Concorde documentary
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John H presented his OPINIONS based on interim reports and his previous experience. But many of the things he said were still conjecture. The stuff about the supermarket trolley behaviour of the left bogey is what lack of a spacer COULD do, not necessarily what happened. A Concorde engineer acquaintance of mine told me that Mike H's scenario is unlikely. And if you look at the tyremarks on the runway (photos are in the report on the web), there's no evidence of shimmy.
I'm with John Farley on this one (see other Concorde thread). Crucifying the French crew is no way to go, and almost certainly unjustifiable. Put yourself in the seat and imagine what it would have been like. It's in that area that I particularly part company with John H's general drift.
I think the French verdict was right. John H is in love with the aeroplane, and that (plus his passion for doing things right as he sees it) overrides everything else for him. He knows what verdict he'd like to see.
We know that the tyre explosion started it all, and now that we know a lot more about the sequence of events which followed it's tempting to believe we know it all.
Sure, I have a lot of questions I would like to see answered yet, but none of the scenarios that I can see as possible would make me criticise Marty and his crew. This time I'm waiting for the full report before I make up my mind.
And do we think that the new AD, when carried out, will make Concorde safe?
At the moment I believe it will, but I am prepared to have that view challenged.
I'm with John Farley on this one (see other Concorde thread). Crucifying the French crew is no way to go, and almost certainly unjustifiable. Put yourself in the seat and imagine what it would have been like. It's in that area that I particularly part company with John H's general drift.
I think the French verdict was right. John H is in love with the aeroplane, and that (plus his passion for doing things right as he sees it) overrides everything else for him. He knows what verdict he'd like to see.
We know that the tyre explosion started it all, and now that we know a lot more about the sequence of events which followed it's tempting to believe we know it all.
Sure, I have a lot of questions I would like to see answered yet, but none of the scenarios that I can see as possible would make me criticise Marty and his crew. This time I'm waiting for the full report before I make up my mind.
And do we think that the new AD, when carried out, will make Concorde safe?
At the moment I believe it will, but I am prepared to have that view challenged.
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I thought they did a fair job on the programme. They obviously can't get over technical in a programme like that. Captain Hutchinson seemed to make a lot of good points. The idea of the fire going out seemed a bit unlikely, but then, he's a Concorde pilot and I'm not, so what do I know? A Concorde FO explained to me last year that they have a 'Velocity Zero-Rate-Of-Climb' Basically, Concordes delta wing produces more and more drag the slower it flies but doesn't stall, the limit is bhow much power there is available to counter the drag, hence all the noise, fuel burn etc on final approach with the nose high. I think he said that in the configeration they were in the VZROC was aroun 350 kts. If Captain Martin had rotated early beause they'd been dragged off the side of the runway by the undercarriage fault, and they then couldn't retract the gear (I understand the hydraulics for raising the undercarriage is off the left-hand engines, both of which were shut down) they obviously couldn't achieve a positive climb on two engines.
But with regard to the documentry, that kind of explaination is a bit two envolved for the general public, so apart from possibly a bit too much pathos (and please don't please don't mis-understand me, it was tragic and I have the greatist respect for the crew, passangers and people killed on the ground) I think it did a fair job.
But with regard to the documentry, that kind of explaination is a bit two envolved for the general public, so apart from possibly a bit too much pathos (and please don't please don't mis-understand me, it was tragic and I have the greatist respect for the crew, passangers and people killed on the ground) I think it did a fair job.
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I thought the programme was well presented and well offered to the general public. The lack of attention to MTOW and RTOW and the breaches of both on July 25 did not (unless my attention waned) get any airing what so ever. The focus on the impact on people's lives is fine, I thought everyone concerned presented very well. The Air France guy whose name I dont' recall was a little supercilious but what I liked was his aim to ensure we understood Capt Marty to be an excellent pilot.
