the size of the a/c, or accuracy, or tight beams or whatever. The PAPI is simply set up for a different touchdownpoint than the GS. As the photos show, the PAPI is in a "normal" position at the physical threshold. The GS-antenna is hundreds of meters further down the rwy. Been there, seen it, done that.
BOAC:
Still haven't got the charts handy, but I'm pretty sure those are the limits we use. Obviously, if you're gonna leave the ILS GP you will have to be visual at that point - it really goes without saying! The circling limits allow that. What this also means, is that we are using higher limits (with the potential, and real consequences for punctuality etc.!) to be able to use the whole runway. Weather below these limits, we do NOT fly the approach. We do NOT want to land at the ILS TD-point with only 2610m (let alone 2290m...) remaining. (see also post #116 by Globally!) In my eyes this clearly means a choice by the airline for SAFETY instead of schedule and that's the way it should be.
Please, do NOT misinterpretate me on this! Yes, I enjoy this operation because of the challenge it presents. But neither me, nor any of my colleagues is doing anything here because it would be fun. (We only do that after we get back to the beach after this rotation 
)
We are very, very aware of that and the whole operation is treated very seriously - see below:
Where I come from, it is a Cat C-airport. It means a minimum experience on type for both pilots, briefings, special procedures, a checkride with an instructor and go there at least once a year or do everything again. I have no idea how things are at Iberia and I have no desire to speculate.
That would not be a good idea, no. That's why it's all on our charts, briefed, and practiced (in the simulator, just to be perfectly clear).
All in all, I feel perfectly safe with this operation. But yes, you will be paying attention.
Finally:
Ofcourse, you're right on that - and I guess that's one of the reasons why a new airport is being built, due to open in 2009. http://www.luxner.com/cgi-bin/view_article.cgi?articleID=1417
Re no PAPI indicated on the chart.
Is your experience with a ‘long body’ aircraft (MD11?) where a single PAPI installation may appear to be non-aligned with the ILS?
BOAC:
MB - if, as you post, you are treating this as a 'circle-to-land', are you using 10,500/8km minima?
It may be 'quite fun' ....
)
Apart from our own skins, we accept responsibility for lots of others, and safety margins are there for a reason.
It is obviously a 'special brief' airfield and I would hope at least 'Cat B'
relying on 'visitors' having to make up their own procedure at 650'?
All in all, I feel perfectly safe with this operation. But yes, you will be paying attention.
Finally:
Viewing the situation with a wider perspective wouldn’t it be better to fix the problems at their root
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: LHR
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is very difficult to judge from the video stills but the very last frame is the only one where it looks as if the spoilers MIGHT be deployed.
There is no evidence of the spray caused by reverse thrust until a couple of frames before the a/c goes out of sight..... Having said that the landing performance is not reliant upon the use of reverse thrust, it does however require spoilers deployed.
Let me guess.... yet another deep landing onto a limiting runway with late selection of reverse ?
"Baldrick... Make up the spare room.....Mr. Cockup is paying a visit"
Perhaps Iberia are chasing Air France for the title of 'Most HF Related Hull Losses"
There is no evidence of the spray caused by reverse thrust until a couple of frames before the a/c goes out of sight..... Having said that the landing performance is not reliant upon the use of reverse thrust, it does however require spoilers deployed.
Let me guess.... yet another deep landing onto a limiting runway with late selection of reverse ?
"Baldrick... Make up the spare room.....Mr. Cockup is paying a visit"
Perhaps Iberia are chasing Air France for the title of 'Most HF Related Hull Losses"
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Ecuador
Age: 40
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
while any explanations for the accident right now are speculations (until the official accident report is released) I've heard from a local pilot and aeronautic authorities that the plane landed after the first 1/3 of the runway (pilot error) .. anyway, still speculations
one important thing is the steep crown globally said.. the last part of the rwy is downhill
also, gobally mentioned volcanic ash as a possible problem. Although I can still find volcanic ash in my home (yes, I live in Quito) I wonder if it is still a problem after about 8 years of normal operations in UIO
improvements in the current Quito airport will not happen .. as you can notice, there is no room for making the runway longer, and also they are waiting for the new quito airport (called NQIA) to open instead of fixing the current airport
the new airport construction has been delayed for many years. Its plans were done in the 70s and it was expected to be finally built in the 90s .. it is 2007 and we have no new airport yet .. the cause of the delay is political problems. Even now, the current president of Ecuador objects the construction of the new airport because of its 'unfair' contract to the government .....will we ever have a new airport?
