I/O Error with a Difference

[NigelOnDraft]

The report states (2.2 page 7) that the PF had done a line check into Knock the previous day. One would have expected that would have made him fully aware of the "work in progress", and conversent with the constraints on the nav aids etc. Or is it possible that the line check .. and whoever conducted it ... had an equal paucity of up to date documentation ?

It almost certainly did have the same lack of documentation. But if they were on 27 the day before, none of the "issues" would have arisen, or the weather was better etc.

(and I was only just reading the thread about keeping below 250 kts below 10,000 ft.)

Report seems quite clear they always were below 250K IAS < 10K'. See p4 - NB "strong tailwind"

[jumbojet]

blah blah blah! If the crew had confirmed "ALT HLD" on the FMA, the a/c would of not decended below 1300ft. "ALT AQR" is not good enough; Its what their for.

[fmgc]

Even so I doubt that the CAA would do anything.

[RogerIrrelevant69]

WHBM

As CamelhAir correctly points out it was a "Irish aeroplane operating in Irish airspace" so therefore no role for the CAA. Blindingly obvious to me and wasn't going to bother replying to the red herring about this thread being about "dispatch issues"?? rather than it being about all the factors that lead up to this serious incident.

Ho hum...

[bloggs2]

There is a lot of waffling about external factors here, indeed some have merit (we deal with similar at other airlines ie briefing times).

However, what i don't get is if you arrive somewhere and end up with an arrival/approach that is completely unexpected and are now under some pressure, where is the basic airmanship, go into the hold at a safe height, sort your crap out and do the approach. No excuse to both be head down barrelling along at the ground regardless of how little time you had in the briefing room at the start of the day.

These guys/gals would have got quite a shock thinking about it afterwards. They and the people behind them would have augered in without the benefit of an important safety system (EGPWS) developed after countless others had died as the result of similar incidents.

[shortfinals]

What a coincidence...

These may not be directly connected with the incident, but there's some food for thought here courtesy of IALPA via Flight International:


http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles...fety'.html


http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles...ze+assets.html

[cwatters]

Finally made the Times today...
http://travel.timesonline.co.uk/arti...487057,00.html

The paper edition has the now compulsory graphic showing how high 400ft is compared to Canary barf.

[Dave Gittins]

NoD (Post #21) I grant you that would have been (and presumeably was) the position on the previous day if operations were on rwy 27. But that should not excuse the lack of preparedness .. and I am surprised that the investigation did not review whether the lack of appropraite documentation on a line check was part of a more general problem.

As I said yesterday, I find that one of the most disturbing parts of the whole affair.

Insofar as whether 250 + knts was reached, perhaps - perhaps not ... radar lost them at 1100 ft ( = 435 ft AGL) at 265 kts and accelerating with a surface wind of 15 kts (and a reported tail wind of 25 kts). Still seems a tad quick to me.

[jumbojet]

pherhaps somebody could print the letter the crews received from MOL about what would happen if another rushed apprach was done. Quiet aggressive. I dnt have a copy; RGDS

[alf5071h]

The threats and errors identified in this incident keep on reoccurring. In part, they are fundamental elements of operating in our industry, thus continuous vigilance is required by operators and crews. There are many similarities with the incidents reported in ‘Near CFIT incidents. Perhaps this operator, if not all of us should heed the conclusions and recommendations in the paper with reference to the contributing factors in this incident.
We all have responsibility for threat and error management. It is disturbing that this aircraft penetrated several safety defences, to encounter the last one – the EGPWS. However, the positive conclusion was assured by the crew following procedures (SOPs) by discontinuing the approach.

[MarkD]

can anyone point me to any thread where EI or REs ops have been queried with reference to the ability of IAA to supervise?

[CamelhAir]

can anyone point me to any thread where EI or REs ops have been queried with reference to the ability of IAA to supervise?

Can't think of one off-hand. There are big differences between these 2 and ryanair. ryanair is far-flung and widespread, for example, making the task of a small regulator that much harder. Particularly one that is uninterested.
EI would need rather less supervision than ryanair I imagine, as they have a safety culture, whereas ryanair don't. Read the Flight Internation articles (links above) about the benefit to safety of a union.
Also, EI and RE don't regularly threaten to re-register in eastern Europe. It doesn't take a genius to work out exactly what message, when ryanair threaten to do this, is sent to the regulator.