That Concorde should re-fly with kevlar-lined fuel tanks is excellent. That Pirelli should make new non-burstable tyres is wonderful. That all those souls should have been lost because someone didn't clear the runway...remember..the cause was a piece of titanium on runway ripping tyre and hitting fuel tank..is not acceptable. At no point in the programme did the issue of runway sweeping enter the debate...even as a passing comment surely this should have been addressed. I am glad the Suffolk Yoof Orchestra weren't involved but, excuse me, this was meant to be a programme about Concorde crash and has been timed to be broadcast just as the Goddess of the Skies (well indulge me, she is the most amazing aircraft the world has seen in passenger transportation) is due to be relicensed...
I am delighted to have had the chance to see some beautiful footage of Concorde in the air, above cloud, but I am dissatisfied that the "medja" have chosen not to pursue a serious analysis of the accident but merely to follow up on the "ground effect".
I just hope that CDG has improved on its runway sweeping policies!!
That Concorde should re-fly with kevlar-lined fuel tanks is excellent. That Pirelli should make new non-burstable tyres is wonderful. That all those souls should have been lost because someone didn't clear the runway...remember..the cause was a piece of titanium on runway ripping tyre and hitting fuel tank..is not acceptable. At no point in the programme did the issue of runway sweeping enter the debate...even as a passing comment surely this should have been addressed. I am glad the Suffolk Yoof Orchestra weren't involved but, excuse me, this was meant to be a programme about Concorde crash and has been timed to be broadcast just as the Goddess of the Skies (well indulge me, she is the most amazing aircraft the world has seen in passenger transportation) is due to be relicensed...
I am delighted to have had the chance to see some beautiful footage of Concorde in the air, above cloud, but I am dissatisfied that the "medja" have chosen not to pursue a serious analysis of the accident but merely to follow up on the "ground effect".
I just hope that CDG has improved on its runway sweeping policies!!
Jacko
you can probably get through to John Hutch via GAPAN. See http://www.gapan.org for details.
Skua
you can probably get through to John Hutch via GAPAN. See http://www.gapan.org for details.
Skua
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Arkroyal and the legendary John Farley call it correct.
The programme was utter rubbish. I tuned in expecting a 50 minute, BBC style short but effective documetary that outlined the aircrafts History, the events leading up to the accident and all that has currently been done since, with BA and AF to get her back where she should be - on revenue flights. The programme from the very start was backed with sad and tragic sounding music, with the kind of still photography you would associate with a murder hunt. An insight to the backgounds of the people, friends and families involved was the backbone of the programme, with a star perfomance by a waitress at the hotel where the aircraft came down. All of us have major condolences for every one involved in this tragic event. The poor people of Borrusia Munchen-Gladbach, the aircraft crew, and the four people who died at the hotel. But, to call the programme "The History of Concorde" defies belief. I guess if you make a real bad programme, about a well touchy subject, youve got to call it something interesting to get the public to watch it.
Thank god for John Hutchinson. The French didnt like what he said much - we arent out to annoy people, but if you are just relaying factual accounts as John was, it wouldnt be right to shoot the messenger, would it......?
Too much drama, not enough fact.
Regards, Ppruners
Speedy.
The programme was utter rubbish. I tuned in expecting a 50 minute, BBC style short but effective documetary that outlined the aircrafts History, the events leading up to the accident and all that has currently been done since, with BA and AF to get her back where she should be - on revenue flights. The programme from the very start was backed with sad and tragic sounding music, with the kind of still photography you would associate with a murder hunt. An insight to the backgounds of the people, friends and families involved was the backbone of the programme, with a star perfomance by a waitress at the hotel where the aircraft came down. All of us have major condolences for every one involved in this tragic event. The poor people of Borrusia Munchen-Gladbach, the aircraft crew, and the four people who died at the hotel. But, to call the programme "The History of Concorde" defies belief. I guess if you make a real bad programme, about a well touchy subject, youve got to call it something interesting to get the public to watch it.
Thank god for John Hutchinson. The French didnt like what he said much - we arent out to annoy people, but if you are just relaying factual accounts as John was, it wouldnt be right to shoot the messenger, would it......?
Too much drama, not enough fact.
Regards, Ppruners
Speedy.