some suggest moving some operations from Quito SEQU to Latacunga SELT, just about 40 miles south of Quito .. pros: the runway is longer than Quito's and approach is much easier .. cons: there is no taxiway, terminal building is too small, political problems (again!)
one important thing is the steep crown globally said.. the last part of the rwy is downhill
also, gobally mentioned volcanic ash as a possible problem. Although I can still find volcanic ash in my home (yes, I live in Quito) I wonder if it is still a problem after about 8 years of normal operations in UIO
improvements in the current Quito airport will not happen .. as you can notice, there is no room for making the runway longer, and also they are waiting for the new quito airport (called NQIA) to open instead of fixing the current airport
the new airport construction has been delayed for many years. Its plans were done in the 70s and it was expected to be finally built in the 90s .. it is 2007 and we have no new airport yet .. the cause of the delay is political problems. Even now, the current president of Ecuador objects the construction of the new airport because of its 'unfair' contract to the government .....will we ever have a new airport?
some suggest moving some operations from Quito SEQU to Latacunga SELT, just about 40 miles south of Quito .. pros: the runway is longer than Quito's and approach is much easier .. cons: there is no taxiway, terminal building is too small, political problems (again!)
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Virginia, USA
Age: 74
Posts: 36
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Supersean. I may have overstated the effect of volcanic dust as it interacts with rain on an already slick runway. But I do recall that after the first takeoff we made out of Quito last year in our 747-400, we looked back during the SID and saw a cloud of dust lingering over the runway, even though there was no reported volcanic activity. A firetruck hosed down some of the shoulder area of the runway before and after we made our first landing there. I have also watched some 747s during takeoff roll and the dust cloud behind the airplane was fairly thick, even though there was no visible dust on the surface to the naked eye. In any event, we consider the effect of rain mixed with dust and other factors causing a slick surface when we discuss braking technique during the approach briefing. I don't know if dust mixed with rain technically makes the runway slicker, but I'd rather plan for it and land in the first 3,000 feet with a higher brake setting than ignore it.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Ecuador
Age: 40
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
more news: they will tow the aircraft back to the airport hangars and they are already bringing airbus equipment to analyse the damaged aircraft .. they do not want it to be a write-off so they will check if they can repair it and make it leave Quito flying by its own
This is a valuable thread enabling opportunity to think about safety issues and learn from them; thanks to all of the contributors.
TowerDog no criticism of your view on mechanical failure; although unlikely, this is not totally dismissed particularly in an operation where the tyres, brakes / gear might be at the top end of their performance spec – high energy (speed altitude), tyre speed/temp.
Re” Landing long at high speed would of course trigger a no-fault go-around. - Surely the Iberia crews are trained to think that way.”
Yes, but such assumptions are often found to be inaccurate due to the limitations of human performance; we (all of us) forget, we are distracted, we press-on because we ’think’ that it safe or not knowing the risk, or we do not know how close to the edge of a safe operation the particular landing is.
MoodyBlue, re PAPI not aligned with ILS GS. I agree with your deduction. Not forgetting that the ILS GS is a reflected beam from the ground some distance in front of the aerial (at 3 deg down then up), there appears to be a discrepancy which is not identified in the charts – thus an opportunity for error.