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Yup it was a sad programme all right and I think it would have hit a spot in most non-technical viewers. Apart from the loss of life there was also the loss of a beatiful machine and possibly confidence in sharp end technology.
The spacer/shimmy theory is the first I have heard of it but I recall a sory that the French President Chirac was sitting in a stationary plane at CDG at the time and Concorde was heading in the general direction of the presidential plane at one point during the take off run...Shimmy ?.
Incidentally I understand that Captain Marty PIC Concorde made an attempt to windsail across the Atlantic in his younger
days and a documentary of this appeared on UK TV.
The spacer/shimmy theory is the first I have heard of it but I recall a sory that the French President Chirac was sitting in a stationary plane at CDG at the time and Concorde was heading in the general direction of the presidential plane at one point during the take off run...Shimmy ?.
Incidentally I understand that Captain Marty PIC Concorde made an attempt to windsail across the Atlantic in his younger
days and a documentary of this appeared on UK TV.
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shortfinals
Don't ever let the general public hear you say that!
Forgive me it was unintentional, but use of the word "safe" in that context is very problematic. It means different things to different people. To an engineer like myself, saftey is a quantifiable parameter, like any other. To most people in the street it is an absolute: something is either safe or it's not safe. If it's not safe, then they want to know why the hell they should fly in it and, if someone's been hurt or killed, how much compensation they can get from someone because it wasn't designed right!
Are you implying that it wasn't safe before the AD? Are you implying that it is 100% safe after? These are the sorts of questions and demands that the guy in the street has.
I think Concorde always was a "safe" aircraft; and I use that in the sense that there is a high safety factor - so to speak. With the mods, it is now safer, which can only be a good thing!
I think there is a very high probability that under exactly the same circumstances, the AD would prevent exactly the same accident from happening again. But then, what is the probability that exactly the same circumstances will transpire again?
Still, if the money spent on the mods gives Joe Public (or even the CAA) a warm and fuzzy feeling about flying the old bird again, then I'm happy. Long may she continue to grace our skies.
[ 07 September 2001: Message edited by: Covenant ]
And do we think that the new AD, when carried out, will make Concorde safe?
Forgive me it was unintentional, but use of the word "safe" in that context is very problematic. It means different things to different people. To an engineer like myself, saftey is a quantifiable parameter, like any other. To most people in the street it is an absolute: something is either safe or it's not safe. If it's not safe, then they want to know why the hell they should fly in it and, if someone's been hurt or killed, how much compensation they can get from someone because it wasn't designed right!
Are you implying that it wasn't safe before the AD? Are you implying that it is 100% safe after? These are the sorts of questions and demands that the guy in the street has.
I think Concorde always was a "safe" aircraft; and I use that in the sense that there is a high safety factor - so to speak. With the mods, it is now safer, which can only be a good thing!
I think there is a very high probability that under exactly the same circumstances, the AD would prevent exactly the same accident from happening again. But then, what is the probability that exactly the same circumstances will transpire again?
Still, if the money spent on the mods gives Joe Public (or even the CAA) a warm and fuzzy feeling about flying the old bird again, then I'm happy. Long may she continue to grace our skies.
[ 07 September 2001: Message edited by: Covenant ]
Jackonicko - e-mail me direct and I will forward your e-mail to John H asking him to reply to you.
John Farley - your statement in this thread is, in my humble opinion, absolutely correct.
John Farley - your statement in this thread is, in my humble opinion, absolutely correct.
BEagle,
Wilco!
All,
I don't want to get into criticising Captain Marty for his handling of the emergency after crossing the main road (I had earlier (on another strand) questioned whether others felt that they'd have turned for Le Bourget earlier, and perhaps traded a small but steady rate of climb for more airspeed, and even whether the final turn was too slow and too tight) - especially after John Farley and Covenant have expressed their belief that he was doing an excellent job in handling the aeroplane. Who am I, a humble (?) PPL, to question....
But even if we don't question the Captain's handling or judgement in that final phase of the flight, that doesn't mean we should either blame or absolve the crew of blame entirely - and I think we should continue to ask questions about the human and CRM factors involved.