One such error is to duck under the ILS GS and follow the PAPI visual slope; this could be a particular hazard in long body aircraft (large eye/wheel height, long eye/wheel dist) where the resultant TCH could be extremely low. Comparing the A340-600 with a smaller aircraft aiming for TCH 50ft +/- 10ft, the A340 following the same visual path may only have 20ft +/- 10ft wheel clearance. [eye-wheel ht ~ 18ft, + attitude correction 12ft (6deg @ 120ft eye wheel dist – from Airbus ebriefing 2006)]. A further consideration may be that apart from the risk of the manoeuvre, a duck under at higher GS (higher energy/inertia) might result in an overshoot of the desired visual path giving even less TCH clearance. Then consider the lack of a paved undershoot area before the threshold (see pics #114).
polea, “the plane landed after the first 1/3 of the runway (pilot error) … ”. This statement follows the old view of error – pilot error.
Consider an IFR operation with the planned touchdown aim-point based on the ILS origin, then a small change in the tailwind or the ‘standard’ error in reporting the wind (see link from #108), could cause the aircraft to float down the runway, even further if it were ‘over the first hump’ beyond the touchdown markings. Alternatively, consider the possibility of a visual illusion with the up-sloping runway or a relatively narrow runway for its extra length, or poor light/visibility (dusk?), any of these factors makes the landing a demanding task in a large aircraft. Then consider any differences between management operational assumptions vs what the crew assumed; what landing distance is assumed; full length, 2610m, or even less (it would be nice to establish what value operators’ use in their planning charts or perf computers – cf 737 Midway accident - data in computer).
Thus the ‘long landing’ could be within the normal distribution of touchdown position when compared with a landing on a non limiting runway. What we don’t know are the assumptions in the operation, I hope the crew knew.
Considering the plans for a new airport, then improvements at UIO appear unlikely and with financial constraint even runway maintenance cleaning/removal of rubber deposits may be overlooked. Thus the operator / crew will have to accommodate any additional risk during landing. Add to the above a wet runway which had less friction than normal – greater depth of water, or residual dust in the runway pores (there doesn’t have to be an active volcano), blocked grooves (is the runway grooved?), and increasing rubber deposits, then the risk of an overrun increases.
Crews may rarely encounter truly limiting runways, thus they acquire and present a perception of apparent safety (“737 land safely so why can everyone else”). Whereas landing performance provides a safety margin for normal flying tolerances, the margin cannot accommodate a combination of extremes or any false assumptions carried over from less demanding operations.
A routine, ‘normal’ landing might consume 50% of the safety margin due to deviations from the ideal in approach speed, TCH, flare time, touchdown position, spoiler/rev deployment, and use of brakes. The crew’s perception, particularly on a non limiting runway could be of a large residual safety margin based on the runway remaining; what they may fail to appreciate is where they where expected to stop by the certification and operational assumptions. Thus it is possible to form a biased view of the margins of safety based on normal operations, …. but UIO is not normal.
JAR-OPS performance is based on a ‘standard’ wet runway (only found in certification?), in practice there is a range of reducing levels of friction between wet and some magic changeover point of flooded/contaminated – what the crew do not know is how slippery a wet runway is (excluding ‘slippery when wet’ which is separate, but important additional risk). So for a crew who for good reason conduct a difficult landing at UIO as perhaps they have done before, suddenly find that that the margin of safety rapidly disappears and alternative action is required – more reverse or more brakes – just at the point where the runway is wet, slippery, and contaminated with rubber!
Some research suggests that it is necessary to increase existing safety factor from 1.92 up to 2.2/2.4 on wet runway in order to maintain the same level of safety on a dry runway.
For those who use a w - b analysis it might be interesting to take a speculative view of this scenario and ‘pencil-in’ opportunities for error and thus preventative measures, e.g.
why at UIO aircraft should not duck under:
because an unstable approach may offset any gain in landing distance, possible reduced TCH, no undershoot.
why max braking should be considered:
because the point of touchdown may vary more than normal, prevalence of tailwind landings, potentially slippery runway (wet and dry - dusty?), non standard overrun area.
This proactive assessment could be the basis of a special briefing or SOP, which of course should include a GA if the TD position appears to be long (specify a fixed point on the runway).
Refs:
Runway Slipperiness Research.
Safety Factor on Wet Concrete Runway.
TowerDog no criticism of your view on mechanical failure; although unlikely, this is not totally dismissed particularly in an operation where the tyres, brakes / gear might be at the top end of their performance spec – high energy (speed altitude), tyre speed/temp.
Re” Landing long at high speed would of course trigger a no-fault go-around. - Surely the Iberia crews are trained to think that way.”
Yes, but such assumptions are often found to be inaccurate due to the limitations of human performance; we (all of us) forget, we are distracted, we press-on because we ’think’ that it safe or not knowing the risk, or we do not know how close to the edge of a safe operation the particular landing is.
MoodyBlue, re PAPI not aligned with ILS GS. I agree with your deduction. Not forgetting that the ILS GS is a reflected beam from the ground some distance in front of the aerial (at 3 deg down then up), there appears to be a discrepancy which is not identified in the charts – thus an opportunity for error.
One such error is to duck under the ILS GS and follow the PAPI visual slope; this could be a particular hazard in long body aircraft (large eye/wheel height, long eye/wheel dist) where the resultant TCH could be extremely low. Comparing the A340-600 with a smaller aircraft aiming for TCH 50ft +/- 10ft, the A340 following the same visual path may only have 20ft +/- 10ft wheel clearance. [eye-wheel ht ~ 18ft, + attitude correction 12ft (6deg @ 120ft eye wheel dist – from Airbus ebriefing 2006)]. A further consideration may be that apart from the risk of the manoeuvre, a duck under at higher GS (higher energy/inertia) might result in an overshoot of the desired visual path giving even less TCH clearance. Then consider the lack of a paved undershoot area before the threshold (see pics #114).
polea, “the plane landed after the first 1/3 of the runway (pilot error) … ”. This statement follows the old view of error – pilot error.
Consider an IFR operation with the planned touchdown aim-point based on the ILS origin, then a small change in the tailwind or the ‘standard’ error in reporting the wind (see link from #108), could cause the aircraft to float down the runway, even further if it were ‘over the first hump’ beyond the touchdown markings. Alternatively, consider the possibility of a visual illusion with the up-sloping runway or a relatively narrow runway for its extra length, or poor light/visibility (dusk?), any of these factors makes the landing a demanding task in a large aircraft. Then consider any differences between management operational assumptions vs what the crew assumed; what landing distance is assumed; full length, 2610m, or even less (it would be nice to establish what value operators’ use in their planning charts or perf computers – cf 737 Midway accident - data in computer).
Thus the ‘long landing’ could be within the normal distribution of touchdown position when compared with a landing on a non limiting runway. What we don’t know are the assumptions in the operation, I hope the crew knew.
Considering the plans for a new airport, then improvements at UIO appear unlikely and with financial constraint even runway maintenance cleaning/removal of rubber deposits may be overlooked. Thus the operator / crew will have to accommodate any additional risk during landing. Add to the above a wet runway which had less friction than normal – greater depth of water, or residual dust in the runway pores (there doesn’t have to be an active volcano), blocked grooves (is the runway grooved?), and increasing rubber deposits, then the risk of an overrun increases.
Crews may rarely encounter truly limiting runways, thus they acquire and present a perception of apparent safety (“737 land safely so why can everyone else”). Whereas landing performance provides a safety margin for normal flying tolerances, the margin cannot accommodate a combination of extremes or any false assumptions carried over from less demanding operations.
A routine, ‘normal’ landing might consume 50% of the safety margin due to deviations from the ideal in approach speed, TCH, flare time, touchdown position, spoiler/rev deployment, and use of brakes. The crew’s perception, particularly on a non limiting runway could be of a large residual safety margin based on the runway remaining; what they may fail to appreciate is where they where expected to stop by the certification and operational assumptions. Thus it is possible to form a biased view of the margins of safety based on normal operations, …. but UIO is not normal.
JAR-OPS performance is based on a ‘standard’ wet runway (only found in certification?), in practice there is a range of reducing levels of friction between wet and some magic changeover point of flooded/contaminated – what the crew do not know is how slippery a wet runway is (excluding ‘slippery when wet’ which is separate, but important additional risk). So for a crew who for good reason conduct a difficult landing at UIO as perhaps they have done before, suddenly find that that the margin of safety rapidly disappears and alternative action is required – more reverse or more brakes – just at the point where the runway is wet, slippery, and contaminated with rubber!