Shortfinals:
You say that "Crucifying the French crew is no way to go, and almost certainly unjustifiable. Put yourself in the seat and imagine what it would have been like."
I would hope that any professional pilot putting himself in Captain Marty's seat wouldn't have deliberately and knowingly taxied out and taken off overweight, and would have acted differently on learning of the change in wind direction, since that increased the discrepancy between ATOW and RTOW to an unacceptable extent.
I would hope that any flight engineer putting himself in the French FE's seat would similarly have not shut down the No.2 engine at that stage of the flight.
I would hope that no FE would shut down an engine without a direct command to do so from the Captain or handling pilot.
I would hope (though with less vigour and much less confidence!) that any Captain would have made some reassuring or explanatory remark in response to his FO's repeated shouts of 'airspeed!'.
"none of the scenarios that I can see as possible would make me criticise Marty and his crew."
What would you have done when you realised that ATOW was above MTOW, even before you taxied, and perhaps even above max structural for taxying, then?
What would you have done when you realised that ATOW was way above RTOW when you reached the threshold then?
If you'd have done the same as they did, then there's no reason for criticism, but if (as I suspect) you'd have done your job according to the rules and regs, then there are grounds for asking questions at least, even if they imply a degree of possible or potential criticism.
Personally, I'd question the risk perception of a pilot who attempted to surf-board across the Atlantic. I can't see that as indicating anything other than enormous self confidence, courage and probably skill, strength and intellectual toughness too - but (on the flip side) might also suggest a fairly cavalier attitude to conventional perceptions of risk and procedure. That said, of course, there are individuals who can exhibit entirely different characteristics in different areas of their lives, and a careful, methodical plodder on the flight deck may be a devil-may-care exhibitionist and dare-devil on the water, in bed, or on the racetrack, or whatever, but may never let one set of characteristics intrude into another area of his life. Captain Marty may well have been such a man.
Wilco!
All,
I don't want to get into criticising Captain Marty for his handling of the emergency after crossing the main road (I had earlier (on another strand) questioned whether others felt that they'd have turned for Le Bourget earlier, and perhaps traded a small but steady rate of climb for more airspeed, and even whether the final turn was too slow and too tight) - especially after John Farley and Covenant have expressed their belief that he was doing an excellent job in handling the aeroplane. Who am I, a humble (?) PPL, to question....
But even if we don't question the Captain's handling or judgement in that final phase of the flight, that doesn't mean we should either blame or absolve the crew of blame entirely - and I think we should continue to ask questions about the human and CRM factors involved.
Shortfinals:
You say that "Crucifying the French crew is no way to go, and almost certainly unjustifiable. Put yourself in the seat and imagine what it would have been like."
I would hope that any professional pilot putting himself in Captain Marty's seat wouldn't have deliberately and knowingly taxied out and taken off overweight, and would have acted differently on learning of the change in wind direction, since that increased the discrepancy between ATOW and RTOW to an unacceptable extent.
I would hope that any flight engineer putting himself in the French FE's seat would similarly have not shut down the No.2 engine at that stage of the flight.
I would hope that no FE would shut down an engine without a direct command to do so from the Captain or handling pilot.
I would hope (though with less vigour and much less confidence!) that any Captain would have made some reassuring or explanatory remark in response to his FO's repeated shouts of 'airspeed!'.
"none of the scenarios that I can see as possible would make me criticise Marty and his crew."
What would you have done when you realised that ATOW was above MTOW, even before you taxied, and perhaps even above max structural for taxying, then?
What would you have done when you realised that ATOW was way above RTOW when you reached the threshold then?
If you'd have done the same as they did, then there's no reason for criticism, but if (as I suspect) you'd have done your job according to the rules and regs, then there are grounds for asking questions at least, even if they imply a degree of possible or potential criticism.
Personally, I'd question the risk perception of a pilot who attempted to surf-board across the Atlantic. I can't see that as indicating anything other than enormous self confidence, courage and probably skill, strength and intellectual toughness too - but (on the flip side) might also suggest a fairly cavalier attitude to conventional perceptions of risk and procedure. That said, of course, there are individuals who can exhibit entirely different characteristics in different areas of their lives, and a careful, methodical plodder on the flight deck may be a devil-may-care exhibitionist and dare-devil on the water, in bed, or on the racetrack, or whatever, but may never let one set of characteristics intrude into another area of his life. Captain Marty may well have been such a man.
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What Concorde programme can call itself complete without an iterview with Chris Orlebar? The man who flew Concorde, wrote the Concorde Story and is now preparing a sequel - not to be missed.
The programme was disjointed in it's direction, a mishmash of fact and fiction. Shame.
The programme was disjointed in it's direction, a mishmash of fact and fiction. Shame.
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Jackonicko
Having only very limited aviation experience I am hesitant to raise this question again in an aviation professionals' forum, but you've touched upon a subject that I am curious to explore: ie how risk assessments are made on the flight deck.
When I asked a question about this following last year's SQ009 accident it appeared that there is no formal risk assessment process for weighing up the combined effect of the myriad factors that could effect the safety of a flight, but that a go / no-go decision relied mostly on the Captain's (and sometimes FO's) instincts.
Formal risk assessment is a practice that seems to me could benefit the whole aviation industry, but from what I was told, it doesn't appear to take place. In an industry that strives to project itself as safety-conscious, and with the enormous financial implications that accrue from a serious accident, I find it somewhat incredible that such systems are not in place.
Has anyone else considered this aspect? It seems to me that if such a process had been applied, the three or four factors regarding weight, windspeed, maintenance of the runway etc., may well have resulted in a risk index that would have said to all involved 'this flight should not go ahead until 'x' has happened'.
Having only very limited aviation experience I am hesitant to raise this question again in an aviation professionals' forum, but you've touched upon a subject that I am curious to explore: ie how risk assessments are made on the flight deck.
When I asked a question about this following last year's SQ009 accident it appeared that there is no formal risk assessment process for weighing up the combined effect of the myriad factors that could effect the safety of a flight, but that a go / no-go decision relied mostly on the Captain's (and sometimes FO's) instincts.
Formal risk assessment is a practice that seems to me could benefit the whole aviation industry, but from what I was told, it doesn't appear to take place. In an industry that strives to project itself as safety-conscious, and with the enormous financial implications that accrue from a serious accident, I find it somewhat incredible that such systems are not in place.
Has anyone else considered this aspect? It seems to me that if such a process had been applied, the three or four factors regarding weight, windspeed, maintenance of the runway etc., may well have resulted in a risk index that would have said to all involved 'this flight should not go ahead until 'x' has happened'.
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Risk management decisions are not new to aviation safety and are commonly employed in manufacturer recommendations regarding retrofits and/or maintenance.
The fundamental basis of risk management is the understanding of average risk assumed in the design and operation of the product vs. what additional risk may added on top of the average for a specific flight.
In hindsight, factors of differences exist for individual flights and it is the risk management objective to limit these differences. However the biggest risk contributor has always been the "unknown" risk of problems not yet identified (hidden) which significantly contribute to the average assumed risk. With this in mind typical risk limitations are applied to the individual known contributions depending on their individual severity quotient (incident, or accident, or catastrophe etc.).
In summary, for the known risks there may have been nothing wrong in continuing the flight, assuming the risks were within expected variation levels.
The fundamental basis of risk management is the understanding of average risk assumed in the design and operation of the product vs. what additional risk may added on top of the average for a specific flight.
In hindsight, factors of differences exist for individual flights and it is the risk management objective to limit these differences. However the biggest risk contributor has always been the "unknown" risk of problems not yet identified (hidden) which significantly contribute to the average assumed risk. With this in mind typical risk limitations are applied to the individual known contributions depending on their individual severity quotient (incident, or accident, or catastrophe etc.).
In summary, for the known risks there may have been nothing wrong in continuing the flight, assuming the risks were within expected variation levels.
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That's fine but as I see it, what you have outlined only looks at various factors in isolation of others.