Some research suggests that it is necessary to increase existing safety factor from 1.92 up to 2.2/2.4 on wet runway in order to maintain the same level of safety on a dry runway.
For those who use a w - b analysis it might be interesting to take a speculative view of this scenario and ‘pencil-in’ opportunities for error and thus preventative measures, e.g.
why at UIO aircraft should not duck under:
because an unstable approach may offset any gain in landing distance, possible reduced TCH, no undershoot.
why max braking should be considered:
because the point of touchdown may vary more than normal, prevalence of tailwind landings, potentially slippery runway (wet and dry - dusty?), non standard overrun area.
This proactive assessment could be the basis of a special briefing or SOP, which of course should include a GA if the TD position appears to be long (specify a fixed point on the runway).
Refs:
Runway Slipperiness Research.
Safety Factor on Wet Concrete Runway.
TV clip with the aircraft in the background:
http://www.ecuavisa.com/NewsGallery/...x?e=942&f=7011
Commentator says removal now planned for Tuesday 27th; delayed due inclement weather. Pneumatic cushions and heavy earthmoving machinery visible; hard tracks are being laid for towing back to the runway. Another news site said a new port gear assembly had been brought in and was being attached in situ. If that's correct (and it's not a cushioned bogie just for support during tow) it would seem to indicate less damage to the wing structure than was originally presumed to have occurred. Rainboe, was that a smirk?
After a brief suspension, Iberia are now back to Quito but apparently not with the -600.
http://www.ecuavisa.com/NewsGallery/...x?e=942&f=7011
Commentator says removal now planned for Tuesday 27th; delayed due inclement weather. Pneumatic cushions and heavy earthmoving machinery visible; hard tracks are being laid for towing back to the runway. Another news site said a new port gear assembly had been brought in and was being attached in situ. If that's correct (and it's not a cushioned bogie just for support during tow) it would seem to indicate less damage to the wing structure than was originally presumed to have occurred. Rainboe, was that a smirk?
After a brief suspension, Iberia are now back to Quito but apparently not with the -600.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Guayaquil
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
They are pulling EC-JOH
It is today in Ecuadorian TV news. EC-JOH has a new undercarriage and they are pulling it slowly to the apron. So it is no hull loss.
Does anyone know what caused a similar incident with an Iberia Airbus in SEQU on August 31th 2007?
Does anyone know what caused a similar incident with an Iberia Airbus in SEQU on August 31th 2007?
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Virginia, USA
Age: 74
Posts: 36
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BOAC. I'm not sure we are "ducking under" with such a high DH height above touchdown. For a Cat 1 with the usual height of above touchdown of 200 feet, ducking under should never be carried out. But what about a situation like Quito, where there is more than adequate time from DH to adjust the glideslope to land in the first 3,000 feet, which is where the instrument markings are located in the first place? From all my experience flying into Quito, including an observation period in the tower, I never saw any airplane land in conjunction with the ILS glideslope. Everyone landed in the first 3,000 feet.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not sure which 'duck under' you refer to, but my last was a comment on the number of red papis (on a 737-200). As Alf says, the whole ethos of the approach needs looking at IMO wrt landing performance calcs.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Guayaquil
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
They are flying again aircrafts of the A340 family, it is in their press release on the IBERIA web site (Sala de Prensa -> Noticia). But they do not mention if the use any A340-600 for IB6463. A week before I went with an A340-300 EC-GPB TERESA DE AVILA on this flight number. Now Iberia has again its regular schedule for the MAD UIO GYE MAD route.
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: Earth
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
According to El Comercio they are again flying the a346. I'll verify and upload pics later
http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto...&mes=11&dia=24
http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto...&mes=11&dia=24
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Virginia, USA
Age: 74
Posts: 36
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BOAC. Agreed. The approach needs to be reviewed. We do all our weight planning based on the touchdown at the ILS displaced threshold. Flying the approach and landing as a practical matter, however, needs further review.