Accidents tend to happen not just as a single failure in design or decision, but because two or more things have gone wrong in a sequence of events.
So I am talking about risk assessment where the combinations of known limitations and factors (that in themselves may be acceptable) are examined to see whether there is any factor that, when interacting with one or more other factors, takes the overall risk factor above an acceptable level.
Of course there will always be the 'unknown' risks, but if you have a sufficient margin of comfort with all the others, then you are better able to deal with a sudden emergency than when you are right up against the limit of safety and then something unforeseen occurs ...
[ 08 September 2001: Message edited by: Seat 32F ]
Accidents tend to happen not just as a single failure in design or decision, but because two or more things have gone wrong in a sequence of events.
So I am talking about risk assessment where the combinations of known limitations and factors (that in themselves may be acceptable) are examined to see whether there is any factor that, when interacting with one or more other factors, takes the overall risk factor above an acceptable level.
Of course there will always be the 'unknown' risks, but if you have a sufficient margin of comfort with all the others, then you are better able to deal with a sudden emergency than when you are right up against the limit of safety and then something unforeseen occurs ...
[ 08 September 2001: Message edited by: Seat 32F ]
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I did not see the programme, so therefore cannot comment on it directly, but having read most of this thread there are a couple of things that I would like to add.
In circumstances such as this, it is often all too easy and convenient to place at least some, if not all, of the blame on to the flightcrew. These guys are dead and therefore cannot defend themselves, and can be libled and slandered with no recourse.
Okay, so what if the first officers medical certificate was lapsed, illegal yes, unprofessional yes, but did it contribute to the events in any way? No. Also, unless every crewmember, passenger, bag, cargo panier and galley cart is individually weighed then there will be an error in actual TOW. Using average assumed weights will yield an approximate TOW only. There will also be errors due to inaccuracies in the fuel quantity indicating system. I'd be very surprised if there was not at least a 1% error between estimated and actual TOW's on most big jet flights. Perf charts are factored to take account of all this, and again, 1.5 tonnes overweight did not contribute to what happened, so why bring it up??? We already know the chain of events; FOD, high energy tyre failure, fuel tank puncture etc. etc.
Lastly, this talk of missing shims. JH is a nice guy (met him a couple of times), and no doubt a skilled and experienced aviator, but it seems he just said too much here. In my experience (as a flight engineer and ex spanner basher!) most pilots are just not qualified to make such comments, their only technical knowledge coming from ATPL textbooks. Most would not know what a shim was, let alone what it was for!
In circumstances such as this, it is often all too easy and convenient to place at least some, if not all, of the blame on to the flightcrew. These guys are dead and therefore cannot defend themselves, and can be libled and slandered with no recourse.
Okay, so what if the first officers medical certificate was lapsed, illegal yes, unprofessional yes, but did it contribute to the events in any way? No. Also, unless every crewmember, passenger, bag, cargo panier and galley cart is individually weighed then there will be an error in actual TOW. Using average assumed weights will yield an approximate TOW only. There will also be errors due to inaccuracies in the fuel quantity indicating system. I'd be very surprised if there was not at least a 1% error between estimated and actual TOW's on most big jet flights. Perf charts are factored to take account of all this, and again, 1.5 tonnes overweight did not contribute to what happened, so why bring it up??? We already know the chain of events; FOD, high energy tyre failure, fuel tank puncture etc. etc.
Lastly, this talk of missing shims. JH is a nice guy (met him a couple of times), and no doubt a skilled and experienced aviator, but it seems he just said too much here. In my experience (as a flight engineer and ex spanner basher!) most pilots are just not qualified to make such comments, their only technical knowledge coming from ATPL textbooks. Most would not know what a shim was, let alone what it was for!
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It is fair to say that the one of the conclusions of the producers of this documentary was to question the morality of the key decision makers in British Airways.
Whereas British Airways saw the S.O.P. of Air France as an ingredient towards this terrible tragedy, it was distinctly disrespectful to ever murmur such accusations so close to the event. I felt the program made a strong case to once again call to task the sour/disrespectful/poorly informed/arrogant directors of BA. Will the senior heirarchy within British Airways EVER learn? The bullying attitude has eroded a once polished brand into an embarrasing outfit to work for.
I wish all those who operate Concorde, a quiet time for the next few years....but could you choose someone different to speak on your behalf other than your current Chief? What an
rse
Whereas British Airways saw the S.O.P. of Air France as an ingredient towards this terrible tragedy, it was distinctly disrespectful to ever murmur such accusations so close to the event. I felt the program made a strong case to once again call to task the sour/disrespectful/poorly informed/arrogant directors of BA. Will the senior heirarchy within British Airways EVER learn? The bullying attitude has eroded a once polished brand into an embarrasing outfit to work for.
I wish all those who operate Concorde, a quiet time for the next few years....but could you choose someone different to speak on your behalf other than your current Chief? What an
rse
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Quote from above
"So I am talking about risk assessment where the combinations of known limitations and factors (that in themselves may be acceptable) are
examined to see whether there is any factor that, when interacting with one or more other factors, takes the overall risk factor above an
acceptable level.
Of course there will always be the 'unknown' risks, but if you have a sufficient margin of comfort with all the others, then you are better able to
deal with a sudden emergency than when you are right up against the limit of safety and then something unforeseen occurs ..."
The design regulation JAR 25.1309 and its advisory material do call for assessing the combinations of risks and of course the subsequent limitations to flight in the maintenance and operating manuals do take this into account. My risk management comments had more to do with continued airworthiness and the expected variations among the contributing causes.
I don't believe that there is a lack of process.
"So I am talking about risk assessment where the combinations of known limitations and factors (that in themselves may be acceptable) are
examined to see whether there is any factor that, when interacting with one or more other factors, takes the overall risk factor above an
acceptable level.
Of course there will always be the 'unknown' risks, but if you have a sufficient margin of comfort with all the others, then you are better able to
deal with a sudden emergency than when you are right up against the limit of safety and then something unforeseen occurs ..."
The design regulation JAR 25.1309 and its advisory material do call for assessing the combinations of risks and of course the subsequent limitations to flight in the maintenance and operating manuals do take this into account. My risk management comments had more to do with continued airworthiness and the expected variations among the contributing causes.
I don't believe that there is a lack of process.
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This post may be slightly inappropriate for this particular thread. If it is, I'll edit if required, but here goes.
The programme touched upon the fact BA fitted the "deflector" across the main under carriage wheels, whereas Air France apparently did not. However, towards the end of the programme, we were shown an Air France Concorde with the "deflector" fitted. [The registration of the aircraft was F-BVFB]
Can anyone clarify? Or have I mis-interpreted the facts/evidence as they were presented on the programme?
Digressing, the for the "quality" of the programme, it did attempt to cater for two camps; on one hand, the intelligent, science, technology minded viewer and on the other, Joe Average.
[ 08 September 2001: Message edited by: Egg Mayo ]
The programme touched upon the fact BA fitted the "deflector" across the main under carriage wheels, whereas Air France apparently did not. However, towards the end of the programme, we were shown an Air France Concorde with the "deflector" fitted. [The registration of the aircraft was F-BVFB]
Can anyone clarify? Or have I mis-interpreted the facts/evidence as they were presented on the programme?
Digressing, the for the "quality" of the programme, it did attempt to cater for two camps; on one hand, the intelligent, science, technology minded viewer and on the other, Joe Average.
[ 08 September 2001: Message edited by: Egg Mayo ]
Death Cruiser Flight Crew
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Egg Mayo: All Concordes have the spray deflector fitted. However, after a tyre burst incident, BA modified it so that in such an event, it couldn't fly off and cause damage. Air France allegedly didn't carry out this mod.
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Reading the transcript of the crash the crew seemed to behave utterly impeccably.
It would appear the plane just became unflyable as the flames burned away the control surfaces.
It would appear the plane just became unflyable as the flames burned away the control surfaces.
Basil and twisted,
Please see the previous threads before telling us all how impeccably the crew behaved, and how the weight was of no consequence.
Whether or not the excessive weight (way more than a tonne once they were dealing with the tailwind) may have been a factor is a question that's been hotly disputed by those with greater expertise than I, but most agree that the crew's failure to ensure that they met the legalities of MTOW and RTOW represented a fairly major breach of good practise, and marked a significant failure to exercise their professional responsibilities. They knowingly taxied out and took off above the maximum structural weight (let alone RTOW) and then failed to recalculate RTOW in the event of the wind changing from a headwind to an eight knot tailwind. This is much worse than the misapplication of formulae used to calculate baggage weights. Moreover, the FE's independent decision to shut down an engine is also worthy of comment and question, if not outright condemnation.
I would be the first to decry the regrettable (and unfortunately common) practise of blaming dead aircrew for an accident - but would be equally vociferous if mistakes or poor practise were to be covered up in the name of 'maintaining reputations' or not upsetting grieving families.
NO-ONE IS CONDEMNING CAPTAIN MARTY OR HIS CREW - though some of us are asking questions about some of their actions. Mistakes and poor decision making may be inevitable in extreme circumstances, and are not a matter for gloating or condemnation, but may be a matter for consideration and deliberation, and certainly for questions and analysis. And do you think a man with the obvious character of Marty (see some moving posts on previous threads by people who knew him) would not want others to benefeit from an analysis of all the factors in this terrible tragedy?
And while it's legitimate to accuse anyone who asks about Marty's handling of the emergency after take off (speed, height control, turn rate, timing of the turn) of speculation, it is also speculation to suggest that "the plane just became unflyable as the flames burned away the control surfaces." There is no hard evidence to support this hypothesis, I'm afraid. And I thought that a plane was a carpentry tool?
BTW, Basil, mate, before you start condemning ATPL's as being "just not qualified to make such comments, their only technical knowledge coming from ATPL textbooks" may I point out that you leave yourself open to provoking equally infantile and over-generalistic comments about 'illiterate' engineers. Is libel really such a hard one to spell?
Please see the previous threads before telling us all how impeccably the crew behaved, and how the weight was of no consequence.
Whether or not the excessive weight (way more than a tonne once they were dealing with the tailwind) may have been a factor is a question that's been hotly disputed by those with greater expertise than I, but most agree that the crew's failure to ensure that they met the legalities of MTOW and RTOW represented a fairly major breach of good practise, and marked a significant failure to exercise their professional responsibilities. They knowingly taxied out and took off above the maximum structural weight (let alone RTOW) and then failed to recalculate RTOW in the event of the wind changing from a headwind to an eight knot tailwind. This is much worse than the misapplication of formulae used to calculate baggage weights. Moreover, the FE's independent decision to shut down an engine is also worthy of comment and question, if not outright condemnation.
I would be the first to decry the regrettable (and unfortunately common) practise of blaming dead aircrew for an accident - but would be equally vociferous if mistakes or poor practise were to be covered up in the name of 'maintaining reputations' or not upsetting grieving families.
NO-ONE IS CONDEMNING CAPTAIN MARTY OR HIS CREW - though some of us are asking questions about some of their actions. Mistakes and poor decision making may be inevitable in extreme circumstances, and are not a matter for gloating or condemnation, but may be a matter for consideration and deliberation, and certainly for questions and analysis. And do you think a man with the obvious character of Marty (see some moving posts on previous threads by people who knew him) would not want others to benefeit from an analysis of all the factors in this terrible tragedy?
And while it's legitimate to accuse anyone who asks about Marty's handling of the emergency after take off (speed, height control, turn rate, timing of the turn) of speculation, it is also speculation to suggest that "the plane just became unflyable as the flames burned away the control surfaces." There is no hard evidence to support this hypothesis, I'm afraid. And I thought that a plane was a carpentry tool?
BTW, Basil, mate, before you start condemning ATPL's as being "just not qualified to make such comments, their only technical knowledge coming from ATPL textbooks" may I point out that you leave yourself open to provoking equally infantile and over-generalistic comments about 'illiterate' engineers. Is libel really such a hard one to spell?